

# Econ H191 Thesis Proposal V2

## Measuring the Impact of Israel's 2021–2023 Port Reforms on Labor Productivity Mediated by Capital Deepening

Elye Kehat

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### 1 Abstract, Design, and Data

This paper measures the impact of Israel's recent (2021–2023) port reforms on the sector's persistently low labor productivity. The reforms were aimed at breaking monopoly conditions by introducing intra-port competition through new deep-water terminals in Haifa and Ashdod, and by privatizing Haifa's legacy operator. Beyond the overall effect of the reforms on labor productivity, the study quantifies the share of productivity gains mediated by capital deepening, a channel of special interest given the endemically notably low levels of capital per worker in Israel's non-tradable sectors. Finally, this paper contrasts the effects of privatization and intra-port competition on labor productivity.

I use an event-study DiD for staggered adoption as developed by Sun–Abraham (2021) and Callaway–Sant'Anna (2025) to evaluate the impact of each of the three reforms on K/L and on labor productivity (LP). I then use IV-mediation to distinguish gains in LP through the K/L channel as opposed to other factors by implementing a 2TSL with a yet-to-be-defined proxy to instrument K/L.

The final data I need is monthly or quarterly panel data on each port detailing output, K/L, and LP. None of these metrics are directly reported, so I will have to build proxies for each one. For output, I'll use TEU's processed, perhaps multiplied by a factor of service-time KPIs such as waiting time, dwell time, and output per ship-hour. I can access most if not all of the above metrics from Israel's Administration of Shipping and Ports report Statistical Yearbook – Shipping and Ports 2024,” which details port statistics. For related summary statistics I can use Israel's State Comptroller's 2024 report The Ports Sector in Israel and Aspects of Operation and Service” Both are publicly available online.

For K/L, I treat K and L separately. To get K, I'll make a manual monthly capital stock proxy which combines meters of berth completed, STS and RGM cranes (multiplied by a factor of their height, outreach, and tandem lift), and perhaps software used such as OCR. I can access data on all of the above (with the possible exception of software, which I may remove from the proxy) from dated news reports and from the official websites of the Ashdod port and the Haifa Bayport Terminal. As for the legacy terminal in Haifa, I may need to send an email to someone (I have

connections so I'll try and figure it out). As for Labor, pre-reform worker count is accessible through the Ministry of Finance Public Bodies Wage Report. For levels of L after the first reform in 2021, I will have to either request the data directly, or build a proxy/estimate of monthly hours worked using data that is published and available online: annual hours worked, accident rate per 100,000 hours, monthly “activity weights”, and quarterly labor utilization ranges.

For LP, I'll just use my proxies for output and L to calculate  $LP = \text{output} / L$ .

## 2 Literature Review

Two literature strands motivate this study: Israel-specific diagnostics and international evidence on port reforms.

In Israel, following massive protests related to high cost of living, the Trajtenberg Committee Report (2011) points out port inefficiency driven by monopoly power as an important economy-wide cost, and recommends introducing intra-port competition by building new terminals in the Haifa and Ashdod ports. This recommendation was formally adopted by the government in late 2011. The Taub Center's analyses (Brand and Regev, 2015a; 2015b) document widening productivity gaps between Israel and the OECD and emphasize structural frictions in non-tradables, motivating attention to sectors like ports. In their study Why Is Labor Productivity in Israel So Low?” Hazan and Tsur (2021) show that accumulated factors (including K/L) explain most of Israel's productivity gap from peer OECD economies. Joseph Zeria's 2021 book similarly diagnoses a missing capital” gap and calculates as an example that Israeli output per worker is roughly 25

When it comes to economic literature on port reforms and labor productivity more generally, a consensus seems to emerge, which is that intra-port competition (i.e., multiple terminals under different ownership) seems to be the chief engine of productivity improvement, and that capital deepening is an important effect of competition. Additionally, privatization alone does not seem to have a decisive impact on productivity gains. In a 2010 paper, Cheon, Dowall, and Song analyze port reforms globally and find that competition-inducing reforms drive up FTP growth, and emphasize that productivity gains are more likely when privatization is paired with competitive pressure and technology upgrades (likely leading to capital deepening). Additional studies show that competition is a stronger predictor of productivity gains than privatization, with ports run by multiple terminal operators outperforming private monopolies (Cullinane, Ji and Wang, 2005; Tongzon and Heng 2005). However, the channel through which efficiency is increased is not measured (e.g., capital deepening vs. higher labor utilization). Finally, the OECD Policy Roundtable Competition in Ports and Port Services (2011) synthesizes global experiences and concludes that introducing intra-port competition improves productivity and lowers user costs. Country-specific case studies provide confirmation for the patterns discussed above. Estache, González, and Trujillo's 2002 paper documents efficiency gains in Mexican ports following reforms, driven by frontier shifts” (e.g., capital deepening) and catch-up” (e.g., better utilization). No measurement is done to calculate the proportion of gains realized through each channel. Similarly, González and Trujillo's 2009 paper shows that intra-port

competition yielded larger efficiency improvements in Spanish ports than privatization alone.

Overall, three gaps are evident in this literature. First, most studies either bundle competition and privatization together, or look at them over different ports. Second, while several studies mention multiple mechanisms through which reforms increased labor productivity, no study measures the productivity gains mediated by a particular channel such as labor utilization or capital deepening. Third, the identification in these studies is too coarse, as evidence is often annual or at most quarterly, and sometimes estimated with naive two-way fixed effects, which may wrongly use post-reform (i.e., treatment) data as control in staggered rollout contexts such as Israel's, potentially biasing results. For the Israeli ports specifically, no study causally measures productivity gains due to the reform (reports and studies only point out the overall efficiency improvements over time), and no attempt is made to distinguish between gains made from different channels. These gaps are all addressed by my paper's empirical design.

### 3 Empirical Design and addressing gaps in the literature

I exploit Israel's staggered implementation of three reforms to its two primary ports as a natural experiment. My design works in two large steps: (i) staggered-adoption event-study difference-in-differences as developed by Sun and Abraham (2021) and Callaway and Sant'Anna (2023; 2025) to trace the causal effects of each reform on proxied K/L (the mediator) and proxies LP (the outcome). (ii) I use IV-Mediation (as developed by Dippel and Ferrara in their 2020 paper) to quantify the share of LP gains mediated by K/L versus other channels. Proximal monthly or panel data allows me to separate the effects of each of the three reforms: Haifa competition (September 2021), Ashdod competition (Q4 2022), and Haifa privatization (January 2023). This design addresses previous gaps in the scholarship, as I detail below.

First, the unique staggered rollout of Israel's port reforms – including the fact that competition entry and privatization reforms were implemented separately in the same port with a two year gap – combined with the relatively high-frequency (monthly or quarterly) proxies I construct, allows me to better control for identification problems which limited the robustness of previous studies. More concretely, I am able to completely separate the effects of competition-induction and privatization by having each port serve as its own before/after control, while the other port serves as a same-month control. This two-layer design (testing the treatment within the port over time and across the ports in the same period) improved the credibility and robustness of my results.

Second, I implement 2SLS IV-mediation to quantify the proportion of each reform's productivity gain mediated by capital deepening versus other channels. I do this by instrumenting K/L with various dated and manually factorized engineering milestones such as the introduction of new cranes, meters of berth completed, and so on. For the 2SLS, I first regress K/L on the proxy and on various controls (also using more advanced techniques developed by Clarke in his 2017 paper to control for spillover effects from the other port). In the second stage, I regress LP on the instrumented  $(K/L)_{\text{hat}}$ . Following this process I am then able to decompose total LP gains from each reform into

indirect” (i.e., via K/L, our mediator of interest) and direct” (i.e., not via K/L) components.

## 4 Observed Data and building proxies

The key observed data we work with is officially published statistical reports detailing throughput and key performance indicators (KPIs). From official monthly reports we record port-level monthly TEU (20-foot-equivalent unit, a standard metric in port statistics) and tons throughput, as well as terminal-level TEU by quarter once the new terminals are opened. From yearly published KPIs we extract yearly TEU per work-hour, and various service-quality measures (e.g., average waiting, berth, and stay times) reported at the port level and - once available - at the terminal level. The table below summarizes the observed series and KPIs.

Table 1: Observed throughput series and extracted KPIs (coverage and counts)

Series	Variable	Granularity	Range	N
Haifa	Throughput (TEU)	Monthly	01-2008–10-2021	166
Haifa	Throughput (tons)	Monthly	01-2008–08-2025	200
Ashdod	Throughput (TEU)	Monthly	01-2008–10-2021	166
Ashdod	Throughput (tons)	Monthly	01-2008–08-2025	200
Haifa–Bayport	Throughput (TEU)	Quarterly	Q3-2021–Q4-2024	14
Haifa–Bayport	Throughput (tons)	Monthly	07-2021–08-2025	50
Ashdod–HCT	Throughput (TEU)	Quarterly	Q3-2021–Q4-2024	14
Ashdod–HCT	Throughput (tons)	Monthly	08-2021–08-2025	49
Haifa	KPI: TEU/hour (II)	Annual	2018–2024	7
Ashdod	KPI: TEU/hour (II)	Annual	2018–2024	7
Haifa–Legacy	KPI: TEU/hour (II)	Annual	2018–2024	7
Ashdod–Legacy	KPI: TEU/hour (II)	Annual	2018–2024	7
Haifa–Bayport	KPI: TEU/hour (II)	Annual	2021–2024	4
Ashdod–HCT	KPI: TEU/hour (II)	Annual	2022–2024	3

**Labor proxy:** Since labor hours are not publicly reported, we must create a labor proxy based on the data outlined in the table above. First, we recover annual labor hours from the published TEU-per-hour KPI:

Let  $y$  index calendar years,  $i$  index terminals (or ports for  $y < 2023$ ), and let  $\text{TEU}_{i,y}$  denote the observed annual throughput aggregated from monthly/quarterly data for entity  $i$ . Let  $\Pi_{i,y}$  denote TEU per work-hour for the same entity and year. Then the implied annual hours are:

$$H_{i,y} = \frac{\text{TEU}_{i,y}}{\Pi_{i,y}}.$$

These annual port/terminal data points for L are free of bias, but such data is not granular enough for this study’s needs. Currently, I am in the process of getting more granular data straight from the port authority, as more granular data is not published online in any report I am aware of. Nonetheless, I outline below one (albeit somewhat problematic) method to increase the granularity

of our labor-hour measure:

By scaling observed quarterly throughput with the annual KPI, we are able to synthetically assign labor-hours to each quarter per port/terminal:

$$L_{i,y,q} = \frac{\text{TEU}_{i,y,q}}{\Pi_{i,y}}, \quad q \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}, \quad \sum_{q=1}^4 L_{i,y,q} = H_{i,y},$$

This step increases granularity but relies on the assumption that labor hours per move are approximately constant within a year (i.e., that labor productivity is constant within a year):

$$\Pi_{i,y,q} \equiv \frac{\text{TEU}_{i,y,q}}{L_{i,y,q}^{\text{true}}} \approx \Pi_{i,y} \quad \text{for all } q \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}.$$

Given the nature of this study, such an assumption is arguably unacceptable. Hence, I will rely on receiving more granular labor-hour data from the non-public source, or will otherwise devise another way to get more granular labor data.

**Labor productivity (once I receive more granular labor-hours data):** We compute labor productivity directly as container moves per work-hour:

$$\text{LP}_{p,t} = \frac{\text{TEU}_{p,t}}{H_{p,t}} \quad (\text{port} \times \text{month}), \quad \text{LP}_{i,q} = \frac{\text{TEU}_{i,q}}{H_{i,q}} \quad (\text{terminal} \times \text{quarter}).$$

Where  $H_{p,t}$  denotes observed work-hours in that period.

**Labor productivity proxy:** Until granular hours arrive, we proxy productivity by combining a cargo-mix factor with the published TEU-per-work-hour KPI:

$$\widehat{\text{LP}} = \left( \frac{\text{tons}}{\text{TEU}} \right) \times \text{KPI}^{\text{TEU/hour}}.$$

*Pre-reform (port×month).* For port  $p$  and month  $m$ , set

$$\widehat{\text{LP}}_{p,m} = \left( \frac{\text{tons}_{p,m}}{\text{TEU}_{p,m}} \right) \text{KPI}_{p,q(m)}^{\text{TEU/hour}},$$

where the port-quarter KPI is implied by terminal-year KPIs via terminal TEU shares,

$$\text{KPI}_{p,q}^{\text{TEU/hour}} = \sum_{i \in p} \alpha_{i,p,q} \text{KPI}_{i,y(q)}^{\text{TEU/hour}}, \quad \alpha_{i,p,q} = \frac{\text{TEU}_{i,q}}{\sum_{j \in p} \text{TEU}_{j,q}}.$$

*Post-reform (terminal×quarter; baseline).* For terminal  $i$  in port  $p(i)$  and quarter  $q$ , set

$$\widehat{\text{LP}}_{i,q} = \left( \frac{\sum_{m \in q} \text{tons}_{p(i),m}}{\text{TEU}_{p(i),q}} \right) \text{KPI}_{i,y(q)}^{\text{TEU/hour}}.$$

*Planned variant (terminal-specific mix).* Where terminal-month tons are available, define

$$\widehat{LP}_{i,q}^{\text{term}} = \left( \frac{\sum_{m \in q} \text{tons}_{i,m}}{\text{TEU}_{i,q}} \right) \text{KPI}_{i,y(q)}^{\text{TEU/hour}}.$$

This proxy preserves a clear identity (mix  $\times$  KPI) and aligns frequencies across series; it will be replaced by the direct ratio  $LP = \text{TEU}/\text{hours}$  as soon as granular hours are obtained.

**Capital measurement (K): overview.** To construct the capital stock  $K$ , we build a proxy that captures one-time shocks (dated additions of e.g. deep water-berth meter, STS and yard cranes, etc.) and combine it with published financial metrics including deflated net property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to create a hybrid K proxy. With the K proxy we are able to build a K/L proxy:

$$M_{p,t} = \ln \left( \frac{K_{p,t}}{L_{p,t}} \right),$$

which is the mediator (capital deepening,  $\ln(K/L)$ ) used in the mediation analysis.

## 5 Econometric Design

The econometric design is meant to estimate how Israel's 2021-2023 port reforms – the construction of new deep-water terminals with the entry of private operators to run them ,and the subsequent privatization of legacy operators – impacted labor productivity in the Haifa and Ashdod ports. The design has two parts: First, a staggered event-study quantifies the dynamic impact of each reform on labor productivity. Second, a 2SLS mediation design estimates the effect of capital deepening on productivity and decomposes the total reform effect into indirect (through K/L) and direct components.

### 5.1 Model 1 — Event-Study: Reform $\rightarrow \ln(LP)$

**Equation.**

$$Y_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \delta_t + \beta_0 \mathbf{1}\{\tau_{p,t}^{(r)} = 0\} + \beta_1 \mathbf{1}\{1 \leq \tau_{p,t}^{(r)} \leq 6\} + \beta_2 \mathbf{1}\{7 \leq \tau_{p,t}^{(r)} \leq 24\} + \psi S_{p,t} + \varepsilon_{p,t}.$$

**TERMS.**

- **Outcome**  $Y_{p,t}$ : log labor productivity at port  $p$  in month  $t$ .
- **Fixed effects**  $\alpha_p, \delta_t$ : port FE (time-invariant differences); month FE (nationwide shocks/seasonality).
- **Event time**  $\tau_{p,t}^{(r)}$ : months since reform  $r \in \{\text{competition, privatization}\}$  at port  $p$ .
- **Spillover flag**  $S_{p,t}$ : indicator that the other port is post-reform to capture spillover effects.
- **Error**  $\varepsilon_{p,t}$ : standard errors clustered by port; wild bootstrap for small  $G$ .

## IDENTIFICATION.

- **Treatment (for reform  $r$ ):** months with  $\tau_{p,t}^{(r)} \geq 0$  at port  $p$ .
- **Controls (not-yet-treated only):** (i) the same port's pre months ( $\tau < 0$ ); (ii) the other port's months before it experiences the same reform. Months when both ports are already treated for  $r$  drop out (differenced by  $\delta_t$ ).
- **Estimator (SA/CS):** Sun–Abraham / Callaway–Sant'Anna compute cohort- and event-time ATTs using only not-yet-treated comparisons, then aggregate, avoiding treated-as-control contamination that plagues naïve TWFE event-studies.

## INTERPRETATION.

- $\beta_0$ : immediate change at the reform month.
- $\beta_1$ : average change in the first six months after reform.
- $\beta_2$ : average change in months 7–24 after reform.

Read each as a percent change relative to pre-reform using only valid not-yet-treated comparisons (report  $100 \times (\exp(\beta) - 1)$ ). Together these coefficients communicate whether each reform raised productivity, how quickly effects appear, and whether they persist.

## 5.2 Model 2 — Mediation: $\ln(K/L) \rightarrow \ln(LP)$ (2SLS)

### Equations.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{First stage: } M_{p,t} &= \alpha_p + \delta_t + \lambda_1, T_{p,t}^{\text{comp}} + \lambda_2, T_{p,t}^{\text{priv}} + \omega, Z_{p,t} + u_{p,t} \\ \text{Second stage: } Y_{p,t} &= \alpha_p + \delta_t + \beta_M, \widehat{M}_{p,t} + \theta_1, T_{p,t}^{\text{comp}} + \theta_2, T_{p,t}^{\text{priv}} + \varepsilon_{p,t}. \end{aligned}$$

## TERMS.

- **Mediator  $M_{p,t}$ :** log capital deepening  $\ln(K/L)$ .
- **Reform timing  $T_{p,t}^{\text{comp}}, T_{p,t}^{\text{priv}}$ :** calendar-time dummies (post-competition; post-privatization).
- **Instruments  $Z_{p,t}$ :** concrete engineering milestones that shift  $K/L$ , e.g., STS crane commissioning by class (Panamax/Post-Panamax/Super-Post-Panamax), berth deepening and channel dredging completion (meters  $\times$  depth), yard crane deliveries (RTG/RMG), terminal/yard automation go-live (TOS, gate OCR), and new berth segments entering service.
- **Fitted mediator  $\widehat{M}_{p,t}$  and elasticity  $\beta_M$ .**
- **Fixed effects  $\alpha_p, \delta_t$ :** as in Model 1 (FE in both stages).

## INTERPRETATION.

- From Model 1, take the total reform effects for the three windows (event month; months 1–6; months 7–24).
- From the first stage, compute the average change in predicted  $M$  over the same windows ( $\Delta M$ ).
- **Indirect effect via capital deepening:**  $IE = (\Delta M) \times \beta_M$ .
- **Direct effect:**  $DE = TE - IE$ .
- **Mediated share:**  $IE/TE$  (when  $TE > 0$ ).

These outputs jointly quantify the reform's impact (magnitude and timing) and the mechanism share attributable to capital deepening, stated in a way that is easy to read on two proposal pages.