

Proposal V2 — Econometric Design (Final Draft, Simplified)

The econometric are designed to estimate how Israel's two port reforms --competition entry of private deep-water terminals ,and the subsequent privatization of legacy operators -- impacted labor productivity in the Haifa port and the Ashdod port. The design has two parts: First, a staggered event-study quantifies the dynamic impact of each reform on labor productivity. Second, a 2SLS mediation design estimates the effect of capital deepening on productivity and decomposes the total reform effect into indirect (through K/L) and direct components.

Part 1: regress $\ln(LP)$ on reforms

Equation.

$$\ln(LP_{p,t}) = \alpha_p + \delta_t + \beta_0 \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_{p,t}^{(r)}=0\}} + \beta_1 \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_{p,t}^{(r)} \leq 6\}} + \beta_2 \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_{p,t}^{(r)} \geq 24\}} + \psi S + \varepsilon_{p,t}$$

with all pre-reform months ($\tau_{p,t}^{(r)} < 0$) omitted as the reference category. Bins are: **Event month** (β_0), **Early** (months 1–6; β_1), and **Sustained** (months 7–24; β_2).

TERMS.

- **Outcome** $Y_{p,t}$: log labor productivity at port p in month t .
- **Fixed effects** α_p, δ_t : port FE (time-invariant differences); month FE (nationwide shocks/seasonality).
- **Event time** $\tau_{p,t}^{(r)}$: months since reform r (competition or privatization) at port p .
- **Spillover flag** $S_{p,t}$: the other port is already post-reform.
- **Error** $\varepsilon_{p,t}$: SEs clustered by port; wild bootstrap for small G .

IDENTIFICATION.

- **Treatment (for reform *****)**: months with $\tau_{p,t}^{(r)} \geq 0$ at port p .
- **Controls (not-yet-treated only)**: (i) the same port's **pre** months ($\tau < 0$); (ii) the other port's months **before** it experiences the same reform. Months when **both** ports are already treated for r drop out (differenced by δ_t).
- **Estimator**: Sun–Abraham / Callaway–Sant'Anna to get average treatment effects using only not-yet-treated comparisons.

INTERPRETATION.

- β_0 : immediate change at the reform month.
- β_1 : average change in the first six months after reform.

- β_2 : average change in months 7–24 after reform. Interpret each as a percent change relative to pre-reform using only valid not-yet-treated comparisons. Together these coefficients communicate whether each reform raised productivity, how quickly effects appear, and whether they persist.
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Part 2: 2SLS to get impact of reform on $\ln(LP)$ mediated by $\ln(K/L)$

Equations.

First stage: $M_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \delta_t + \lambda_1 T_{p,t}^{\text{comp}} + \lambda_2 T_{p,t}^{\text{priv}} + \omega Z_{p,t} + u_{p,t}$. Second stage: $Y_{p,t} = \alpha_p + \delta_t + \beta_M \widehat{M}_{p,t} + \theta_1 T_{p,t}^{\text{comp}} + \theta_2 T_{p,t}^{\text{priv}} + \varepsilon_{p,t}$.

TERMS.

- **Mediator** $M_{p,t}$: log capital deepening $\ln(K/L)$.
- **Reform timing** $T_{p,t}^{\text{comp}}, T_{p,t}^{\text{priv}}$: calendar-time dummies (post-competition; post-privatization).
- **Instruments** $Z_{p,t}$: concrete engineering milestones that shift K/L , e.g., **STS crane commissioning by class** (Panamax/Post-Panamax/Super-Post-Panamax), **berth deepening and channel dredging completion** (meters × depth), **yard crane deliveries** (RTG/RMG), **terminal/yard automation go-live** (TOS, gate OCR), and **new berth segments entering service**.
- **Fitted mediator** $\widehat{M}_{p,t}$ and **elasticity** β_M .
- **Fixed effects** α_p, δ_t : as in Model 1.

INTERPRETATION.

- From **Part 1**, take the total reform effects for the three windows (event month; months 1–6; months 7–24).
- From the **first stage**, compute the average change in predicted M over the same windows (ΔM).
- **Indirect effect via capital deepening:** $IE = (\Delta M) \times \beta_M$.
- **Direct effect:** $DE = TE - IE$.
- **Mediated share:** IE/TE (when $TE > 0$). These outputs jointly quantify the reform's impact (magnitude and timing) and the mechanism share attributable to capital deepening, stated in a way that is easy to read on two proposal pages.