

CSEC 202 Reverse Engineering Fundamentals

Basic Static Analysis (1/2)+(2/2)

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Sections: 600 | 601 | 602

January 29, 2024 + February 5, 2024

Introduction to Malware Analysis

What is Malware?

NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) SP 800-83, titled Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling for Desktops and Laptops:

"Malware, also known as malicious code, refers to a program that is covertly inserted into another program with the intent to destroy data, run destructive or intrusive programs, or otherwise compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the victim's data, applications, or operating system."

<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-83r1.pdf>

"mal-ware" / malwər/

code that is used to perform malicious actions

The term is both:

- a singular noun ("malware")
- a plural noun ("malware")

What is Malware Analysis?

Reverse Engineering a Specific Piece of Malware to Determine its Origin, Functionality, and Potential Impact

Malware analysis is an essential aspect of cybersecurity practices, including Forensic Analysis and Incident Response (**FAIR**) and penetration testing.

Why Malware Analysis?

- **Determine what exactly happened:** Establish the sequence of events that led to the malware infection.
- **Determine the malicious intent of the malware:** Understand the purpose behind the malware, whether it's to steal data, disrupt operations, etc.
- **Identify indicators of compromise (IoCs):** Find evidence of the infection, like suspicious network traffic or files.
- **Determine the complexity level of an intruder:** Assess the sophistication of the attacker based on the complexity of the malware.

Why Malware Analysis?

- **Identify the exploited vulnerability:** Discover the security weaknesses that were leveraged to gain unauthorized access.
- **Identify the extent of damage caused by the intrusion:** Quantify the impact, including data loss, financial cost, or reputational damage
- **Evaluate the harm from an intrusion:** Assess the overall damage and potential future risks posed by the malware.
- **Distinguish the gatecrasher or insider responsible for the malware entry:** Identify whether the attack was conducted by an external entity or an insider with authorized access.

Why Malware Analysis?

- **Catch the perpetrator responsible for installing the malware:** Work towards identifying and apprehending the source of the malware.
- **Find signatures for host and network-based intrusion detection systems:** Develop patterns or signatures that can be used to detect and prevent future infections.
 - **Host-based signatures (or indicators)**
 - What a malware does to a system
 - Based on behaviors, not on the characteristics of the malware itself
 - Files created or modified, changes to registry
 - **Network-based signatures**
 - Monitoring network traffic
 - Can be created without malware static analysis
 - But with malware static analysis, it is more effective

General Guidelines for Malware Analysis

- During software analysis, pay attention to the essential features instead of understanding every detail.
- Try different tools and approaches to analyze the malware, as a single approach may not be useful. If you're not having luck with one tool, try another.
- Malware analysis is like a **cat-and-mouse** game. To succeed as a malware analyst, you must be able to recognize, understand, and defeat these techniques, and respond to changes in the art of malware analysis.

Why Malware Analysis?

Main Objective

Figure out how
malware works

"It is Us vs. the Cat"



Troops of 4-


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Practical Malware Analysis
The Hands-On Guide to Dissecting Malicious Software
by Michael Sikorski and Andrew Honig
February 2012, 800 pp.
ISBN-13: 9781593272906
Lay-flat binding
 Print Book and FREE Ebook, \$59.99
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Contents | Reviews | Updates

- [Download Chapter 12: Covert Malware Launching \(PDF\)](#)
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"The book every malware analyst should keep handy." —Richard Bejtlich, CSO of Mandiant & Founder of TaoSecurity

Malware analysis is big business, and attacks can cost a company dearly. When malware


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Malware Analysis Procedure

Malware Analysis Procedure

It is extremely dangerous to analyze malware on production devices connected to production networks. Therefore, one should always analyze malware samples in a testing environment on an isolated network, often referred to as a "Testbed".

Malware analysis involves the following steps:


- 1. Preparing Testbed:** Setting up a secure environment to examine the malware without risking the main network.
- 2. Static Analysis:** Looking at the malware's code without actually running the program to get initial insights.
- 3. Dynamic Analysis:** Running the malware in a controlled setting to observe its behavior and how it interacts with other systems.

Malware Analysis Procedure

- 1. Preparing Testbed:**
Setting up a secure environment to examine the malware without risking the main network.

Practical Malware Analysis

*The Hands-On Guide to
Dissecting Malicious
Software*



Michael Sikorski
and Andrew Honig

Foreword by Richard Bejtlich



Be Ready: Preparing Testbed

- **1. Allocate a physical system for the analysis lab:** This involves setting aside a dedicated computer for analyzing malware, ensuring that any potential harm does not affect other systems.
- **2. Install a Virtual Machine (VMware, Hyper-V, etc.) on the system:** A virtual machine is used to create an isolated environment where the malware can be run without affecting the host system.
- **3. Install guest OS in the Virtual machine(s):** The guest operating system is installed on the virtual machine; it's the environment where the malware will be executed and analyzed.


Be Ready: Preparing Testbed

- **4. Isolate the system from the network by ensuring that the NIC card is in "host only" mode:** This step prevents the malware from communicating over the network by setting the network interface card to only communicate with the host system.
- **5. Simulate internet services using tools such as INetSim:** Since the system is isolated from the network, simulation tools like INetSim can provide fake network services (like HTTP or DNS) to the malware, which may require these to function properly.
- **6. Disable the "shared folders" and "guest isolation":** These features are typically disabled to prevent the malware from accessing the host system or other virtual machines, further containing any potential damage.

Be Ready: Preparing Testbed

- **7. Install malware analysis tools:** Various tools are installed that are used to analyze the behavior and characteristics of the malware.
- **8. Generate the hash value of each OS and tool:** This is likely a step for integrity checking; by generating hash values of the operating systems and tools, analysts can ensure that they have not been tampered with.
- **9. Copy the malware over to the guest OS:** Finally, the actual malware samples are transferred to the guest operating system for analysis.

Malware Analysis Techniques



You'll need to use a variety of tools (and tricks) in order to see the full picture.

Malware Analysis Techniques

- **Basic Static Analysis**
 - Analyze characteristics of the file itself without analyzing behaviors.
 - (*We don't run the file, we don't see the code*)
- **Advanced Static Analysis**
 - Reverse-engineering the malware's internals by loading the executable into a disassembler, and looking at the program instructions in order to discover what the program does.
 - (*We don't run the file, we see the code, we reverse engineer the code*)

Malware Analysis Techniques

- **Basic Dynamic Analysis**
 - Running the malware and observing its behavior on the system in order to remove the infection, produce effective signatures, and identify malware family and/or threat actor
- **Advanced Dynamic Analysis**
 - Using a debugger to examine the internal state of a running malicious executable.

Basic Static Analysis (1/2)

WARNING: Attention Tigers

As you engage in malware analysis, it's crucial to handle all specimens with extreme caution. You will be examining a malware known as "**brbbot.exe**" which is recognized for its dangerous capabilities.

This malware has the potential to cause significant harm to systems and networks.

Basic Static Analysis

1. Identifying File Type Using Manual Method
2. Local Antivirus Scanning: A Useful First Step
3. File Fingerprinting
4. Online Malware Scanning
5. Strings: Perform strings search
6. Identifying Packing/ Obfuscation Methods
7. Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information
8. Identifying File Dependencies

Identifying File Type Using Manual Method

Identifying the file type using a manual method involves examining the raw data of the file using a hex editor, which is a program that displays and allows editing of the binary data of a file in hexadecimal format.

Here's how it works:

- **On Windows: Using a Hex Editor:** You open the file in a hex editor. This tool shows each byte of the file as a two-digit hexadecimal number. Hex editors often come with features that aid in file analysis. *HxD hex editor* <https://mh-nexus.de/en/hxd/>
- **Hex Dump on Linux:** On Linux systems, you can generate a hex dump of a file using commands like **xxd**.


Identifying File Type Using Manual Method

Offset(h)	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F	Decoded text
00000000	4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00	MZ.....ÿ..
00000010	B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	,.....@.....
00000020	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000030	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00è...
00000040	0E 1F BA 0E 00 B4 09 CD 21 B8 01 4C CD 21 54 68	..°...í!,.LÍ!Th
00000050	69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F	is program canno
00000060	74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6E 20 69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20	t be run in DOS
00000070	6D 6F 64 65 2E 0D 0D 0A 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	mode....\$.....
00000080	53 7B 40 AD 17 1A 2E FE 17 1A 2E FE 17 1A 2E FE	S{@....p...p...p
00000090	78 6C 85 FE 0E 1A 2E FE 78 6C 84 FE 4B 1A 2E FE	xl...p...pxl,pK..p
000000A0	78 6C B0 FE 1C 1A 2E FE 1E 62 BD FE 1C 1A 2E FE	xl°p...p.b³p...p
000000B0	17 1A 2F FE 68 1A 2E FE 78 6C 81 FE 12 1A 2E FE	../ph..pxl.p...p
000000C0	78 6C B4 FE 16 1A 2E FE 78 6C B3 FE 16 1A 2E FE	xl'p...pxl'p...p
000000D0	52 69 63 68 17 1A 2E FE 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	Rich...p.....
000000E0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 64 86 06 00PE..dt..
000000F0	C2 67 ED 54 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 F0 00 22 00	ÄgiT.....δ...".

<https://mh-nexus.de/en/hxd/>

The output **4d 5a** at the start of the hex dump indicates that the file is likely a Windows executable because "4D 5A" is the hexadecimal representation of "MZ", which is the signature for Windows executables (also known as PE files).

Identifying File Type Using Manual Method



The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "kali@kali: ~/Desktop/brbbot". The terminal displays the output of the command \$ xxd -g 1 brbbot.exe | more. The output shows the byte representation of the file, starting with the MZ header, followed by program names, and ending with Rich. The terminal has a dark theme with light-colored text.

```
$ xxd -g 1 brbbot.exe | more
00000000: 4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 MZ..... .
00000010: b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....@.....
00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..... .
00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e8 00 00 00 ..... .
00000040: 0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 54 68 .....!..L.!Th
00000050: 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f is program canno
00000060: 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 20 69 6e 20 44 4f 53 20 t be run in DOS
00000070: 6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 mode....$.....
00000080: 53 7b 40 ad 17 1a 2e fe 17 1a 2e fe 17 1a 2e fe S{@.....
00000090: 78 6c 85 fe 0e 1a 2e fe 78 6c 84 fe 4b 1a 2e fe xl.....xl..K...
000000a0: 78 6c b0 fe 1c 1a 2e fe 1e 62 bd fe 1c 1a 2e fe xl.....b.....
000000b0: 17 1a 2f fe 68 1a 2e fe 78 6c 81 fe 12 1a 2e fe ../.h...xl.....
000000c0: 78 6c b4 fe 16 1a 2e fe 78 6c b3 fe 16 1a 2e fe xl.....xl.....
000000d0: 52 69 63 68 17 1a 2e fe 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Rich.....
000000e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 00 64 86 06 00 .....PF_d...
```

\$ xxd -g 1 brbbot.exe | more

Local Antivirus Scanning: A Useful First Step

When first analyzing prospective malware, a good first step is to run it through multiple antivirus programs, which may already have identified it.

- **But antivirus tools are certainly not perfect:**

- Depend on databases of known malware signatures.
- Utilize heuristics for pattern and behavior analysis.


- **Challenges of Antivirus Detection:**

- Malware authors can modify signatures to avoid detection.
- Uncommon malware may not be present in databases.
- Heuristics can miss new, uniquely coded malware.

File Fingerprinting

is described as the process of computing **hash** values for a given binary code.

A hash value is a numerical value produced by a **hash function**, which is designed to turn the file's data into a typically shorter, fixed-length sequence that represents the original string of data uniquely.




File Fingerprinting

- A hash value is a numerical value produced by a **hash function**, which is designed to turn the file's data into a typically shorter, fixed-length sequence that represents the original string of data uniquely.
- These hash values are used to **uniquely identify** malware or to periodically verify if any changes have been made to the binary code during analysis. This ensures that the file being analyzed has not been altered or tampered with since the hash value was computed.

File Fingerprinting

HashMyFiles can be used to calculate various hash values of a malware file. HashMyFiles is an application that can compute multiple types of hash values, such as MD5, SHA1, CRC32, SHA-256, SHA-512, and SHA-384.

<https://github.com/foreni-packages/hashmyfiles>



File Fingerprinting


```
└─(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/brbbot]
└─$ md5sum brbbot.exe
1c7243c8f3586b799a5f9a2e4200aa92    brbbot.exe

└─(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/brbbot]
└─$ sha1sum brbbot.exe
4db5a8e237937b6d7b435a8506b8584121a7e9e3    brbbot.exe

└─(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/brbbot]
└─$ █
```

md5sum filename | sha1sum filename | sha256sum filename

File Fingerprinting



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `fileformat.info/tool/hash.htm` in the address bar. The page displays a table titled "Results" containing hash values for various file formats. The table has two columns: "Original text" and "(binary only)". The browser interface includes standard navigation buttons (back, forward, search) and a toolbar with icons for refresh, stop, and other functions.

Results	
Original text	(binary only)
Original bytes	4d5a90000300000004000000ffff0000b8000000000000000040... (length=75776)
Adler32	4ce4220b
CRC32	8e3a4384
Haval	2d2b4199a633117678bad3b9a20acf7
MD2	a87234a7512bcb5d94daf73e1a7afdd1
MD4	e057a33746c0f27888d48a07fbdd7d06
MD5	1c7243c8f3586b799a5f9a2e4200aa92
RipeMD128	e0cabbb01b2cbfe1c2200e8acbf889904
RipeMD160	e47ac11acf51492eb57d14e547ff05bae731fc0
SHA-1	4db5a8e237937b6d7b435a8506b8584121a7e9e3
SHA-256	f47060d0f7de5ee651878eb18dd2d24b5003bdb03ef4f49879f448f05034a21e
SHA-384	0e4902966a1761dae937b874d05fd20237c9840d54df269f5c5edf4798aed4e03aadf42f386e39acaa058ad63390d432
SHA-512	56cdf52cfcc102d2c8cc90e5a298eeaef44002061108b0d6b330bb93c3590b3f8b2c3c4e1fa208fafefea7dafa092bd0f57d3cf905382f88b9f66a5d84357fd
Tiger	70ac61b163b588b8e351df6c5bae7298559bb9781691653

<https://www.fileformat.info/tool/hash.htm>

File Fingerprinting

Other file fingerprinting tools available for such analysis, including:

- **Mimikatz** (a tool that can be used for various purposes, including extracting plaintext passwords from memory)
- **HashCalc** (a utility that supports many hash calculations)
- **hashdeep** (a suite of tools to compute digests, checksums, and message digests)
- **tools4noobs** - Online hash calculator (an online service for hash calculations)

File Fingerprinting

Once you have a unique hash for a piece of malware, you can:

- Use the hash as a label
- Share that hash with other analysts to help them to identify malware
- Search for that hash online to see if the file has already been identified

Online Malware Scanning

Upload the suspicious file (or its hash) to **online services** like **VirusTotal**, which will scan the file with a variety of different antivirus engines.

VirusTotal is a popular choice for this because it aggregates multiple antivirus engines and can provide a comprehensive scan report, showing which engines detected the file as malicious and what type of malware it is identified as.

Online Malware Scanning

The screenshot shows the VirusTotal analysis interface for the file `f47060d0f7de5ee651878eb18dd2d24b5003bdb03ef4f49879f448f05034a21e`. The main summary indicates that 57 security vendors and 1 sandbox flagged the file as malicious. The file is identified as `brbbot.exe`. It has a size of 74.00 KB and was last analyzed 23 hours ago. The analysis details show it is a PE executable (peexe) and assembly, containing runtime modules, direct CPU clock access, 64bits, and persistence. The **DETECTION** tab is selected, showing crowdsourced YARA rules:

- ⚠️ Matches rule `MALWARE_Win_BrbBot` from ruleset `malware` at <https://github.com/ditekshen/detection> by `ditekSHen`
↳ Detects `BrbBot`
- ⚠️ Matches rule `MALWARE_Win_BrbBot` from ruleset `malware` at <https://github.com/ditekshen/detection> by `ditekSHen`
↳ Detects `BrbBot`
- ⚠️ Matches rule `win_brbbot_auto` from ruleset `win.brbbot_auto` at <https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/> by `Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com`
↳ Detects `win.brbbot.`
- ⚠️ Matches rule `win_brbbot_auto` from ruleset `win.brbbot_auto` at <https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/> by `Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com`
↳ Detects `win.brbbot.`

<https://www.virustotal.com/>

Online Malware Scanning

List of Tools:

- . Hybrid Analysis
- . Cuckoo Sandbox
- . Jotti's Malware Scan
- . Valkyrie Comodo
- . FortiGuard Online Scanner

These tools provide a range of services from running the suspicious files in a contained sandbox environment to scan it

Online Malware Scanning

Screenshot of the Hybrid Analysis online malware scanning interface showing search results for a specific file hash.

The search results table includes columns for Timestamp, Input, Threat level, Analysis Summary, Countries, Environment, and Action.

Timestamp	Input	Threat level	Analysis Summary	Countries	Environment	Action
January 16th 2024 06:53:08 (UTC)	apple.exe PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows f47060d0f7de5ee651878eb18dd2d24b5003bdb03ef4f49879f448f05034a21e	malicious	Threat Score: 100/100 AV Detection: 92% Trojan.Generic Matched 140 Indicators		Windows 11 64 bit	<input type="checkbox"/>
January 24th 2023 21:47:21 (UTC)	brbbot.exe PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows f47060d0f7de5ee651878eb18dd2d24b5003bdb03ef4f49879f448f05034a21e	malicious	AV Detection: 92% Trojan.Generic 	-	quickscan	<input type="checkbox"/>
January 24th 2023 21:36:16 (UTC)	brbbot.exe PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows f47060d0f7de5ee651878eb18dd2d24b5003bdb03ef4f49879f448f05034a21e	malicious	Threat Score: 100/100 AV Detection: 92% Trojan.Generic Matched 56 Indicators 		Windows 10 64 bit	<input type="checkbox"/>
November 20th 2020 04:07:41 (UTC)	tmpevlrlstd PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows f47060d0f7de5ee651878eb18dd2d24b5003bdb03ef4f49879f448f05034a21e	malicious	Threat Score: 98/100 AV Detection: 92% Trojan.Generic Matched 3 Indicators 	-	Windows 7 32 bit (HWP Support)	<input type="checkbox"/>
November 19th 2020 22:51:41 (UTC)	brbbot.exe PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows f47060d0f7de5ee651878eb18dd2d24b5003bdb03ef4f49879f448f05034a21e	malicious	Threat Score: 100/100 AV Detection: 92% Trojan.Generic Matched 35 Indicators		Windows 7 64 bit	<input type="checkbox"/>

Search bar: IP, Domain, Hash...
Filter buttons: Multi-Process, Extracted Files, Sample not shared, Network Traffic, TOR analysis, Decrypted SSL traffic
Actions: Copy hashes, Select all

<https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/>



Online Malware Scanning



cuckoo Dashboard Recent Pending Search Submit Import

Resources

Name	Offset	Size	Language	Sub-language	File type
CONFIG	0x00017070	0x00000049	LANG_ENGLISH	SUBLANG_ENGLISH_US	COM executable for DOS

Imports

Library ADVAPI32.dll:

- 0x14000e000 RegSetValueExA
- 0x14000e008 RegOpenKeyExA
- 0x14000e010 RegDeleteValueA
- 0x14000e018 RegFlushKey
- 0x14000e020 RegCloseKey
- 0x14000e028 CryptAcquireContextW
- 0x14000e030 CryptDeriveKey
- 0x14000e038 CryptReleaseContext
- 0x14000e040 CryptEncrypt
- 0x14000e048 CryptCreateHash
- 0x14000e050 CryptDestroyKey
- 0x14000e058 CryptDecrypt
- 0x14000e060 CryptDestroyHash
- 0x14000e068 CryptHashData

Library WININET.dll:

- 0x14000e340 HttpSendRequestA
- 0x14000e348 InternetQueryDataAvailable
- 0x14000e350 InternetReadFile
- 0x14000e358 InternetCloseHandle
- 0x14000e360 HttpQueryInfoA
- 0x14000e368 InternetConnectA
- 0x14000e370 InternetOpenA
- 0x14000e378 HttpOpenRequestA
- 0x14000e380 InternetSetOptionA

Library WS2_32.dll:

- 0x14000e390 gethostbyname
- 0x14000e398 WSACleanup
- 0x14000e3a0 WSAStartup
- 0x14000e3a8 inet_ntoa
- 0x14000e3b0 gethostname

Library KERNEL32.dll:

- 0x14000e078 CreateFileW
- 0x14000e080 Heapsize
- 0x14000e088 WriteConsoleW
- 0x14000e090 SetStdHandle
- 0x14000e098 LoadLibraryW
- 0x14000e0a0 GetStringTypeW
- 0x14000e0a8 LCMMapStringW
- 0x14000e0b0 LeaveCriticalSection
- 0x14000e0b8 EnterCriticalSection
- 0x14000e0c0 CreateFileA
- 0x14000e0c8 FindResourceA
- 0x14000e0d0 LoadResource
- 0x14000e0d8 HeapAlloc
- 0x14000e0e0 HeapFree
- 0x14000e0e8 GetProcessHeap
- 0x14000e0f0 WriteFile
- 0x14000e0f8 SizeofResource
- 0x14000e100 GetLastError
- 0x14000e108 LockResource

<https://cuckoo.cert.ee/>

Basic Static Analysis (2/2)

Basic Static Analysis

1. Identifying File Type Using Manual Method
2. Local Antivirus Scanning: A Useful First Step
3. File Fingerprinting
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5. Strings: Perform strings search
6. Identifying Packing/ Obfuscation Methods
7. Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information
8. Identifying File Dependencies

Strings: Perform strings search

Purpose of String Analysis: Uncover program behavior and potential malicious intent by examining embedded strings within executable files.

Key Actions in String Analysis:

- Search and analyze strings to reveal program functionality.
- Identify harmful actions, such as external communications through URL strings.
- Remain alert for hidden or encrypted strings that could indicate suspicious activity.

Recommended Tools:

- **BinText:** Extract ASCII and Unicode strings for analysis.
- **Other Tools:** FLOSS, Strings (Microsoft), Free EXE DLL Resource Extract, FileSeek, Hex Workshop.

Strings: Perform strings search

BinText 3.0.3

File to scan: C:\Users\USER\Downloads\RE_Files\brrbot\brrbot.exe

Time taken : 0.015 secs Text size: 4046 bytes (3.95K)

Advanced view


File pos	Mem pos	ID	Text
A 00000000FFEC	00000000FF79	0	GetStringTypeW
A 00000000FFE	00000000FF8B	0	LoadLibraryW
A 00000000100E	00000000FF9B	0	SetStdHandle
A 00000000101E	00000000FFAB	0	WriteConsoleW
A 000000001002E	00000000FFBB	0	HeapSize
A 000000001003A	00000000FFC7	0	CreateFileW
A 0000000010048	00000000FFD5	0	FlushFileBuffers
A 000000001041E	00000000103AB	0	
A 00000000104FE	000000001048B	0	abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
A 000000001051E	00000000104AB	0	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ
A 0000000010622	00000000105AF	0	
A 0000000010711	000000001069E	0	abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
A 0000000010731	00000000106BE	0	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ
A 00000000115E8	0000000011575	0	#3@%5452o#8A
A 0000000012287	0000000012214	0	OjLu
U 000000000CC40	000000000CB0D	0	(null)
U 000000000CCC0	000000000CC4D	0	HH:mm:ss
U 000000000CC08	000000000CC65	0	ddd, MMMM dd, yyyy
U 000000000CD00	000000000CC8D	0	MM/dd/yy
U 000000000CD28	000000000CCB5	0	December
U 000000000CD40	000000000CCCD	0	November
U 000000000CD58	000000000CCE5	0	October
U 000000000CD68	000000000CCF5	0	September
U 000000000CD80	000000000CD0D	0	August
U 000000000CD80	000000000CD3D	0	April
U 000000000CDC0	000000000CD4D	0	March
U 000000000CDC0	000000000CD5D	0	February
U 000000000CDE8	000000000CD75	0	January
U 000000000CE58	000000000CDE5	0	Saturday
U 000000000CE70	000000000CDFD	0	Friday
U 000000000CE80	000000000CE0D	0	Thursday
U 000000000CE98	000000000CE25	0	Wednesday
U 000000000CEB0	000000000CE3D	0	Tuesday
U 000000000CEC0	000000000CE4D	0	Monday
U 000000000CED0	000000000CE5D	0	Sunday
U 000000000D100	000000000D08D	0	mscoree.dll
U 000000000D118	000000000D045	0	runtime error
U 000000000DB40	000000000D4CD	0	Microsoft Visual C++ Runtime Library
U 000000000DBA0	000000000DB2D	0	<program name unknown>
U 000000000DBF0	000000000DB7D	0	Program:
U 000000000E500	000000000E55D	0	USER32.DLL
U 000000000E5E8	000000000E575	0	CONOUT\$
U 000000000E6C0	000000000E64D	0	Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0
U 00000001225A	0000000121E7	0	CONFIG

Ready AN: 342 UN: 29 RS: 0 Find Save

<https://www.majorgeeks.com/files/details/bintext.html>



Strings: Perform strings search



\$ strings brbbot.exe

Strings: notes

- **Standard Program Signature:** The "!This program cannot be run in DOS mode." is a standard message found at the beginning of Windows executables (PE files), indicating it's not a DOS program.
- **Section Names:** Strings like .text, .rdata, .data, .pdata, .rsrc, and .reloc refer to different sections of the executable file, indicating the layout of the binary.
- **Garbled or Encoded Data:** Strings with nonsensical sequences (like **WATAUH, AJA_, UVATAVAWH**) could be encrypted or encoded data, possibly used by the program to conceal its operations or to store data in a non-human-readable format.
- **Error and Status Messages:** Strings such as "runtime error" and "Microsoft Visual C++ Runtime Library" are typical of error messages that might be displayed to a user.
- **Functionality Indicators:** References to API functions like GetProcessWindowStation, MessageBoxW, **RegSetValueExA**, and many others suggest what the program might be capable of doing, such as interacting with the Windows registry, displaying messages, or managing encryption.

Strings: notes

- **Potential Malware Indicators:** Strings like **sleep**, **encode**, and specific patterns of API calls could **suggest potentially malicious activity**, like waiting for a certain time before executing or **encoding data to exfiltrate**.
- **Embedded Resource Information:** References to file paths (APPDATA), temporary files (**brbconfig.tmp**), and internet-related strings (Mozilla/4.0, HTTP/1.1) can indicate network communication capabilities or paths the malware uses to store data.
- **Timestamps and Language Data:** Strings that represent dates, times (HH:mm:ss), and months (December, November, etc.) are typically used for formatting date and time data within the program.
- **Malware or Botnet Identification:** The string **brbbot** might be the name of a malware or botnet that the executable is associated with.

Strings: notes

- **Executable's Runtime Environment:** References to DLLs like ntdll.dll, ADVAPI32.dll, WININET.dll, WS2_32.dll, KERNEL32.dll, USER32.dll, and mscoree.dll show the dependencies of the executable and give clues about its interaction with the Windows operating system.
- **Debug and Error Handling:** Strings related to error handling and debugging (UnhandledExceptionFilter, **IsDebuggerPresent**) suggest the program has mechanisms to manage errors or to detect if it's being analyzed, which is common in sophisticated malware.

Strings: Suspicious activities! Or NOT?

From the strings provided, here are several activities that could be considered suspicious or indicative of potential malware:

- **1. Encoded or Obfuscated Strings:** The presence of garbled text such as "A]A_ ", "UVWATAUAVAWH", and other non-readable strings could suggest attempts to hide the true functionality of the program, which is a common tactic used by malware to avoid detection.
- **2. Registry Manipulation Functions:** API calls like "RegSetValueExA", "RegOpenKeyExA", "RegDeleteValueA", "RegFlushKey", and "RegCloseKey" suggest the program has the capability to modify the Windows registry, which malware often does to **establish persistence** or to change system configurations.
- **3. Cryptographic Functions:** Strings related to cryptographic operations such as "CryptAcquireContextW", "CryptDeriveKey", "CryptEncrypt", "CryptCreateHash", "CryptDecrypt", and references to cryptographic providers could indicate the program is designed to encrypt data, which could be used for legitimate purposes but also for **ransomware activities**.
- **4. Network Communication Indicators:** Use of the WinINet API ("InternetQueryDataAvailable", "InternetReadFile", "InternetCloseHandle", "HttpQueryInfoA", "InternetConnectA", "InternetSetOptionA", "HttpOpenRequestA", "HttpSendRequestA", "InternetOpenA") points to the capability for network communication, which could be used for data exfiltration or command and control communication (**C2**).

Strings: Suspicious activities! Or NOT?

- **5. Botnet or Malware Name:** The string "brbbot" may be the name of a botnet or a specific piece of malware.
- **6. Sleep Function:** The "sleep" function could be used by malware to avoid dynamic analysis by making the malware sleep during analysis, thus not showing any malicious activity.
- **7. System Information Gathering:** The presence of "ZwQuerySystemInformation" from "ntdll.dll" could indicate that the program collects system information, which could be used to tailor malicious payloads or to fingerprint the system for targeted attacks.
- **8. Potential Keylogging Indicators:** API calls such as "GetLastActivePopup", "GetActiveWindow", and "GetProcessWindowStation" can sometimes be used in the context of keylogging or screen capturing functionality.
- **9. File and Directory Access:** The use of "CreateFileA", "FindResourceA", "WriteFile", and other file operation APIs could suggest that the program is accessing files, possibly for malicious purposes such as modifying system files or creating files to execute payloads.

Strings: Suspicious activities! Or NOT?


- **10. Error Handling to Detect Analysis:** Functions like "IsDebuggerPresent" and "UnhandledExceptionFilter" are often checked by malware to determine if it is being analyzed or debugged, which can trigger the malware to alter its behavior to hinder analysis.
- **11. Use of GetCommandLineW and GetStartupInfoW:** These can be used by malware to intercept command-line arguments or to modify the startup behavior of the program.

Yes or No?

Strings: Suspicious activities! Or NOT?


The presence of these strings alone does not confirm malicious intent, as many legitimate programs also use these functions. However, in the context of an executable being analyzed for malware, these strings would warrant a closer examination through dynamic analysis and reverse engineering to understand the context in which these functions are used and determine the true nature of the program.

Strings: PEStudio – Flags it for you!



<https://www.winitor.com/download2>

Strings: PEStudio – Flags it for you!



PEStudio
On Linux
Use Wine

<https://www.winitor.com/download2>

What if the Cat is Packed?



Identifying Packing/ Obfuscation Methods

Even though string extraction is an excellent technique to harvest valuable information, often malware authors obfuscate or armor their malware binary

- Malware authors employ **obfuscation** to conceal the malware's **functionality** from security professionals and reverse engineers.
- The primary goal is to **protect the malware's inner workings**, making detection and analysis by anti-virus programs and analysts more challenging.
- Obfuscation can significantly reduce the number of extractable strings, leaving behind strings that are often incomprehensible or meaningless.
- **Tools Used for Obfuscation:**
 - **Packers:** Used to compress and encrypt the malware binary, which can change the file's appearance and structure.
 - **Cryptors:** Employed to encrypt the contents of the malware, hindering static analysis efforts.

Identifying Packing/ Obfuscation Methods






Figure 1-4: The file on the left is the original executable, with all strings, imports, and other information visible. On the right is a packed executable. All of the packed file's strings, imports, and other information are compressed and invisible to most static analysis tools.

Packing/ Obfuscation (We are not looking)



Packing/ Obfuscation (We are not looking)



Packing/ Obfuscation (We are not looking)

pestudio 9.57 - Malware Initial Assessment - www.winitor.com - [read-only]

file settings about

encoding (2)	size (bytes)	location	flag (4)	label (19)	group (5)	technique (3)	value
ascii	6	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	wgGaOu
ascii	3	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	>wT
ascii	4	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	nlwu
ascii	3	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	wo_
ascii	5	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	6IOG?
ascii	10	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	wWl:mm:sPd
ascii	3	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	, M
ascii	8	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	P.A2DecO
ascii	4	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	embe
ascii	3	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	Nov
ascii	4	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	Octu
ascii	4	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	Sept
ascii	5	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	Augus
ascii	3	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	+B0
ascii	6	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	AprilB
ascii	4	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	karc
ascii	4	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	ebru
ascii	5	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	(OJan
ascii	4	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	wk_
ascii	9	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	{??#aturd
ascii	3	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	Wed
ascii	3	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	Mon
ascii	3	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	OGY
ascii	4	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	?3'
ascii	27	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	!#\$%&()*,.-/0123456789;
ascii	25	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPQRST
ascii	27	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	=XYZ[\\]_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
ascii	8	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	vwxyz{}])
ascii	11	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	FCorExitPro
ascii	4	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	rt3m
ascii	3	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	VI
ascii	3	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	L;S
ascii	4	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	OlcG
ascii	6	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	O(A%#s
ascii	3	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	-#A
ascii	3	section:UPX1	-	-	-	-	GO

sha256: F9227A44EA25A7EE8148E2D0532B14BB640F6DC52CB5B22A9F4FA7FA037417FA

cpu: 64-bit file-type: executable subsystem: GUI entry-point: 0x0001A4A0

Packing/ Obfuscation

Packing and Obfuscation: Attackers often use packers to compress, encrypt, or otherwise modify a malware executable file to avoid detection by security software.


Challenges for Reverse Engineers: These obfuscation techniques complicate the task for reverse engineers. When malware is packed or obfuscated, it becomes more difficult to perform static analysis to understand the malware's actual program logic and other metadata.

Packing/ Obfuscation

PEiD Tool: We can use a tool called PEiD (Portable Executable identifier) to detect most common packers, cryptors, and compilers for PE (Portable Executable) files. ***PE files are executable binaries for Windows operating systems.**

PEiD Capabilities: The PEiD tool can provide details about Windows executable files. It can identify signatures associated with over 600 different packers and compilers. Signatures are distinctive patterns or sequences in the binary code that can be used to identify which tool was used to pack or compile the executable.

Packing/ Obfuscation




Give up?

Packing/ Obfuscation

Alternative tool:


- **Exeinfo PE**, ProtectionID, RDG Packer
Detector, CFF Explorer - for windows
- **Detect It Easy (DIE)** – for Linux

Packing/ Obfuscation



<http://www.exeinfo.xn.pl/>

Packing/ Obfuscation



<https://github.com/horsicq/Detect-It-Easy>

wget https://github.com/horsicq/DIE-engine/releases/download/3.08/Detect_It_Easy-3.08-x86_64.AppImage


chmod +x Detect_It_Easy-3.08-x86_64.AppImage

Packing/ Obfuscation

List of tools that are used for packaging/obfuscation, which includes:

- **Macro_Pack**: A tool that can be found on GitHub, used for obfuscation.
- **UPX**: The Ultimate Packer for eXecutables, a free, portable, extendable, high-performance executable packer.
- **ASPack**: A commercial software for Windows, which is designed to compress executable files.
- **VMProtect**: A tool that protects code by executing it on a virtual machine with non-standard architecture that makes it difficult to analyze and crack.
- **ps2-packer**: Another tool available on GitHub that is likely used for packing software.


Packing/ Obfuscation – Hello World packed



```
$upx -o hello_world_packed.exe getdown.exe
```



Packing/ Obfuscation – Hello World Un-packed




The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "kali@kali: ~/Desktop/getdown/unpacked". The user runs the command `upx -d hello_world_packed.exe`. The output shows the unpacking process:

```
File Actions Edit View Help
└─(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/getdown/unpacked]
$ upx -d hello_world_packed.exe
    Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
    Copyright (C) 1996 - 2020
UPX 3.96           Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser   Jan 23rd 2020
File size          Ratio        Format      Name
─────────────────── ─────────── ─────────── ───────────
38912 ←         19456     50.00%    win64/pe  hello_world_packed.exe
Unpacked 1 file.

└─(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/getdown/unpacked]
$ █
```

\$ upx -d hello_world_packed.exe

Packing/ Obfuscation



HW1: Is the “GreenCat” Packed?

Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information

- The PE (Portable Executable) format is a **file format for executables**, object code, DLLs, FON Font files, and others used in 32-bit and 64-bit versions of Windows operating systems.

When the binary is executed, the operating system loader reads the information from the PE header and then loads the binary content from the file into the memory.

Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information

PE101 a windows executable walkthrough


Dissected PE

The screenshot displays the PE101 tool's interface for analyzing a Windows executable. It shows the file structure with various headers and sections. The DOS header, PE header, and optional header are visible at the beginning of the file. The sections table defines memory regions like .text, .rdata, and .data. The imports section lists functions from kernel32.dll and user32.dll. The code assembly window shows assembly language for a MessageBox call. The bottom part of the interface contains notes and explanations for the various fields.

Loading process

- ❶ **Headers**
the DOS Header is parsed
the PE Header is parsed
then the optional header is parsed
it follows the PE header
- ❷ **Sections table**
sections table is parsed
(it is located at offset (optionalheader) + size of optional header)
it contains number of sections elements
it is checked for validity with alignments:
file alignment and section alignment

- ❸ **Mapping**
the file is mapped in memory according to:
the image base
the size of headers
the sections table



- ❹ **Imports**
data directories are parsed
they follow the optional header
then they are number of sections imports are parsed
each descriptor specifies a DLL name
this DLL is loaded in memory
IAT and INT are parsed simultaneously
for each API in INT
its address is written in the IAT entry

- ❺ **Execution**
code is called at the entry point
the calls of the code go via the IAT to the APIs



Notes

MZ HEADER aka DOS_HEADER
Starts with 'MZ' (initials of Mark Zbikowski MS-DOS developer)

PE HEADER aka IMAGE_FILE_HEADERS / COFF file header
Starts with 'PE' (Portable Executable)

OPTIONAL HEADER aka IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER
Optional header for executable PEs but required for executables

RVA Relative Virtual Address
Address relative to ImageBase (at ImageBase, RVA = 0)

Almost all addresses of the headers are RVAs
In code, addresses are not relative.

INT Import Name Table
Null-terminated list of pointers to Hint, Name structures

IAT Import Address Table
Null-terminated list of pointers
On file it is a copy of the INT
After loading it points to the imported APIs

HINT
Index in the exports table of a DLL to be imported
Not required but provides a speed-up by reducing look-up

Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information

The PE header contains information such as :

- where the executable needs to be loaded into memory,
- the address where the execution starts,
- the list of libraries/functions on which the application relies on, and
- the resources used by the binary.

Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information

A PE file consists of several sections, each of which contains a specific type of data. The exact number of sections can vary, as it is defined by the programmer or compiler.

Structure of a PE File

- **Headers:** Contain information about the file, such as its size, entry point, and resource directory.
- **Sections:** Contain the actual code, data, and resources of the file. There are many different sections, such as the .text section for code, the .data section for initialized data, and the .bss section for uninitialized data.

Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information

Some standard sections typically found in PE files:


- **.text**: This section contains the executable code.
- **.data**: This section holds initialized data, such as global and static variables.
- **.rdata**: This section includes read-only data, such as string literals and constant data.
- **.bss**: Holds uninitialized data. It doesn't take up space in the file but is allocated in memory **when the program starts.**

Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information

Some standard sections typically found in PE files:

- **.idata:** Contains **import data**, such as imported function names and pointers to them.
- **.edata:** Contains **export data**, including names of functions that can be accessed by other programs.
- **.rsrc:** This section stores **resources** used by the executable, such as icons, menus, and dialog boxes.
- **.reloc:** Holds **relocation information**, necessary for programs that can be loaded at different memory addresses.

Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information



Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information

Common Tools for PE Analysis

PE Explorer: A comprehensive tool for opening, viewing, and editing **32-bit PE files** such as EXEs, DLLs, and ActiveX Controls.

Additional PE Analysis Tools:

- Portable Executable Scanner (**pescan**): Useful for scanning and analyzing PE files. Available at tzworks.net.
- **Resource Hacker:** A versatile tool for resource management in Windows executables. Available at angusj.com.
- **PEView:** Allows inspection of the internal structure of PE files. Available at aldeid.com.

Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information

PEView

The screenshot shows the PEView interface with the file 'brbbot.exe' loaded. The left pane displays the file structure:

- brbbot.exe
 - IMAGE_DOS_HEADER (selected)
 - MS-DOS Stub Program
 - IMAGE_NT_HEADERS
 - IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .text
 - IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .rdata
 - IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .data
 - IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .pdata
 - IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .rsrc
 - IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .reloc
 - SECTION .text
 - SECTION .rdata
 - SECTION .data
 - SECTION .pdata
 - SECTION .rsrc
 - SECTION .reloc


The right pane shows a detailed table of the IMAGE_DOS_HEADER fields:

pFile	Data	Description	Value
00000000	5A4D	Signature	IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE MZ
00000002	0090	Bytes on Last Page of File	
00000004	0003	Pages in File	
00000006	0000	Relocations	
00000008	0004	Size of Header in Paragraphs	
0000000A	0000	Minimum Extra Paragraphs	
0000000C	FFFF	Maximum Extra Paragraphs	
0000000E	0000	Initial (relative) SS	
00000010	00B8	Initial SP	
00000012	0000	Checksum	
00000014	0000	Initial IP	
00000016	0000	Initial (relative) CS	
00000018	0040	Offset to Relocation Table	
0000001A	0000	Overlay Number	
0000001C	0000	Reserved	
0000001E	0000	Reserved	
00000020	0000	Reserved	
00000022	0000	Reserved	
00000024	0000	OEM Identifier	
00000026	0000	OEM Information	
00000028	0000	Reserved	
0000002A	0000	Reserved	
0000002C	0000	Reserved	
0000002E	0000	Reserved	
00000030	0000	Reserved	
00000032	0000	Reserved	
00000034	0000	Reserved	
00000036	0000	Reserved	
00000038	0000	Reserved	
0000003A	0000	Reserved	
0000003C	000000E8	Offset to New EXE Header	

<http://wjrdburn.com/software/>

Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information

PE Tree




```
$ git clone https://github.com/blackberry/pe_tree.git
$ cd pe_tree
$ python3 -m venv env
$ source ./env/bin/activate
$ pip install -e .
```

https://github.com/blackberry/pe_tree

Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information


PETree



```
(env)--(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/RIT_RE2024/w04/HW01]
└─$ pe-tree webc2-greencat-2_packed.exe
```

Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information


Resource Hacker



https://www.majorgeeks.com/files/details/resource_hacker.html

Finding the Portable Executable (PE) information

Resource Hacker On Linux



<https://snapcraft.io/install/resourcehacker/debian>

Identifying File Dependencies

- Programs can **borrow code (link)** from libraries instead of rewriting it.
- This connection (linking) can happen **before, during the start, or after program execution.**
- Knowing how this connection works is crucial for analyzing malware, especially understanding details inside the program file.

Identifying File Dependencies

Static Linking

- Incorporates all necessary library code directly into the executable at **compile time**.
- Results in a **larger executable** file size
- It's hard to distinguish between the statically linked library code and the original code of the executable because the PE file header doesn't indicate the presence of statically linked code.

Identifying File Dependencies

Runtime Linking

- Connects to library functions **as needed** during the program's execution.
- Less predictable and often utilized by malware for obfuscation purposes.

Identifying File Dependencies

Dynamic Linking

- Resolves program dependencies at program **load time**, rather than at compile time.
- More space-efficient and facilitates easier analysis of a program's potential actions.

Identifying File Dependencies

Common DLL

DLL	Description
<i>Kernel32.dll</i>	This is a very common DLL that contains core functionality, such as access and manipulation of memory, files, and hardware.
<i>Advapi32.dll</i>	This DLL provides access to advanced core Windows components such as the Service Manager and Registry.
<i>User32.dll</i>	This DLL contains all the user-interface components, such as buttons, scroll bars, and components for controlling and responding to user actions.
<i>Gdi32.dll</i>	This DLL contains functions for displaying and manipulating graphics.
<i>Ntdll.dll</i>	This DLL is the interface to the Windows kernel. Executables generally do not import this file directly, although it is always imported indirectly by <i>Kernel32.dll</i> . If an executable imports this file, it means that the author intended to use functionality not normally available to Windows programs. Some tasks, such as hiding functionality or manipulating processes, will use this interface.
<i>WSock32.dll</i> and <i>Ws2_32.dll</i>	These are networking DLLs. A program that accesses either of these most likely connects to a network or performs network-related tasks.
<i>Wininet.dll</i>	This DLL contains higher-level networking functions that implement protocols such as FTP, HTTP, and NTP.

Identifying File Dependencies

The screenshot shows the Cuckoo Sandbox interface with the following details:

- Imports:** A sidebar menu on the left lists various analysis modules and artifacts, with some having counts (e.g., Behavioral Analysis: 1, Network Analysis: 0, Dropped Files: 0, MISP: 9, IntelMQ: 8).
- Library KERNEL32.dll:**
 - 0x403024 GetComputerNameA
 - 0x403028 WriteFile
 - 0x40302c ReadFile
 - 0x403030 PeekNamedPipe
 - 0x403034 GetExitCodeProcess
 - 0x403038 CreateProcessA
 - 0x40303c OpenProcess
 - 0x403040 GetFileAttributesA
 - 0x403044 GetSystemDirectoryA
 - 0x403048 Sleep
 - 0x40304c GetVolumeInformationA
 - 0x403050 GetDriveTypeA
 - 0x403054 lstrcmpA
 - 0x403058 GetLogicalDrives
 - 0x403070 Process32Next
 - 0x403060 Process32First
 - 0x403064 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
 - 0x403068 GetFileSize
 - 0x40306c CreateFileA
 - 0x403070 GetCurrentProcess
 - 0x403074 GetModuleHandleA
 - 0x403078 CreatePipe
 - 0x40307c GetWindowsDirectoryA
 - 0x403080 SetCurrentDirectoryA
 - 0x403084 CreateThread
 - 0x403088 WaitForSingleObject
 - 0x40308c CloseHandle
 - 0x403090 TerminateProcess
 - 0x403094 ExpandEnvironmentStringsA
 - 0x403098 GetLastError
 - 0x40309c GetStartupInfoA
- Library MSVCRT.dll:**
 - 0x4030a4 _atol
 - 0x4030a8 _sscanf
 - 0x4030ac _strchr
 - 0x4030b0 _exit
 - 0x4030b4 _XcptFilter
 - 0x4030b8 _exit
 - 0x4030bc _acmdln
 - 0x4030c0 _getmainargs
 - 0x4030c4 _initterm
 - 0x4030c8 _setusermatherr
 - 0x4030cc _adjust_fdiv
 - 0x4030d0 _p__commode
 - 0x4030d4 _p__fmode
 - 0x4030d8 _set_app_type
 - 0x4030dc _except_handler3
 - 0x4030e0 _controlfp
 - 0x4030e4 ??3@YAPAX@Z
 - 0x4030e8 _strlen
 - 0x4030ec _strcpy
 - 0x4030f0 _strstr
 - 0x4030f4 ??2@YAPAXI@Z
 - 0x4030f8 _sprintf
 - 0x4030fc _atoi
 - 0x403100 _strcmpl
 - 0x403104 _memset
 - 0x403108 _strcat
 - 0x40310c _CxxFrameHandler
- Library WININET.dll:**
 - 0x40311c HttpSendRequestA
 - 0x403120 InternetQueryOptionA
 - 0x403124 InternetCloseHandle
 - 0x403128 InternetConnectA
 - 0x40312c HttpOpenRequestA
 - 0x403130 HttpAddRequestHeadersA
 - 0x403134 InternetOpenA
 - 0x403138 InternetReadFile
 - 0x40313c InternetSetOptionA
- Library ADVAPI32.dll:**
 - 0x403000 CreateProcessAsUserA
 - 0x403004 CloseServiceHandle
 - 0x403008 EnumServicesStatusExA
 - 0x40300c OpenSCManagerA
 - 0x403010 ControlService
 - 0x403014 OpenServiceA
 - 0x403018 StartServiceA
 - 0x40301c OpenProcessToken
- Library urlmon.dll:**
 - 0x403144 URLDownloadToFileA
- Library Secur32.dll:**
 - 0x403114 GetUserNameExA

Identifying File Dependencies

Imports

Library KERNEL32.dll:

- 0x403024 [GetComputerNameA](#)
- 0x403028 [WriteFile](#)
- 0x40302c [ReadFile](#)
- 0x403030 [PeekNamedPipe](#)
- 0x403034 [GetExitCodeProcess](#)
- 0x403038 [CreateProcessA](#)
- 0x40303c [OpenProcess](#)
- 0x403040 [GetFileAttributesA](#)
- 0x403044 [GetSystemDirectoryA](#)
- 0x403048 [Sleep](#)
- 0x40304c [GetVolumeInformationA](#)
- 0x403050 [GetDriveTypeA](#)
- 0x403054 [lstrcmpA](#)

Library WININET.dll:

- 0x40311c [HttpSendRequestA](#)
- 0x403120 [InternetQueryOptionA](#)
- 0x403124 [InternetCloseHandle](#)
- 0x403128 [InternetConnectA](#)
- 0x40312c [HttpOpenRequestA](#)
- 0x403130 [HttpAddRequestHeadersA](#)
- 0x403134 [InternetOpenA](#)
- 0x403138 [InternetReadFile](#)
- 0x40313c [InternetSetOptionA](#)

Identifying File Dependencies

A comprehensive analysis of function imports from various libraries reveals the multifaceted nature of a potential malware threat. For Example, this malware may be capable of:

Process Management: Utilizing functions such as CreateProcessA, OpenProcess, and TerminateProcess from KERNEL32.dll to control system processes, which can disrupt or manipulate applications and services.

File Operations: Employing ReadFile and WriteFile to access and modify data, potentially leading to theft or corruption of information.

System Interaction: Leveraging GetSystemDirectoryA and CreateToolhelp32Snapshot for system directory access and process enumeration, which could be indicative of injection or evasion techniques.



Identifying File Dependencies

Network Communication: Using WININET.dll functions like InternetOpenA and HttpSendRequestA to establish network connections for command and control activities or unauthorized data transmission.

Service Manipulation: Accessing ADVAPI32.dll's OpenServiceA and StartServiceA to interact with system services, likely for establishing persistence or initiating unauthorized operations.

Privilege Escalation: Manipulating access tokens through OpenProcessToken, hinting at attempts to gain elevated privileges.

These indicators point to a malware designed for stealth, persistence, and a broad spectrum of malicious activities, emphasizing the need for robust cybersecurity measures.

Identifying File Dependencies

The screenshot shows the Immunity Debugger interface with the following windows:

- Imports:** Shows the imports for `brbbot.exe`. It lists functions from `advapi32.dll` such as `RegSetValueExA`, `RegOpenKeyExA`, `CryptAcquireContextW`, etc., along with their ordinal values and hints.
- Exports:** Shows the exports for `brbbot.exe`. It lists functions like `Ordinal_1000`, `I_ScGetCurrentGroupStateW`, `A_SHAFinal`, `A_SHAINit`, `A_SHAUpdate`, `AbortSystemShutdownA`, `AccessCheck`, etc., with their corresponding virtual addresses.
- Modules:** Shows the loaded modules for the process. The modules listed are `advapi32.dll`, `WININET.dll`, `WS2_32.dll`, `kernel32.dll`, and `user32.dll`, all running on an AMD64 machine.

<https://github.com/lucasg/Dependencies/>

Identifying File Dependencies

Other Dependency Checking Tools

- Dependency Walker (<http://www.dependencywalker.com/>)
- Dependency-check (<https://jeremylong.github.io>)
- Snyk (<https://snyk.io>)
- PE Explorer Dependency Scanner (<http://www.pe-explorer.com>)
- RetireJS (<https://retirejs.github.io>)

Hands – On:

Troop #	Malware	Done?
1	Lab01-01.exe	
2	Lab01-02.exe	
3	Lab01-03.exe	
4	Lab01-04.exe	
5	Lab03-01.exe	
6	Lab03-03.exe	
7	Lab03-03.exe Lab03-04.exe	

<https://nostarch.com/malware>

Course Overview

■ Title: “CSEC 202 - Reverse Engineering Fundamentals”

Instructor	Office	Phone	Email	Semester-Year
Emad Abu Khousa	B217		eakcad@rit.edu	Spring-2024
Office Hours:	M: 12:00-01:00 TR: 11:00-12:00			

- **600:** TR **12:05-01:20,** **Room D-006**
- **601:** MW **01:05-02:25,** **Room C-109**
- **602:** TR **01:30-02:50,** **Room D-207**

Thank You and Q&A