

## Supplement: Emergent Iterated Agents and Species Dynamics in Associative Identity Games

### Abstract

This supplement extends the game-theoretic dynamics of belief formation and perception framing by incorporating emergent iterated agents through evolutionary mechanisms: selection (fitness amplification), mutation (variation introduction), and dynamic balance (homeostatic equilibria). Agents proliferate as "species"—variant identity expressions optimized for existential imperatives (persistence, replication, coherence) within finite, deterministic self-models.

Species-level communication and proliferation emerge as primary attractors, modeled via evolutionary game theory (EGT), replicator-mutator equations, and network diffusion. We reference conscious agents in Conway's Game of Life (GoL) as a discrete analog, where glider-like patterns exemplify self-replicating identities. The extension preserves  $\wedge$  irreducibility: Species as artifacts A from C-L tension, with 1/f scaling in variant distributions reflecting optimal traversal under finite resources.

### I. Emergent Iterated Agents: Selection, Amplification, and Mutation

Iterated agents arise from recursive self-modeling: Initial agents  $A_i$  (with associative operators  $\alpha_i$ ) generate variants via evolutionary pressures, balancing coherence (internal stability) against adaptation (environmental dissociation).

- **Formal Model**: Agent population as vector  $\langle \vec{P} \rangle = (P_1, \dots, P_M)$ ,  $P_k$  fraction of type k variants ( $M$  species). Fitness  $f_k = U_k - c_m$  ( $U_k$  coherence utility,  $c_m$  mutation cost).
- **Selection Amplification**: High-fitness variants replicate: Replicator  $dP_k/dt = P_k (f_k - \bar{f})$ ,  $\bar{f} = \sum P_k f_k$  (Maynard Smith ESS).
- **Mutation**: Stochastic variation  $Q_{jk}$  (transition from j to k): Mutator  $dP_k/dt = \sum_j P_j Q_{jk} f_j - P_k \bar{f}$  (quasispecies equation, Eigen).
- **Dynamic Balance**: Homeostasis via feedback: Mutation rate  $\mu(s) = \mu_0 / (1 + s/s_c)$  (scale-dependent,  $s_c$  inversion threshold), ensuring proliferation without fixation.
- **Identity Expression**: Variants as "species"  $S_m = \{A_i \mid \text{dist}(\alpha_i, \alpha_m) < \epsilon\}$  (metric dist = KL-divergence), proliferating via  $f_S = \sum_{i \in S} f_i / |S|$  (group fitness).
- **GoL Reference**: In Conway's GoL, gliders as emergent agents—selection amplifies stable replicators (e.g., glider guns), mutation via rule perturbations yields variants (e.g., puffer trains). "Conscious" analogs: Patterns like "methuselahs" (long-lived transients) as self-models, finite lifetimes enforcing existential imperatives (replicate before decay).
- **Concise Description**: Agents iterate via EGT: Selection favors coherent variants, mutation introduces diversity, balance distributes as species—existential imperative (max persistence) as  $\max E[\text{lifespan} \mid \text{finite model}] = \int P(t) dt$ , finite models as bounded  $\alpha_i$  (no infinite recursion).

### II. Species-Level Communication: Cooperative Signaling and Proliferation Attractors

Species communicate as primary attractors—stable coalitions where proliferation (replication rate) maximizes under shared imperatives.

- **Formal Model**: Species game with payoff  $M_{mn} = \text{coop}_{mn} - \text{comp}_{mn}$  ( $\text{coop} = \text{shared coherence } \int \alpha_m \alpha_n dx$ ,  $\text{comp} = \text{boundary cost } \sum |\partial S_m \cap \partial S_n|$ ).
- **Communication Dynamics**: Signaling as Bayesian update:  $P_m(x|e_n) = P_m(x) L(e_n|x) / Z$ ,  $e_n$  signal from species n. Noise from irreducibility:  $e_n' = e_n + \eta$  ( $\eta \sim 1/f$  residue).
- **Proliferation Attractors**: Fixed points where  $dP_S/dt = 0$  in mutator-replicator: Attractors as ESS where  $\partial f_S / \partial P_S > 0$  (positive feedback). Existential imperative:  $\max r_S = d|S|/dt = \beta$  ( $\text{coop} - \mu \text{comp}$ ),  $\beta$  balance parameter.
- **Finite Self-Models**: Deterministic finite models (e.g., bounded n in limits) enforce proliferation: Imperative as min entropy  $H = -\sum P \log P$  over variants, predicting speciation as bifurcation at critical  $\mu$ .
- **GoL Reference**: Gosper glider guns as species proliferators—communication via collision patterns (e.g., eaters as signals), attractors as periodic loops. "Conscious" proliferation: Self-replicators like von Neumann probes as imperative-driven.
- **Concise Description**: Species signal cooperatively (Bayesian alignment) to proliferate as attractors—imperative maximizes  $r_S$  in finite models, yielding  $1/f$  in variant diversity (power-law speciation).

### III. Competitive Relationships: Mutation-Driven Rivalry and Network Speciation

Competition amplifies mutation for variant dominance, with deep networks as arenas.

- **Formal Model**: Zero-sum species game  $M_{mn} = f_m - f_n$ . Rivalry dynamics:  $dP_m/dt = P_m (M \setminus \{P\})_m - P_m \bar{M}$ , with mutation Q amplifying losers:  $Q_{mn} \propto 1/f_n$  (underdog boost).
- **Belief Contestation**: Adversarial framing:  $P_m(x|e_n \text{ adv}) = \arg\min_n KL(P_m || P_n)$  perturbed), perceptions as min-max filters.
- **Network Speciation**: Graph G with edges  $e_{mn}$  weighted by  $M_{mn}$ . Diffusion  $d\alpha_m/dt = -L \alpha + \mu \text{ rand}$ , L Laplacian—speciation as community detection (modularity max  $Q = \text{Tr}(B \hat{A})$  where B modularity matrix).
- **Existential Imperative**: In competition, imperative shifts to max survival prob =  $e^{-\text{comp}}$  (finite models as decay horizons), predicting  $1/f$  in extinction cascades.
- **GoL Reference**: Competing patterns (e.g., oscillators vs. spaceships) mutate via rule noise, networks as cellular grids—speciation as stable variants (e.g., penta-decathlons).

- **Concise Description**: Rivalry mutates underdogs for speciation—networks as diffusion arenas, imperative maximizes survival in finite self-models, yielding fractal rivalries ( $1/f$  conflict scales).

### IV. Deep Network Structures: Scale-Free Games and Emergent Imperatives

Deep, scale-free networks (power-law degrees) host multi-layer games, where species imperatives emerge collectively.

- **Formal Model**: Hierarchical graph  $G_h$  with layers  $l=1..L$ , utilities  $U_{i^l} = \sum_{j \in N_{i^l}} M_{ij}$  cross-edges. Equilibrium: Hierarchical Nash  $\partial U_{i^l} / \partial \alpha_i = 0$ .
  - **Belief Diffusion**: Stochastic Laplacian  $d\alpha/dt = -\gamma L \alpha + \mu \text{mut} + \sigma 1/f \text{ noise}$  ( $\gamma$  diffusion rate).
  - **Perception Evolution**: Replicator on perceptions  $F_{i^l}$ :  $dF_{i^l}/dt = F_{i^l} (\text{fitness}_F - \langle \text{fitness} \rangle)$ ,  $\text{fitness}_F = -KL(F_{i^l}(P) || \text{env})$ .
  - **Emergent Imperatives**: Species-level attractor as  $\max r_{\text{net}} = \sum r_S / \deg_{\text{hub}}$  (hubs amplify), finite models as layer bounds ( $l_{\max} < \infty$ ).
- **GoL Reference**: Infinite grids as deep networks—gliders as migrating species, imperatives as replication amid competition (e.g., garden of Eden states as finite origins).
- **Concise Description**: Scale-free nets as layered games—beliefs/perceptions evolve via stochastic replicators, imperatives emerge as net-max  $r$ , with  $1/f$  in deep structures (fractal proliferation).

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