This week (Mon + Wed)

- Security (Lesson 11)
  - ⇒ * Terminologies
- Security implementation in AFS

24 %

24 %

Exam week 100 %

Lesson outline

→ Terminologies

Security and authentication using a Private Key infrastructure

"Firsts" from Computing Pioneers

- First vision for a network of computers
  - Memorandum For Members and Affiliates of the Intergalactic Computer Network, by J. C. R. Licklider, April 23, 1963
- First computer-computer communication
  - The Day the Infant Internet Uttered its First Words, Oct 29, 1969
- First e-mail
  - Ray Tomlinson, BBN, 1971

"First" Computer – computer Communication



Log Book of Prof. Kleinrock, UCLA, Oct 29, 1969

All the Computers in the World in one chart!!



(PLEASE NOTE THAT WHILE THIS MAP SHOWS THE HOST POPULATION OF THE NETWORK ACCORDING TO THE BEST INFORMATION OBTAINABLE, NO CLAIM CAN BE MADE FOR ITS ACCURACY)

NAMES SHOWN ARE IMP NAMES, NOT (NECESSARILY) HOST NAMES

Computer system model, 1975



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  - * false sense of security
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e.g. MS-DOS ... Chooks for mistake prevention
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Strings on into
- e.g. "TOP Secret"

Need to deal with dynamics of use

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Takeaways:
- Difficult to crack protection boundary
- Detection rather than prevention

Key takeaways

- classic information security issues relevant to this day.
- visionary work by computer pioneers