# Assignment #4

# **CPEN 442**

November 1, 2015

SwagMasterFlex
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

I. QUESTION #1

II. QUESTION #2

Student #:

33657115

**Student #:** 33657115

Hash:

LTF6A2CBE86F0354722C9B377E9E187885D1DE6B5D

Hash:

CS0DF2939D499DCC46A693653DB281FDBB016B502B

Bits of entropy

 $\sim 13 \text{ bits} = ln(10^4)/ln(2)$ 

Bits of entropy

 $\sim$ 37 bits =  $ln(76^6)/ln(2)$ 

Password found:

1531

Password found:

v%jtaf

**CPU/GPU** time spent:

Less than a second

CPU/GPU time spent:

3 mins, 30 secs

(70,748,995,584 combinations tried)

I started off by examining the number of characters in the hashed password. The count came out to 42 characters (168 bits), which didn't match any of the common hashing algorithms. Next, I observed that the first two characters of my hash were non-hex, while the other 40 characters were hex characters.

This led me believe that the first two characters of the hash were stored as the salt, and the following 40 characters were the result of hashing the password using **SHA1**, since **SHA1** produces a 20-character hash (40-character hex-representation).

hex-representation).

To crack the password, I ran **oclHashcat** [2], a password cracker that runs on the GPU. It took less than a second for

oclHashcat to crack the password.

Since the format of the hash is the same as Question #1, I made the same assumption as before. Namely, that the hash function used to hash the password was **SHA1**.

Again, I ran **oclHashcat** in order to crack the password. It took the program about three and a half minutes to find the password.

# III. QUESTION #3

### Student #:

33657115

#### Found Password:

#1!Je\*iDiHBbB50#\_Bm

In order to begin, I disassembled the binary using **IDAPro** [1]. This allowed me to step through the assembly code in order to find the password.

The first thing I noticed was that the program was denying access if the length of the string was not nineteen characters  $(0\times13)$  long. Next, I inputted a nineteen-character long password, which allowed me to progress further through the code.

```
push offset arleaseLnterras; "Please enter password:"
push offset unk 41850; int
call sub 48300
add esp, 8
lea eax, [ebp+var_28]
push eax
push offset dword 418490
call sub 483470
add esp, 8
lea ecx, [ebp+var_28]
call unknown libname_1; Microsoft VisualC 2-11/net runtime
mov [ebp+var_2C], eax
mov [ebp+var_2C], eax
mov [ebp+var_2C] ex
since (ebp+var_2C)
push ecx; [char *
call strlen
dd esp, 4
cmp eax, 13h
nz short loc 481084
```

Fig. 1. Result of strlen() being compared with 0x13

At this point, I noticed that the program was fetching one character at a time from my inputted password string and offset  $0\times419051$ , and comparing these two values. I assumed that this was the password that the program was looking for. I extracted 19 characters from this offset location, and inputted this result on the next program iteration. This password finally granted me access.

```
loc_40107F:
               [ebp+var_2C]
                             ; char
push
          eax
call
           strlen
add
          [ebp+var_34], eax
short loc_4010B2
         <u>....</u> 🚄 🖟
                   ecx, off 419000
                         [ebp+var_
         add
                        byte ptr [ecx+51h]
[ebp+var_2C]
          MOVSX
                   edx.
                   eax,
          add
                         [ebp+var_34]
          movsx
                   ecx, byte ptr [eax]
          cmp
                   edx, ecx
                               4010R0
```

Fig. 2. My input string being compared with the stored password

In order to patch the program, I changed the value of  $\$ ebp + var\_2D$  to always be 1, indicating that the correct password was entered. When the value of  $\$ ebp + var\_2D$  was tested (or compared to 0), it would always pass through, and grant me access.




Fig. 3. Assigning  $ebp + var_2D$  to 1 prevents the program from jumping to the "Access Denied" block

# IV. QUESTION #4

#### Student #:

33657115

# Hash:

929a2e98651FD2DDE3629F8DB8F0BDC32B673BE4

#### **Found Password:**

M7rUAV

# **CPU/GPU** time spent:

2 mins, 53 secs

The process to find the required password for this problem was very similar to Question #3. Once again I used IDAPro. The presence of a SHA1 function led me to believe that password was stored as a hash. The only parameter to the SHA1 function was the input password itself, which led me to assume that no salt was used to hash the password.

```
call
         unknown libname 2 ; Microsoft VisualC 2
push
         ecx, [ebp+var_28]
lea
                              Microsoft VisualC 2
push
         eax
call
         SHA1
         esp, OCh
add
mov
         [ebp+var_29],
mov
         [ebp+var_44],
         short loc 40109F
jmp
```

Fig. 4. SHA1 function shown with parameters (notice no salt passed)

I noticed that my hashed input string was being compared with a string located at 0×4141F3. I extracted 20 characters from this location and took it to be the password hash. Next, I entered the hash into **oclHashcat** and it generated the corresponding plaintext password.

To patch the program, I changed the value of %ebp + var\_29 to always be 1. Fig. 5 highlights where I changed the value of this variable from 0 to 1. This allowed the program to always grant access, regardless of whether the password was correct or not.

In order to allow the user to change the password of the program, I created a Python program that asked the user for the new password, hashed it, and then overwrote the old hashed password, which was stored in static memory in the binary, with the new hashed password. The next time the user ran the program, they would need to enter the new password in order to gain access.




Fig. 5. My hashed input being compared with the hashed password. Also shows the instruction that I patched

#### REFERENCES

- [1] *IDAPro*. 2015. URL: https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/ (visited on 10/29/2015).
- [2] Jens 'atom'Steube. *oclHashcat*. 2015. URL: http://hashcat.net/oclhashcat/ (visited on 10/29/2015).