

# The Hegemon's Dilemma.\*

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## Abstract

By keeping dollars scarce in international markets, the U.S. – the hegemon – earns monopoly rents when borrowing in dollar debt and investing in foreign currency assets. However, in equilibrium, these rents both result in a strong dollar, which depresses global demand for its exports and leads to losses on existing holdings of foreign assets, and give rise to private sector over-borrowing. Using an open economy model with nominal rigidities and segmented financial markets, I show that, because of over-borrowing, monetary and fiscal policy alone cannot achieve the constrained efficient allocation. Absent a corrective macro-prudential tax on capital inflows, the hegemon is faced with a policy dilemma between achieving efficient stabilization *or* maximizing monopoly rents. By increasing liquidity in international markets, dollar swap lines extended by the central bank improve stabilization, but, unlike macro-prudential taxes, do so at the cost of eroding monopoly rents. The dilemma matters for distribution as well as efficiency. A scarce dollar leads to larger monopoly rents which benefit financially-active households, but they over-borrow at the expense of inactive households, who suffer the full blunt of aggregate demand externalities.

JEL Codes: E44, E63, F33, F40, G15

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# 1 Introduction

In periods of global financial distress, international capital systematically flows into dollar assets. Dollar shortages in foreign markets are an important and recurrent feature of recent financial crises, including as the 2007 Great Financial Crisis (GFC) and the early-stages of the Covid-19 pandemic. Foreign investors demand dollar debt in large quantities even though, as dollars becomes scarce, the dollar tends to appreciate and the return on a portfolio that is long in dollar bonds, funded by borrowing in foreign currencies becomes significantly negative.<sup>1</sup> Because of the specialness of the dollar, fluctuations in the supply and demand of dollar assets matter disproportionately in the world economy, as does the conduct of U.S. policy.<sup>2</sup> In particular, Rey (2015) shows that, because of a global financial cycle in asset prices driven by the dollar, countries in the rest of the world cannot set monetary policy independently, unless they sacrifice the free mobility of capital. Strong and volatile demand for dollars by foreign investors, however, also has stark implications for U.S. domestic outcomes as the losses incurred by foreign investors result in a transfer of wealth to the U.S. but are associated with a dollar appreciation. In this paper, I show how the specialness of the dollar (specifically the implications that the supply and demand of dollar assets in foreign markets) matters for U.S. domestic outcomes and how it constrains the working of U.S. monetary policy.

Any historical motivation on mopo indep / US pol?

To set the stage for my analysis, Figure 1 documents the recurrent pattern in dollar markets during periods of international turmoil. In particular, the dollar appreciates at the onset of crises and depreciates thereafter. Interest rates on 3-month U.S. treasuries fall, but only moderately (see Figure 1, Panel a). Together, these patterns imply that foreign investors forego significant returns to hold a portfolio of dollar debt which they finance by borrowing in foreign currency during crises (see Figure 1, Panel b). For example, the return on this portfolio in August 2008 was  $-6\%$  over the next 12 months.<sup>3</sup> Intuitively, foreign currencies which tend to contemporaneously depreciate vis-à-vis the dollar in periods of dollar shortages, systematically appreciate thereafter, therefore the dollar cost of repaying foreign debt rises, even if interest rate differentials are small. Additionally, since the GFC, the Federal Reserve has systematically extended dollar swap lines during crises reflecting the dollar shortages which arise. Furthermore, when dollar swap uptake is high, the dollar tends to stop appreciating and the borrowing

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<sup>1</sup>Dollar shortages in foreign markets can be large. McGuire and Peter (2009) document that European Banks' short term dollar funding gap (i.e dollar roll-over needs) were at least 7% of U.S. GDP at the onset of the GFC. Aldasoro et al. (2020) document that in June 2018, non-U.S. banks had a total of \$12.8 trillion of dollar-denominated borrowing, used to finance purchases of U.S. assets.

<sup>2</sup>For instance, an acute shortage of dollar assets can lead to deflationary safety traps (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2017)) and a sharp tightening in international financial conditions (Jiang (2021)). Kalemli-Ozcan (2019), Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020), and Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2020), amongst others, show that U.S. monetary policy has large spillovers in foreign and particularly emerging economies.

<sup>3</sup>Krishnamurthy and Lustig (2019) further show that foreign investors have very poor market timing when purchasing dollar bonds – they tend to buy dollar bonds when the price of dollars is high, as documented in Appendix A. This appendix also contains further details on the construction of Figure 1 and provides further evidence on the returns across country groups and the timing of purchases by foreign investors.

spread systematically narrows.

Tie in with appendix




Figure 1: (a) 2-month forward sum of ex-post deviations from the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) based on a trade-weighted average of G10 and EM7 currencies in *p.p.* (b) 3-month Interest rate differentials, 3-month dollar index movements Shaded regions reflect periods when dollar swap facilities exceeded \$60000 million. Source: Global Financial Data, Federal Reserve and author's calculations.

The contribution of this paper is to re-consider the trade-off faced by the hegemon, as issuer of dollar assets, and show why this results in a policy dilemma between efficiently stabilizing internal objectives (output and prices) *or* maximizing monopoly rents earned in international financial markets. The trade-off is driven by the following elements. A scarce dollar leads to a higher return on the net investment position of the U.S.– interpretable as monopoly rents from issuing dollar debt which result in a transfer from abroad.<sup>4</sup> However, this transfer leads to an equilibrium appreciation of the dollar which depresses the global demand for U.S. exports, resulting in unemployment and, on impact, results in losses on the portfolio of foreign-currency

<sup>4</sup>Farhi and Maggiori (2016)) also consider a model where a hegemon issuer of reserve currency earns monopoly rents, but they do not consider optimal monetary policy in the hegemon and, in their framework, monopoly rents arise only through lower interest rates.

denominated assets coming due.<sup>5</sup> Critically, the demand for dollars also causes the private sector in the hegemon to over-borrow in international markets.

The central result in this paper is to show that, in the absence of an optimal macro-prudential tax to correct over-borrowing, monetary and fiscal policy alone are unable to support the constrained efficient allocation when there are dollar shortages abroad. Namely, vis-à-vis the presence of monopoly rents putting pressure on the dollar to appreciate, output and inflation stabilization requires policy rates to be cut; reducing the incentive for households to borrow inefficiently from abroad requires rates to be raised. To best appreciate the implications of the policy dilemma, I additionally consider the distributional consequences of dollar shortages and the ability of policy to efficiently assign resources across households in the hegemon. Extending the model to allow for the fact that, realistically, only a measure of households participates in financial markets, I show that dollar shortages systematically favour active households, and that these households over-borrow at the expense of their financially-inactive counterparts.

I adopt a standard open-economy model, featuring nominal rigidities and financial frictions in international markets. Specifically, dollar and foreign currency markets for financial assets are separate, building on the segmented markets framework of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015). In this framework, dollar assets can be issued by U.S. public and private agents and they can also be manufactured, at an increasing cost, by international financial intermediaries. Because intermediation is costly, a rise in the demand for dollar debt by foreign investors generates a dollar appreciation and a fall in the cost of borrowing in dollars, consistent with the empirical evidence. Moreover, because intermediation costs are increasing, the U.S. faces a downward sloping demand for dollar debt. The model is consistent with empirical evidence both on the implications of dollar demand and supply shocks (see e.g. Krishnamurthy and Lustig, 2019 and Georgiades2021) and on the implications of dollar swap lines (see Bahaj and Reis (2018)).

**what i do, what i dont (why is dollar special/ desirable?)**

The main results of my analysis are as follows. First, I establish that dollar shortages abroad lead to private sector over-borrowing by hegemon households because of two externalities: a financial (issuance) externality and an aggregate demand externality.<sup>6</sup> The former arises because atomistic households borrowing in financial markets do not internalize that the country as a whole faces a downward sloping demand for dollar debt (the result of frictions faced by financial intermediaries). In other words, atomistic households fail to internalize that issuing an additional unit of dollar debt lowers the the price for all other units of debt, both private and public. Aggregate demand externalities are the result of nominal rigidities in goods markets. Households do not take into account the stimulative effects of their spending on domestic goods.

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<sup>5</sup>As documented in Figure 1, a portfolio funded by dollar borrowing and long in foreign assets suffers losses at the onset of the crisis. However, this is followed by large returns during the crisis. Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2020) describe the higher expected future returns on the U.S. portfolio as a “capitalization” effect and document a wealth inflow to the U.S. during the GFC. This net wealth flow is debated in the literature: on empirical grounds, Maggiori (2017) and Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2018) find evidence of losses for the U.S., albeit using a narrower definition for wealth. See Appendix A for a comparison of the results in the two papers.

<sup>6</sup>Aggregate demand externalities are studied in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) and Farhi and Werning (2016), amongst others. Financial externalities are studied in Fanelli and Straub (2018), Basu et al. (2020) and Bianchi and Lorenzoni (2021).

To show that these two externalities translate to over-borrowing in the hegemon, I derive that the optimal macro-prudential response to an increase in dollar shortages, at the constrained efficient allocation, is a positive tax on borrowing. I define the constrained efficient allocation as the best feasible allocation that can be supported by the optimal mix of monetary, fiscal and macro-prudential policy. These three instruments are required for the hegemon to both stabilize the economy efficiently and maximize monopoly rents from the issuance of dollar assets.

Second, I show that when the borrowing tax is not set optimally or is not available, private sector over-borrowing weighs on the trade-offs faced by monetary and fiscal policy. Starting with monetary policy, I show that, in response to dollar shortages, the optimal interest rate response is expansionary, so as to mitigate the pressure on the dollar appreciate and sustain the global demand for U.S. goods and employment. However, monetary policy internalizes the borrowing externality. Because of this, monetary policy cuts interest rates by less than it would in the constrained efficient allocation— to encourage households to borrow less.<sup>7</sup> A similar second-best argument applies to fiscal policy. I show that the dilemma I propose, and the over-borrowing at its core, survives even in a flexible-price environment as the model feature monetary non-neutrality, as in Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021).

The result that monetary policy in the hegemon cannot efficiently balance internal objectives when there are dollar shortages abroad, unless it manages capital inflows using a tax on private borrowing, complements the idea put forth by Rey (2015). Rey argues that countries cannot set monetary policy independently because of a global financial cycle in asset prices driven by the dollar. I adopt a strict characterization of monetary policy independence, consistent with Farhi and Werning (2014), in the spirit Mundell’s policy trilemma.<sup>8</sup> I define monetary policy to be independent if it can achieve the constrained efficient allocation absent the use of any tax on borrowing. Based on this definition, my findings suggest that the U.S. *also* faces a Mundellian policy dilemma, since monetary policy does not achieve the constrained efficient allocation due to capital flows driven by foreigners’ demand for dollars.

Third, I find that the policy dilemma gives scope for direct dollar liquidity provision in international markets, as exemplified by the Federal Reserve (FED) dollar swap lines, to improve welfare. Swap lines are agreements according to which the FED lends dollars to a foreign central bank, against good collateral and over short maturities, in exchange for foreign currency. The foreign central bank, in turn, lends dollars to its domestic financial institutions alleviating their dollar constraints. Since the GFC, swap lines have been used extensively. The outstanding dollar swap liabilities amounted to 38% of U.S. GDP in 2008 Q4.<sup>9</sup> Like the (missing) macro-

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<sup>7</sup>See e.g. Fanelli (2017) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2018) for an analysis of optimal monetary policy in open economies with incomplete markets. Egorov and Mukhin (2019) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2020) study optimal monetary policy when exports are predominantly priced in dollars.

<sup>8</sup>Mundell’s classical view is that countries can achieve two objectives out of capital market openness (no taxes on capital flows), monetary policy independence (addressing domestic objectives) and exchange rate stability. Recent literature has instead suggested that efficient monetary policy requires taxation in capital markets as well, therefore the policy choice is between exchange rate stability with free capital mobility and no monetary independence or monetary policy independence with capital flows management.

<sup>9</sup>Dollar swaps signal a recognition by the FED of the role of dollars in the international markets, and its own role as a *global* lender of last resort in the spirit of Bagehot, see Bahaj and Reis (2018).

prudential borrowing tax, dollar swaps allow the hegemon to address inefficient over-borrowing and stabilize output, but, in stark contrast with the borrowing tax, they achieve these objectives at the cost of eroding monopoly rents as dollar assets become more easily available. Since dollar swaps address over-borrowing, they help the hegemon regain monetary policy “independence”. In the model, dollar swaps never improve welfare when the optimal macro-prudential is used.

The workings of dollar swap lines in the model are as follows. Financial intermediaries can manufacture dollar debt but are subject to portfolio costs and position limits. Because of this, they are only willing to issue dollar debt if the cost of borrowing in dollars is lower than the cost of borrowing in foreign currency. The tighter the intermediaries’ portfolio constraint, the larger the spread required for the dollar market to clear. By exchanging dollars for foreign currency, dollar swaps increase liquidity in international markets and alleviate the frictions constraining the supply of dollar debt by financial intermediaries. Since smaller dollar shortages moderate the pressure on the dollar to appreciate, swaps contribute to sustaining employment and weaken the incentive for hegemon residents to (over-)borrow. In the case where the only shock in the economy is a one-off dollar demand shock, dollar swaps can, by themselves, fully mute the effects of the shock—but, the resulting allocation does not coincide with the constrained optimal. This is because a macro-prudential tax that postpones consumption can simultaneously address over-borrowing *and* increase the size of monopoly rents transferred from abroad. I show that the benefits from dollar swap lines are substantial when interest rates cannot be optimally adjusted and pass-through to import prices is low.

I contrast dollar swap policy with the supply of public debt, through which the U.S. government can also satisfy foreign demand for dollar assets. However, public debt changes the government balance sheet and is needed to optimally smooth spending and taxes, particularly during periods of financial distress. Dollar swaps, instead, have little effect on the public sector balance sheet and directly target the spread in the cost of borrowing in dollars vis-a-vis foreign currency. Like with monetary policy, the presence of over-borrowing implies fiscal policy cannot efficiently address internal objectives. Quantitative easing by which the Fed purchases U.S. treasuries also results in a reduction in the supply of dollar assets domestically and abroad.<sup>10</sup>

Fourth, I highlight that dollar shortages have strong domestic distributional consequences. Given the over-borrowing inefficiency, I consider an extension of the model which distinguishes between households who are financially-active, and can trade in dollar debt vis-à-vis financial intermediaries, and inactive households who consume their current income. Dollar shortages abroad have heterogeneous effects on these two types of households. Financially-active households benefit from higher returns on their financial position (short in dollar bonds and long in foreign assets) and, unlike inactive households, are partly able to smooth the income loss from depressed exports and from losses on the government’s portfolio of assets. Inactive households lose out even if, in equilibrium, financially-active households spend part of the rents they earn on domestic goods, raising domestic income for all residents. The use of dollar swap lines systematically redistributes from financially-active to inactive households because they mute the

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<sup>10</sup>Krishnamurthy and Lustig (2019) show that quantitative easing where the Fed purchased treasuries indeed widened the treasury basis, consistent with larger shortages in my model.

effect of shortages on the exchange rate and erode monopoly rents.<sup>11</sup> I note that distributional issues persist even at the constrained optimal allocation. If the majority of households participates in financial markets, the optimal borrowing tax prioritises monopoly rent maximization to boost aggregate welfare, at the expense of inactive households who suffer from depressed export demand.

I close the paper with a simple quantitative exercise. I calibrate the hegemon economy to the U.S. in 2008Q1, specifically targeting the size and currency composition of U.S. gross assets and liabilities, detailed in Appendix A. I then consider a one-off unanticipated shock to foreign investors' demand for dollars which leads to a 6-8% appreciation of the dollar (depending on the interest rate response), and results in a spread in the cost of borrowing in foreign currency vis-à-vis dollars of about 6%, consistent with the U.S. experience during the GFC (see Figure 1). Consistent with evidence in Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2020), dollar shortages generally lead to a net transfer into the U.S. with monopoly amounting to about 8% of GDP.<sup>12</sup>

I highlight three key quantitative results. While optimal monetary policy alone (a 3% interest rate cut) can improve aggregate outcomes in the face of dollar shortages, it achieves only *one-third* of the welfare gain which is possible at the constrained optimal allocation. While if interest rates do not respond, dollar shortages cost about 0.35% of consumption equivalent per quarter over the 2 year duration of the crisis, when interest rates adjust optimally the economy gains the equivalent of 0.5% per quarter in the aggregate. The constrained optimal allocation requires a large macro-prudential borrowing tax of up to 8%, highlighting that such an instrument is not used in practice, and interest rates adjust by about 5% (subject to an effective lower bound). At this allocation, the aggregate welfare gain rises to 1.5% consumption equivalent per quarter. As a corollary, since a one-off unexpected increase in dollar shortages improves welfare, extending dollar swap lines will not achieve the constrained efficient allocation, i.e. the hegemon planner can still do better.

Furthermore, I find that the distributional implications of dollar shortages persist even when monetary policy adjusts and, surprisingly, the allocation can become more inequitable at the constrained efficient. When monetary policy responds optimally, inactive households experience consumption losses (0.17% per quarter) which are more than offset by gains for active (0.81%). At the constrained efficient allocation, large gains for active households (2.2%) overshadow losses incurred by financially-inactive households. In a calibration where, reasonably, 30% of households are inactive, with equal Pareto weights, the planner prioritises active household welfare and the optimal borrowing tax maximizes monopoly rents and targets stabilization, as preferred by active households. As such, the welfare of the minority of inactive households falls when the optimal borrowing tax is used (0.23% loss vs. 0.17% loss in the case of monetary policy alone).

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<sup>11</sup>Chien and Morris (2017) show that financial market participation varies by U.S. state even when controlling for household income. Therefore, dollar shortages introduce a political trade-off in the hegemon and the extension of dollar swap lines can become a political decision.

<sup>12</sup>This should be interpreted as an upper bound, since all assets in the model are one period securities and I assume all liabilities are dollar-denominated, whilst all assets are foreign-currency denominated.



**Related Literature.** Thematically, this paper belongs to the literature on the role of the U.S. and the dollar in the International Monetary System (IMS). Amongst recent contributions, Maggiori (2017), Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2018), Kekre and Lenel (2020) consider general equilibrium models where the U.S. has a larger capacity to bear risk, earning excess returns outside of crises but facing losses during crises. Farhi and Maggiori (2016) emphasize, that the U.S. faces a downward sloping demand for its debt, derived from mean-variance investors, and earns monopoly rents. Similarly, Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2020) consider a model where the U.S. earns seignorage rents from issuing debt because foreign investors assign a convenience yield to dollar debt. Relative to these papers, I highlight the role for policy to manage the trade-offs faced by the U.S. and I highlight the macroeconomic externalities which arise.

I draw on a new, mostly theoretical, literature on optimal capital controls which aims to identify macroeconomic externalities in goods and financial markets. Specifically Costinot, Lorenzoni, and Werning (2014) and Lloyd and Marin (2020), study the use of capital controls to internalise terms of trade externalities both inter-temporally and intra-temporally, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) and Farhi and Werning (2016) look at aggregate demand externalities and Basu et al. (2020) and Bianchi and Lorenzoni (2021) analyze financial externalities. Relative to these contributions, I show that these externalities result in a U.S. policy dilemma which, absent capital controls, compromises U.S. monetary and fiscal policy independence.<sup>13</sup> Then, I propose an externality-based interpretation of dollar swap lines and I highlight how the over-borrowing inefficiency can be exacerbated by limited financial market participation.

Even though dollar swap lines have been one of the most prominent policy innovations over the past decade, there is comparatively little literature on their effect on macro outcomes.<sup>14</sup> A number of contributions have assessed the efficacy of dollar swaps empirically: Baba and Packer (2009) and Moessner and Allen (2013) analyse the effect of swap lines during the GFC using variation across currency pairs and Aizenman, Ito, and Pasricha (2021) conduct a similar analysis for the aftermath of COVID-19. Bahaj and Reis (2018) use both cross-sectional and time-series variation to show that dollar swaps introduce a ceiling on deviations from the covered interest rate parity, reduce portfolio flows into dollar assets and lower the price of dollar corporate bonds. Of these papers, only Bahaj and Reis (2018) consider a theoretical framework, and their analysis is restricted to a three-period model of global banks which later allows for a basic model of production and investment. The contribution of this paper is to characterize dollar swap lines as part of the (Ramsey) optimal policy and highlight a meaningful trade-off facing the U.S. when it extends these to foreign central banks.

Finally, this paper relates to an established literature that studies the implications of limited financial market participation on risk-sharing outcomes in closed and open economies.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup>Farhi and Werning (2014) emphasize that capital controls are generally useful, in addition to monetary policy, to smooth the terms of trade in a New-Keynesian model.

<sup>14</sup>McCauley and Schenk (2020) detail the history of liquidity provision policies by the U.S. and other central banks.

<sup>15</sup>See e.g. Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002), Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009), Kollmann (2012) and Cociuba and Ramanarayanan (2017)



Recently, Fanelli and Straub (2018) derive optimal foreign exchange interventions in a model with segmented international financial markets where hand-to-mouth households are hurt by a pecuniary externality. De Ferra, Mitman, and Romei (2019) study the effects of a sudden stop in capital inflows in a small-open HANK economy where household debt is partly denominated in foreign currency. Auclert et al. (2021), build on Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), to analyze the effects of household heterogeneity on the costs of an appreciation. In this paper, I emphasize the distributional consequences for U.S. households of dollar shortages and derive how limited participation interacts with the macroeconomic externalities which arise. Furthermore, I analyze the scope for monetary policy and dollar swaps as instruments for redistribution.

This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 considers a stylized framework which outlines the key trade-offs. Section 4 solves for welfare maximizing policy and analyzes the hegemon's policy dilemma. Section 4.3 considers the distributional implications of dollar shortages in a two-agent version of the model. Section 5 conducts a calibration exercise. Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Model Setup

There is a continuum of countries  $i \in [0, 1]$ . I denote the *hegemon* by  $i = 0$  and suppress the subscript for domestic variables. The baseline setup builds on a standard open-economy model as in Galí and Monacelli (2005), recently adopted in, e.g. Farhi and Werning (2016) and Egorov and Mukhin (2019). To distinguish between a market for dollar assets and a market for foreign currency assets, I allow for financial market segmentation in the spirit of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015). The hegemon differs from other countries in  $i = [0, 1]$  in one important way— it is the monopoly issuer of dollar assets in its market segment.

**Households.** A representative household in country  $i = 0$  (Home) has preferences described by the following instantaneous utility function,

$$\mathcal{U}_t = \frac{C_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \kappa \frac{L_t^{1+\psi}}{1+\psi} \quad (1)$$

where  $C_t$  is consumption of private goods and  $L_t$  is labour supplied. Private consumption is an index composed of Home and Foreign good varieties,

$$C_t = [\chi^{\frac{1}{\theta}} C_{H,t}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} + (1-\chi)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} C_{F,t}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}]^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \quad (2)$$

and  $C_{H,t}, C_{F,t}$  consists of,

$$C_{H,t} = \left[ \int_0^1 C_{H,t}(j)^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} dj \right]^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}, \quad (3)$$

$$C_{F,t} = \left[ \int_0^1 C_{i,t}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} di \right]^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}, \quad C_{i,t} = \left[ \int_0^1 C_{i,t}(j)^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} dj \right]^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}},$$

where  $j$  denotes different varieties of the the same good and  $\epsilon$  is the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties,  $i$  denotes countries and  $\theta$  is the constant (macro) elasticity of substitution between imports from different countries, see e.g Feenstra et al. (2018). The parameter  $\chi$  reflects the weight of domestic goods in a country's final consumption index, where  $\chi > 0.5$  captures home bias.<sup>16</sup>

Households purchase goods, earns wages  $W_t$  from providing labour  $L_t$  and receive profits  $\Pi_t = \Pi_t^g + \Pi_t^f$  from their ownership of goods' and financial firms respectively. Households borrow in one-period, non-contingent bonds  $x_t$  at time  $t$ , denominated in domestic currency, and repay  $R_t$  at  $t+1$ . I also allow households to have an exposure to foreign-currency denominated assets. Households take a long position of  $a_t^F$  dollars in foreign currency debt (purchasing  $\frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} a_t^F$  units) with a dollar return  $R_t^* \mathcal{E}_t$  at  $t+1$ .<sup>17</sup> Households also receive a lump-sum rebate from the government  $T_t$  in every period. The budget constraint is given by,

$$P_{F,t} C_{F,t} + P_{H,t} C_{H,t} \leq \Pi_t + W_t L_t - T_t + x_t - R_{t-1} x_{t-1} - a_t^F + R_{t-1}^* \mathcal{E}_t \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} a_{t-1}^F \quad (4)$$

The household's optimization problem consists of choosing a sequence  $\{C_{H,t}, C_{F,t}, L_t, x_t\}$  to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (4), taking initial debt  $x_0$ , production  $\{Y_{H,t}\}$  and prices  $\{W_t, R_t, P_{H,t}, P_{F,t}\}$  as given. The first-order conditions characterizing the households' optimal allocation are given by,

$$\frac{C_t^{-\sigma}}{P_t} - \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{C_{t+1}^{-\sigma}}{P_{t+1}} \right] R_t = 0, \quad (5)$$

$$\kappa L_t^\psi C^\sigma = \frac{W_t}{P_t}, \quad (6)$$

$$C_{H,t} = \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \left( \frac{P_{H,t}}{P_{F,t}} \right)^{-\theta} C_{F,t}, \quad (7)$$

where (5) is the household Euler equation governing the intertemporal allocation of consumption, taking the gross interest rate  $R_t$  as given, (6) characterises the optimal labour allocation and (7) determines the allocation of spending between home and foreign good varieties.

<sup>16</sup>Foreign households have analogous preferences and face a symmetrical problem detailed in Appendix F.

<sup>17</sup>This is consistent with evidence in Curcuru, Thomas, and Warnock (2013), building on Curcuru et al. (2011), who show that the U.S. earns a positive return on its net investment position even when its a net debtor. Gourinchas and Rey (2005) and Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2018) emphasize that the U.S. tends to borrow in safe dollar liabilities, and invest in riskier foreign currency assets—explaining part of the return differential.

In the standard segmented markets framework of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015), households can only hold domestic currency assets. Here, households can take a limited position in foreign currency assets  $a_t^F$  which I take as exogenous and calibrate to the U.S. gross foreign assets in the quantitative exercise.<sup>18</sup>

**Firms.** In each country there is a continuum of firms indexed by  $j$ , which produce a unique variety of tradable goods and are endowed with linear production technology which uses only labour,

$$Y_{H,t}(j) = A_t L_t(j) \quad (8)$$

where  $A_t$  is a Home (aggregate) productivity. Goods are consumed both domestically and exported abroad:

$$Y_{H,t} = C_{H,t} + G_{H,t} + C_{H,t}^* \quad (9)$$

where  $G_{H,t}$  denotes government expenditure on home varieties and  $C_{H,t}^*$  denotes foreign demand.

I focus on the case where prices are perfectly rigid.<sup>19</sup> I allow for a constant employment tax  $\tau^L$  and define the effective wage for firms by  $\tilde{W}_t = W_t(1 + \tau^L)$ .<sup>20</sup> When prices are rigid, I distinguish between two pricing paradigms. Under producer currency pricing (PCP), domestic producers set identical domestic prices for all the goods they produce, regardless of whether they are consumed domestically or exported, as assumed in Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Farhi and Werning (2012). However, in the data, exported goods are predominantly denominated in dollars. This is referred to as DCP and is documented in Gopinath et al. (2020). I assume the hegemon also issues the dominant currency, consistent with the case of the dollar.<sup>21</sup>

Consider the maximization faced by a firm  $j$  in the Home country when prices are perfectly rigid,

$$\max_{P_H(j)} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left[ P_{H,t}(j) Y_{H,t}(j) - \frac{\tilde{W}_t}{A_t} L_t(j) \right] \quad (10)$$

In a symmetric equilibrium  $P_{H,t}(j) = P_{H,t}$ ,  $Y_{H,t}(j) = Y_{H,t}$ . The price is given by,

$$P_{H,t} = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} (1 + \tau^L) \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t+s} \frac{W_{t+s}}{A_{t+s}} Y_{H,t+s} \right]}{\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t+s} Y_{H,t+s} \right]}, \quad (11)$$

where the labour subsidy is chosen to eliminate steady state monopolistic distortions  $1 + \tau^L =$

<sup>18</sup>n Fanelli and Straub (2018), the authors assume there is a maximum position in foreign currency that households can take, i.e  $\bar{a}^F$ . If there is no uncertainty, households will take a position  $\bar{a}^F$  at time  $t$  as long as  $R^* \frac{\varepsilon_{t+1}}{\varepsilon_t} > R_t$ . Partial segmentation is considered in the online appendix of Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) where the demand  $a_t^F$  is limited to linear rules.

<sup>19</sup>This assumptions, also used in Egorov and Mukhin (2019) and Basu et al. (2020), allow me to abstract from price dynamics and dispersion. Price dynamics in open economies have been the focus of a large literature on open economy New-Keynesian models, see Galí and Monacelli (2005), Farhi and Werning (2012) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2018) amongst others.

<sup>20</sup>In Appendix A, I detail the maximization for a firm in any country  $i$  and show that the perfectly rigid price setting condition can be derived as the limit of Rotemberg pricing.

<sup>21</sup>Recent literature argues that the dominance of the dollar in financial and goods market is closely connected, see Gopinath and Stein (2018) and Chahrour and Valchev (2021).

$(\epsilon - 1)/\epsilon$  and  $\Lambda_t$  is households stochastic discount factor. Consistent with the literature, I assume firms set the same price for all export destinations. In contrast, if prices are perfectly flexible, firm  $j$  chooses prices such that for each period,

$$\max_{P_{H,t}(j)} P_{H,t}(j)Y_{H,t}(j) - \frac{\tilde{W}_t}{A_t}L_t(j) \quad (12)$$

and in equilibrium,

$$P_{H,t}^{flex} = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}(1 + \tau^L)\frac{W_t}{A_t} \quad (13)$$

such that firms charge a constant mark-up over  $\tilde{W}_t/A_t$ . simple like in bianchi lorenzoni;

**Price indices, exchange rates and foreign variables.** The home consumer price index (CPI) is defined as  $P_t = [\chi P_{H,t}^{1-\theta} + (1 - \chi)P_{F,t}^{1-\theta}]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}$ . The home producer price index (PPI) is given by  $P_{H,t} = (\int P_{H,t}(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$ . The import price index is given by  $P_{F,t} = (\int P_{i,t}^{1-\theta} di)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}$  in dollars, where  $P_{i,t} = (\int P_{i,t}(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$  is country  $i$ 's PPI in dollars. I define the world price index  $P_t^* = (\int P_{i,t}^{1-\theta} di)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}$  where  $P_{i,t}^i$  is the price of good  $i$  in country  $i$  expressed in domestic currency. I define  $\mathcal{E}_t$  as the effective dollar nominal exchange rate, where an increase in  $\mathcal{E}_t$  reflects a depreciation of the dollar. Import and export prices for the home country satisfy:

$$P_{H,t}^* = \frac{P_{H,t}}{\mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}, \quad P_{F,t} = P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^{\lambda^*} \quad (14)$$

where  $\lambda$  is exchange rate pass-through to imports in  $i = 0$  and  $\lambda^*$  is exchange rate pass-through on hegemon exports. Under (full) DCP,  $\lambda = 0, \lambda^* = 1$ .<sup>22</sup> Assuming prices at the border are perfectly rigid, consumer prices are time-varying only if pass-through is non-zero. Without loss of generality, I assume  $\bar{P}_F^* = 1$ .

To emphasize the distinction between the Home (hegemon) and other countries, I assume all foreign countries are symmetric and I model a single foreign sector consisting of  $i \in (0, 1]$  countries. Foreign sector variables are denoted by an asterisk.

## 2.1 International Financial Markets

Asset markets are incomplete and segmented. Markets are incomplete because households in each country trade in non-contingent bonds denominated in domestic currency. Markets are segmented because households are confined to trade within their own financial market segment only, i.e. they cannot directly trade with households in other countries. For simplicity, I focus on a ‘*dollar*’ and a ‘*foreign*’ market segment only.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup>For comparison,  $\lambda = \lambda^* = 1$  under PCP where the law of one price holds.

<sup>23</sup>Figure 17 in Appendix F illustrates the market structure: trade in goods across markets is unrestricted, but trade in assets must be intermediated.

A continuum of financial intermediaries indexed by  $k \in [0, \hat{k})$  trade one-period, non-contingent bonds at each time  $t$ , across market segments, with agents in the home and foreign segments. Each financier starts with no initial capital, faces a participation cost  $k$  and position limits  $\{-\bar{Q}, \bar{Q}\}$ .<sup>24</sup> The variable  $k$  corresponds to both the financiers' cost of participating and their index. Without loss of generality, I assume financial intermediaries trade in a single foreign bond with the foreign sector with dollar return  $R_t^* \mathcal{E}_t$ . Since foreign countries are symmetric,  $R_{i,t} = R_t^*$  for  $i > 0$ . Financiers choose a position in dollar bonds  $q_t(k)$ , financed by a position  $-\frac{q_t(k)}{\mathcal{E}_t}$  in foreign-currency bonds, to maximize profits earned at  $t + 1$ . Specifically,  $q_t(k) < 0$  denotes a short position in dollar bonds, i.e. financiers sell a promise to a dollar tomorrow in exchange for  $q_t(k)$  dollars today. The problem of an individual financier, indexed by  $k$ , at time  $t$  can be summarised as,

$$\max_{q_t(k) \in \{-\bar{Q}_t, \bar{Q}_t\}} \left( R_t - R_t^* \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}}{\mathcal{E}_t} \right] \right) q_t(k) - k$$

Financial intermediaries participate as long as  $|R_t - R_t^* \frac{\mathbb{E}_t[\mathcal{E}_{t+1}]}{\mathcal{E}_t}| \bar{Q}_{t+1} > k$ . In equilibrium, a measure  $\mathbf{k}_t = |R_t - R_t^* \frac{\mathbb{E}_t[\mathcal{E}_{t+1}]}{\mathcal{E}_t}| \bar{Q}_t$  participate. The total demand for dollars by financiers is given by  $Q_t = \text{sign}(R_t - R_t^* \frac{\mathbb{E}_t[\mathcal{E}_{t+1}]}{\mathcal{E}_t}) \bar{Q}_t \mathbf{k}_t$ . I define  $\Gamma_t = 1/\bar{Q}_t^2$ .

In equilibrium, because of non-zero entry costs and position limits, financial intermediaries require excess returns when there are dollar imbalances in international markets ( $Q_t \neq 0$ ), leading to deviations from UIP:

$$\left( R_t - R_t^* \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}}{\mathcal{E}_t} \right] \right) = \Gamma_t Q_t \quad (15)$$

The LHS of (15) reflects the return required by financiers to engage in arbitrage across markets. Suppose there is a shortage of dollars  $Q_t < 0$ . Then, (15) is the compensation financiers require to intermediate dollar shortages for a given level of (inverse) dollar liquidity  $\Gamma$ .<sup>25</sup> In periods of low liquidity, when financiers are more constrained (i.e.  $\bar{Q}_t$  is low and  $\Gamma_t$  is high) a larger spread is required for a given  $Q_t$ . As a result, the dollar price of dollar debt exceeds that of foreign-currency denominated debt.<sup>26</sup> In the limit where dollar liquidity is abundant ( $\Gamma_t = 0$ ) the spread does not depend on  $Q_t$ .

Furthermore, I assume there is a separate group of non-optimizing, unconstrained agents belonging to the foreign sector who have inelastic demand  $\xi_t \geq 0$  for dollar debt, which they

<sup>24</sup>Position limits can be motivated by collateral constraints, see e.g. Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Gromb and Vayanos (2010) or value at risk constraints, see Adrian and Shin (2014). The timing of the intermediation problem follows Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002) and Cociuba and Ramanarayanan (2017). Position limits restrict the level of dollar liquidity in markets. Evidence of this is provided in Appendix A.

<sup>25</sup>The distinction between deviations in the covered (CIP) and uncovered (UIP) interest rate parities depends on risk. In particular, deviations in the covered interest rate parity arise in the absence of risk (i.e. when financiers fully hedge exchange rate risk using swaps) and translate 1:1 to deviations in uncovered interest rate parity. The model is silent on this distinction, but UIP deviations tend to be an order of magnitude greater than their CIP counterparts.

<sup>26</sup>Liao (2020) and Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2020) show that a similar but smaller spread exists for corporate bonds (AAA to AA-) as well, suggesting the private sector in the U.S. also benefits from this.

finance by taking a position  $-\xi_t/\mathcal{E}_t$  in foreign currency debt. Market clearing in the dollar segment requires,<sup>27</sup>

$$Q_t = x_t - \xi_t, \quad (16)$$

where  $x_t$  is dollar debt issued by households and  $\xi_t$  is inelastic demand for dollar debt from foreign agents. For markets to clear, the financiers' position in dollar debt ( $Q_t$ ) is equal to the supply of dollar assets ( $x_t + B_t$ ) minus the demand for dollar debt  $\xi_t$ . Equations (15) and (16) summarise the dollar market equilibrium.

The model implies an upward sloping supply curve for dollar debt by financial intermediaries. Figure 2 below illustrates the equilibrium in the dollar market.<sup>28</sup> Excess demand for dollar debt generates monopolistic rents for both financiers (green triangle) and the hegemon (purple rectangle), which I discuss in detail later on.




Figure 2: Equilibrium in the dollar market.  $F^S$  denotes the supply of dollars ( $Q_t < 0$ ) by financial intermediaries and  $F^D$  denotes the demand for dollar debt financial intermediaries face. The green triangle denotes financiers' profits whilst the purple area captures rents accruing to the hegemon.

The framework above captures two key features of dollar markets. First, non-U.S. entities supply substantial amounts of dollar debt in foreign markets, but face costs. Evidence of issuance of U.S. debt by non-U.S. entities is presented in Bruno and Shin (2017) and Maggiori, Neiman, and Schreger (2018). Relatedly, Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2020) study a model where foreign firms are able to produce dollar debt at the cost of balance sheet mismatch. Second, following an unanticipated increase in  $\xi_t$ , foreign investors demand dollars in a period

<sup>27</sup>Demand for dollar debt may be efficient because dollar debt economizes on liquidation costs in the foreign sector, as in Liu, Yaron, and Schmid (2019). In that case, a widening in the borrowing cost spread can lead to inefficiency in foreign markets.

<sup>28</sup>For simplicity, I assume  $B_t = 0$  and  $x_t = a_t^F/\mathcal{E}_t$  in Figure 2. The demand faced by financial intermediaries when foreign investors inelastically demand  $\xi_t$  and U.S. households supply an exogenous quantity  $x$  is  $\xi_t - x$ .

when dollars are expensive, i.e they have bad market timing, as is documented in the data by Krishnamurthy and Lustig (2019) (see Appendix A). Financial intermediaries at  $t - 1$  priced assets based on an expectation  $\mathbb{E}_t[\xi_t] = \bar{\xi}$  (its steady state value), so they did not require  $\mathcal{E}_{t-1}$  to appreciate.

**Multipolar World.** To highlight the special position of the hegemon in the model, consider the case when there are  $N$  competing issuers within a segment, and for clarity, consider the dollar segment. Market clearing is then given by,

$$Q_t = x_t + B_t + \sum_{i>0}^{N-1} x_t^i - \xi_t, \quad (17)$$

where  $x_t^i$  is the issuance of dollar assets by issuer  $i > 0$  households. If foreign issuers of close-substitute debt respond to changes in  $\xi_t$  (which leads to a fall in  $R_t$ ) by a factor  $\epsilon > 0$ , as the number of issuers becomes large, shortages cannot arise in the market segment. <sup>29</sup>

## 2.2 Dollar Swap Lines

A key institutional innovation in recent years has been the (re-)establishment of dollar swap lines. As part of a swap line agreement, the U.S. Federal Reserve lends dollars to a foreign central bank over a short maturity. The foreign central bank, in turn, lends dollars to their domestic financial institutions— in this instance, the financial intermediation sector. The FED receives a foreign currency deposit as collateral and at the end of the loan, the FED gets its currency back at the original exchange rate. In the model, I assume the FED swaps dollars directly with financial intermediaries expanding the portfolio limits they face.




Figure 3: Weekly outstanding dollar swaps (Wednesday level). Source: Federal Reserve

<sup>29</sup>In Appendix B, I show within a stylized model that if  $N$  symmetric governments compete a la Cournot when issuing substitutable varieties of debt, dollar shortages in international markets go to zero, as do rents from issuance.



Absent dollar swaps, each financier can promise to deliver a maximum  $\bar{Q}$  dollars tomorrow. Instead, when dollar swaps are available, I assume the financier can promise an additional  $Q^s$  dollars tomorrow, which it draws from the swap facility.<sup>30</sup> Financiers will choose to do so as long as the currency-adjusted interest rate differential is greater than the participation cost and the cost of taking up dollar-swaps. Specifically, when dollar swap lines are available, a financier indexed by  $k$  faces the following maximization:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\substack{q_t(k) \in \{-\bar{Q}, \bar{Q}\} \\ q_t^s(k) \in \{-Q^s, 0\}}} & \left\{ \left( R_t - R_t^* \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}}{\mathcal{E}_t} \right] \right) (q_t(k) + q_t^s(k)) - \tau^s q_t^s(k) - k \right\} \end{aligned}$$

where  $q_t^s(k)$  reflects the financier's position in dollars, backed by dollar swaps. The cost of drawing  $q_t^s(k)$  from the dollar swap line is  $q_t^s(k)\tau^s$ . Financiers enter with a position  $\bar{Q} + Q^s$  as long as,

$$\left( R_t - R_t^* \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}}{\mathcal{E}_t} \right] \right) (\bar{Q} + Q^s) - \tau^s (\bar{Q} + Q^s) \frac{Q^s}{(\bar{Q} + Q^s)} \geq k \quad (18)$$

In equilibrium, redefining  $\Gamma = \frac{1}{\bar{Q} + Q^s}^2$ .

$$\left( R_t - R_t^* \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}}{\mathcal{E}_t} \right] \right) - \tau^s \frac{Q^s}{(\bar{Q} + Q^s)} = \Gamma Q_t \quad (19)$$

The next lemma summarises the effect of dollar swaps on the equilibrium UIP deviations.

**Lemma 1 (Dollar Swaps)**

If  $\tau^s = 0$  (no spread on dollar swaps), then, the model is isomorphic to the baseline with UIP deviations given by (15), except the semi-elasticity of demand is now given by:

$$\Gamma_t = \left( \frac{1}{\bar{Q} + Q^s} \right)^2 < \left( \frac{1}{\bar{Q}} \right)^2 \quad (20)$$

Total up-take of dollar swaps in the model is given by:

$$\mathbf{k}_t Q^s = -Q_t \frac{Q^s}{\bar{Q} + Q^s} \geq 0 \quad (21)$$

where  $\mathbf{k}_t = |R_t - R_t^* \frac{\mathbb{E}_t[\mathcal{E}_{t+1}]}{\mathcal{E}_t}| \bar{Q}_t + Q^s$ .

Equation (21) maps directly to the data on dollar swap up-take in Figure 3, which in turn provides evidence on the level of dollar shortages  $Q_t$ . When portfolio limits are very tight, e.g.

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<sup>30</sup>Note that a period in the model corresponds to a quarter, whereas dollar swaps are usually completed within a week. Therefore, I assume financial intermediaries are exposed to the entirety of the currency fluctuation even when they engage in swap line operations.

$\bar{Q}_t \rightarrow 0$ , the uptake of dollar swaps will coincide with the entirety of dollar shortages. Away from this limit, up-take is proportional to the size of dollar shortages with coefficient  $\frac{Q^s}{\bar{Q} + Q^s}$ . Lemma 1 details that dollar swap lines lower  $\Gamma_t$ , as illustrated in Figure 4. When dollar swaps are available, fewer, more specialized financiers are able to satisfy the whole demand for dollar debt. Therefore, the costs of intermediation and the equilibrium spread are lower. Financiers' profits captured by the green triangle are lower, as dollars are easier to come by.




Figure 4: Equilibrium in the dollar market. Extending dollar swaps lines lowers the gradient of  $F^S$ , which denotes the supply of dollars by financial intermediaries.

A key contribution of this paper is to show that the hegemon planner faces a meaningful trade-off when deciding whether or not to extend dollar swap lines, which does not rely on the spread  $\tau^s$ . Therefore I consider the limit as  $\tau^s \rightarrow 0$ .<sup>31</sup>

## 2.3 Equilibrium and Macroeconomic Implications of Dollar Shortages

**Simplifying assumptions.** To maintain the tractability of the model and isolate the mechanisms of interest I make the following assumptions.

**If Bianchi lorenzoni is  $R^*$ , drop explicit ass A.1 (World Interest Rates)** *Foreign sector monetary policy is fully characterised by a constant  $R^*$  policy.*

**A.2 (Cole-Obstfeld)** *Unitary elasticity of substitution, unitary macro elasticity  $\sigma = \theta = 1$ .*

<sup>31</sup>The model can be generalised to the case where the Fed earns a positive spread  $\tau^s > 0$ . In this case, an individual financier can choose to take position  $\bar{Q}$  or  $\bar{Q} + Q^s$ . In the limit where all financiers take a position  $\bar{Q} + Q^s$  and dollar swap lines are large  $\frac{Q^s}{\bar{Q} + Q^s} \rightarrow 1$ , the semi-elasticity of demand is  $\Gamma_t = \frac{1}{\bar{Q} + Q^s}^2$ , the relevant spread is  $\left( R_t - R_t^* \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}}{\mathcal{E}_t} \right] \right) - \tau^s$  and the hegemon earns  $\tau^s \bar{Q}^s k$  rents from extending the dollar swap.

A.1 isolates the incentive of the hegemon to manipulate dollar imbalances, from the incentive to manipulate foreign prices. The hegemon is modelled as a small open economy (SOE) which takes  $P_F^*$  and  $R^*$  as given, but is large in dollar markets. Therefore, the hegemon affects its interest rate only by manipulating excess exchange rate returns.<sup>32</sup> A.2. is a utility specification frequently used in the literature since Cole and Obstfeld (1991), that lends tractability to the model. I relax this assumption in Section 5.

The next lemma summarises the conditions required for an equilibrium.

**Lemma 2 (Implementability)**

*Given  $\{\xi_t, \bar{Q}_t, a_t^F\}$ , a household allocation  $\{C_{H,t}, C_{F,t}, x_t, L_t\}$  and a government allocation  $\{G_{H,t}, G_{F,t}, B_t, Q_t^s\}$  with prices  $\{\mathcal{E}_t, R_t, W_t, P_{H,t}\}$ , taking  $\{C_t^*, R_t^*, P_{F,t}^*\}$  as given, constitute part of equilibrium if and only if conditions (5), (7), (9), (57) and (19) hold.*

Following the tradition in public finance, building on Lucas and Stokey (1983), I try to summarise the equilibrium using a small number of equations. Substituting the expressions for  $C_{H,t}^*$  and  $\Pi_t$  into (4), using 9 and (19) yields the consolidated household budget constraint:<sup>33</sup>

$$C_{F,t} + G_{F,t} \leq \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda} \left\{ \underbrace{\zeta \mathcal{E}_t^\eta \bar{P}_H^{1-\eta}}_{\mathcal{E}_t P_{H,t} C_{H,t}^*} + \underbrace{(x_t - a_t^F)}_{\text{net foreign liabilities}} - R_{t-1}^* \frac{\mathbb{E}_{t-1}[\mathcal{E}_t]}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} (x_{t-1} - a_{t-1}^F) \right. \\ \left. \underbrace{-\Gamma_{t-1} Q_{t-1} x_{t-1}}_{\text{(a) Monopoly rents}} \underbrace{- R^* \frac{\mathbb{E}_{t-1}[\mathcal{E}_t] - \mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} a_{t-1}^F}_{\text{(b) Valuation effects}} \underbrace{+\omega \Gamma_t Q_t^2}_{\text{(c) Financiers' profits } (-ve)} \right\} \quad (23)$$

The first term on the right-hand side reflects total revenues earned from the export of goods. The next two terms reflect the return on the net external position for the U.S. which is financed at cost  $R_{t-1}$ . If there are no dollar shortages (or dollar liquidity is abundant  $\Gamma = \infty$ ), and no unexpected movements in the supply or demand for dollars, then  $Q_t = 0$  and  $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}[\mathcal{E}_t] = \mathcal{E}_t$  so the terms (a), (b) and (c) are zero. The model then coincides with a canonical SOE where dollar and foreign currency debt are interchangeable.

Instead, consider the case of an unexpected increase in the demand for dollars by foreigners  $\xi_t - \mathbb{E}[\xi_t] > 0$ . Then  $Q_t < 0$  and term (a) captures the positive rents from issuing dollar assets

<sup>32</sup>Generally, there are three channels through which the home country can manipulate its interest rate  $R_t$ : its size in financial markets, its size in goods markets and as a result of dominant currency pricing. This paper focuses on the first, rules out the second by assuming the hegemon is small in goods markets and A.1 rules out the third channel. In Appendix F I provide parametric conditions for which A.1 is the optimal policy. For a recent analysis of (goods market) terms of trade manipulation see Costinot, Lorenzoni, and Werning (2014), and Lloyd and Marin (2019) for an extension with trade taxes. Egorov and Mukhin (2019) show the U.S. can manipulate foreign prices and the foreign SDF, even if it is a SOE, under DCP and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2020) investigate optimal policy in large open economy with DCP.

<sup>33</sup>From (15), we can derive total profits accruing to the financial intermediation sector,

$$\Pi_t^f = \left( \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}}{\mathcal{E}_t} \right] R_t^* - R_t \right) Q_t = \Gamma Q_t^2 \geq 0 \quad (22)$$

and investing them in foreign currency assets. Notice that at time  $t$ , monopoly rents are 0 but are positive from  $t + 1$  onwards since  $Q_{t+h} < 0$  for some  $h$ . Term (b) captures the valuation effects discussed in Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2018). The contemporaneous appreciation of the dollar at time  $t$  lowers the return in dollar terms on foreign assets purchased at  $t - 1$  and, since this was unexpected, it is not reflected in  $\mathcal{E}_{t-1}$  or  $R_{t-1}$ . Finally, (c) reflects profits for financial intermediaries of which the hegemon owns a share  $\omega$ .

## 2.4 Rents, the Transfer Problem and policy.

The hegemon benefits from a transfer of monopoly rents from the foreign sector, akin to seignorage.<sup>34</sup> At time  $t$ , foreign investors forego a spread  $\Gamma_t Q_t$  on a gross position  $\xi_t$  to hold U.S. bonds. Of this, financiers earn a share  $\Gamma_t Q_t^2$ . In the case that the net investment position of the U.S. is zero ( $a_t^F = x_t$ ), then, it follows from (59) that the hegemon earns the remaining rents  $\Gamma_t Q_t x_t$ , shaded in purple in Figure 2.

However, the transfer of wealth leads to a contemporaneous dollar appreciation which can lead to trade-offs. At the crux of this trade-off is a version of the transfer problem, first debated in Keynes (1929) and Ohlin (1929).<sup>35,36</sup> Monetary policy in the hegemon has to balance the costs from the dollar appreciation at the onset of the crisis, with the wealth transfer which follows. Note that the hegemon earns rents even if monetary policy keeps interest rates relatively constant, consistent with the relatively narrow interest rate differentials documented in Fig. 1. Monopoly rents then arise through higher future dollar returns on the portfolio of foreign assets, due to the expected depreciation of the dollar moving forward. Monetary policy does determine the magnitude of the rents to the extent that an interest rate movement affects the total supply of dollar debt (akin to a Bernanke and Blinder (1992) credit channel).

## 3 Analytical Hegemon's Dilemma

In this section, I illustrate the trade-off between maximizing monopoly rents and moderating the demand effects of a dollar appreciation, statically, and for a given monetary policy stance. I describe how debt issuance and dollar swaps affect equilibrium outcomes.

**Setup.** Consider a two-period version  $t = \{1, 2\}$  of the model described in Section 2. At  $t = 0$ , I normalize dollar supply, demand and imbalances to zero ( $x_0 = \xi_0 = Q_0 = 0$ ) and I assume

<sup>34</sup>There are two important differences between monopoly rents and seignorage. First, monopoly rents are a transfer from abroad to the U.S. whereas seignorage revenues are partly earned domestically. Second, seignorage tend to be significantly smaller, especially during periods of low inflation. Del Negro et al. (2017) estimate that seignorage is 0.23% a year on average.

<sup>35</sup>Keynes argued that war reparations paid by Germany to France would impose further costs to the German economy in the form of adverse terms of trade movements, which Ohlin suggested would not materialise if the French spent the reparations on German goods. Relative to the initial debate, as well as the price movements, associated with a transfer, I emphasize the pecuniary externalities which result from them.

<sup>36</sup>In contrast to classical analyses of the transfer problem, I emphasize that transfer leads to macroeconomic externalities not internalized by private agents who trade in financial markets, building on recent theoretical contributions most recently summarized in Bianchi and Lorenzoni (2021). In Section 4.3.

inverse dollar liquidity is given by  $\Gamma_0 = \bar{Q}^{-2}$  (dollar swaps are not used). In the final period  $t = 2$ , I assume there is no issuance of new households debt in period 2 ( $x_2 = 0$ ) and monetary policy credibly commits to a long-run exchange rate  $\mathcal{E}_2 = \bar{\mathcal{E}}$  such that  $\tau_2 = \tau_0 = 0$ . To capture the idea of an increase in the demand for dollars from abroad I assume foreigners' demand for dollar debt rises to  $\xi_1 = 1$  at  $t = 1$ .

Monetary policy plays a key role in the mode of transmission of dollar shortages to hegemon allocations. To capture this in a tractable manner, I define the monetary instrument  $\mu_t = \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda C_{F,t} + \bar{P}_H C_{H,t}$ , such that  $R_1 = \beta \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\mu_1}$ . An increase in  $\mu_1$  implies a fall in interest rates.<sup>37</sup> For simplicity, I further assume  $\beta = \beta^* = 1$ . Rearranging (15) and substituting in  $R_1$ , the expression for the exchange rate at time  $t = 1$  is given by:

$$\mathcal{E}_1 = \bar{\mathcal{E}} \left( \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\mu_1} - \Gamma_1 Q_1 \right)^{-1} \quad (24)$$

I specify a monetary policy rule parametrized by a single responsiveness parameter  $s$ : (i) if  $s = 0$ , monetary policy maintains a constant  $R_1$  and the adjustment happens through a dollar appreciation (ii) if  $s > 0$ , the monetary policy response to shortages is expansionary ( $R_1 \downarrow$ ) and, in the limit ( $s = 1$ ), targets an exchange rate  $\bar{\mathcal{E}}$ . The monetary policy rule is given by:

$$\frac{\mu_1}{\bar{\mu}} = (1 - s) + s(1 + \Gamma_1 Q_1)^{-1} \quad (25)$$

**Stabilization and Monopolist Incentives.** Define the period-1 labour wedge  $\tau_1$  as,

$$\tau_1 = 1 - \frac{1}{A_1} \frac{\kappa}{\chi} C_{H,1} L_1^\psi, \quad (26)$$

where  $L_1 = C_{H,1} + C_{H,1}^*$ . The labour wedge is frequently considered in the literature as a measure of the output gap, see e.g. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) and Farhi and Werning (2016). The labour wedge is equal to zero if prices are flexible such that (6) holds, but is generally non-zero if prices are rigid. I define periods where  $\tau_t > 0$  to be periods of *recession*, since there is involuntary unemployment in the economy and conversely periods where  $\tau_t < 0$  as *boom* periods— more specifically, periods when households are over-working relative to the flex-price allocations. Dollar shortages transmit to the labour wedge through two channels. First, the dollar appreciation reduces demand for exports leading to a fall in employment ( $L_1 \downarrow$ ). Second, the monetary policy responds by cutting interest rates ( $\mu_1 \uparrow$ ) according to the parameter  $s > 0$  which stimulates domestic consumption ( $C_{H,1} \uparrow$ ).

Next, I define  $\Omega_2$  as the return on a portfolio  $x_1$  of dollar borrowing, invested in foreign assets and adjusted for the hegemon's share of intermediaries' profits. For simplicity, I assume the hegemon forms an arbitrage portfolio in period 1 ( $x_1 = a_1^F$ ), earning  $R_1 - R^* \frac{\bar{\mathcal{E}}}{\mathcal{E}_1}$  in period

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<sup>37</sup>As in, e.g., Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), the quantity  $\mu_t$  is the return on a perpetual bond. This follows from iterating the Euler equation forward and using the identity for  $\mu_t$ .

2. <sup>38</sup>The portfolio return for the hegemon is given by:

$$\Omega_2 = -\Gamma_1 Q_1 x_1 + \omega \Gamma_1 Q_1^2 \quad (27)$$

I posit that the hegemon planner optimally chooses private debt issuance in period  $x_1$  at  $t = 1$ , via an implicit macro-prudential tax, and the level of dollar liquidity  $\Gamma_1 = \frac{1}{\overline{Q} + Q_1^s}^2$ , via issuance of dollar swaps  $Q_1^s$ , to maximize a convex combination over two incentives: employment stabilization and maximization of monopoly rents:<sup>39</sup>

$$\max_{\{x_1, \Gamma_1 \leq \overline{Q}^{-2}\}} \left\{ w^S |\tau_0 - \tau_1(x_1, \Gamma_1; \xi_1)| + (1 - w^S) \Omega_2^M(x_1, \Gamma_1; \xi_1) \right\} \quad (\text{HD1})$$

I make explicit the dependence of the period 1 labour wedge and monopoly rents (earned in period 2) on the supply of dollar assets  $x_1$ , (inverse) dollar liquidity  $\Gamma_1$  and dollar demand  $\xi_1$ . The parameter  $w^S$  captures the preference for stabilization. The optimal allocation is summarised by the first-order conditions for (HD1) with respect to  $x_1$  and  $\Gamma_1$  (if the positivity constraint does not bind) and are presented in Appendix B.

**Proposition 1 (Analytical Hegemon’s Dilemma)**

(i) An increase in dollar shortages ( $Q_1 < 0$ ) increases monopoly rents ( $\Omega_2 > 0$ ) and widens the labour wedge ( $|\tau_1 - \bar{\tau}| > 0$ ) as long as  $s \neq \bar{s}$ .

(ii) Consider the limit  $w^S = 1$  (stabilization strategy). The hegemon supplies dollar assets to satisfy demand ( $x_1 = \xi_1$ ) or extends dollar swaps such that  $\Gamma_1 \rightarrow 0$  to perfectly stabilize employment. Instead, if  $w^S = 0$  (monopolist strategy), the hegemon chooses  $x_1$  at the top of a ‘returns Laffer’ curve and dollar swaps are not used  $\Gamma_1 = \overline{Q}^{-2}$ .

**Proof.** See Appendix B. □

A surge in capital inflows results in a widening of the labour wedge unless  $s = \bar{s}$ , in which case  $R_1$  moves to exactly offset the effect of  $dQ_1$  on  $\tau_1$ . Proposition 1 isolates two key channels which drive the hegemon policy response –macroeconomic stabilization and monopoly (financial) rent extraction. Suppose the hegemon is only concerned with closing the labour wedge gap ( $w^S = 1$ ), i.e a ‘stabilization’ strategy. Then, following a rise in dollar demand  $\xi_1 > 0$ , the planner can either choose debt issuance  $x_1$  such that for any level of dollar demand  $\xi_1$ , dollar shortages are zero  $Q_1 = 0$  or extend dollar swaps such that  $\Gamma_1 \rightarrow 0$  and shortages do not imply any movement in the exchange rate. However, this strategy comes at the cost of a lower price for dollar debt.

Suppose instead that  $w^S = 0$ , corresponding to a ‘monopolist’ strategy. In this case, the hegemon chooses debt  $x_1$  at the top of a Laffer curve for portfolio returns, detailed in Appendix

<sup>38</sup>This assumption imposes that hegemon net foreign assets are zero in every period, further emphasizing the importance of gross flows.

<sup>39</sup>This modelling choice is made for clarity and I make no claim that it maps to welfare optimization. Specifically, there is a welfare maximizing level for  $w^s$  and  $s$ , but I take these values as given. Nonetheless, when I solve for the welfare maximizing allocation in Section 4, I show that stabilization of the labour wedge is approximately attained in the constrained optimal allocation.




Figure 5: Left panel:  $w^S = 1$ . Right panel:  $w^S = 0$ . Parametrization:  
 $s = 0.5, \kappa = \bar{\mu} = \bar{\mathcal{E}} = \zeta = \eta = \psi = 1, \chi = 0.6, \beta = \beta^* = 1$ .

B and targets a level of dollar shortages  $Q_1 < 0$ . Since monopoly rents are strictly decreasing in dollar liquidity  $\Gamma_1$  therefore dollar swaps are not used. Figure 16 illustrates the locus of  $x_1, \Gamma_1$  which maximize the hegemon's objective function in each of the two corner cases. For intermediate values of  $\omega^S$ , the hegemon compromises between the two strategies and the Laffer curve shifts to higher levels of  $x_1$ . In Appendix B, I pursue two extensions within this stylized framework. I analyse the implications of an appreciation on a portfolio set at  $t = 0$  and I look at how the results change when there are competing issuers of dollar assets (or other reserve currencies).

## 4 Constrained Optimal Allocation

In this section, I identify the macroeconomic externalities which arise in the dynamic model, especially due to dollar shortages abroad, and analyse how they impinge on the efficiency of monetary and fiscal policy. To do so, I first derive the constrained optimal allocation, attained when the hegemon is able to set monetary, fiscal and macroprudential policy optimally, where macroprudential policy takes the form of a time-varying tax on private borrowing.<sup>40</sup> The hegemon planner chooses allocations and prices to maximize *domestic household welfare only*, subject to the equilibrium conditions detailed in Lemma 2. I assume the planner is endowed with perfect commitment and I restrict the analysis to one-off unanticipated shocks. The planning problem for the hegemon can be summarised as follows:<sup>41</sup>

$$\max_{\{C_{F,t}, x_t, \mathcal{E}_t\}_{t \geq 0}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t V(C_{F,t}, \mathcal{E}_t) \quad (\text{HD2})$$

<sup>40</sup>I distinguish between capital controls and a macroprudential borrowing tax, by assuming that the former would enter as a wedge in the UIP equation. Therefore, capital controls in the model would correspond to a tax on financiers.

<sup>41</sup>The full derivation of both the indirect utility function and the implementation constraints is presented in Appendix C. In the main body, I maintain  $\sigma = \theta = 1$  and relegate the generalization to Section E.



s.t (59),

where I attach multiplier  $\eta_t^C$  to the implementability condition (59). The indirect utility function  $V(C_{F,t}, \mathcal{E}_t)$  is given by,

$$V(C_{F,t}, G_{F,t}, \mathcal{E}_t) = \chi \log \left( \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \frac{\mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_H} C_{F,t} \right) + (1-\chi) \log(C_{F,t}) - \frac{1}{1+\psi} \left( \frac{1}{A_t} \left[ \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \frac{\mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_H} C_{F,t} + \zeta \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{P_H} \eta \right] \right)^{1+\psi} \quad (28)$$

Following Farhi and Werning (2016), I assume that the planning problem is convex in the region of interest such that the first-order conditions characterise the equilibrium allocation. I characterize the planner's preferred allocation as a function of partial derivatives of the indirect utility with respect to  $C_{F,t}$  and  $\mathcal{E}_t$ , denoted by  $V_{C_{F,t}}, V_{\mathcal{E}_t}$  respectively, and wedges.

Key to my analysis is the case where the planner does not have access to the optimal borrowing tax and therefore cannot optimally choose  $\{x_t\}$ . Then, the planner also faces households' Euler (5) as a constraint, to which I attach multiplier  $\eta_t^E$ . I begin by defining a measure of over-borrowing by private households in the economy. By analogy to the labour wedge  $\tau_t$  defined in (26), I define the financing (issuance) wedge  $\tau_t^\Omega$ :

$$\tau_t^\Omega = \frac{R_t + \Gamma_t x_t - 2\omega \Gamma_t Q_t}{R_t} - 1, \quad (29)$$

where the numerator reflects the social cost of issuing an additional unit of dollar debt (i.e the cost faced by the country as a whole) and the denominator reflects the private (individual) cost faced by households. A positive wedge reflects the failure of atomistic private households to internalize the effect of their savings decision on the price of dollar debt. The wedge is positive as long as the hegemon borrowing (in gross) in dollars is positive ( $x_t > 0$ ) –which is the case when the foreign sector demands dollar debt ( $\xi_t > 0$ ) and there is a shortage of dollar liquidity in foreign markets ( $\Gamma_t > 0$ ). The wedge is also increasing in the share of financiers' profits accruing to the hegemon ( $\omega$ ), since dollar shortages lead to intermediation profits.

### Proposition 2 (Over-borrowing by private agents)

*Households over-borrow in dollar debt as long as:*

$$\frac{1 + \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \tau_{t+1}}{1 + \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \tau_t} (1 + \tau_t^\Omega) > 1, \quad (30)$$

*and under-issue otherwise.*

**Proof.** Combine the first order condition (FOC) for the planner with respect to  $x_t$ , which characterizes the socially optimal level of private borrowing, with the FOC with respect to  $C_{F,t}$  and the expression for  $V_{C_{F,t}}$  detailed in Appendix C. Then, derive the optimal tax  $\tau_t^x$  on private borrowing by comparing the planners' optimality condition with the Euler equation (5), which dictates the privately optimal level of borrowing. Households over-borrow if the optimal

borrowing tax is positive ( $\tau_t^x > 0$ ). □

The optimal level of borrowing by hegemon households is determined by the interaction of two key frictions in the model—segmented international financial markets leading to dollar scarcity and nominal rigidities. Financial market segmentation is particularly important because it exposes the hegemon economy (and optimal policy) to fluctuations in the supply and demand of dollar assets abroad. Consider first the case where prices are flexible or monetary policy finds it optimal to target the flexible allocation, such that the labour wedge is zero ( $\tau_t = \tau_{t+1} = 0$ ). In this case, over-borrowing still arises because households do not act as monopolists in the market for dollars. Next, suppose that prices are rigid and the monetary authority responds to dollar shortages by lowering the interest rate sufficiently, such that  $\tau_t \leq \tau_{t+1} < 0$ . Then, in addition to the issuance externality, private households fail to internalize that the social value of a unit of  $C_{F,t}$  tomorrow is higher due to its effects on employment. Notice that the two externalities which underlie the over-borrowing are dynamic versions of the incentives detailed in (HD1). The following corollary details the borrowing tax required at the constrained efficient allocation.

**Corollary 1 (Optimal tax on borrowing)**

*The optimal ex-post borrowing tax is given by:*

$$1 - \tau_t^x = \frac{1 + \frac{\chi}{1-\chi}\tau_{t+1}}{1 + \frac{\chi}{1-\chi}\tau_t}(1 + \tau_t^\Omega), \quad (31)$$

where  $\tau_t^x < 0$  denotes a tax on borrowing.

Over-borrowing matters because it compromises the ability of other policy instruments to achieve their objectives. To quantify the effects of over-borrowing, I consider the multiplier on the Euler equation denoted by  $\eta_t^E$ , which is positive whenever households are over-borrowing, i.e (30) is satisfied. Taking the first-order condition of (29) with respect to  $x_t$  and rearranging,

$$\eta_t^E = \left\{ \Gamma_t \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}^\lambda C_{F,t+1}} \right\}^{-1} \left\{ \beta \eta_{t+1}^C \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{-\lambda} [R_t + \Gamma_t x_t - 2\omega \Gamma_t Q_t] - \eta_t^C \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda} \right\} \quad (32)$$

First, households over-borrow when the cost of borrowing faced by the country as a whole (the term in square brackets) is higher than that faced by an atomistic household  $R_t$ , captured by  $\tau_t^\Omega > 0$ . Second, households over-borrow when the social value of a unit of consumption tomorrow ( $\eta_{t+1}^C$ ) is high relative to its private value, as is the case when the labour wedge tomorrow is relatively high.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>As derived in Appendix C, when monetary policy is optimally set,

$$\eta_t^C = V_{C_{F,t}} = u_{C_{F,t}}(1 + \frac{\chi}{1-\chi})\tau_t, \quad (33)$$

**Monetary policy.** In open economies, monetary policy faces a well-understood trade-off between macroeconomic stabilisation and risk-sharing incentives. With flexible exchange rates monetary policy can target the flexible price allocation ( $\tau_t = 0$ ). Generally, however, when markets are incomplete, monetary policy does not target  $\tau_t = 0$  because of the incentive to depreciate the dollar lowering the burden of debt and a counteracting incentive to appreciate the exchange rate such that the price of imports per unit of labour falls. I assume monetary policy chooses the exchange rate  $\mathcal{E}_t$ . Combining the FOCs with respect to  $\mathcal{E}_t$  and  $C_{F,t}$  yields a targeting rule for monetary policy,

$$\underbrace{V_{\mathcal{E}_t} + X_{\mathcal{E}_t}(\eta_t^C)}_{\text{terms of trade}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{E}_t}(\eta_t^C, \eta_{t+1}^C)}_{\text{risk-sharing}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{E}_t}(\eta_t^E, \eta_{t-1}^E)}_{\text{over-borrowing inefficiency}} = 0 \quad (34)$$

where  $X_{\mathcal{E}_t}$  denotes the effect of a depreciation on the foreign demand for exports,  $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{E}_t}$  denotes the effect of a depreciation on households' and governments' returns on their financial position and  $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{E}_t}$  is the derivative of the implicit formulation of the Euler equation (5). Each term depends on the constraint multipliers and is detailed in Appendix C.

When macro-prudential policy is available ( $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{E}_t} = 0$  because  $\eta_t^E = \eta_{t-1}^E = 0$ ), the monetary policy targeting rule faces familiar trade-offs. The partial derivative  $V_{\mathcal{E}_t}$  captures the direct effects of a depreciation on households' utility. This balances the positive effect of an increase in consumption of home goods as they become relatively cheaper and the negative effect that households must work relatively more to afford the same amount of imports. Monetary policy also takes into account that a depreciation increases export revenues expressed in terms of imports. Together these channels capture the terms of trade motive of monetary policy. The risk-sharing motive of monetary policy depends on the level of issuance  $\{x_t\}$ , the level of asset holdings  $\{a_t^F\}$  and the level of dollar demand  $\{\xi_t\}$ . If pass-through to import prices is non-zero ( $\lambda > 0$ ), monetary policy has an incentive to depreciate debt coming due, however this is anticipated by investors.

Monopoly rents and portfolio valuations effects play an important role in the determination of the optimal monetary policy response and are contained within the risk-sharing motive, specifically  $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{E}_t}$ . Monetary policy has a strong incentive to fight the appreciation because of valuation effects (the losses accruing on the U.S. portfolio at the onset of the crisis), and so lowers the interest rate when faced with an unexpected increase in dollar shortages (via an increase in demand by foreign investors). On the other hand, while the spread  $\Gamma_t Q_t$  does not directly depend on the interest rate response, it does depend on the effect of interest rates on the supply of dollar debt, akin to the Bernanke and Blinder (1992) credit channel. Moreover, since issuance rents are denominated in dollars, an appreciation is desirable as it increases the amount of imports monopoly rents can buy.

Absent macro-prudential policy, monetary policy cannot attain the constrained efficient allocation in the economy when there are dollar shortages. When  $\eta_t^E > 0$ ,  $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{E}_t} \neq 0$  and

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where  $V_{C_{F,t}}$  is the social value of a unit of consumption and  $u_{C_{F,t}}$  is the marginal value. If monetary policy is constrained or unresponsive, then  $\eta_t^C = V_{C_{F,t}} - \eta_t^\mu$  which may exacerbate over-borrowing, as detailed in Section 4.2.

therefore monetary policy no longer efficiently balances the terms-of-trade and risk-sharing incentives. Intuitively, because there is over-borrowing in the economy, monetary policy faces an additional incentive to raise interest rates to encourage households to borrow less—partly internalizing the over-issuance.<sup>43</sup> This results in an inefficiently appreciated dollar which further depresses export demand and lowers the dollar return on foreign currency assets coming due at the onset on the crisis – even though there is still some over-borrowing in equilibrium.

This finding can be interpreted in terms of the classical Mundellian Trilemma. Using (34), I tightly define hegemon monetary policy to be independent when it can achieve the constrained efficient allocation, independent of the level of dollar shortages abroad. While Rey (2015) and others show that a dollar-led global financial cycle compromises monetary policy independence in the rest of the world, I show that the relationship goes both ways—U.S. monetary policy too is compromised by capital flows due to foreign demand for dollars. Since shortages of dollars themselves provide an incentive for higher interest rates in the U.S, this in itself reduces the supply of dollar debt, perpetuating dollar shortages and potentially worsening outcomes for the rest of the world.

#### 4.1 Hegemon’s Dilemma Revisited

**Dollar Swaps.** I now endow the hegemon with the ability to extend dollar swap lines  $Q^s > 0$  to financial intermediaries, easing portfolio constraints and increasing dollar liquidity in international markets ( $\Gamma = (\bar{Q} + Q^s)^{-2} < \bar{Q}^{-2}$ ). I show that dollar swap lines support stabilization policy and help the hegemon regain monetary policy independence, at the cost of eroding monopoly rents. In practice, the hegemon establishes dollar swap lines (with a high or no ceiling) *in anticipation* of dollar shortages, and their up-take is determined by financial intermediaries according to (21).<sup>44</sup> However, to illustrate the mechanisms driving the hegemon’s policy choice, in this section, I assume the hegemon can indirectly choose the level of liquidity period by period. Consider the first order condition of (HD2) with respect to  $\Gamma_t$ :

$$\underbrace{-\eta_t^C \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda} \{Q_t x_t + \omega Q_t^2\}}_{\text{cost of foregone issuance rents}} = \eta_t^E \underbrace{\frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}^\lambda C_{F,t+1}} Q_t}_{\text{cost of over-borrowing}} \quad (35)$$

The left hand side of (35) represents the marginal cost of increasing liquidity by one unit. Suppose there are dollar shortages ( $Q_t < 0$ ). Increasing dollar liquidity erodes monopoly rents from issuance of dollar debt by households and the government, since intermediaries can now issue dollars at a lower cost. The right hand side of (35) captures the marginal (social) benefit of increasing liquidity by one unit. Dollar swaps affect the interest rate and therefore the allocation of private sector borrowing over time. Increasing liquidity by one unit, when there are dollar

<sup>43</sup>This mechanism extends the ‘insurance channel’ of monetary policy discussed in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), Fanelli (2017) and Wang (2019).

<sup>44</sup>If I assume dollar swaps are established after the unanticipated increase in demand for dollars occurs, the analysis is unchanged with  $\xi_t = \rho_\xi(\bar{\xi} + \epsilon_\xi)$  where  $\rho_\xi$  is the persistence of the dollar demand shock and  $\epsilon_\xi$  is the innovations. The country incurs the full effects in the prior period where  $\Gamma_{t-1} = 1/\bar{Q}^2$ .

shortages, raises the cost of borrowing through a lower exchange rate premium, lowering over-borrowing ( $\eta_t^E \downarrow$ ). Instead, if the optimal borrowing tax were available, private borrowing would be at an optimal and  $\eta_t^E = 0$ . In that case, the net marginal benefit of issuing dollar swaps in the model is negative and the constraint  $Q^s \geq 0$  binds.

### Proposition 3 (Dollar Swaps)

*Faced with dollar shortages, dollar swaps address over-borrowing at the cost of lower monopoly rents from issuance. Dollar swaps are not used if an optimal borrowing tax is available.*

Dollar swaps can support efficient monetary policy in the hegemon, and (at least partly) recover monetary independence. In the case of a shock to dollar demand  $\xi_t$ , dollar swaps are able to directly address the shock and achieve stabilisation regardless of monetary policy. Section 6 considers a productivity shock ( $A_t$ ) where dollar swaps help recover monetary policy independence but cannot themselves offset the effects of the shock. Moreover, Section 6 also considers an extension of the model with firesale of assets by foreign investors such that hegemon households earn lower returns on foreign (or home) assets when there are shortages. In this case, I show that dollar swaps can be useful over and above the optimal macroprudential tax.

While dollar swaps are an imperfect substitute to macro-prudential taxation for addressing internal objectives in the hegemon, the two policies lead to very different outcomes internationally. On the one hand, the optimal borrowing tax restricts private sector issuance resulting in larger dollar shortages and worse portfolio returns for foreign investors. On the other hand, the provision of dollar swaps narrows the spread in borrowing costs for any level of shortages, improving outcomes for foreign investors. Since dollar swaps can be Pareto improving globally, this may explain why dollar swaps have been used by the U.S. but macroprudential policies restricting the supply of dollar assets have not.

In Appendix C.3, I consider an extension of the model with government spending and public debt issuance and I investigate whether public debt issuance can be chosen to replicate the allocation achieved by optimal macroprudential policy. I show that although debt issuance can be chosen to implement the desirable level of dollar shortages abroad, this will generally not be the optimal allocation because of domestic fiscal incentives such as smoothing spending.

## 4.2 Constant $R_t$

In addition to assuming that a macro-prudential tax is not available, I now analyze the case where monetary policy is unresponsive.<sup>45</sup> Define:

$$\mathcal{E}_t^\lambda C_{F,t} = \mu_t(1 - \chi), \quad (36)$$

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<sup>45</sup>Over the past decade, interest rates have hovered around the zero lower bound (ZLB) and interest rates are largely unresponsive to shocks. The analysis in this section coincides with imposing a zero lower bound in the limit  $\beta \rightarrow 1$ . I present the first order conditions associated with this problem in Appendix C

where  $\mu_t$  is a synthetic monetary instrument and  $R_t = \beta \frac{\mu_{t+1}}{\mu_t}$ . When  $\mu_t$  grows at a constant rate, this ensures nominal interest rates  $R_t$  are constant in the absence of macro-prudential policy. For simplicity, I consider the case  $\mu_t = \mu$  and attach the multiplier  $\eta_t^\mu$  to the monetary policy constraint (36). The multiplier  $\eta_t^E$ , given by (32), captures the cost of over-borrowing which occurs when the value of a unit of debt today ( $\eta_t^C$ ) is too low relative to tomorrow ( $\eta_{t+1}^C$ ). If (36) holds instead of (34), then monetary policy does not respond and  $\eta_t^C = V_{C_{F,t}} - \eta_t^\mu$ . Intuitively, when interest rates don't adjust, each additional unit of  $C_{F,t}$  is also associated with a dollar appreciation which further depresses domestic demand for  $H$ -type goods. This pushes down the value of a unit of consumption today  $\eta_t^C$  and the cost of over-borrowing will tend to rise.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, if households experience a loss of income and increase issuance, over-borrowing as captured by  $\eta_t^E$  additionally rises because of the financial externality captured by  $\eta_t^C \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda} \Gamma_t x_t$ .

**Lemma 3 (Dollar swaps when monetary policy is constrained)**

*If interest rates do not adjust, the cost of over-borrowing rises, ceteris paribus, in response to dollar shortages. Dollar swaps are an imperfect substitute for monetary policy.*

**Proof:** From (30), the cost of over-borrowing captured by  $\eta_t^E$  rises since  $\eta_t^\mu > \eta_{t+1}^\mu$ . Dollar swaps are an imperfect substitute to monetary policy because they prevent an appreciation, akin to a fall in interest rates.  $\square$

### 4.3 Limited Financial Market Participation

I extend the model to allow for limited financial market participation and I show that dollar shortages in international markets have distributional consequences for households in the hegemon. I consider two types of households. Financially-active households trade in a domestic currency, non-contingent bond with financial intermediaries. I denote active household quantities by an  $A$  superscript and the measure of financially active households is exogenously given by  $\mathbf{a}_t$ . Financially inactive households, have allocations denoted by an  $NA$  superscript, and consume their wages and profits in every period.<sup>47</sup> I make the following assumptions.

#### A.3 (Limited Financial Market Participation)

- (i.) Labour is rationed equally when the economy is demand constrained:  $L_t^A = L_t^{NA}$ .
- (ii.) Profits from goods' firms  $\Pi_t^g$  accrue equally amongst all households.
- (iii.) Profits from ownership of financial firms  $\Pi_t^f$  accrue exclusively to active households.

<sup>46</sup>Note that this is true even if the level of over-borrowing, as measured by the required tax (see Corollary 1), falls because  $\tau_t > \tau_{t+1}$ .

<sup>47</sup>In the literature, these households are often referred to as *hand-to-mouth*, see Aguiar et al. (2015) for an empirical investigation. Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002) and Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009) study models of endogenous financial market segmentation based on fixed costs, analogous to the problems faced by financial intermediaries in Section 3.

A full exposition of the model is delegated to Appendix D. Here, I detail some key features of the model. Financially active households trade in complete markets domestically and price traded assets:

$$\frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t^\lambda C_{F,t}^A} = \beta R_t \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}^\lambda C_{F,t+1}^A}, \quad (37)$$

Therefore, only active household allocations appear in the Euler condition. Inactive households consume their wages in each period, and a representative inactive household can be considered because of the absence of idiosyncratic risks. Goods market clearing is given by  $Y_{H,t} = \mathbf{a}_t C_{H,t}^A + (1 - \mathbf{a}_t) C_{H,t}^{NA} + C_{H,t}^*$ . Dollar market clearing now requires:

$$Q_t = \alpha_t x_t - \xi_t \quad (38)$$

Since  $\mathbf{a}_t$  determines the size of the country in financial markets, the financial externality, measured by  $\tau_t^\Omega$ , is increasing with  $\mathbf{a}_t$ .

The next proposition highlights the distributional implications of dollar shortages abroad for hegemon households.

**Proposition 4 (Dollar Shortages and Redistribution)**

*Consumptions of individual active and inactive households are given by,*

$$C_{F,t}^A \leq \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda} \left[ \zeta \left( \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{P_{H,t}} \right)^\eta P_{H,t} + (1 - (1 - \mathbf{a}_t)\chi) F_t \right], \quad (39)$$

$$C_{F,t}^{NA} \leq \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda} \left[ \zeta \left( \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{P_{H,t}} \right)^\eta P_{H,t} + \mathbf{a}_t \chi F_t \right], \quad (40)$$

*respectively, where,*

$$F_t = x_t - a_t^F - R_{t-1}(x_{t-1} - a_{t-1}^F) - \underbrace{\Gamma_{t-1} Q_{t-1} a_{t-1}^F}_{\text{Monopoly rents}} - R^* \frac{\mathbb{E}_{t-1}[\mathcal{E}_t] - \mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} a_{t-1}^F + \omega \Gamma_t Q_t^2$$

*In equilibrium, monopoly issuance rents accrue disproportionately to active households if  $\chi < 1$ .*

Under A.3(i), export revenues contribute equally to both active and inactive households' consumption, but monopoly rents disproportionately accrue to financially-active households as long as  $\chi < 1$ , i.e. active households spend a share of their rents abroad. Active households partly spend monopoly rents on domestic goods, contributing to domestic demand and boosting inactive household consumption but less than one to one. The set-up above resembles a two agent model as in Bilbiie (2020) and Auclert et al. (2021). In these models a spending multiplier arises, equal to  $\frac{1}{1-(1-\alpha)}$ , where  $1 - \alpha$  is the measure of hand-to-mouth households. In open economies, financially active households spend a share  $1 - \chi$  income on foreign goods, so the multiplier becomes  $\frac{1}{1-(1-\alpha)\chi} < \frac{1}{1-(1-\alpha)}$ . Allowing for redistributive taxes (ruled out by A.3 (iii))



) or domestically complete markets ( $\mathbf{a} = 1$ ), then  $C_{F,t}^A = C_{F,t}^{NA}$ .

**Optimal policy with limited financial market participation.** I denote the indirect utility function with limited financial market participation by  $V(C_{F,t}^A, C_{F,t}^{NA}, \mathcal{E}_t; \boldsymbol{\lambda}, \mathbf{a}_t)$ , where  $\boldsymbol{\lambda} = [\lambda^A \ \lambda^{NA}]$  are Pareto weights with  $\mathbf{a}_t \lambda^A + (1 - \mathbf{a}_t) \lambda^{NA} = 1$ . The planning problem is given by,

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{C_{F,t}^A, C_{F,t}^{NA}, \mathcal{E}_t, x_t\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} V(C_{F,t}^A, C_{F,t}^{NA}, \mathcal{E}_t; \boldsymbol{\lambda}, \mathbf{a}_t) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad (39), (40) \end{aligned}$$

where (39) and (40) are the constraints for active and inactive households respectively. I detail the indirect utility function, the conditions governing the planner's allocation in Appendix D.

## 5 Numerical Exercise

In this section I calibrate the model steady state to key features of the U.S. economy in 2008Q1. I then simulate a realistic shock to dollar shortages to match the dollar appreciation seen in the data. First, I quantify the driving forces in the model: how large are the monopoly rents earned from issuing dollar debt, how much do export revenues fall and how large are the losses on the U.S. portfolio of foreign assets? Then, based on this, I assess the effectiveness of monetary policy, with and without the optimal borrowing tax. The quantitative model relaxes A.1 (Cole-Obstfeld specification) and focuses on the case of limited financial market participation  $\mathbf{a} < 1$ . The relevant equations characterizing optimality are detailed in Appendix D and E.

I abstract from the many other interesting linkages between the foreign sector and the hegemon economy to isolate the direct effects of dollar shortages and the downward-sloping demand for dollar debt on the U.S. economy. Namely, I maintain that total foreign sector consumption  $C^*$  and the foreign-currency returns on forest assets  $R^*$  are independent of  $Q_t$ .

**Calibration.** The calibration is quarterly. I choose  $\beta = \beta^* = 0.99$  based on an annual natural interest rate of about 4%. I choose a CRRA coefficient  $\sigma = 1.5$  and an elasticity of substitution across domestic and imported goods ( $\theta = 2.5$ ) consistent with RBC literature estimates. Similarly, I set the Frisch elasticity  $\psi$  of substitution to 2.5 and choose  $\kappa$  to target a steady-state labour supply of two-thirds.<sup>48</sup> I choose  $\chi = \chi^G = 0.8$  and  $\omega^G = 0.5$  such that government spending to GDP  $PG/P_H Y_H = 0.3$  and  $P_H C_H^*/P_H Y_H = 0.15$ , consistent with data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). I choose an export demand elasticity  $\eta = 2.5$ .

To generate realistic values for monopoly rents in the U.S. economy, I target the both the conditional return on a portfolio long in dollars funded in foreign currency during crises and the gross positions of the U.S. in foreign assets and liabilities. I choose  $\frac{1}{Q}^2 = 0.14$ , based on an internal calibration such that a 1% of U.S. GDP change in dollar shortages leads to about a

<sup>48</sup>See e.g. Valchev (2020), Eichenbaum, Johannsen, and Rebelo (2020).

2% appreciation for the dollar, on impact, holding  $R_t$  constant, consistent with evidence of FX dollar swaps vis-a-vis Brazil as identified in Kohlscheen and Andrade (2014). I choose steady-state demand for dollars ( $\bar{\xi} = 0.8$ ) to match a net foreign asset position of 12% of U.S. GDP and  $a^F$  to target gross external assets (foreign currency-denominated) of 148% GDP consistent with data from the BEA documented in A.<sup>49</sup>

Parameter	Value	Description	Target
$\beta = \beta^*$	0.99	Discount factor, quarterly calibration	4% annual interest
$\sigma$	1.5	Coefficient of relative of risk aversion (A.1)	RBC
$\theta$	2.5	Macro elasticity of substitution (A.1)	RBC
$\psi$	2.5	Frisch elasticity of labour supply	RBC
$\zeta$	1	Size of foreign economy	Normalisation
$\eta$	2.5	Elasticity of export demand	RBC
$\kappa$	6	Disutility from labour	RBC
$P_F^* = 1$	1	Price of foreign goods	Normalisation
$\omega$	0	Home ownership of financiers	
$\chi = \chi^G$	0.85	Share of Home goods	$\frac{X}{Y} = 15\%$
$\omega^G$	0.5	Share of utility from public goods	$\frac{G}{Y} = 30\%$
$\lambda$	0.2	Pass-through for U.S. imports	Matarazzi et al. (2019)
$\bar{\Gamma}$	0.14	Elasticity of financiers' demand	$\frac{d\mathcal{E}}{dQ} = 2$
$\bar{\xi}$	8.6	Mean dollar demand	-12% nfa
$a_t^F$	7.2	Government portfolio	BEA
$\alpha$	0.3	Share of inactive households	Survey Cons. Finances

Table 1: Benchmark Model Calibration. RBC refers to a standard parameter value taken from the literature.

## 5.1 Dollar demand shock.

The analysis focuses on a shock to dollar demand by foreign agents  $\xi_t$ . I assume the dollar shock follows an AR(1) process with quarterly persistence 0.85, such that dollar shortages last about 4 quarter, see Figure 6 (left panel). This is consistent with the experience of the U.S. during the GFC. Furthermore, I choose the size of the dollar demand shock  $\xi$  to result in an exchange rate appreciation (on impact) of about 7% if interest rates are held constant, see Figure 6 (right panel). The implied size of the dollar demand shock is about 7% of U.S. GDP.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>49</sup>Note that dollar shortages are always zero in steady-state (consistent with low unconditional ERRP (about 0.5% in the data over the sample relative to up to 8% during crises) and so steady state values for monopoly rents in the model are zero.

<sup>50</sup>McGuire and Peter (2009) find that European bank's dollar shortfall (the biggest counterparty for the U.S. in terms of dollar swap lines) at the onset of the GFC was about 1 – 1.2 trillion, or roughly 7-8% of U.S. GDP in 2007, so the size of the dollar shock implied by the model is reasonable. Adrian and Xie (2020) show that the dollar asset share of non-U.S. banks is a good proxy for dollar demand, and co-moves with the dollar.




Figure 6: Impulse response to dollar demand shock  $\xi_t$ . Left panel: Dollar demand shock dollar shortages expressed in % of U.S. GDP. Right panel: Exchange rate appreciation in % deviations from steady state.

## 5.2 Evaluating the effectiveness of policy

**Monetary Policy.** Figure 7 contrasts the effects of a dollar demand shock on allocations and prices in the hegemon, and shortages abroad, if interest rates are held constant and if monetary policy is set optimally according to (34). In both cases, the demand shock  $\xi_t > 0$  leads to an excess demand for dollars ( $Q_t < 0$ ). The middle panel illustrates exchange rate and interest rate movements under the two monetary regimes, expanding on Figure 6. The hegemon optimally lowers interest rates such that a smaller dollar appreciation is required to satisfy financiers' optimality condition (15), mitigating the trade-offs discussed extensively in Sections 2.4 and 3.

The right panel illustrates the response of the average labour wedge. If when interest rates are held constant, the demand shock leads to a domestic recession ( $\tau_t > 0$ ). This outcome is driven by a fall in the demand for exported goods and a fall in public spending due to portfolio losses, both driven by the dollar appreciation. Instead, if interest rates respond optimally, the hegemon experiences a temporary boom ( $\tau_t < 0$ ), although a recession follows after about 6 quarters.<sup>51</sup> As reflected in the monetary policy targeting rule (66), absent a borrowing tax, the monetary authority accepts a degree of externally induced employment volatility and private sector over-borrowing.<sup>52</sup>

Finally, notice that dollar shortages are more prevalent and more persistent when monetary policy is optimally set. This is because households face a smaller recession (or boom) and therefore borrow less in foreign markets. The spread in the cost of borrowing in dollars as opposed to foreign currency amounts to 4 – 5% on impact, plotted in Appendix G, consistent with the quarterly average of the fall in borrowing costs of the U.S. during periods of global distress.

<sup>51</sup>Kekre and Lenel (2020) study a fully fledged New-Keynesian model where monetary policy follows a Taylor rule. In their calibration, the U.S. experiences a recession following a capital inflow shock.

<sup>52</sup>Appendix G illustrates the impulse response for the multiplier  $\eta_t^E$  on the Euler, where as positive value reflects private sector over-borrowing, see Proposition 1.




Figure 7: Impulse response to dollar demand shock  $\xi_t$ . Comparison of optimal monetary (solid line) policy vs. passive monetary policy (dashed line). Left Panel: Sum of private and public borrowing expressed as % GDP in deviations from steady state. Middle panel: Exchange rate and interest rate movements expressed in % deviations from steady state. Right panel: Labour wedge deviations.

Since only a measure  $\mathbf{a} < 1$  of households in the hegemon participate in financial markets in any given period, dollar shortages have heterogeneous effects on the two groups of households within the hegemon. Building on the Section 4.3, Figure 8 contrasts the impulse response of the labour wedge for financially active and inactive households when monetary policy is set optimally and when interest rates are held constant. Under both regimes, inactive households experience involuntary unemployment, but the effect is significantly stronger when interest rates are constant. On the other hand, active households experience involuntary unemployment only if interest rates are held constant, and are overworked otherwise.<sup>53</sup>




Figure 8: Impulse response to dollar demand shock  $\xi_t$ . Labour wedge deviations.

**Constrained optimal allocation.** Consider now the constrained optimal allocation which is achieved through a combination of monetary policy and a borrowing tax. The latter can be

<sup>53</sup>Since by assumption A.3(i), labour is rationed uniformly, this result reflects that active households consumption rises whereas inactive households' consumption falls. See Appendix G.

used to independently choose the cost of borrowing faced by households, so that interest rates can focus on controlling the extent of the dollar appreciation. Interest rates are cut significantly to stem the appreciation and an optimal borrowing tax is used to postpone consumption to the future. The borrowing tax ensures households borrow less such that the price of dollar debt is high. The left panel in Figure 9 shows that total borrowing falls and, as a result, dollar shortages are larger and more persistent. At the constrained optimum allocation, the interest rate cut is larger (5% vs. 3%, subject to the effective lower bound), lowering the pressure on the exchange rate to appreciate, as illustrated in the middle panel. This difference reflects how much dollar shortages abroad weigh on monetary policy in the absence of a borrowing tax. Together, these effects imply the aggregate labour wedge is almost fully stabilized: there is no temporary boom followed by a future recession. At the constrained optimal, the planner no longer accepts externally induced employment instability and is at the same time able to efficiently maximize the transfer of monopoly rents from abroad.<sup>54</sup>




Figure 9: Impulse response to  $\xi^* > 0$ . Comparison of optimal macropru (rivetted line) vs. no macropru.(solid line). Left Panel: Sum of private and public borrowing expressed as % GDP in deviations from steady state. Middle panel: Exchange rate and interest rate movements expressed in % deviations from steady state. Right panel: Labour wedge deviations.

### 5.3 Driving mechanisms.

**drop this if it doesnt work with non zero ss** Recapping the main mechanisms in the paper: dollar shortages abroad lead to a dollar appreciation and a relative fall in interest rates in the U.S. This has three key implications driving the macroeconomic outcomes. First, a dollar appreciation depresses demand for exports. Second, relative cost of borrowing in dollars falls resulting in monopoly rents from issuing dollar debt. Third, a dollar appreciation leads to wealth transfers at the onset of crises from the U.S. to the rest of the world due to the currency composition of the U.S. portfolio.

Starting from the left panel of Figure 10, the model predicts that the fall in export revenues attributable to the dollar appreciation reaches 3% if interest rates are constant. The middle

<sup>54</sup>Decomposing the aggregate labour wedge into a labour wedge for financially active and inactive households shows that even at the constrained optimal active households experience a boom and inactive households experience a bust. This is illustrated in Appendix G.




Figure 10: Impulse response to  $\xi > 0$ . Comparison of export revenues, monopoly rents from issuance and valuation effects, as % of GDP per quarter (flow), under the optimal and unresponsive monetary regimes.

illustrates monopoly rents, transferred to the hegemon from abroad, which amount to about 8% of GDP annually. The right panel illustrates the transfer of wealth from the hegemon to the foreign sector due to valuation effects, which reach 3.5% GDP annually if interest rates do not adjust, entirely due to an exchange rate appreciation. <sup>55</sup>

#### 5.4 Welfare and Dollar Swap Lines

To assess the welfare implications of a rise in dollar shortages for the hegemon, I denote the present discounted value of welfare for a household  $i \in \{A, NA\}$ , following a dollar demand shock  $\{\xi_t\} > 0$  when dollar liquidity is  $\Gamma$ , by:

$$\mathcal{W}^i(\{\mathcal{E}_t, \tau_t^x\}; \{\Gamma, \xi_t\}) \quad (41)$$

where I make explicit the dependence of welfare on policy. I next define the Hicksian equivalent variation for consumption,

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \frac{C_t^i (1 + \nu_t^i)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \kappa \frac{L_t^{1+\psi}}{1+\psi} + V(G_t) \right] = \mathcal{W}^i(\{\mathcal{E}_t, \tau_t^x\}; \Gamma, 0), \quad (42)$$

<sup>55</sup>Gourinchas, Rey, and Truempner (2011) calculate that during the GFC there was a 13% of U.S. GDP transfer of wealth from the U.S. to foreign countries, of which about one third was due to exchange rate movements and two-thirds were due to a fall in returns on risky assets. In the model, the fall in returns on risky assets can be modelled by a negative shock to the return on gross foreign assets  $R^*(1 + \tau^F)$ ,  $\tau^F \downarrow$ .

where  $\nu_t^i$  is a proportional consumption transfer, calculated over the period of the crisis, such that household  $i \in \{A, NA\}$  is equally well-off whether or not the dollar demand shock occurs.<sup>56</sup> A positive transfer  $\nu > 0$  suggests that a one-off unexpected increase in dollar shortages is costly to the household, i.e.  $\mathcal{W}(\{\mathcal{E}_t, \tau_t^x\}; \Gamma, 0) > \mathcal{W}(\{\mathcal{E}_t, \tau_t^x\}; \{\Gamma, \xi_t\})$ . Table 2 details the welfare outcomes from a one-off dollar demand shock for the calibration discussed above.

	Active	Inactive	Aggregate
Unresponsive monetary (no macropru.)	0.25%	0.43%	0.31%
Optimal monetary (no macropru.)	-0.81%	0.17%	-0.51%
Constrained Optimal	-2.2%	0.23%	-1.5%

Table 2: Hicksian welfare transfers under different policy regimes, in response to a one-off, unanticipated dollar-asset demand shock.

When interest rates do not respond (first row of Table 2), dollar shortages cost about 0.31% of consumption equivalent per quarter, in the aggregate, over the 2 year duration of the crisis. These are driven by both losses to financially-active and inactive households, although the latter suffer disproportionately as per Proposition 4. Instead if monetary policy responds optimally, which requires an interest rate cut of just over 2%, the aggregate economy gains the equivalent of 0.5% consumption per quarter over the 2 years, but this is only one-third of the gain that could be achieved at the constrained optimal, in conjunction with an optimal tax on borrowing. However, this figure masks welfare losses facing inactive households (0.17%), which are more than offset by gains to active (0.81%).

**Revisiting Dollar Swaps.** In practice, dollar swap lines are extended by the Federal Reserve at a time  $t$ , and their take-up in future periods is determined by the demand of foreign central banks. Therefore, the U.S. makes a one-off decision to extend dollar swaps if:

$$\int \lambda^i \mathcal{W}^i(\{\mathcal{E}_t, \tau_t^x\}; \{\frac{1}{Q+Q^s}^2, \xi_t\}) di > \int \lambda^i \mathcal{W}^i(\{\mathcal{E}_t, \tau_t^x\}; \{\frac{1}{Q}^2, \xi_t\}) di \quad (43)$$

where  $\lambda^i = \mathbf{a}\lambda^A$  for  $i = A$  and  $\lambda^i = (1 - \mathbf{a})\lambda^{NA}$  for  $i = NA$ . Dollar demand shocks on their own have no macroeconomic consequences for the hegemon if dollar liquidity is very high, therefore swaps are optimal when dollar demand leads to welfare losses but dollar swaps cannot achieve the constrained efficient allocation when dollar shortages improve aggregate welfare for the hegemon.

Dollar swaps have only become a prominent part of policy since the GFC, yet the U.S. has been experiencing capital inflows which appreciate the dollar since the 1930s, see Corsetti and Marin (2020). I emphasize three reasons why the welfare value of dollar swaps may have increased in recent years. First, interest rates in the U.S. have been at or near the zero lower bound since the GFC and have likely responded less to inflows than they otherwise would have.

<sup>56</sup>Such consumption transfers are used Lucas (2003) to evaluate the welfare costs of business cycles. I assume  $\nu_t^i = \nu$  for the first 8 quarters after the shock hits (after which its size becomes negligible) and  $\nu_t^i = 0$  thereafter.



I show that this results in a higher welfare cost of over-borrowing. Since dollar swaps are a partial substitute to a borrowing tax, swaps are more desirable when monetary policy does not respond, as is the case near the zero lower bound.<sup>57</sup> In this case, dollar swaps are more desirable if exchange rate pass-through to imports in the hegemon is low. The cost of a dollar appreciation is higher if it depresses exports and imports fo not become substantatially cheaper (i.e  $\lambda$  is low). Therefore, for a given level of dollar demand, DCP contributes to higher welfare costs from the resulting appreciation due to the presence of real income effects, see e.g Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Auclert et al. (2021).<sup>58</sup>

Finally, financially inactive households will incur larger losses (or smaller gains) for any reasonable calibration, in the absence of redistributive fiscal policy. Assigning Pareto weights  $\{\lambda^A, \lambda^{NA}\}$  to financially active and inactive household welfare respectively, dollar swaps become more desirable as  $\lambda^{NA}$  rises, inactive household outcomes are over-weighted.

## 6 Extensions

**Firesales** Suppose the return on foreign assets is  $R^*(1 - \phi(\Gamma_t, \xi_t))$ , where  $\phi$  denotes a *haircut* which can accrue on foreign assets.<sup>59</sup> This captures a situation where the foreign sector is selling-off these assets (fire-sales) because of liquidity shortages. In particular, I assume,  $\phi$  is increasing in  $\Gamma_t$  and  $\xi_t$ . Then, ... and dollar swap lines can be desirable over and above macro-prudential policy. I detail the first order condition governing the use of dollar swaps in appendix XX.

**Productivity shocks.** Instead, consider a productivity shock ( $A_t$  falls).<sup>60</sup> Households experience an income loss and borrow to smooth their consumption. From Proposition 1, we know that households will over-borrow because they fail to internalise their size in financial markets. Once again, absent a borrowing tax, because  $\eta_t^E > 0$  monetary policy cannot efficiently trade-off internal objectives. If dollar swaps are extended,  $\eta_t^E$  falls significantly and monetary policy moves closer the constrained optimal allocation. It does not achieve the officiant allocation, as also pointed out in Farhi and Werning (2014), controls on capital flows are required to deal with terms of trade motives as well, but, the inefficiency is no longer dependent on the level of dollar shortages abroad.

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<sup>57</sup>Similarly, dollar swaps are more desirable when fiscal policy does not have the flexibility to use public debt issuance to manipulate shortages, as is the case when fiscal revenues are low.

<sup>58</sup>However, as noted in Farhi and Maggiori (2016), the extent of demand for dollar assets and the associated safety premium is likely to be endogenous to the international pricing paradigm. Farhi and Maggiori (2016) look at a dollarized economy and argue that dollar debt, if not defaulted upon outright, becomes safe in real terms since devaluations on behalf of the U.S. would not reduce the amount of goods foreigners can purchase.

<sup>59</sup>Firesales were cited by the Fed...

<sup>60</sup>Appendix G plots the impulse response functions to an unanticipated productivity shock.

## 7 Conclusion

The prominent role of the dollar in financial markets is costly not only for non-U.S. investors who search for dollar debt despite its poor return, but also interferes with the efficient working of U.S. monetary and fiscal policy. Because dollars are scarce, U.S. households and the government earn monopoly rents from issuing domestic-currency denominated debt, but face costs associated with a dollar appreciation. I show that these trade-offs cannot be resolved by monetary and fiscal policy alone. Monetary policy in the hegemon can stabilize the domestic economy, but it cannot achieve the constrained efficient allocation absent a macro-prudential tax because of (inefficient) over-borrowing by households. Over-borrowing arises because atomistic households fail to internalize their size in dollar markets and because of nominal rigidities. U.S. monetary policy cannot therefore efficiently balance internal objectives independently of the level of dollar shortages abroad. Welfare outcomes for the hegemon are worse and the cost of over-borrowing rises if monetary policy is constrained (i.e due to a ZLB). Fiscal policy faces a similar trade-off: debt issuance is driven by the incentive to smooth public spending over time and is not used to manipulate dollar shortages abroad.

Dollar swaps can improve welfare for the hegemon, in place of a missing macro-prudential tax, but they cannot achieve the constrained efficient allocation. Dollar swaps expand the portfolio limits faced by financial intermediaries who can manufacture dollar debt and alleviate dollar shortages in foreign markets. This addresses the over-borrowing inefficiency but only at the cost of eroding monopoly rents. Dollar swaps are more desirable if monetary policy is unresponsive, if governments face a fiscal downturn and if pass-through to import prices is low, consistent with the dollar pricing paradigm. When a measure of households in the hegemon country do not participate in financial markets, dollar shortages abroad lead to distributional consequences which can drive the policy response. Specifically, dollar swaps systematically favour inactive households by stabilizing wages, at the expense of active households who forego excess returns on their portfolio.

To conclude, this paper has analyzed the ability of traditional instruments (monetary and fiscal policy) to manage relatively new problems (large and volatile capital flows driven by the demand for dollars). Macro-prudential policy which exacerbates dollar shortages abroad can be used to achieve the constrained efficient allocation for the U.S., but does so at the expense of foreign investors. This could undermine the position of the dollar moving forward or prompt retaliatory action and, perhaps, this is why it is not used in practice. The International Monetary System seems to have settled in an uncomfortable equilibrium, where the U.S. provides dollar liquidity via swap lines when needed (acting as a lender of last resort), even though by doing so it foregoes some monopoly rents. A rethinking of the system may be on the horizon, which could entail the use of digital currencies or centralized clearing of financial markets.

Global reserve currency?

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## A Additional Empirical Evidence.

### Evidence on deviations from the Uncovered Interest Parity and Monopoly Rents.

Figure 11 below considers the decomposition of the difference in the return of a panel of foreign-currency debt and dollar debt, using G10 and EM7 currency trade-weighted averages. Two points are noteworthy: first both G10 and EM7 currency-denominated debt trades at a higher (realized) return during crises. The portfolio returns for EM7 currencies are larger, and significantly so in the most recent COVID-19 episode. The key take-away is that the borrowing costs tend to be larger vis-à-vis emerging markets, and this was particularly true during COVID. However, the spread exists for G10 countries too.




Figure 11: Source: Federal Reserve

Next, I discuss evidence on the correlation of capital flows and portfolio returns. As is clear from Figure 1, the difference in the return of foreign currency and dollar debt is small outside of crises and the dollar appreciates at the onset of crises, which makes the realised cost of borrowing in dollar debt higher at that time. Borrowing in dollar debt is however much cheaper during crises, generating the monopoly rents at the core of this paper. Figure 12 plots gross trade volumes and the peak occurs during the GFC. Specifically, Krishnamurthy and Lustig (2019) show that gross flows are strongly negatively correlated with the changes in the spread. The correlation between gross purchases of Treasuries by foreigners and the change in the 3-month spread is -0.58 at monthly frequencies.

Related to this, Figure 13, from Corsetti, Lloyd, and Marin (2020), plots emerging market capital flows and exchange rate risk premia as 6-month moving averages. While the correlation of these two variables is close to zero when calculated over the whole period, it becomes strongly positive around periods of significant financial distress and low liquidity. Over a 2005:01-2020:03 sample, the correlation between non-resident portfolio flows to EMs and the EM PPP-weighted exchange rate risk premium, at monthly frequency, is just 0.08—consistent with a  $\Gamma_t$  close to zero. This result is often highlighted by the literature on the ‘exchange rate disconnect’, stress-





Figure 12: Evidence on timing of purchases of U.S. bonds by foreigners. Purchases by foreign investors and sales to foreign investors normalised by the foreign holdings of Treasuries.  
Source: Krishnamurthy and Lustig (2019).

ing the apparent weak relationship between currency valuation and economic fundamentals, including capital flows, see Meese and Rogoff (1983). However, a rolling correlation between these series over a 6-month window highlights that this correlation rises to above 0.75 during periods of financial distress: the Great Financial Crisis, the 2013 Taper Tantrum and the recent COVID crisis—all of which are characterised by large capital movements and low international liquidity. In these periods, the data suggests a level of dollar illiquidity –  $\Gamma_t$  in the model— that is substantially positive.

Figure 13: Capital flows and *ex post* exchange rate risk premia for EMs



*Note:* 6-month moving average of: non-resident portfolio flows to EMs, and 1-month *ex post* EM exchange rate risk premia vis-à-vis US dollar (PPP-weighted). Capital flows cumulated over each calendar month, with negative value implying an outflow from EMs. Moving averages plotted at end-date of period. Shaded areas denote periods in which 6-month rolling correlation of raw capital flows and exchange rate risk premia exceed 0.75. Unconditional correlation of raw series equal to 0.08 over the sample. *Dates:* January 2005 to March 2020. *Data Sources:* Datastream, IIF, IMF International Financial Statistics.

**Evidence on the deteriorating U.S. position.** I use data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis on net and gross foreign asset positions of the U.S. to analyze the potential size of monopoly rents that can accrue to the U.S. I use this data for the calibration of the model. Figure 14 (left panel) plots the net investment position of the U.S., as a % of GDP, from 2006Q1 to 2021Q4. This is calculated as the difference in gross external assets and liabilities (right panel), and has rapidly worsened over time. This data is used in in Section 5 to calibrate the U.S. portfolio of foreign assets.



Figure 14: Left Panel: Net Investment Position for the United States in as % GDP. Right panel: Gross assets and liabilities as % GDP. Source: BEA and author's calculations.

**Evidence of Wealth Inflows to the U.S. during the GFC** The next figure contrasts the calculation of the U.S. net foreign asset position around the GFC by Maggiori (2017) and Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2020). The latter consider a more general formulation and find evidence of a net transfer to the U.S. from abroad, even though the position deteriorated in absolute value. Specifically, they consider equities, bonds, and deposits issued in the U.S. , held by both U.S. and non-U.S. agents, plotted by the black-dashed line. The red line measures the same quantity for Canada, Germany, France, Great Britain and Japan. This evidence is consistent with the presence of a convenience yield channel, which drives the policy dilemmas I consider in this paper.




Figure 15: Left panel: Figure 5 from Maggiori (2017). Right panel: Figure 5 from Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2020).

## B Further derivations for Section 3: Analytical Hegemon's Dilemma

For convenience, I repeat below the expression for the exchange rate,

$$\mathcal{E}_1 = \bar{\mathcal{E}} \left( \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\mu_1} - \Gamma_1 Q_1 \right)^{-1} \quad (44)$$

for a given monetary policy  $\mu_1$ . The monetary policy rule determining  $\mu_1$  is given by:

$$\mu = (1 - s)\bar{\mu} + s\bar{\mu}(1 + \Gamma_1 Q_1)^{-1} \quad (45)$$

For  $s < 1$ , dollar shortages ( $Q_1 < 0$ ) leads to an appreciation.

The derivatives  $\frac{d\mu_1}{dQ_1}$  and  $\frac{d\mu_1}{d\Gamma_1}$  characterize monetary decisions in response to dollar imbalances and liquidity and, in turn, these determine  $\frac{d\mathcal{E}_1}{dQ_1}$ ,  $\frac{d\mathcal{E}_1}{d\Gamma_1}$ . Specifically,

$$\frac{d\mathcal{E}_1}{dQ_1} = -\bar{\mathcal{E}} \left( \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\mu_1} - \Gamma_1 Q_1 \right)^{-2} \left[ -\frac{\bar{\mu}}{\mu_1^2} \frac{d\mu_1}{dQ_1} - \Gamma_1 \right], \quad (46)$$

$$\frac{d\mathcal{E}_1}{d\Gamma_1} = -\bar{\mathcal{E}} \left( \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\mu_1} - \Gamma_1 Q_1 \right)^{-2} \left[ -\frac{\bar{\mu}}{\mu_1^2} \frac{d\mu_1}{d\Gamma_1} - Q_1 \right], \quad (47)$$

where the first term in the square brackets is the standard "UIP channel" by which interest rates affect exchange rates and the second term is the risk premium channel, akin to a Bernanke and Blinder (1992) "credit channel".

Consider the labour wedge  $\tau_1$ , given by (26). The derivatives with respect to  $Q_1$  and  $\Gamma_1$  are given by:

$$\frac{d\tau_1}{dQ_1} = -\frac{1}{A_1} \frac{\kappa}{\bar{P}_H} \left\{ \frac{d\mu_1}{dQ_1} L_1^\psi + \mu\psi L^{\psi-1} \left[ \frac{\chi}{\bar{P}_H} \frac{d\mu_1}{Q_1} + \frac{\zeta}{\bar{P}_H} \mathcal{E}_1^{\eta-1} \eta \frac{d\mathcal{E}_1}{dB_1} \right] \right\}, \quad (48)$$

$$\frac{d\tau_1}{d\Gamma_1} = -\frac{1}{A_1} \frac{\kappa}{\bar{P}_H} \left\{ \frac{d\mu_1}{d\Gamma_1} L_1^\psi + \mu\psi L^{\psi-1} \left[ \frac{\chi}{\bar{P}_H} \frac{d\mu_1}{d\Gamma_1} + \frac{\zeta}{\bar{P}_H} \mathcal{E}_1^{\eta-1} \eta \frac{d\mathcal{E}_1}{d\Gamma_1} \right] \right\}, \quad (49)$$

where  $\frac{d\mu_1}{dQ_1} = -s\bar{\mu} \frac{\Gamma_1}{(1+\Gamma_1 Q_1)^2}$ , and  $\frac{d\mu_1}{d\Gamma_1} = -s\bar{\mu} \frac{Q_1}{(1+\Gamma_1 Q_1)^2}$ ,

Consider next the portfolio returns  $\Omega_2$ , which can be rewritten as:

$$-\Gamma_1 x_1^2 + \Gamma_1 \xi_1 x_1 + \omega \Gamma_1 (x_1 - \xi_1)^2 \quad (50)$$

An additional unit of  $x_1$  lowers the return on the portfolio by eroding the scarcity of dollar abroad but, for a given size of dollar shortages, an additional unit of  $x_1$  expands the size of the portfolio— so (50) captures the 'returns Laffer curve'.

The derivatives of monopoly rents  $\Omega_2$  with respect to  $x_1$  and  $\Gamma_1$  are as follows:

$$\frac{d\Omega_2}{dx_1} = -2\Gamma_1 x_1 + \Gamma_1 \xi_1 + 2\omega \Gamma_1 Q_1, \quad (51)$$

$$\frac{d\Omega_2}{d\Gamma_1} = -x_1^2 + \xi_1 x_1 + \omega Q_1^2 \quad (52)$$

where (50) describes the returns Laffer curve faced by the hegemon. For low values of  $x$ , each additional unit issued increases  $\Omega_2$  but for high values of  $x_1$ ,  $\frac{d\Omega_2}{dx_1}$  turns negative.

### Proof to Proposition 1.

Trade-off- part (i): The relationship between the labour wedge and dollar shortages is given by (48) and depends on the responsiveness parameter  $s$  through  $\frac{d\mu_1}{dQ_1}$ . The level of  $s$  which stabilises the labour wedge  $\bar{s}$  is implicitly defined by setting  $\frac{d\tau_1}{dQ_1} = 0$ . Notice that for  $s = 0$ ,  $\frac{d\mu_1}{dQ_1} > 0$  since the appreciation lowers exports and  $\mu_1$  is constant. Instead, if  $s = 1$ ,  $\frac{d\mu_1}{dQ_1} < 0$ , since exchange rates are stabilised but monetary policy is expansionary. Given that  $\frac{d\mu_1}{dQ_1}$  is a continuous function,  $\bar{s}$  exists by the intermediate value theorem.

The relationship between the hegemon's portfolio returns and dollar shortages is given by (51) and is strictly increasing ( $\frac{d\Omega_2}{dQ_1} < 0$ ) as long as there are dollar shortages  $Q_1 < 0$ .

Optimality- part (ii): The first-order conditions for (HD1) with respect to  $x_1$  and  $\Gamma_1$  respectively are given by ,

$$\omega^S \text{sign}(\bar{\tau} - \tau_1) \frac{d\tau_1}{dx_1} + (1 - \omega^S) \frac{d\Omega_2}{dx_1} = 0, \quad (53)$$

$$\omega^S \text{sign}(\bar{\tau} - \tau_1) \frac{d\tau_1}{d\Gamma_1} + (1 - \omega^S) \frac{d\Omega_2}{d\Gamma_1} = 0, \quad (54)$$

where  $\frac{d\tau_1}{dx_1}$ ,  $\frac{d\Omega_2}{dx_1}$ ,  $\frac{d\tau_1}{d\Gamma_1}$ ,  $\frac{d\Omega_2}{d\Gamma_1}$  are given by (48), (49), (51) and (52). If the planner chooses  $\Gamma_1 \geq \Gamma_1 = \frac{1}{Q}^2$  then (54) is replaced by  $\Gamma_1 = \frac{1}{Q}^2$ . Combining (53) and (54) with (48), (49), (51) and (52) yields the optimal allocation  $\{x_1, \Gamma_1\}$ .

Consider the case where the planner only cares to stabilize the labour wedge, captured by  $\omega^S = 1$ . If  $\Gamma_1$  is bounded from below above zero, perfect stabilization can only be achieved if  $dx_1 = -d\xi_1$ , i.e the hegemon satisfies dollar excess demand by issuing dollar bonds. If  $\Gamma_1 = 0$  can be reached with dollar swaps, stabilization can be achieved using either dollar swaps or issuance.

Instead, consider the case where the planner only cares about maximizing its portfolio returns  $\omega^S \rightarrow 0$ . Then, rearranging (53) :

$$x_1 = \xi_1 \frac{1 - 2\omega}{2 - 2\omega} \quad (55)$$

which is the level of  $x_1$  at the top of the Laffer curve (50). From this, it follows that  $0 < \frac{dx_1}{d\xi_1} < 1$  leading to  $\frac{dQ_1}{d\xi_1} < 0$ . In other words, the optimal allocation does not entail perfectly stabilising shortages. Additionally,  $\frac{d\Omega_1^M}{d\Gamma_1} > 0$  as long as  $x_1 > 0$  and  $Q_1 < 0$  therefore dollar swaps are not used.

For intermediate values of  $\omega^S$ , the hegemon trades off monopoly rent maximization for macroeconomic stabilization requiring inefficiently high  $x_1$ , relative to (55). Given  $\frac{d\tau_1}{d\Gamma_1} > 0$ ,  $\frac{d\Omega_1^M}{d\Gamma_1} > 0$  if  $Q_1 < 0$  then, from (54) we see that dollar swaps become useful as  $|\tau - \bar{\tau}|$  grows.  $\square$

The following figure plots the objective function when  $w^S = 0.2$ . Notice that the Laffer curve is now shifted to higher levels of  $x_1$ .




Figure 16:  $w^S = 0.2$ . Parametrization:  $s = 0.5, \kappa = \bar{\mu} = \bar{\mathcal{E}} = \zeta = \eta = \psi = 1$ ,  $\chi = 0.6, \beta = \beta^* = 1$ .

**Exorbitant privilege vs. valuation effects.** Monopoly rents represent a wealth inflow to the U.S. during crises, when demand for dollars is high. However, the return on the U.S. portfolio of assets initially falls due to the sharp appreciation, documented in Figure 1. This initial fall in portfolio returns is referred to as ‘valuation effects’, see e.g. Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Gourinchas, Rey, and Govillot (2018) and contributes to a wealth outflow at the onset of crises. To analyze the two-way relationship between fiscal policy and dollar swaps on valuation effects, I consider the return on a portfolio ( $x_1 = a^F$ ) formed at time 0. From this, the hegemon earns  $R^* \frac{\mathcal{E}_1}{\mathcal{E}_0} - R_0$  in period 1. An unanticipated appreciation of the dollar lowers the dollar-return of the time 0 portfolio at  $t = 1$ .<sup>61</sup> For all values of  $w^S$ , the hegemon has a stronger incentive to prevent an appreciation at  $t = 1$ , either by issuing more debt or by extending dollar swaps.

**Cournot competition in issuance.** I leverage the stylized framework to analyze the effects of international competition in issuance of dollar (or close-substitute) assets, embedding the results in Farhi and Maggiori (2016). Dollar market clearing is given by (17) when there are  $N$  other countries issuing assets that are close substitutes to dollar assets. I focus on the case  $w^S = 0$  and, now, (53) implies the following analogue to (55):

$$x_1 = \frac{\xi_1 - x_1 - \sum_{i>0}^{N-1} (x_1^i)}{2},$$

<sup>61</sup>Notice that this return can be re-written using (15) as  $-\Gamma_0 Q_0 - (\mathbb{E}_0[\mathcal{E}_1] - \mathcal{E}_1)/\mathcal{E}_0$ , where  $\Gamma_0 Q_0 = 0$  and  $\mathbb{E}_0[\mathcal{E}_1 - \mathcal{E}_1] > 0$ . Then,  $\Omega_2 = -\Gamma_1 Q_1 x_1 + \omega \Gamma_1 Q_1^2 - \left(1 - \frac{\mathcal{E}_1}{\mathcal{E}}\right) x_0$ . Since  $\frac{\mathcal{E}_1}{\mathcal{E}} < 1$  for all  $s < 1$ ,  $\Omega_2$  falls relative to before for  $Q_1 < 0$ .



Imposing symmetry ( $x_1^i = x_1 \forall i$ ) yields the optimal issuance chosen by the planner when there are  $N$  competing issuers:

$$x_1 = \frac{\xi_1 - \sum_{i>0}^{N-1} x_1^i}{N+1}, \quad Q_1 = \frac{\xi_1 - x_1 - \sum_{i>0}^{N-1} x_1^i}{N}$$

As the number of competing issuers becomes large, dollar shortages go to zero. In the case  $w^S = 1$ , as detailed above, each individual issuer finds  $Q_1 = 0$  optimal.

## C Further derivations for Section 4: Constrained Optimal Allocation

### C.1 Introducing public sector

**Why do I care?** Households derive additively separable utility from public goods  $V^G(G_t)$  in each period, given by,

$$V^G(G_t) = \omega^G \log \left( \left[ (\chi^G)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} G_{H,t}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} + (1 - \chi^G)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} G_{F,t}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right]^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \right) \quad (56)$$

where I assume the elasticity of substitution between  $H$  and  $F$  varieties is the same as in (2) and  $\omega^G$  captures the relative preference for public spending. A portion  $\chi^G$  of total public expenditure is spent on domestic varieties and stimulates domestic aggregate demand whereas a portion  $1 - \chi^G$  is spent on imports. Households have a unitary elasticity of substitution of 1 for public spending over time. Relative demand for public spending on home and foreign varieties is given analogously to (7).

The government finances public expenditures by issuing one-period non-contingent bonds  $B_t$  at an interest rate  $R_t$  and through lump-sum taxes  $T_t$ .<sup>62</sup> The government budget constraint is given by:

$$P_{F,t}G_{F,t} + P_{H,t}G_{H,t} + R_{t-1}B_{t-1} \leq B_t + T_t \quad (57)$$

The results in the main body are unchanged for  $\mathbf{a} = 1$  (representative agent), since the planner's FOCs with regards to  $x_t$  and  $B_t$  are identical, see.

Market clearing for dollar assets becomes,

$$Q_t = x_t + B_t - \xi_t, \quad (58)$$

---

<sup>62</sup>In the representative agent model, Ricardian equivalence holds, therefore fluctuations in  $B_t$  are 'undone' by household savings decisions, however this result breaks in Section 4.3 where I consider limited financial market participation. Furthermore, I assume the interest rate on (US) household and government bonds is equal. In practice, there is a spread between U.S. treasury yields and corporate debt (TED spread), see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), Valchev (2020) and Liao (2020).

where  $B_t$  is dollar debt issued by the hegemon government. Then (59) is replaced by:

$$C_{F,t} + G_{F,t} \leq \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda} \left\{ \underbrace{\zeta \mathcal{E}_t^\eta \bar{P}_H^{1-\eta}}_{\bar{P}_H C_{H,t}^*} + \underbrace{(x_t + B_t - a_t^F)}_{\text{net foreign liabilities}} - R_{t-1}^* \frac{\mathbb{E}_{t-1}[\mathcal{E}_t]}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} (x_{t-1} + B_{t-1} - a_{t-1}^F) \right. \\ \left. \underbrace{-\Gamma_{t-1} Q_{t-1} (x_{t-1} + B_{t-1})}_{\text{(a) Monopoly rents}} \underbrace{- R^* \frac{\mathbb{E}_{t-1}[\mathcal{E}_t] - \mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} a_{t-1}^F}_{\text{(b) Valuation effects}} \underbrace{+\omega \Gamma_t Q_t^2}_{\text{(c) Financiers' profits } (-ve)} \right\} \quad (59)$$

## C.2 Deriving indirect utility function

To derive the indirect utility function, start from (1) and substitute in (7), (9) and government's relative demand for  $H$  and  $F$  goods:

$$V(C_{F,t}, \mathcal{E}_t, G_{F,t}) = \chi \log \left( \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \frac{P_{F,t}}{\bar{P}_{H,t}} C_{F,t} \right) + (1-\chi) \log(C_{F,t}) \quad (60) \\ -\kappa \frac{\left( \frac{1}{A_t} \left[ \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \frac{P_{F,t}}{\bar{P}_{H,t}} C_{F,t} + (1-\chi) \frac{P_t^*}{\bar{P}_{H,t}} C_t^* + \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \frac{P_{F,t}}{\bar{P}_{H,t}} G_{F,t} \right] \right)^{1+\psi}}{1+\psi} \\ + \omega^G \left[ \chi^G \log \left( \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \frac{P_{F,t}}{\bar{P}_{H,t}} G_{F,t} \right) + (1-\chi^G) \log(G_{F,t}) \right]$$

Assuming prices are perfectly rigid,  $P_{H,t} = \bar{P}_H$ , and normalizing foreign prices to 1,  $P_{F,t} = \bar{P}_F^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda = \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda$ . With perfectly rigid prices, the firms' pricing condition (11), is not a constraint in equilibrium on the planning problem, but is instead only used to back out prices. Note also that,

$$C_H^* = (1-\chi) \left( \frac{P^*}{\bar{P}_H^*} \right)^\eta C^* = \underbrace{(1-\chi)\mu^*}_{\zeta} \left( \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{\bar{P}_H} \right)^\eta, \quad (61)$$

where  $P_t^{*\eta} C_t^* = \mu^* = \frac{1}{\beta^*}$  by assumption A.1 and  $\beta R^* = 1$ , therefore  $C_H^* = \zeta \left( \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{\bar{P}_H} \right)^\eta$ .

The partial derivatives with respect to  $C_{F,t}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}_t$  and  $G_{F,t}$  respectively, are give by,

$$V_{C_{F,t}} = \frac{1-\chi}{C_{F,t}} \left( 1 + \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \tau_t \right), \quad (62)$$

$$V_{\mathcal{E}_t} = \frac{1-\chi}{C_{F,t}} \left( \tau_t \left( \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} C_{F,t} + \zeta \eta \bar{P}_H^{1-\eta} \mathcal{E}_t^{\eta-\lambda-1} + \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} G_{F,t} \right) - \zeta \eta \bar{P}_H^{1-\eta} \mathcal{E}_t^{\eta-\lambda-1} \right. \\ \left. - \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} G_{F,t} \right) + \omega^G \frac{1-\chi^G}{G_{F,t}} \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} G_{F,t}, \quad (63)$$

$$V_{G_{F,t}} = \frac{1-\chi}{C_{F,t}} (\tau_t - 1) \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} + \omega^G \left\{ \frac{1-\chi^G}{G_{F,t}} \left( 1 + \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \right) \right\} = \frac{1-\chi}{C_{F,t}} \left( 1 + \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \tau_t \right) \quad (64)$$

where I have used that  $-\kappa L_t^\psi = (\tau_t - 1) A_t \frac{1-\chi}{C_{F,t}} \frac{\bar{P}_H}{\mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}$ .

The planner's first order conditions for (HD2), with respect to  $C_{F,t}$ ,  $\mathcal{E}_t$ ,  $x_t$ ,  $G_{F,t}$  and  $B_t$  re-

spectively, are given by:

$$C_{F,t} : \quad V_{C_{F,t}} - \eta_t^C - \eta_t^\mu + \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t^\lambda C_{F,t}^2} [\eta_t^E - R_{t-1} \eta_{t-1}^E] = 0, \quad (65)$$

$$\mathcal{E}_t : \quad V_{\mathcal{E}_t} + \eta_t^C \zeta(\eta - \lambda) \mathcal{E}_t^{\eta-\lambda-1} \bar{P}_H^{1-\eta} + \quad (66)$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \eta_t^C \left\{ -\lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda-1} (x_t + B_t - a_t^F) - (1 - \lambda) \frac{R^* \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} (x_{t-1} + B_{t-1} - a_{t-1}^F) + \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda-1} \Gamma_{t-1} Q_{t-1} (x_{t-1} + B_{t-1}) \right\} \\ & + \beta \eta_{t+1}^C \left\{ \frac{R^* \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{1-\lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_t^2} (x_t + B_t - a_t^F) \right\} \\ & + \eta_t^E \left\{ \frac{1}{C_{F,t}} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda-1} - \frac{1}{C_{F,t+1}} \beta R^* \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{1-\lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_t^2} \right\} + \eta_{t-1}^E \frac{1}{C_{F,t}} \left\{ (1 - \lambda) \frac{\mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} - \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda-1} \Gamma_{t-1} Q_{t-1} \right\} \\ & - \eta_t^\mu \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda-1} \mu (1 - \chi) = 0, \end{aligned}$$

$$x_t : \quad \eta_t^C \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda} - \beta \eta_{t+1}^C \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{-\lambda} [R_t + \Gamma_t (x_t + B_t) - 2\omega \Gamma_t Q_t] + \eta_t^E \beta \Gamma_t \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}^\lambda C_{F,t+1}} = 0, \quad (67)$$

$$G_{F,t} : \quad V_{G_{F,t}} - \eta_t^C = 0 \quad (68)$$

**$B_t$ ?**

Next, I focus on deriving the monetary policy rule (34). Using (66) the monetary policy targetting rule can be written as:

$$V_{\mathcal{E}_t} + \eta_t^C \frac{dC_{H,t}^*}{d\mathcal{E}_t} + \left\{ \eta_t^C \frac{dF_t}{d\mathcal{E}_t} + \eta_{t+1}^C \frac{dF_{t+1}}{d\mathcal{E}_t} \right\} + \left\{ \eta_t^E \frac{dR_t}{d\mathcal{E}_t} \right\} + \left\{ \eta_{t-1}^E \frac{dR_{t-1}}{d\mathcal{E}_t} \right\} = 0,$$

where,

$$\frac{dC_{H,t}^*}{d\mathcal{E}_t} = \zeta(\eta - \lambda) \mathcal{E}_t^{\eta-\lambda-1} \bar{P}_H^{1-\eta}, \quad (69)$$

$$\frac{dF_t}{d\mathcal{E}_t} = -\lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda-1} (x_t + B_t - a_t^F) - (1 - \lambda) \frac{R^* \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} (x_{t-1} + B_{t-1} - a_{t-1}^F) \quad (70)$$

$$\begin{aligned} & + \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda-1} \Gamma_{t-1} Q_{t-1} (x_{t-1} + B_{t-1}), \\ & \frac{dF_{t+1}}{d\mathcal{E}_t} = \beta \frac{R^* \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{1-\lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_t^2} (x_t + B_t - a_t^F), \end{aligned} \quad (71)$$

$$\frac{dR_t}{d\mathcal{E}_t} = \frac{1}{C_{F,t}} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda-1} - \frac{1}{C_{F,t+1}} \beta R^* \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{1-\lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_t^2}, \quad (72)$$

$$\frac{dR_{t-1}}{d\mathcal{E}_t} = \frac{1}{C_{F,t}} \left\{ (1 - \lambda) \frac{\mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} - \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda-1} \Gamma_{t-1} Q_{t-1} \right\} \quad (73)$$

In the main body, (34) follows from grouping the terms in (75) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_{\mathcal{E}_t} + \underbrace{\eta_t^C \frac{dC_{H,t}^*}{d\mathcal{E}_t}}_{X_{\mathcal{E}_t}} + \underbrace{\left\{ \eta_t^C \frac{dF_t}{d\mathcal{E}_t} + \eta_{t+1}^C \frac{dF_{t+1}}{d\mathcal{E}_t} \right\}}_{\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{E}_t}} \\
+ \underbrace{\left\{ \eta_t^E \frac{d\mathcal{R}_t}{d\mathcal{E}_t} \right\} + \left\{ \eta_{t-1}^E \frac{d\mathcal{R}_{t-1}}{d\mathcal{E}_t} \right\}}_{\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{E}_t}} = 0
\end{aligned} \tag{74}$$

If  $\eta_t^E > 0$ , the hegemon has an incentive to appreciate the exchange rate (higher interest rates) so that households delay consumption to the future. Since policy is set with commitment this is anticipated. Households at  $t$  expecting an appreciation at time  $t + 1$ , would instead increase their consumption and borrowing. Rolling the periods back by one, this is reflected in the term on  $\eta_{t-1}^E$ .

### C.3 Public debt issuance vs. macroprudential taxes.

In this appendix, I investigate whether fiscal policy can be used in place of the optimal borrowing tax or dollar swaps. Specifically, unlike monetary policy, fiscal policy can directly manipulate dollar imbalances through the supply of public debt. Consider the limiting case where there is no lump-sum tax available and all government spending is on imports ( $\chi^G \rightarrow 0$ ).<sup>63</sup> Consider the optimal level of debt issuance by the hegemon, described by the FOC of (HD2) with respect to  $B_t$ :

$$\underbrace{\eta_t^G \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda}}_{\substack{\text{gain from} \\ \text{issuing unit } B_t}} = \underbrace{\beta \eta_{t+1}^G \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{-\lambda} + \Gamma_t \left\{ \eta_{t+1}^G \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{-\lambda} B_t + \eta_{t+1}^C \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{-\lambda} (x_t + 2\omega Q_t) \right\}}_{\text{cost of issuing unit } B_t} - \underbrace{\eta_t^E \Gamma_t \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t^\lambda C_{F,t}}}_{>0 \text{ if over-borrowing}}$$

The first two terms of (75) compares the benefit of a unit of debt issued today (LHS) against the cost of a foregone unit of government spending tomorrow (RHS). If macroprudential policy is available ( $\eta_t^E = 0$ ), the optimality condition determines the level of public debt issuance which trades-off stabilization incentives (smoothing government spending and aggregate demand) and monopolist incentives captured by the term on  $\Gamma_t$  (manipulating the price of dollar debt). In the absence of the optimal macroprudential tax, over-borrowing by the private sector reduces the cost of borrowing, captured by the RHS of (75), and incentivizes the government to increase debt issuance today (as long as shortages persist and  $\eta_t^E > 0$ ). Intuitively, higher public debt issuance erodes the monopoly rents transferred from abroad. While this may boost public spending at time  $t$ , it comes at the cost of lower government spending at  $t + 1$ .

<sup>63</sup>To ensure government spending is positive, I assume there is a fixed level of pre-installed spending  $\underline{G}_H$  and  $\underline{G}_F$  that are sufficiently large. The level  $G_{F,t}$  can then be interpreted as cyclical or discretionary public spending. I relax these assumptions in Section 5 where Ricardian equivalence fails due to limited participation by households.

## D Further Derivations for Section 5 : Limited Financial Market Participation

### Proof to Proposition 4.

Consider the market clearing equation (9) with  $C_{H,t} = \mathbf{a}_t C_{H,t}^A + (1 - \mathbf{a}_t) C_{H,t}^{NA}$ . Assume equal rationing of goods' firm profits, employment and lump-sum taxes such that  $\Pi^g, i = \Pi$ ,  $L^i = L$ ,  $T_t^i = T_t$  but assume that financiers profits accrue fully to active households. Substituting in  $T_t$ , we can express inactive households' consumption by,

$$C_{F,t}^{NA} \leq \frac{\mathbf{a}_t \chi}{1 - (1 - \mathbf{a}_t) \chi} \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda C_{F,t}^A + \frac{1 - \chi}{1 - (1 - \mathbf{a}_t) \chi} \left( \zeta \mathcal{E}_t^\eta \bar{P}_H^{1-\eta} + B_t - R_{t-1} B_{t-1} \right) \quad (75)$$

Similarly, evaluating the budget constraint (4) for active households' and substituting (9) yields,

$$\mathcal{E}_t^\lambda C_{F,t}^A \left( 1 + \frac{\chi}{1 - \chi} (1 - \mathbf{a}_t) \right) \leq (1 - \mathbf{a}_t) \frac{\chi}{1 - \chi} \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda C_{F,t}^{NA} + \zeta \mathcal{E}_t^\eta \bar{P}_H^{1-\eta} + B_t - R_{t-1} B_{t-1} + F_t, \quad (76)$$

where,

$$F_t = x_t - a_t^F - R_{t-1}(x_{t-1} - a_{t-1}^F) - \Gamma_{t-1} Q_{t-1} a_{t-1}^F - R^* \frac{\mathbb{E}_{t-1}[\mathcal{E}_t] - \mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} a_{t-1}^F + \omega \Gamma_t Q_t^2$$

Solving (75) and (76) jointly yields :

$$C_{F,t}^A + G_{F,t} \leq \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda} \left[ \zeta \mathcal{E}_t^\eta \bar{P}_H^{1-\eta} + B_t - R_{t-1} B_{t-1} + (1 - (1 - \alpha) \chi) F_t \right], \quad (77)$$

as detailed in (39). Substituting back into (75) yields:

$$C_{F,t}^{NA} + G_{F,t} \leq \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda} \left[ \zeta \mathcal{E}_t^\eta \bar{P}_H^{1-\eta} + B_t - R_{t-1} B_{t-1} + \alpha \chi F_t \right], \quad (78)$$

The total private portfolio return is given by  $[\mathbf{a}_t(1 - (1 - \mathbf{a}_t)\chi) + (1 - \mathbf{a}_t)\mathbf{a}_t\chi]F_t = \mathbf{a}_t F_t$  and total export revenues are given by  $(\mathbf{a}_t + (1 - \mathbf{a}_t))\zeta \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} = \zeta \mathcal{E}_t^{-\eta} \bar{P}_H^{1-\eta}$ .  $\square$

With limited financial market participation, the indirect utility function for the hegemon planner is given by,

$$\begin{aligned} V(C_{F,t}^A, C_{F,t}^{NA}, \mathcal{E}_t, G_{F,t}; \boldsymbol{\lambda}, \mathbf{a}_t) = & \mathbf{a}_t \lambda^A \mathcal{U} \left( \frac{\chi}{1 - \chi} \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} C_{F,t}^A, C_{F,t}^A, L_t \right) + \\ & (1 - \mathbf{a}_t) \lambda^{NA} \mathcal{U} \left( \frac{\chi}{1 - \chi} \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} C_{F,t}^{NA}, C_{F,t}^{NA}, L_t \right) + \\ & \omega^G \left[ \chi^G \log \left( \frac{\chi^G}{1 - \chi^G} \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} G_{F,t} \right) + (1 - \chi^G) \log(G_{F,t}) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (79)$$

where  $\boldsymbol{\lambda} = [\lambda^A, \lambda^{NA}]$  are the Pareto weights the planner attaches to  $A$  and  $NA$  households respectively and satisfy  $\mathbf{a}_t \lambda^A + (1 - \mathbf{a}_t) \lambda^{NA} = 1$ . Moreover,  $C_{F,t}^A$  is given by (76),  $C_{F,t}^{NA}$  is given

by (78) and  $L_t^A = L_t^{NA}$  is given by market clearing and  $L_t = Y_t/A_t$ . The partial derivatives of the indirect utility function with respect to  $C_{F,t}^A$ ,  $C_{F,t}^{NA}$  and  $\mathcal{E}_t$  are given, respectively, by:

$$V_{C_{F,t}^A} = \alpha \lambda^A \frac{1-\chi}{C_{F,t}^A} \left( 1 + \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \tau_t^A \right), \quad (80)$$

$$V_{C_{F,t}^{NA}} = (1-\alpha) \lambda^A \frac{1-\chi}{C_{F,t}^{NA}} \left( 1 + \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \tau_t^{NA} \right), \quad (81)$$

$$\begin{aligned} V_{\mathcal{E}_t}(C_{F,t}, \mathcal{E}_t; \mathbf{a}_t) = & \mathbf{a}_t \lambda^A \frac{1-\chi}{C_{F,t}^A} \left\{ \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} C_{F,t}^A \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} + \right. \\ & \left. (\tau_t^A - 1) \left( \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} [\mathbf{a}_t C_{F,t}^A + (1-\mathbf{a}_t) C_{F,t}^{NA}] + \zeta \eta \mathcal{E}_t^{\eta-\lambda-1} + \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} G_{F,t} \right) \right\} \\ & (1-\mathbf{a}_t) \lambda^{NA} \frac{1-\chi}{C_{F,t}^{NA}} \left\{ \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} C_{F,t}^{NA} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} + \right. \\ & \left. (\tau_t^{NA} - 1) \left( \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} [\mathbf{a}_t C_{F,t}^A + (1-\mathbf{a}_t) C_{F,t}^{NA}] + \zeta \eta \mathcal{E}_t^{\eta-\lambda-1} + \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} G_{F,t} \right) \right\} + \\ & \omega^G \left\{ \frac{1-\chi^G}{G_{F,t}} \left( 1 + \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \right) \right\} = \frac{1-\chi}{C_{F,t}} \left( 1 + \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \tau_t \right) \end{aligned} \quad (82)$$

With limited financial market participation, the interest rate reflects the marginal rate of substitution for  $A$  households only, see ((37)). Therefore, the condition characterising unresponsive monetary policy is given by,

$$P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda C_{F,t}^A = \mu_t (1-\chi), \quad (83)$$

where  $\mu$  is a synthetic monetary instrument. If  $\mu_t/\mu_{t+1}$  is constant,  $R_t = \frac{1}{\beta}$ .

Moreover, because of limited financial market participation, Ricardian equivalence fails even when a lump-sum tax is available to the government. As a result, the planner can choose  $B_t$  to affect the quantity of dollars issued by international intermediaries ( $Q_t$ ) – which reflect the size of dollar shortages in the model.

The hegemon planner now maximizes (79) subject to (76) and (78). I assume  $\mathbf{a}_t = \mathbf{a}$  and I attach multipliers  $\eta_t^A$  and  $\eta_t^{NA}$  to (76) and (78) respectively. The optimal allocation is

characterized by the following first order conditions:

$$C_{F,t}^A : \quad V_{C_{F,t}} - \mathbf{a}\eta_t^A - \eta_t^\mu + \mathbf{a} \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t^\lambda C_{F,t}^2} [\eta_t^E - R_{t-1}\eta_{t-1}^E] = 0, \quad (84)$$

$$C_{F,t}^{NA} : \quad V_{C_{F,t}^{NA}} - (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_t^{NA} = 0, \quad (85)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E}_t : \quad & V_{\mathcal{E}_t} + [\mathbf{a}\eta_t^A + (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_t^{NA}] \zeta(\eta - \lambda) \mathcal{E}_t^{\eta - \lambda - 1} \bar{P}_H^{1 - \eta} + \\ & [\mathbf{a}\eta_t^A (1 - (1 - \mathbf{a})\chi) + (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_t^{NA} \mathbf{a}\chi] \left\{ -\lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda - 1} (x_t - a_t^F) - (1 - \lambda) \frac{R^* \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} (x_{t-1} - a_{t-1}^F) + \right. \\ & \left. \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda - 1} \Gamma_{t-1} Q_{t-1} (x_{t-1}) \right\} + \beta [\mathbf{a}\eta_{t+1}^A (1 - (1 - \mathbf{a})\chi) + (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_{t+1}^{NA} \mathbf{a}\chi] \left\{ \frac{R^* \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{1 - \lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_t^2} (x_t - a_t^F) \right\} + \\ & [\mathbf{a}\eta_t^A + (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_t^{NA}] \left\{ -\lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda - 1} B_t - (1 - \lambda) \frac{R^* \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} B_{t-1} + \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda - 1} \Gamma_{t-1} Q_{t-1} B_{t-1} \right\} + \\ & \beta [\mathbf{a}\eta_{t+1}^A + (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_{t+1}^{NA}] \left\{ \frac{R^* \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{1 - \lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_t^2} B_t \right\} + \\ & \mathbf{a}\eta_t^E \left\{ \frac{1}{C_{F,t}^A} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda - 1} - \frac{1}{C_{F,t+1}^A} \beta R^* \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{1 - \lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_t^2} \right\} + \mathbf{a}\eta_{t-1}^E \frac{1}{C_{F,t}^A} \left\{ (1 - \lambda) \frac{\mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda}}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} - \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda - 1} \Gamma_{t-1} Q_{t-1} \right\} \\ & - \eta_t^\mu \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda - 1} \mu (1 - \chi) = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (86)$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_t : \quad & [\mathbf{a}\eta_t^A (1 - (1 - \mathbf{a})\chi) + (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_t^{NA} \mathbf{a}\chi] \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda} - \\ & \beta [\mathbf{a}\eta_{t+1}^A (1 - (1 - \mathbf{a})\chi) + (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_{t+1}^{NA} \mathbf{a}\chi] \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{-\lambda} [R_t + \mathbf{a}\Gamma_t (x_t - a_t^F) - 2\omega \mathbf{a}\Gamma_t Q_t] + \\ & \beta [\mathbf{a}\eta_{t+1}^A + (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_{t+1}^{NA}] \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{-\lambda} \mathbf{a}\Gamma_t B_t + \mathbf{a}\eta_t^E \left\{ \mathbf{a}\Gamma_t \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}^\lambda C_{F,t+1}^A} \right\} = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (87)$$

$$G_{F,t} : \quad V_{G_{F,t}} - [\mathbf{a}\eta_t^A + (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_t^{NA}] = 0, \quad (88)$$

$$\begin{aligned} B_t : \quad & [\mathbf{a}\eta_t^A + (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_t^{NA}] \mathcal{E}_t^{-\lambda} - \beta [\mathbf{a}\eta_{t+1}^A + (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_{t+1}^{NA}] \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{-\lambda} [R_t + \Gamma_t B_t] - \\ & \beta [\mathbf{a}\eta_{t+1}^A (1 - (1 - \mathbf{a})\chi) + (1 - \mathbf{a})\eta_{t+1}^{NA} \mathbf{a}\chi] \mathcal{E}_{t+1}^{-\lambda} (\Gamma_t x_t - 2\omega \Gamma_t Q_t) + \mathbf{a}\eta_t^E \left\{ \Gamma_t \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}^\lambda C_{F,t+1}^A} \right\} = 0 \end{aligned} \quad (89)$$

## D.1 Fiscal Policy and Limited Financial Market Participation

Two points are noteworthy regarding fiscal policy in the model with limited financial market participation. First, redistributive taxation can complete the market domestically, recovering the representative agent case, as in Farhi and Werning (2017), but I abstract from this. Second, even with a lump-sum tax, if it is levied equally across all households, Ricardian equivalence fails and an increase in the supply of public debt will result in a higher net supply of dollar assets to abroad –so fiscal policy will face an analogous trade-off to (75).



## E Generalizing preferences $\sigma, \theta \neq 1$

In this subsection, I consider the generalisation of the model beyond the Cole-Obstfeld specification. This is used for the quantitative exercise in Section 5. The indirect utility function is given by:

$$V(C_{F,t}, \mathcal{E}_t, G_{F,t}) = \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \left( \left[ \chi^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \left( \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \left( \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} \right)^\theta C_{F,t} \right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} + (1-\chi)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} C_{F,t}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right]^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \right)^{1-\sigma} - (90)$$

$$\kappa \frac{1}{1+\psi} \left[ \left( \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \left( \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} \right)^\theta C_{F,t} \right) + \zeta \left( \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{P_{H,t}} \right)^\eta + \left( \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \left( \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} \right)^\theta G_{F,t} \right) \right]^{1+\psi} +$$

$$\omega^G \log \left( \left[ \chi^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \left( \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \left( \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} \right)^\theta G_{F,t} \right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} + (1-\chi)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} G_{F,t}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right]^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \right)$$

The partial derivatives with respect to  $C_{F,t}$ ,  $G_{F,t}$  and  $\mathcal{E}_t$  are given as follows:

$$V_{C_{F,t}} = C_t^{\frac{1-\theta\sigma}{\theta}} \left\{ \chi^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \left[ \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \left( \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} \right)^\theta \right] C_{H,t}^{\frac{-1}{\theta}} + (1-\chi)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} C_{F,t}^{\frac{-1}{\theta}} \right\} - \kappa L_t^\psi \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \left( \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}, \quad (91)$$

$$V_{\mathcal{E}_t} = C_t^{\frac{1-\theta\sigma}{\theta}} \left\{ \chi^{\frac{1}{\theta}} C_{H,t}^{\frac{-1}{\theta}} \left( \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{\lambda-1} \frac{1}{P_{H,t}} C_{F,t} \right\} - \quad (92)$$

$$\kappa L_t^\psi \left\{ \frac{\chi}{1-\chi} \left( \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{\lambda-1} \frac{1}{P_{H,t}} C_{F,t} + \zeta \eta \left( \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{\eta-1} + \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \left( \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{\lambda-1} \frac{1}{P_{H,t}} G_{F,t} \right\} +$$

$$\omega^G G_t^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}} \left\{ \chi^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \left( \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \left( \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \lambda \mathcal{E}_t^{\lambda-1} G_{F,t} \right) G_{H,t}^{\frac{-1}{\theta}} \right\},$$

$$V_{G_{F,t}} = -\kappa L_t^\psi \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \left( \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} + \omega^G G_t^{\frac{1-\theta}{\theta}} \left\{ (\chi^G)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \left[ \frac{\chi^G}{1-\chi^G} \left( \frac{P_{F,t}^* \mathcal{E}_t^\lambda}{P_{H,t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \right] G_{H,t}^{\frac{-1}{\theta}} + (1-\chi^G)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} G_{F,t}^{\frac{-1}{\theta}} \right\} \quad (93)$$

All the expression in this section coincide with the main body counterparts in the limit  $\sigma, \theta \rightarrow 1$ . The expressions for the  $\mathbf{a} < 1$  case follow from expanding on the relevant conditions in Appendix D.

## F Model for the $i$ -th country

What is purpose of this? Consolidate and sharpen.

In this Appendix I detail the equilibrium conditions for the global model for a country  $i > 0$  under dollar currency pricing, where country  $i = 0$  is the issuer of dollars. I detail the model for an arbitrary utility function, CES aggregator and market structure. For simplicity, I abstract from government spending.

**Model Setup.** The consumption basket for country  $i$  is given by,

$$C_{i,t} = \left[ \chi C_{ii,t}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} + (1-\chi) C_{i,t}^*{}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right]^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}, \quad (94)$$

where  $C_{i,t}^* = \int_j C_{ji,t} dj$  denotes the import good bundle and  $C_{ji,t}$  denotes country  $i$ 's consumption of goods produced in country  $j$ . In turn,

$$C_{ji,t} = \left( \int_{\omega} C_{ji,t}(\omega)^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} d\omega \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}} \quad (95)$$

The country  $i$  consumer-price index is given by,

$$P_{i,t} = \left[ \chi P_{ii,t}^{1-\theta} + (1-\chi) \int_j P_{ji,t}^{1-\theta} dj \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}, \quad (96)$$

where prices are expressed in the currency of destination,  $P_{ii,t}$  denotes country  $i$  prices of domestic goods and  $P_{ji,t}$  is the price of goods produced in  $j$  and consumed in  $i$ . The demand for home and foreign goods respectively is given by,

$$C_{ii,t} = \chi \left( \frac{P_{ii,t}}{P_{i,t}} \right)^{-\theta} C_{i,t}, \quad C_{ji,t} = (1-\chi) \left( \frac{P_{ji,t}}{P_{i,t}} \right)^{-\theta} C_{i,t}, \quad (97)$$

I define the real exchange rate  $Q_{i,t}$ , the terms of trade  $S_{i,t}$  and deviations from the law of one price  $\Phi_{i,t}$  as follows,

$$Q_{i,t} = \frac{\mathcal{E}_{i,t} P_t^*}{P_{i,t}}, \quad S_{i,t} = \frac{P_t^*}{P_{i,t}}, \quad \Phi_{i,t} = \frac{\mathcal{E}_{i,t} P_{i,t}^*}{P_{ii,t}} \quad (98)$$

where, from (97),

$$Q_{i,t}^{\theta-1} = \chi + (1-\chi)(S_{i,t}\Phi_{i,t})^{\theta-1} \quad (99)$$

The households' budget constraint is given by,

$$P_{i,t} C_{i,t} = W_{i,t} L_{i,t} + \Pi_{i,t} + T_{i,t} + x_{i,t} - R_{i,t-1} x_{i,t-1}, \quad (100)$$

where  $\Pi_{i,t} = \Pi_{i,t}^g + \Pi_{i,t}^f$  combines goods' firms and financial firms' profits. The market clearing constraint is given by,

$$Y_{i,t} = C_{ii,t} + \int_j C_{ij,t} dj \quad (101)$$

**Firm's pricing conditions.** For country  $i > 0$ , the price-setting problem for domestic sales is given by,<sup>64</sup>

$$\max_{P_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{i,t} \left[ (P_t - \tilde{M}C_{i,t}) \left( \frac{P_t}{P_{ii,t}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t^D \right] \quad (103)$$

and for exports,

$$\max_{P_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{i,t} \left[ (\mathcal{E}_{i,t} P_t^* - \tilde{M}C_{i,t}) \left( \frac{P_t^*}{P_{i,t}^*} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t^E \right] \quad (104)$$

in which market prices are set in dollar terms. In a symmetric equilibrium  $P_t = P(j)_t$ . In contrast, for country  $i = 0$  who issues dollars,

$$\max_{P_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{i,t} \left[ (P_t - \tilde{M}C_{i,t}) \left( \frac{P_t}{P_{ii,t}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_{i,t} \right] \quad (105)$$

where  $Y_{i,t} = Y_{i,t}^D + Y_{i,t}^E$ . Denoting  $P_t = P_{H,t}$ ,  $Y_{i,t} = Y_{H,t}$  and substituting  $\tilde{M}C_{i,t} = \frac{\tilde{W}_t}{A_t}$  yields the pricing condition for hegemon firms in the main body (10).

**Equilibrium Conditions.** Goods' firms profits are given by,

$$\Pi_t^g = (P_{ii,t} - MC_{i,t})Y_{i,t} + (\mathcal{E}_{i,t}P_{i,t}^* - MC_{i,t})Y_{i,t}^E \quad (106)$$

where  $MC_{i,t}(Y_{i,t} + Y_{i,t}^E) = W_{i,t}L_{i,t}$ . The consolidated budget constraint can be written as,

$$\int_j P_{ji,t} C_{ji,t} dj - \int_j P_{ij,t} C_{ij,t} dj = x_{i,t} - R_{i,t}x_{i,t-1} + \Pi_{i,t}^f$$

Using the relative demand equations (97) and (98), the market clearing equation (101) can be expressed as,

$$A_{i,t}L_{i,t} = \chi \Phi_{i,t} S_{i,t}^{\theta} Q_{i,t}^{-\theta} C_{i,t} + (1 - \chi) S_{i,t}^{\theta} C_t^* \quad (107)$$

---

<sup>64</sup>This can be considered as the limit  $\phi \rightarrow \infty$  of the dynamic pricing with Rotemberg adjustment costs considered in Egorov and Mukhin (2019). In the domestic market,

$$\max_{P_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{i,t} \left[ (P_t - \tilde{M}C_{i,t}) \left( \frac{P_t}{P_{ii,t}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t^D \right] - \chi \frac{\phi}{2} \left( \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_{i,t}^D \quad (102)$$

As adjusting prices becomes very costly,  $\lim_{\phi \rightarrow \infty} \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} = 1$ .

where I have assumed production is linear and only uses labour. Similarly, the consolidated budget constraint (100) can be rewritten as,

$$(1 - \chi)\mathcal{E}_{i,t}P_{i,t}^* \int_j \left(\frac{P_{ij,t}}{P_{j,t}}\right)^{-\theta} C_{j,t}dj - (1 - \chi) \int_j P_{ji,t} \left(\frac{P_{ji,t}}{P_{i,t}}\right)^{-\theta} dj C_j = \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} F_{i,t}$$

where,

$$F_{i,t} = \mathcal{E}_{i,t} \left( x_{i,t} - R_{i,t}x_{i,t-1} + \Pi_{i,t}^f \right) \quad (108)$$

In complete markets,  $F_{i,t} = x_{i,t}^h$ , where  $h$  denotes the realisation of history, and  $\sum_{t,h} x_{i,t}^h = 0$ .

<sup>65</sup> Converting to dollar terms, the consolidated budget constraint can be further simplified to,

$$(1 - \chi)P_t^* \left[ S_{i,t}^{\theta-1} \int_j Q_j^{-\theta} C_{j,t}dj - Q_{i,t}^{-\theta} C_{i,t} \right] + F_{i,t} = 0 \quad (109)$$

Consider the maximization problem for country  $i > 0$ , taking  $F_{i,t}$  as given.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\{C_{i,t}, L_{i,t}, \Phi_{i,t}, Q_{i,t}\}} u(C_{i,t}, L_{i,t}) \\ & \text{s.t.} \quad (99), (100), (101). \end{aligned}$$

The monetary policy instrument is  $\Phi_{i,t}$  which relates to  $\mathcal{E}_{i,t}$  as per (98), where  $P_{ii,t}$  is preset and  $P_{i,t}^*$  is taken as given. Condition (99) is used to substitute out  $Q_{i,t}$  noting that  $Q_{i,t}$  is itself a function of  $\Phi_{i,t}$ . I attach multipliers  $\eta_{1,t}^*, \eta_{2,t}^*$ , respectively to (100), (101). I make the following assumption which in the proof to Lemma 4A, I show is satisfied when  $\omega = 1, \phi^* = 0$ .

**A.4 (Portfolio returns in foreign currency independent of policy)**  $F_{i,t}$  given by (108) is unaffected by monetary policy.

The first order conditions with respect to  $C_{i,t}, L_{i,t}$  and  $\Phi_{i,t}$  are given as follows:

$$C_{i,t} : \quad u_{C_{i,t}} - \eta_{1,t}^* \{ \chi Q_{i,t}^\theta \Phi_{i,t}^\theta S_{i,t}^\theta \} - \eta_{2,t}^* \{ (1 - \chi) P_t^* Q_{i,t}^{-\theta} \} = 0, \quad (110)$$

$$L_{i,t} : \quad u_{L_{i,t}} + \eta_{1,t}^* A_{i,t} = 0, \quad (111)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi_{i,t} : \quad & -\eta_{1,t}^* \{ \chi (\theta Q_{i,t}^{2-\theta} \Phi_{i,t}^{2\theta-2} S_{i,t}^{2\theta-1} C_{i,t} + \theta Q_{i,t}^{-\theta} S_{i,t}^\theta \Phi_{i,t}^{\theta-1} C_{i,t}) \} \\ & + \eta_{2,t}^* (1 - \chi) P_t^* \theta Q_{i,t}^{1-2\theta} \chi \Phi_{i,t}^{\theta-2} S_{i,t}^{\theta-1} C_{i,t} = 0 \end{aligned} \quad (112)$$

where the last FOC uses the chain rule. Factorizing and using (99) to simplify (112) yields,

$$\eta_{i,t} S_{i,t} \Phi_{i,t} = \rho_{i,t} P_t^* \quad (113)$$

---

<sup>65</sup>Without loss of generality I assume Arrow Debreu securities are denominated in dollars.

Then combining (110) and (113) yields,

$$\frac{-u_{L_{i,t}}}{u_{C_{i,t}}} = \frac{A_{i,t}}{S_{i,t}\Phi_{i,t}Q_{i,t}^{-1}} \quad (114)$$

Using the household intratemporal consumption-leisure Euler, I show that optimal policy therefore ensures,

$$\frac{W_{i,t}}{A_{i,t}P_{ii,t}} = 1 \quad (115)$$

Optimal monetary policy stabilises marginal costs— a result emphasized in Egorov and Mukhin (2019) who show it generalises to a dynamic environment with Rotemberg pricing.

**Lemma 4A (Foreign monetary policy)**

*Under A.2 and assuming  $\chi^G = 0, \omega = 0, \psi^* = 0$ , and  $A_t = \bar{A}$ , under DCP, optimal monetary policy in the foreign sector is fully characterised by  $R^*\beta = 1$ .*

**Proof.** See Appendix A.

**Proof of Lemma 4A.**

The proof is in two steps. First, I show that if utility is log-linear ( $\psi = 0$ ) and productivity is constant ( $A_{i,t} = \bar{A}$ ) marginal cost stabilization (115), which characterizes the optimal monetary policy, is achieved by  $R_{i,t}\beta = 1$ . By symmetry of countries in the foreign sector  $R^*$  is constant. Second, I verify that A.4 holds if  $\omega = 1$ .

Assuming CRRA utility with  $\sigma = 1, \theta = 1$  and  $\psi = 0$ , (115) can be rewritten as,

$$\frac{P_{i,t}C_{i,t}}{A_{i,t}} \frac{\chi}{\kappa} = 1 \quad (116)$$

In turn, denoting  $P_{i,t}C_{i,t} = \mu_t$ , the nominal interest rate can be expressed as,

$$R_{i,t} = \frac{1}{\beta} \frac{\mu_t}{\mu_{t+1}} \quad (117)$$

If  $A_{i,t} = \bar{A}_t$ , from (116),  $\mu_t$  must be constant. (Then, (117) implies  $R_{i,t}\beta = 1$ .)

To complete the proof, I show A.4 is satisfied if  $\omega^* = 1$ . Since all countries  $i > 0$  are symmetric, I assume  $R_{i,t} = R^*$  for all  $i > 0$ . Furthermore, this implies  $\mathcal{E}_{i,t} = \mathcal{E}_t$  since  $x_{i,t}$  is symmetric across  $i$ . Without loss of generality, financiers can then be assumed to trade in a dollar bond and a single foreign bond denominated in foreign currency. In foreign currency terms, using (108) portfolio returns for any country  $i > 0$  can be expressed as,

$$\frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} F_t^* = \left[ x_t^* - R^* x_{t-1}^* + \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} Q_{t-1} \left( R_t - R_t^* \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} \right) \right] \quad (118)$$

From clearing in the \$ market  $Q_{t-1}^{\$} = x_{t-1}$  (abstracting from other features of the IMS discussed

below), and by financiers' zero-capital condition  $Q_t + Q_t^* \mathcal{E}_t = 0$  where  $-Q_{t-1}^* \mathcal{E}_{t-1} = -x^* \mathcal{E}_{t-1}$ . Substituting this,

$$\frac{1}{\mathcal{E}_t} F_t^* = x_t^* - R^* x_{t-1}^* - \frac{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}}{\mathcal{E}_t} x_{t-1}^* \left( R_t - R_t^* \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} \right) \quad (119)$$

Finally, rearranging, and expressing in \$ terms,

$$F_t^* = -Q_t + R_t Q_{t-1}, \quad (120)$$

which is exogenous to monetary policy in  $i > 0$ . (120) reflects the net foreign asset position of the country, consolidating for international financiers balance sheets. This is consistent with Egorov and Mukhin (2019) who argue incomplete markets do not affect the policy of marginal cost stabilisation if a country issues debt in foreign currency.  $\square$

**Extending Lemma 4A to  $\xi$  shocks** Allowing for foreign \$ demand shocks,

$$\Pi_{t-1}^f = x_t^* - R^* x_{t-1}^* + \xi^* \left( R_t - R_t^* \frac{\mathcal{E}_t}{\mathcal{E}_{t-1}} \right), \quad (121)$$

$$Q_t^* = x_{t-1}^* + \xi_{t-1}^* \quad (122)$$

Substituting these quantities into (108) yields (120) therefore the policy response to fluctuations in  $\xi_t^*$  is a constant  $R^*$  policy for the foreign sector.

Intuitively, because of DCP, foreign countries cannot affect export or import prices and cannot generate expenditure switching beyond switching between domestic goods and imports. The optimal policy is to stabilize domestic firms' marginal costs to replicate part of the flexible price equilibrium.<sup>66</sup> With linear disutility of labour in the foreign sector ( $\psi^* = 0$ ), this is achieved by a constant  $R^*$  as long as  $A_t = \bar{A}$ . Furthermore, as long as foreign households fully own financiers ( $\omega = 0$ ) the country as a whole effectively issues debt in dollars. Consequently, monetary policy cannot affect asset pay-outs, is inward looking and finds it optimal to stabilize marginal costs.<sup>67</sup> While I focus on the DCP case, stabilisation of marginal costs is optimal under PCP as well, see e.g. Corsetti et al. (2007).

**Market Structure Diagram.** Figure 17 below details the asset market structure.

<sup>66</sup>This is a well understood result in the literature. Corsetti et al. (2007) show, in both complete and incomplete markets, that with perfectly rigid prices and DCP, a foreign economy takes as exogenous the terms of trade and pursues a monetary policy which stabilizes domestic marginal costs. Egorov and Mukhin (2019) show this result generalises to dynamic pricing with Rotemberg adjustment, the inclusion of intermediate goods and along other dimensions and show that the equilibrium for non-US countries is less efficient under DCP. The substantial difference relative to Corsetti et al. (2007) and Egorov and Mukhin (2019), is that I allow for financial market segmentation.

<sup>67</sup>Conversely, Egorov and Mukhin (2019) study a version with intermediate goods and find that whilst domestic price stabilisation is still the optimal policy, it is outward looking and part of a global monetary cycle.




Figure 17: International financial market structure

## G Further Results for Calibration Exercise

Below, I provide further results for the calibration exercise in Section 5. The next two figure plot the impulse response of key quantities in the model, under different monetary policy regimes. First, Figure 15 shows the impulse response of the spread in the cost of borrowing in dollars vis-a-vis foreign currency. The impact is close to the empirical values presented in Figure 1.




Figure 18: Impulse response to  $\xi > 0$ . Difference in cost of borrowing in dollars vis-a-vis foreign currency expressed in % (quarterly) , if interest rates are fixed or monetary policy is optimally set.

Next, Figure 17 illustrates the impulse response for the ramsey multiplier on the Euler equation  $\eta_t^E$ , given by (32). The multiplier takes a positive value if there is over-borrowing by prviate households in the economy and is zero if an optimal borrowing tax is levied. The figure below illustrates that monetary policy alone, is able to partly narrow  $\eta_t^E$ , but over-borrowing persists absent the optimal borrowing tax.




Figure 19: Impulse response to  $\xi > 0$ . Difference in cost of borrowing in dollars vis-a-vis foreign currency expressed in %, if interest rates are fixed or monetary policy is optimally set.

Figure 18 details the labour wedge for the two household groups at the constrained optimal allocation.




Figure 20: Impulse response to  $\xi > 0$ . Labour wedge for active and inactive households when a borrowing tax is and is not available, and monetary policy is optimally set.

**Impulse Responses to Dollar Demand Shock.** The next three figure plot consumption allocations and hours worked under different policy regimes.






Figure 21: Impulse response to  $\xi > 0$ . Allocations when interest rates are held constant.




Figure 22: Impulse response to  $\xi > 0$ . Allocations when monetary policy is optimally set.

**Impulse Responses to Productivity Shock.** The next two figures plot the impulse responses to a one-off 1% shock to productivity, when monetary policy is optimally set, with and without the optimal borrowing tax.




Figure 23: Impulse response to  $\xi > 0$ . Allocations at the constrained optimal allocation (monetary policy+optimal borrowing tax).




Figure 24: Impulse response to  $\Delta A > 0$ . Allocations when monetary policy is optimally set.

**Welfare under DCP.** On one hand, ... on the other. Under no Mo.. results as expected. With mo, DCP has offsetting eff cite EM

Finally, Table 3 below repeats the welfare analysis in Table 2 for the case of  $\lambda = 1$ , i.e the




Figure 25: Impulse response to  $\Delta A > 0$ . Allocations at the constrained optimal allocation (monetary policy+optimal borrowing tax).

producer currency pricing benchmark.

	Active	Inactive	Aggregate
Unresponsive monetary (no macropru.)	0.054%	0.068%	0.058%
Optimal monetary (no macropru.)	-0.07%	0.0037%	-0.048%
Constrained Optimal	-0.19%	0.047%	-0.13%

Table 3: Hicksian welfare transfers under different policy regimes, in response to a one-off, unanticipated dollar-asset demand shock.