



Garboling


Yao Garbled Circuit



Classic Garbling




Classic Garbling



Permute bits

[Beaver-Micali-Rogaway]



The extra bits V_a, V_b designate which row to use.

Security property

Garbling of function: $G_b(f)$, $En(X)$

Encoding of input: X

Output: $y=f(x)$

should be indistinguishable from

$Sim(f,y)$


Free XOR garbling

[Kolesnikov-Schneider]

$$C_0 = A_0 + B_0$$

$$C_1 = A_0 + B_0 + R$$

Let R be a random string
s.t. $R \bmod 2 = 1$




Free XOR garbling

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
Evaluator simply
XORs input wires
to compute output
wire. Secure with
good Enc.

[Chou-Katz-Kumaresan-Zhou]

Why is gate-by-
gate garbling the
best (only)
strategy?


Garbling gate by gate has
disadvantages.

gate-by-gate introduces extra
depth to the degarble circuit



Plain


\xrightarrow{G}



Each AND
gate
incurs extra
depth of
cryptographic
H function


If the original circuit has
depth d , then the garbled
circuit may have depth
 $d * \text{depth}(H)$

Q: Does gate-by-gate garbling minimize the size of the garbling?



Alternatives to gate-by-gate garbling?

N-input **gate** = 2^n rows



$$c_{\wedge}(f_{2n}) \leq 2^{n+1} - n - 2$$



of AND
gates needed to
compute a function
of $2n$ vars

$$c_{\wedge}(f_{2n}) \leq 2^{n+1} - n - 2$$

This implies that the SIZE of a garbled circuit for f_{2n} using just AND gates is less than


$$2^{n+3} - 4n - 8 \text{ ciphertexts}$$

$$4 \cdot c_{\wedge}(f_{2n}) \leq 4(2^{n+1} - n - 2) < 2^{2n}$$




Garbled Row Reduction


[Naor-Pinkas-Sumner]



Garbled Row Reduction

[Naor-Pinkas-Sumner]






(0)

$$E_{A_0}(E_{B_1}(C_0))$$

$$E_{A_1}(E_{B_0}(C_0))$$

$$E_{A_1}(E_{B_1}(C_1))$$

3 rows,
not 4



(0)

$$E_{A_0}(E_{B_1}(C_0))$$


$$E_{A_1}(E_{B_0}(C_0))$$

$$E_{A_1}(E_{B_1}(C_1))$$

3 rows,
not 4


works with Free-xor
if $C_1 = C_0 + R$

N-input **gate** = $2^n - 1$ rows




Still better to use AND₂ gates

$$3 \cdot c_{\wedge}(f_{2n}) \leq 3(2^{n+1} - n - 2) < 2^{2n} - 1$$





2-row garbling [Naor-Pinkas-Sumner]



View the problem of
garbling as one of
secret sharing


2-row garbling

[Naor-Pinkas-Sumner]




2-row garbling

[Naor-Pinkas-Sumner]




2-row garbling


[Naor-Pinkas-Sumner]





2-row garbling

[Naor-Pinkas-Sumner]










Problem: C_0 and C_1 are “fixed” by polynomials.
Cannot guarantee $C_0 = C_1 + R$.




Still better to use AND₂ gates


Because XOR gates are not FREE!





Flexor garbling


[Mohassel-Rosulek]












Gates
requires
0,1,2
ciphertexts



Half-gate Garbling

[Zahur-Evans-Rosulek]




$$(a \wedge z) + (a \wedge (b + z)) = a \wedge b$$

random bit

Half-gate Garbling

[Zahur-Evans-Rosulek]




$$(a \wedge z) + (a \wedge (b + z)) = a \wedge b$$

random bit



Generator knows z



$z=0$

$$H(A_0) \oplus C_0$$

$$H(A_1) \oplus C_0$$


$z=1$

$$H(A_0) \oplus C_0$$

$$H(A_1) \oplus C_1$$



Generator knows z



$z=0$

$$C_0 = H(A_0)$$

$z=1$

~~$$H(A_0) \oplus C_0$$~~

$$H(A_1) \oplus C_0$$


$$H(A_0) \oplus C_0$$

$$H(A_1) \oplus C_1$$

Step 1: Apply Garbled Row Reduction



Generator knows z



$z=0$

0

$$H(A_1) \oplus H(A_0)$$

$$C_0 = H(A_0)$$

$z=1$


0

$$H(A_1) \oplus C_1$$

Step 1: Apply Garbled Row Reduction



Generator knows z



$z=0$

0

$$H(A_1) \oplus H(A_0)$$

$$C_0 = H(A_0)$$

$$C_1 = C_0 + R$$

$z=1$


0

$$H(A_1) \oplus C_1$$

Step 2: Free XOR



Generator knows z



$z=0$

0

$$H(A_1) \oplus H(A_0)$$

$$C_0 = H(A_0)$$

$$C_1 = C_0 + R$$

$z=1$


0

$$H(A_1) + H(A_0) + R$$

Step 2: Free XOR




Generator knows z



$$H(A_1) + H(A_0) + zR$$

Step 2: Free XOR

Evaluator knows $b+z$



$$b+z=0$$

$$H(A_0) + D_0$$

$$H(A_1) + D_0$$

$$b+z=1$$

$$H(A_0) + D_0$$

$$H(A_1) + D_1$$

QUARKS	mass → $\approx 2.3 \text{ MeV}/c^2$ charge → $2/3$ spin → $1/2$ <div>u</div> up	mass → $\approx 1.275 \text{ GeV}/c^2$ charge → $2/3$ spin → $1/2$ <div>c</div> charm	mass → $\approx 173.07 \text{ GeV}/c^2$ charge → $2/3$ spin → $1/2$ <div>t</div> top	0 0 1 <div>g</div> gluon	$\approx 126 \text{ GeV}/c^2$ 0 0 0 <div>H</div> Higgs boson
	mass → $\approx 4.8 \text{ MeV}/c^2$ charge → $-1/3$ spin → $1/2$ <div>d</div> down	mass → $\approx 95 \text{ MeV}/c^2$ charge → $-1/3$ spin → $1/2$ <div>s</div> strange	mass → $\approx 4.18 \text{ GeV}/c^2$ charge → $-1/3$ spin → $1/2$ <div>b</div> bottom	0 0 1 <div>γ</div> photon	
	0.511 MeV/c ² -1 1/2 <div>e</div> electron	105.7 MeV/c ² -1 1/2 <div>μ</div> muon	1.777 GeV/c ² -1 1/2 <div>τ</div> tau	91.2 GeV/c ² 0 1 <div>Z</div> Z boson	GAUGE BOSONS
	<2.2 eV/c ² 0 1/2 <div>ν_e</div> electron neutrino	<0.17 MeV/c ² 0 1/2 <div>ν_μ</div> muon neutrino	<15.5 MeV/c ² 0 1/2 <div>ν_τ</div> tau neutrino	80.4 GeV/c ² ± 1 1 <div>W</div> W boson	
LEPTONS					

Work in progress

Malkin-Pastro-shelat

Input A
Input B

1	0	a	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	$1 - a$	0	a	0
0	1	b	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	$1 - b$	0	b
0	0	p_b	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	0	1	0	1

Garbled gate

A
B
R
$H(A)$
$H(B)$
$H(A + R)$
$H(B + R)$

$$\begin{bmatrix}
 1 & 0 & a & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
 0 & 0 & 0 & 1-a & 0 & a & 0 \\
 \hline
 0 & 1 & b & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1-b & 0 & b \\
 \hline
 0 & 0 & p_b & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1
 \end{bmatrix}
 \begin{bmatrix}
 A \\
 B \\
 R \\
 H(A) \\
 H(B) \\
 H(A+R) \\
 H(B+R)
 \end{bmatrix}$$

Input A

Input B =

$$\begin{bmatrix}
 A + aR \\
 \hline
 B + bR \\
 \hline
 H(A) + H(A+R) + p_b R \\
 A + H(B) + H(B+R)
 \end{bmatrix}$$

Garbled gate

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & a & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1-a & 0 & a & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & b & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1-b & 0 & b \\ \hline 0 & 0 & p_b & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \\ R \\ H(A) \\ H(B) \\ H(A+R) \\ H(B+R) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} A + aR \\ \frac{aH(A) + (1+a)H(A+R)}{B + bR} \\ \frac{bH(B) + (1+a)H(B+R)}{H(A) + H(A+R) + p_b R} \\ A + H(B) + H(B+R) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_b \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ v_a \\ v_b \end{bmatrix}^T$$

This is what
the evaluator
does to the
gate.

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & a & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 - a & 0 & a & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & b & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 - b & 0 & b \\ \hline 0 & 0 & p_b & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \\ R \\ H(A) \\ H(B) \\ H(A + R) \\ H(B + R) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \frac{A + aR}{aH(A) + (1 + a)H(A + R)} \\ \frac{B + bR}{bH(B) + (1 + a)H(B + R)} \\ \frac{H(A) + H(A + R) + p_bR}{A + H(B) + H(B + R)} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_b \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ v_a \\ v_b \end{bmatrix}^T = \begin{aligned} & (v_b + v_b)(A) + \\ & 0 \cdot B + \\ & (v_b a + v_a p_b)R + \\ & (1 + a + v_a)H(A) \\ & (1 - b + v_b)H(B) + \\ & (a + v_a)H(A + R) + \\ & (b + v_b)H(B + R) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & a & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1-a & 0 & a & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & b & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1-b & 0 & b \\ \hline 0 & 0 & p_b & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \\ R \\ H(A) \\ H(B) \\ H(A+R) \\ H(B+R) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \frac{A + aR}{aH(A) + (1+a)H(A+R)} \\ \frac{B + bR}{bH(B) + (1+a)H(B+R)} \\ \frac{H(A) + H(A+R) + p_bR}{A + H(B) + H(B+R)} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} v_b \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ v_a \\ v_b \end{bmatrix}^T = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ (ab + p_a p_b)R \\ (1 + p_a)H(A) \\ (1 + p_b)H(B) \\ p_a H(A+R) \\ p_b H(B+R) \end{bmatrix}$$

e.g. when $p_a=p_b=0$, $C_0 = H(A)+H(B)$, $C_1=C_0+R$

Why would this
scheme be
secure?

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & a & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1-a & 0 & a & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & b & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1-b & 0 & b \\ \hline 0 & 0 & p_b & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \\ R \\ H(A) \\ H(B) \\ H(A+R) \\ H(B+R) \end{bmatrix}$$


Step 1: Crypto argument about H.

Step 2: Rank argument about matrix.

Why then the world's
mine oyster/Which I
with sword will open.

Sum of quadratic terms

$$\begin{bmatrix} v_b \\ 1 \\ v_c \\ 1 \\ v_a \\ 0 \\ v_a \\ v_b \\ v_c \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & a & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1+a & 0 & 0 & a & 0 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 0 & b & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1+b & 0 & 0 & b & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 1 & c & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1+c & 0 & 0 & c \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 1 & p_b & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & p_c & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & p_a & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \\ C \\ R \\ H(A) \\ H(B) \\ H(C) \\ H(A+R) \\ H(B+R) \\ H(C+R) \end{bmatrix}$$



Generalized $1/2$ -gate garbling

Thm: Any quadratic polynomial
in n -variables can be garbled
using n ciphertexts.
(nk bits)

Sum of quadratic terms

$$\begin{bmatrix} v_b \\ 1 \\ v_c \\ 1 \\ v_a \\ 0 \\ v_a \\ v_b \\ v_c \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & a & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1+a & 0 & 0 & a & 0 & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 1 & 0 & b & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1+b & 0 & 0 & b & 0 \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 1 & c & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1+c & 0 & 0 & c \\ \hline 0 & 0 & 1 & p_b & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & p_c & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & p_a & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \\ C \\ R \\ H(A) \\ H(B) \\ H(C) \\ H(A+R) \\ H(B+R) \\ H(C+R) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$ab + bc + ac$$

Generalized $1/2$ -gate garbling

Thm: Any quadratic polynomial in n -variables can be garbled using n ciphertexts and non-adaptive H queries.

$v_b v_c$	1	0	0	A	\overline{A}	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	A
1	0	0	0	0	\overline{A}	0	0	A	0	0						B
v_b										\overline{A}	0	0	A	0	0	C
$v_a v_c$	0	1	0	B	0	0	0	0	0	0						R
1	0	0	0	0	0	\overline{B}	0	0	B	0						$H(A)$
v_c											0	\overline{B}	0	0	B	$H(B)$
$v_a v_b$	0	0	1	C	0	0	0	0	0	0						$H(C)$
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	\overline{C}	0	0	C						$H(A + R)$
v_a											0	0	\overline{C}	0	0	$H(B + R)$
v_a	0	0	0	$p_b p_c$	1	0	0	1	0	0			$1 + p_c$		p_c	$H(C + R)$
v_b	0	0	0	$p_a p_c$	0	1	0	0	1	0	$1 + p_a$		p_a			$G(A)$
v_c	0	0	0	$p_a p_b$	0	0	1	0	0	1		$1 + p_b$			p_b	$G(B)$
$v_b v_c$	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1			1	$G(C)$
$v_a v_c$	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			1		1	$G(A + R)$
$v_a v_b$	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1			1		$G(B + R)$
	A	B	C	R	$h(A)$		hA'		gA				$g\overline{A}$			$G(C + R)$

$$(p_b + b)(p_c + c)a = abc + abp_c + acp_b + ap_bp_c$$

$$(p_a + a)(p_c + c)b = abc + abp_c + bcp_a + bp_ap_c$$

$$(p_a + a)(p_b + b)c = abc + acp_b + bcp_a + cp_bp_c$$

$$v_a p_b p_c = a p_b p_c + p_a p_b p_c$$

$$v_b p_a p_c = b p_a p_c + p_a p_b p_c$$

$$v_cp_ap_b = cp_ap_b + p_ap_bp_c$$

$v_b v_c$	1	0	0	A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	A
1	0	0	0	0	\overline{A}	0	0	A	0	0	\overline{A}	0	0	A	0	B
v_b																C
$v_a v_c$	0	1	0	B	0	0	0	0	0	0						R
1	0	0	0	0	0	\overline{B}	0	0	B	0						$H(A)$
v_c											0	\overline{B}	0	0	B	$H(B)$
$v_a v_b$	0	0	1	C	0	0	0	0	0	0						$H(C)$
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	\overline{C}	0	0	C	0	0	\overline{C}	0	0	$H(A + R)$
v_a											0	0				$H(B + R)$
v_a	0	0	0	$p_b p_c$	1	0	0	1	0	0			$1 + p_c$		p_c	$H(C + R)$
v_b	0	0	0	$p_a p_c$	0	1	0	0	1	0	$1 + p_a$		p_a			$G(A)$
v_c	0	0	0	$p_a p_b$	0	0	1	0	0	1		$1 + p_b$			p_b	$G(B)$
$v_b v_c$	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		1			1	$G(C)$
$v_a v_c$	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			1			$G(A + R)$
$v_a v_b$	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1			1		$G(B + R)$
	A	B	C	R	$h(A)$			hA'			gA			$g\overline{A}$		$G(C + R)$

$$(p_b + b)(p_c + c)a = abc + abp_c + acp_b + ap_bp_c$$

$$(p_a + a)(p_c + c)b = abc + abp_c + bcp_a + bp_ap_c$$

$$(p_a + a)(p_b + b)c = abc + acp_b + bcp_a + cp_bp_c$$

$$v_ap_bp_c = ap_bp_c + p_ap_bp_c$$

$$v_bp_ap_c = bp_ap_c + p_ap_bp_c$$

$$v_cp_ap_b = cp_ap_b + p_ap_bp_c$$

Generalized 1/2-gate garbling

Thm: Any degree- k polynomial
in n -variables can be garbled
using $\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} \binom{n}{i}$ ciphertexts
and non-adaptive H queries.

...versus 2^n previously


Wins on adaptivity

May win on size


Reductionism
fails

Every linear garbling scheme for AND
requires 2^k bits. [\[Zahur-Evans-Rosulek\]](#)

Non-linear garbling



Non-linear garbling




Q: Can non-linear garbling
beat linear schemes?

Why study
Garbled circuits?


overhead

2-party Secure computation


Plain



HBC




Malicious




overhead

2-party Secure computation



Parallelizability is KEY



Generator's work

$$H(X_0||Y_0) \ H(X_1||Y_0) \ H(X_0||Y_1) \ H(X_1||Y_1)$$

$$\oplus R$$

$$\oplus Z_0$$

$$\oplus Z_1$$

$$\oplus Z_1$$

Evaluator's work



$$H(X_0||Y_0) \ H(X_1||Y_0) \ H(X_0||Y_1) \ H(X_1||Y_1)$$

$$\oplus R$$

$$\oplus Z_0$$

$$\oplus Z_1$$

$$\oplus Z_1$$



No additional
per-gate depth
for HBC v Malicious