Session 1: Definitions and Oblivious Transfer

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Secure Multiparty Computation

- A set of parties with private inputs
- Parties wish to jointly compute a function of their inputs so that certain security properties are preserved
- Properties must be ensured even if some of the parties maliciously attack the protocol
- Can model any cryptographic task

Applications

- Elections
- Auctions
- Private database search
- Privacy-preserving data mining
- Secure set intersection
- Much much more...

Security Requirements

- Consider a secure auction (with secret bids):
 - An adversary may wish to learn the bids of all parties
 to prevent this, require PRIVACY
 - An adversary may wish to win with a lower bid than the highest – to prevent this, require CORRECTNESS
 - But, the adversary may also wish to ensure that it always gives the highest bid – to prevent this, require INDEPENDENCE OF INPUTS
 - An adversary may try to abort the execution if its bid is not the highest – require FAIRNESS

General Security Properties

- Privacy: only the output is revealed
- Correctness: the function is computed correctly
- Independence of inputs: parties cannot choose inputs based on others' inputs
- Fairness: if one party receives output, all receive output
- Guaranteed output delivery

Defining Security

- Option 1: analyze security concerns for each specific problem
 - Auctions: as in previous slide
 - Elections: privacy, correctness and fairness only (?)

Problems:

- How do we know that all concerns are covered?
- Definitions are application dependent and need to be redefined from scratch for each task

Defining Security

- Option 2: general definition that captures all (most) secure computation tasks
- Properties of any such definition
 - Well-defined adversary model
 - Well-defined execution setting
 - Security guarantees are clear and simple to understand

Modeling Adversaries

Adversarial behavior

- Semi-honest: follows the protocol specification
 - Tries to learn more than allowed by inspecting transcript
- Malicious: follows any arbitrary strategy
- Covert: follows any arbitrary strategy, but is averse to being caught...

Adversarial power

- Polynomial-time: computational security
- Computationally unbounded: information-theoretic security



Modeling Adversaries

Corruption strategy

- Static: the set of corrupted parties is fixed before the execution begins
- Adaptive: the adversary can corrupt parties during the execution, based on what has happened
 - Models modern "hacking"
 - Cannot use strategies that choose a small set of representatives to compute for all
 - In general, much harder!

Execution Setting

Stand-alone

 Consider a single protocol execution only (or that only a single execution is under attack)

Concurrent general composition

- Arbitrary protocols executed concurrently
- Realistic setting, very important model

Stand-alone vs composition

- Stand-alone: a good place to start studying secure computation, techniques and tools are helpful
- Composition: true goal for constructions

Feasibility of Secure Computation

- Assuming an honest majority, any functionality can be securely computed
 - Even information theoretically, and with adaptive security
- Without an honest majority, it is impossible to achieve fairness in general
- Without an honest majority, any functionality can be securely computed without fairness

Preliminaries

Notations:

- Security parameter n
- We wish security to hold for all inputs of all lengths, as long as n is large enough

• Function μ is negligible: if for every polynomial p(n) there exists an N such that for all n > N we have $\mu(n) < \frac{1}{p(n)}$

Preliminaries

- Probability ensemble $X = \{X(a, n)\}$
 - Infinite series, indexed by a string $oldsymbol{a}$ and natural $oldsymbol{n}$
 - Each X(a, n) is a random variable
 - In our context: output of protocol execution with input $m{a}$ and security parameter $m{n}$
 - Probability space: randomness of parties

Preliminaries

- Computational indistinguishability $X \approx Y$
 - For every (non-uniform) polynomial-time distinguisher D there exists a negligible function μ such that for every a and all large enough n's: $|\Pr[D(X(a,n)=1] - \Pr[D(Y(a,n)=1]] < \mu(n)$

$$|\Pr[D(X(a,n) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y(a,n) = 1])| < \mu(n)$$

Notation

Functionality

- $-f = (f_1, ..., f_m)$: for input vector x, each $f_i(x)$ is a random variable (for probabilistic functionalities)
- Party P_i receives f_i
- We denote $(x, y) \rightarrow (f_1(x, y), f_2(x, y))$

Semi-Honest Adversaries

Simulation:


- Given input and output, can generate the adversary's view of a protocol execution
- Important: since parties follow protocol, the inputs are well defined

Semi-Honest Adversaries


- For every semi-honest A, there exists a simulator S such that for every set of corrupted parties I and every vector of inputs x, the following are computationally indistinguishable
 - The output of A, and the outputs of all parties after a protocol execution
 - The output of S given x_i and $f_i(x)$ for all $i \in I$, and all the values $f_1(x), \dots, f_m(x)$

Semi-Honest Adversaries

The REAL execution



Simulation



Properties

- Correctness, independence of inputs, fairness are all non-issues in the semi-honest model
- Why is privacy guaranteed by this definition?
 - The adversary's view in an execution can be generated from the input and output only
 - If the adversary can compute something after a real protocol execution, it can compute it just from the input/output
 - Very similar to zero-knowledge

Joint Distribution

- A crucial point: need to consider the joint distribution of adversary's output and honest parties' output
- In the definition:
 - We compare the distribution of all inputs and outputs together with the adversary's output

Joint Distribution

Example:

- Functionality: A outputs random bit, B outputs nothing
 - B should clearly not learn A's output bit
- Protocol: A chooses a random bit, outputs it, and sends the bit to B (who ignores it)
- This is simulatable when separately looking at distribution of B's view and actual outputs

Deterministic Functionalities

- In the case of deterministic functionalities, the outputs are fully determined by the inputs
- It suffices to separately prove
 - Correctness
 - Simulation: can generate view of semi-honest adversary (corrupted parties' view), given inputs and outputs only
 - This is significantly easier!

Malicious Adversaries

- First attempt: require the existence of a simulator that generates the adversary's view given the inputs/outputs of corrupted
- Problem: what are the inputs used by the adversary?
 - They are not necessarily those written on the input tape
 - They are not explicit: the adversary doesn't run the protocol but arbitrary code

Malicious Adversaries

- We also need to require independence of inputs, correctness, fairness etc.
 - These properties are not captured by "view simulation" alone
- Can we separate correctness and privacy?
 - Instead of computing f, compute a function that reveals first input bit of other party
 - Correctness or privacy???
- What about independence of inputs and privacy?

The Ideal/Real Paradigm

- What is the best we could hope for?
 - An incorruptible trusted party
 - All parties send inputs to trusted party (over perfectly secure communication lines)
 - Trusted party computes output
 - Trusted party sends each party its output (over perfectly secure communication lines)
 - This is an ideal world
- What can an adversary do?
 - Just choose its input...







The Ideal/Real Paradigm

- The real protocol must be like the ideal world
- Formalizing this notion:
 - For every adversary A attacking the real protocol, there exists an adversary S in the ideal model such that the output distributions (of all) are computationally indistinguishable
 - S simulates a real protocol execution while interacting in the ideal world
 - Here we always look at the joint output distribution

The Ideal/Real Paradigm



Ideal World



"Formal" Security Definition

• Protocol π securely computes a function f if:

- For every non-uniform polynomial-time real-model adversary A, there exists a non-uniform polynomial-time ideal-model adversary S, such that for all input vectors and auxiliary inputs:
- the joint outputs of A and the honest parties in a real execution of π is computationally indistinguishable from the joint outputs of S and the honest parties in an ideal execution where the trusted party computes f

Properties

- The following properties hold
 - Privacy: from adversary's outputs
 - Correctness: from honest parties' outputs
 - Independence of inputs: from ideal execution
 - Fairness and guaranteed output delivery: from ideal execution

– More?

Relaxing the Ideal Model

- In some cases, this ideal model is too strong and cannot be achieved
- Fairness cannot be achieved in general without an honest majority

Relaxing the Ideal Model

Change the instructions of the trusted party

- Trusted party receives input from all parties
- Trusted party sends corrupted parties' outputs to adversary
- Adversary says "continue" or "halt"
- If "continue", trusted party sends output to honest parties; else, it sends "abort"

Reactive Functionalities

- Functionalities that obtain inputs and provide outputs in stages
- Examples:
 - Mental poker
 - Commitment schemes
- This is also useful for relaxing ideal functionalities (give side information to S)
- The definition extends naturally to this as well

Advantages of This Approach

- General it captures ALL applications
- The specifics of an application are defined by its functionality, security is defined as above
- The security guarantees achieved are easily understood (because the ideal model is easily understood)
 - We can be confident that we did not "miss" any security requirements

Using Secure Computation

- The ideal-model paradigm
 - You don't need to understand anything about how a protocol works to use it
 - You just need to imagine an incorruptible trusted party computing the functionality for you

Very advantageous for usage

Sequential Modular Composition

Sequential modular composition:

 Secure protocols are run sequentially, with arbitrary messages sent in between them

Why consider this?

- An important security goal within itself
- Very helpful (if not crucial) tool for analyzing the security of protocols

Formalization – Hybrid Model

- A trusted party helps to compute a sub-functionality
- REAL messages & IDEAL messages

Sequential Modular Composition

- Subprotocols ρ_i securely compute functionalities f_i
- Protocol π securely computes g in a hybrid model where a trusted party is used to compute every f_i
 - This is much easier to analyze since each f_i is effectively "perfectly secure"
- **Theorem:** assuming the above, the real protocol π^{ρ} that uses real calls to each ρ_i instead of a trusted party for f_i , securely computes g.

Concurrent Composition

- We have considered the stand-alone model
 - This implies sequential composition
- What about concurrent composition?
 - An Internet-like setting where many (arbitrary, secure and insecure) protocols are run concurrently, with the adversary controlling the scheduling
- This models the real-world setting more accurately
 - We don't know what the result is of running standalone protocols concurrently with related inputs

Concurrent Composition

- Concurrent general composition
 - Strictly harder than the stand-alone model
 - Impossible without some trusted set-up assumption (like a common reference string)
- The UC definition (universal composability) guarantees security in this setting
 - Efficient UC security is a special challenge...
- Recommended to study UC next, after studying the stand-alone setting

Relaxed Definitions

- In order to achieve high efficiency,
 sometimes can consider weaker definitions
 - Semi-honest (but this is very weak)
 - Covert adversaries: adversary may be malicious but is guaranteed to be caught cheating with good probability
 - Suitable where adversaries can be penalized for being caught cheating (e.g., business loss)
 - Privacy only (malicious)
 - Problematic...

Summary

- Semi-honest: simulator given input/output generates the adversary's view
 - Probabilistic functionalities must consider joint distribution of view and outputs
 - Deterministic functionalities: easier, suffices to separately consider correctness and view simulation
- Malicious: ideal-real simulation
- Sequential composition
- Advanced topics
 - Concurrent composition
 - Relaxed definition
 - Semi-honest vs malicious

General vs Specific Protocols

- Most of the school will focus on general protocols
 - Convert the function into a Boolean or arithmetic circuit
 - Compute the circuit securely
- It seems that for specific problems, specific protocols should be more secure


General vs Specific Protocols

- General protocols advantages
 - Implement once
 - Very flexible: almost no difference between
 - Set intersection
 - Size of set intersection
 - Output 1 if set intersection size is greater than k
 - In many cases is competitive, and in fact the fastest solution known

OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER



Oblivious Transfer (OT)



Called 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT_1^2)



Fundamental Primitive

OT is complete

If can compute OT then can compute any functionality

Constructing OT

- OT cannot be constructed from PKE in a black box manner
- Can be constructed from
 - Enhanced trapdoor permutations
 - DDH, RSA, Lattices

Just a Few Important OT Results

- OT is symmetric
- Can construct efficient OT_1^N and OT_k^N from OT_1^2
- Can construct malicious OT from semi-honest
 OT in a black-box manner (inefficiently)
- Many variants of OT are equivalent
 - Random OT
 - Rabin OT
 - Weak OT

Efficient OT from DDH


- Recall the DDH assumption over a group $\mathbb G$ of order q with generator g
 - The DDH assumption says that $\{(g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab})\} \approx \{(g, g^a, g^b, g^c)\}$ where $a, b, c \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ are random

Semi-Honest OT

Recall ElGamal encryption

- Secret key: random a ← \mathbb{Z}_q
- Public key: $h = g^a$
- Encrypt $m \in \mathbb{G}$: $c = (u, v) = (g^r, h^r \cdot m)$, random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$
- **Decrypt** (u, v): compute $m = \frac{v}{u^a}$
 - Note: $\frac{v}{u^a} = \frac{h^r \cdot m}{(g^r)^a} = \frac{h^r \cdot m}{(g^a)^r} = \frac{h^r \cdot m}{h^r} = m$

Semi-Honest OT




Note:

- Encrypt x_0 with h_0 : $(u_0, v_0) = (g^r, (h_0)^r \cdot x_0)$
- Encrypt x_1 with h_1 : $(u_1, v_1) = (g^s, (h_1)^s \cdot x_1)$

Semi-Honest OT – Security

Security:

- Alice sees only two public keys, which are two random group elements (and so learns nothing about σ)
 - Formally, simulate by sending two random group elements
- Bob knows only one private key and so learns only x_{σ}
 - Formally, simulate by encrypting x_σ with h_σ , and encrypting garbage (e.g., 0) with $h_{1-\sigma}$





More Efficient Semi-Honest OT




 h_0, h_1

Choose \mathbf{a}_{σ} ; compute $oldsymbol{h}_{\sigma}=oldsymbol{g}^{a_{\sigma}}$ Choose random $oldsymbol{h}_{1-b}\in\mathbb{G}$

Choose $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ Compute $u = g^r$ Compute $v_0 = (h_0)^r \cdot x_0$ Compute $v_1 = (h_1)^r \cdot x_1$

 u,v_0,v_1





Malicious Adversaries

Corrupted sender:

- Sender cannot cheat
- Simulator can "extract" both x_0, x_1 by choosing both h_0 and h_1 so that it knows the secret keys

Corrupted receiver:

– Receiver can choose both h_0 and h_1 so that it knows the secret keys

Preventing Malicious

The idea:

- Alice sends a random group element w
- Bob chooses h_0 , h_1 so that $h_0 \cdot h_1 = w$
 - Bob can easily do this by choosing a_σ , computing $h_\sigma=g^{a_\sigma}$ and setting $h_{1-\sigma}=w/h_\sigma$
 - Bob cannot know both DLOGs of h_0 , h_1 or it can compute the DLOG of ${\cal H}$
- Encryption uses a random oracle since "not completely knowing" a secret key doesn't suffice
 - Encrypt by $(g^r, HASH((h_0)^r) \oplus x_0),...$

State of the Art – OT

Semi-honest adversaries

- Receiver: 2 exponentiations + send 2 group elements
- Sender: 3 exponentiations + send 3 group elements

Malicious adversaries (Random Oracle)

Same as semi-honest

Malicious adversaries (PVW)

- Receiver: 3 exponentiations + send 2 group elements
- Sender: 8 exponentiations (effectively 6) + send 4 group elements

Proving Malicious Security

- Proving security in the malicious model is tricky and subtle
- The ideal/real model paradigm
 - Need a simulator who internally runs the real adversary and externally interacts with the trusted party (sending input and getting output)
 - The simulator needs to "extract" the real adversary's input, get output, and make the output match
- We demonstrate the ideal/real proof technique for the problem of coin tossing

Proving Malicious Security

Blum's protocol (with ElGamal):

- Party P_1 :
 - Choose random $b \in \{0,1\}$ and $r,s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
 - Compute $h = g^r$, $u = g^s$, $v = h^s \cdot g^b$
 - Send (h, u, v) to P_2
- Party P_2 :
 - Choose random $b' \in \{0,1\}$
 - Send b' to P_1
- Party P_1 sends r, s, b to P_2
- Party P_2 verifies that $h=g^r$, $u=g^s$, $v=h^s\cdot g^b$
- Both parties output $b \oplus b'$

Intuition

• Consider a corrupt P_2

— By the security of El Gamal encryption, it knows nothing about b when it chooses b^\prime

Consider a corrupt P₁

- The values (h, u, v) fully define b
 - There exists a single pair (r,s) so that $h=g^r$, $u=g^s$
 - The value v can either be h^s or $h^s \cdot g$, but **not both**
- $-P_2$ chooses b' after P_1 sends b; by the above, P_1 cannot change b and so P_1 cannot bias the output

Proving Security - P₁ corrupted

- Let A be an adversary; S works as follows
- S receives a random bit β from the trusted party
- S invokes A and receives (h, u, v)
- S works as follows:
 - S *internally* hands A the value b'=0
 - S rewinds A and internally hands A the value b'=1
 - If A replies correctly both times, S learns the value b, sets $b' = b \oplus \beta$, and outputs this as A's view. In addition, A **externally** sends continue to the TTP
 - If A does **not** reply correctly either time, S sends abort to the TTP and outputs a random b' as A's view
 - If A aborts once, then S learns the value b, sets $b' = b \oplus \beta$, and outputs this as A's view. If A aborts on this b' then S sends sends abort to the TTP; else it sends continue to the TTP



Proving Security - P_2 corrupted

- Let A be an adversary; S works as follows
- S receives a random bit β from the trusted party
- S invokes A and works as follows:
 - S chooses a random b and internally hands A the tuple (h, u, v) computed correctly for b
 - S receives b' from A
 - If $b \oplus b' = \beta$ then S outputs (h, u, v) and (r, s, b) as its view, and sends continue to the TTP
 - Else, S rewinds A and goes to the beginning again
- Note: there is no abort here since we can just take b'=0 as default if P_2 doesn't respond



Summary

- Oblivious transfer is a fundamental primitive
 - It is heavily used in most general secure computation protocols
- Oblivious transfer is very efficient
 - But it does cost exponentiations every time!
 - This afternoon we will see how to improve this