

CHAPTER 10 REAL-WORLD PROTOCOLS

SSH

SECURE SOCKET LAYER

IPSEC

KERBEROS



REAL TIME SECURITY COMM

- Real time protocol
 - The parties negotiate interactively to authenticate each other and establish a session key
- Security Association (SA)
 - The conversation protected with that session key



REAL-WORLD PROTOCOLS

- Next, we'll look at specific protocols
 - SSH a simple & useful security protocol
 - ■SSL practical security on the Web
 - IPSec security at the IP layer
 - Kerberos symmetric key, single sign-on
 - WEP "Swiss cheese" of security protocols
 - GSM mobile phone (in)security





SECURE SHELL (SSH)

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SSH

- Creates a "secure tunnel"
- Insecure command sent thru SSH tunnel are then secure
- SSH used with things like rlogin
 - Why is rlogin insecure without SSH?
 - Why is rlogin secure with SSH?
- SSH is very simple protocol


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SSH

- SSH authentication can be based on...
 - Public keys, or
 - Digital certificates, or
 - Passwords
- Here, we consider certificate mode
- Other modes in homework problems
- We consider slightly simplified SSH...

SIMPLIFIED SSH






- CP = "crypto proposed", and CS = "crypto selected"
- $= H = h(Alice,Bob,CP,CS,R_A,R_B,g^a \bmod p,g^b \bmod p,g^{ab} \bmod p)$
- $S_B = [H]_{Bob}$
- $S_A = [H, Alice, certificate_A]_{Alice}$
- \blacksquare K = g^{ab} mod p

MIM ATTACK ON SSH?





- Where does this attack fail?
- Alice computes:
 - \blacksquare H_a = h(Alice,Bob,CP,CS,R_A,R_B,g^a mod p,g^t mod p,g^{at} mod p)
- But Bob signs:
 - $H_b = h(Alice,Bob,CP,CS,R_A,R_B,g^t \bmod p,g^b \bmod p,g^{bt} \bmod p)$






SECURE SOCKET LAYER



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SOCKET LAYER

- "Socket layer" lives between application and transport layers
- SSL usually lies between HTTP (application) and TCP (transport)




WHAT IS SSL?



- SSL is the protocol used for majority of secure transactions over the Internet
- For example, if you want to buy a book at amazon.com...
 - You want to be sure you are dealing with Amazon (authentication)
 - Your credit card information must be protected in transit (confidentiality and/or integrity)
 - As long as you have money, Amazon doesn't care who you are (authentication need not be mutual)

SIMPLE SSL-LIKE PROTOCOL






- Is Alice sure she's talking to Bob?
- Is Bob sure he's talking to Alice?

SIMPLIFIED SSL PROTOCOL







Bob

- S is pre-master secret
- \blacksquare K = h(S,R_A,R_B)
- msgs = all previous messages
- CLNT and SRVR are constants

SSL KEYS



- 6 "keys" derived from $K = hash(S,R_A,R_B)$
 - 2 encryption keys: send and receive
 - 2 integrity keys: send and receive
 - 2 IVs: send and receive
 - Why different keys in each direction?
- Q: Why is h(msgs,CLNT,K) encrypted (and integrity protected)?
- A: Apparently, it adds no security...




SSL AUTHENTICATION

- Alice authenticates Bob, not vice-versa
 - How does client authenticate server?
 - Why does server not authenticate client?
- Mutual authentication is possible: Bob sends certificate request in message 2
 - This requires client to have certificate
 - If server wants to authenticate client, server could instead require (encrypted) password

SSL MIM ATTACK





- Q: What prevents this MiM attack?
- A: Bob's certificate must be signed by a certificate authority (such as Verisign)
- What does Web browser do if sig. not valid?
- What does user do if signature is not valid?



https://blog.hubspot.com/website/fix-ssl-certificate-error

KERBEROS





Kerberos



In Greek mythology, a many headed dog, the guardian of the entrance of Hades



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Usages of Kerberos

- Kerberos is used to authenticate entities requesting access to network resources, especially in large networks to support SSO. The protocol is used by default in many widely used networking systems. Some systems in which Kerberos support is incorporated or available include the following:
 - Amazon Web Services
 - Apple macOS
 - Google Cloud
 - Hewlett Packard Unix
 - IBM Advanced Interactive eXecutive
 - Microsoft Azure
 - Microsoft Windows Server and AD
 - Oracle Solaris
 - Red Hat Linux
 - FreeBSD
 - OpenBSD

KERBEROS



- In Greek mythology, Kerberos is 3-headed dog that guards entrance to Hades
 - "Wouldn't it make more sense to guard the exit?"
- In security, Kerberos is an authentication system based on symmetric key crypto
 - Originated at MIT
 - Based on work by Needham and Schroeder
 - Relies on a Trusted Third Party (TTP)

MOTIVATION FOR KERBEROS



- Authentication using public keys
 - \blacksquare N users \Rightarrow N key pairs
- Authentication using symmetric keys
 - N users requires about N² keys
- Symmetric key case does not scale!
- Kerberos based on symmetric keys but only requires N keys for N users
 - But must rely on TTP
 - Advantage is that no PKI is required



KERBEROS KDC

- Kerberos Key Distribution Center or KDC
 - Acts as a TTP
 - TTP must not be compromised!
 - KDC shares symmetric key K_A with Alice, key K_B with Bob, key K_C with Carol, etc.
 - Master key K_{KDC} known only to KDC
 - KDC enables authentication and session keys
 - Keys for confidentiality and integrity
 - In practice, the crypto algorithm used is DES

KERBEROS TICKETS



- KDC issues a ticket containing info needed to access a network resource
- KDC also issues ticket-granting tickets or TGTs that are used to obtain tickets
- Each TGT contains
 - Session key
 - User's ID
 - Expiration time
- Every TGT is encrypted with K_{KDC}
 - TGT can only be read by the KDC


KERBERIZED LOGIN



- Alice enters her password
- Alice's workstation
 - Derives K_A from Alice's password
 - Uses K_A to get TGT for Alice from the KDC
- Alice can then use her TGT (credentials) to securely access network resources
- Plus: Security is transparent to Alice
- Minus: KDC must be secure --- it's trusted!

KERBERIZED LOGIN






- Kerberos used for authentication
 - Key K_A derived from Alice's password
 - \blacksquare KDC creates session key S_A
 - Workstation decrypts S_A , TGT, forgets K_A
 - TGT = E("Alice", S_A , K_{KDC})


ALICE REQUESTS TICKET TO BOB





- REQUEST = (TGT, authenticator) where authenticator = $E(timestamp, S_A)$
- REPLY = E("Bob", K_{AB} , ticket to Bob, S_A)
- \blacksquare ticket to Bob = E("Alice", K_{AB}, K_B)
- \blacksquare KDC gets S_A from TGT to verify timestamp


ALICE USES TICKET TO BOB



- ticket to Bob = $E(\text{"Alice"}, K_{AB}, K_{B})$
- \blacksquare authenticator = E(timestamp, K_{AB})
- Bob decrypts "ticket to Bob" to get K_{AB} which he then uses to verify timestamp

UNIVERSIT

The Kerberos authentication process



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KERBEROS

- Session key S_A used for
 - authentication
 - Can also be used for confidentiality/integrity
- Timestamps used for
 - mutual authentication
- Recall that timestamps reduce number of messages
 - Acts like a nonce that is known to both sides
 - Note: time is a security-critical parameter!

KERBEROS KEYS



- In Kerberos, $K_A = h(Alice's password)$
- Could instead generate random K_A and
 - \blacksquare Compute $K_h = h(Alice's password)$
 - \blacksquare And workstation stores $E(K_A, K_h)$
- Then K_A need not change (on workstation or KDC) when Alice changes her password
- This alternative approach is often used in applications (but not in Kerberos)