

# CHAPTER 4 PUBLIC KEY CRYPTO

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## APPENDIX

ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
USES FOR PUBLIC KEY CRYPTO
INFORMATION HIDING

DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE

HASH FUNCTION

STEGANOGRAPHY



# Diffie-Hellman Key exchange



- Invented by Williamson (GCHQ) and, independently, by D and H (Stanford)
- A "key exchange" algorithm
  - Used to establish a shared symmetric key
- Not for encrypting or signing
  - Security rests on difficulty of discrete log problem: (Not known: NP-complete)

given  $g, p, and g^k \mod p \rightarrow find k$ 




- O Let p be prime, let g be a **generator** (p,g are public)
  - O For any  $x \in \{1,2,...,p-1\}$  there is n s.t.  $x = g^n \mod p$
- O Alice selects secret value a
- O Bob selects secret value b
- O Alice sends ga mod p to Bob
- O Bob sends g<sup>b</sup> mod p to Alice
- O Both compute shared secret gab mod p
  - $\bigcirc (g^b)^a = g^{ba} = g^{ab} \bmod p$
- Shared secret can be used as symmetric key



- OSuppose that Bob and Alice use gab mod p as a symmetric key
- O Trudy can see ga mod p and gb mod p
- ONote  $g^a g^b \mod p = g^{a+b} \mod p \neq g^{ab} \mod p$
- OIf Trudy can find a or b, system is broken
- OIf Trudy can solve discrete log problem, then she can find a or b



- O Public: g and p
- O Secret: Alice's exponent a, Bob's exponent b



- Alice computes  $(g^b)^a = g^{ba} = g^{ab} \mod p$
- Bob computes  $(g^a)^b = g^{ab} \mod p$
- Could use  $K = g^{ab} \mod p$  as symmetric key

### DIFFIE - HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE: EXAMPLE

#### Domain parameters p=29, g=2

#### Alice

Bob

Choose random private key *a* = 5

Choose random private key b = 12

Compute corresponding public key

$$A = g^a = 2^5 = 3 \mod 29$$



Compute correspondig public key

$$B = g^b = 2^{12} = 7 \mod 29$$

Compute common secret

$$k_{AB} = B^a = g^{ba} = 7^5 = 16 \mod 29$$

Compute common secret

$$k_{AB} = A^b = g^{ab} = 3^{12} = 16 \mod 29$$

Proof of correctness:

Alice computes:  $B^a = (g^b)^a \mod p$ Bob computes:  $A^b = (g^a)^b \mod p$ 

i.e., Alice and Bob compute the same key  $k_{AB}$ !

### Alice

Bob

Choose random private key  $a \in \{1,2,...,p-1\}$ 

Choose random private key  $b \in \{1,2,...,p-1\}$ 

Compute corresponding public key

 $A = \alpha^a \mod p$ 

A

В

Compute correspondig public key

 $B = a^b \mod p$ 

Compute common secret

 $k_{AB} = B^a = (g^a)^b \mod p$ 

Compute common secret  $k_{AB} = A^b = (g^b)^a \mod p$ 


We can now use the joint key  $k_{AB}$  for encryption, e.g., with AES

$$y = AES_{kAB}(x)$$

$$X = AES^{-1}_{kAB}(y)$$



O Subject to man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack



- Trudy shares secret gat mod p with Alice
- Trudy shares secret g<sup>bt</sup> mod p with Bob
- Alice and Bob don't know Trudy exists!



- OHow to prevent MiM attack?
- O Solutions
  - 1. Encrypt DH exchange with symmetric key
  - 2. Encrypt DH exchange with public key
  - 3. Sign DH values with private key
  - 4. Other?
- You MUST be aware of MiM attack on Diffie-Hellman



# ECC: ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY

### ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTO (ECC)



- "Elliptic curve" is **not** a cryptosystem
  - Elliptic curves are a different way to do the math in public key system
- Elliptic curve versions of DH, RSA, etc.
- O Elliptic curves may be more efficient
  - Fewer bits needed for same security
  - O But the operations are more complex

### WHAT IS AN ELLIPTIC CURVE?




• An elliptic curve E is the graph of an equation of the form

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

- Also includes a "point at infinity" : ∞
- What do elliptic curves look like?
- See the next slide!

### ELLIPTIC CURVE PICTURE





O Consider elliptic curve

E: 
$$y^2 = x^3 - x + 1$$

 $\bigcirc$  If  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are on E, we can define

$$\mathbf{P}_3 = \mathbf{P}_1 + \mathbf{P}_2$$

as shown in picture

- Addition is all we need
- For discrete points, we add "mod p" to the EC

## KEY SIZE COMPARISON



Symmetric	ECC	RSA, DL	Remark
64 Bit	128 Bit	≈ 700 Bit	Only short term security (a few hours or days)
80 Bit	160 Bit	≈ 1024 Bit	Medium security (except attacks from big governmental institutions etc.)
128 Bit	256 Bit	≈ 3072 Bit	Long term security (without quantum computers)



### USES FOR PUBLIC KEY CRYPTO

### USES FOR PUBLIC KEY CRYPTO



- Confidentiality
  - Transmitting data over insecure channel
  - Secure storage on insecure media
- OAuthentication (later)
- ODigital signature provides integrity and non-repudiation
  - No non-repudiation with symmetric keys
  - O Who has the secret key is the key for non-repudiation.

### NON-NON-REPUDIATION



- OAlice orders 100 shares of stock from Bob
- OAlice computes MAC using symmetric key
- OStock drops, Alice claims she did not order
- OCan Bob prove that Alice placed the order?
- ONo! Since Bob also knows symmetric key, he could have forged message
- OProblem: Bob knows Alice placed the order, but he can't prove it

### NON-REPUDIATION



- OAlice orders 100 shares of stock from Bob
- OAlice signs order with her private key
- OStock drops, Alice claims she did not order
- OCan Bob prove that Alice placed the order?
- O Yes! Only someone with Alice's private key could have signed the order
- OThis assumes Alice's private key is not stolen (revocation problem)

### PUBLIC KEY NOTATION



- OSign message M with Alice's private
  - key: [M]<sub>Alice</sub>
- **Encrypt** message M with Alice's public key: {M}<sub>Alice</sub>
- **O**Then

$${[M]_{Alice}}_{Alice} = M$$

$$[\{M\}_{Alice}]_{Alice} = M$$

# CONFIDENTIALITY AND NON-REPUDIATION?




- OSuppose that we want confidentiality and integrity/non-repudiation
- OCan public key crypto achieve both?
- OAlice sends message to Bob
  - **OSign and encrypt:** {[M]<sub>Alice</sub>}<sub>Bob</sub>
  - **Encrypt and sign:**  $[\{M\}_{Bob}]_{Alice}$
- OCan the order possibly matter?

### SIGN AND ENCRYPT



■ M = "I love you"




- Q: What's the problem?
- □ A: No problem public key is public

### ENCRYPT AND SIGN



■ M = "My theory, which is mine...."



- Note that Charlie cannot decrypt M
- Q: What is the problem?
- A: No problem public key is public

### PUBLIC KEY CERTIFICATE



- ODigital certificate contains name of user and user's public key (possibly other info too)
- OIt is *signed* by the issuer, a *Certificate Authority* (CA), such as VeriSign

 $M = (Alice, Alice's public key), S = [M]_{CA}$ Alice's Certificate = (M, S)

OSignature on certificate is verified using CA's public key

Must verify that  $M = \{S\}_{CA}$ 

### CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY



- OCertificate authority (CA) is a trusted 3rd party (TTP)
  - creates and signs certificates
- O Verify signature to verify integrity & identity of owner of corresponding private key
  - O Does **not** verify the identity of the **sender** of certificate certificates are public!
- OBig problem if CA makes a mistake
  - O CA once issued Microsoft cert. to someone else
- A common format for certificates is X,509, VPTOGRAPHY

### HASH FUNCTION?




### O Hash function

 a reproducible method of turning some kind of data into a (relatively) small number that may serve as a digital "fingerprint" of the data.

• Crypto Hash function

 a hash function with certain additional security properties to make it suitable for use as various info security applications



CHAPTER 5 HASH FUNCTION 27

### HASH FUNCTION MOTIVATION



- OSuppose Alice signs M
  - $\bigcirc$  Alice sends M and S =  $[M]_{Alice}$  to Bob
  - $\bigcirc$  Bob verifies that  $M = \{S\}_{Alice}$
  - O Aside: Is it OK to just send S?
- OIf M is big, [M]<sub>Alice</sub> is costly to compute
- OSuppose instead, Alice signs h(M), where h(M) is much smaller than M
  - $\bigcirc$  Alice sends M and S =  $[h(M)]_{Alice}$  to Bob
  - $\bigcirc$  Bob verifies that  $h(M) = \{S\}_{Alice}$

### CRYPTO HASH FUNCTION



- OCrypto hash function h(x) must provide the following properties
- **Compression** 
  - output length is small
- **Efficiency** 
  - $\circ$  h(x) easy to computer for any x
- One-way
  - $\bigcirc$  given a value y it is infeasible to find an x such that h(x) = y

### CRYPTO HASH FUNCTION



### **Weak collision resistance**

- Ogiven x and h(x), infeasible to find y with  $y \ne x$  such that h(y) = h(x)
- **OStrong collision resistance** 
  - Oinfeasible to find any x and y, with  $x \neq y$  such that h(x) = h(y)
- OLots of collisions exist, but hard to find one

### POPULAR CRYPTO HASHES



# **OMD(Message Digest) 5**

- Oinvented by Rivest
- ○128 bit output
- $\bigcirc$  MD2  $\rightarrow$  MD4  $\rightarrow$  MD5
- OMD2 and MD4 are no longer secure, due to collision found
- ONote: even MD5, collision recently found

### POPULAR CRYPTO HASHES



# **OSHA(Secure Hash Algorithm)-1**

- OA US government standard (similar to MD5)
- O"The world's most popular hash function"
- 180 bit output
- $\bigcirc$ SHA-0  $\rightarrow$  SHA-1
- OMany others hashes, but MD5 and SHA-1 most widely used



# Hash usages

CHAPTER 5 HASH FUNCTION 33

### HASH USES



- O Authentication (HMAC)
- O Message integrity (HMAC)
- Message fingerprint
- O Data corruption detection
- O Digital signature efficiency
- Anything you can do with symmetric crypto ???

CHAPTER 5 HASH FUNCTION 34

### ONLINE AUCTION



- Suppose Alice, Bob and Charlie are bidders
- OAlice plans to bid A, Bob B and Charlie C
- They don't trust that bids will stay secret
- Solution?
  - O Alice, Bob, Charlie submit hashes h(A), h(B), h(C)
  - All hashes received and posted online
  - Then bids A, B and C revealed
- OHashes don't reveal bids (one way)
- OCan't change bid after hash sent (collision)

35

### INFORMATION HIDING DIGITAL WATERMARK



### Digital Watermarks

- The "Digital Watermarking" name from watermarking of paper or money as a security measure
- A technique which allows an individual to add hidden copyright notices to digital audio, video, or image signals and documents
- O Defense against music or software piracy
- O Example: Add "invisible" identifier to data
- Digital watermarking can be a form of steganography

#### INFORMATION HIDING DIGITAL WATERMARK



- OAdd a "mark" to data
- Several types of watermarks
- OType 1
  - OInvisible Not obvious the mark exists
  - O Visible Such as TOP SECRET stamp
- OType 2
  - ORobust Readable even if attacked
  - OFragile Mark destroyed if attacked

#### INFORMATION HIDING DIGITAL WATERMARK



- OAdd robust invisible mark to digital music
  - If pirated music appears on Internet, can trace it back to original source
- OAdd fragile invisible mark to audio file
  - If watermark is unreadable, recipient knows that audio has been tampered (integrity)
- OCombinations of several types are sometimes used
  - E.g., visible plus robust invisible watermarks



- Steganography "Hidden writing"
  - The art and science of writing hidden messages
    - orecipient does not know of the existence of the mssg
  - Hide the fact that information is being transmitted a kind of covert channel (Ch8)
    - Secret communication channel
    - O Cryptography, where the existence of the message itself is not disguised, but the content is obscured.
  - O Example: Hide data in image or music file



- OAccording to Herodotus (Greece 440BC)
  - O Shaved slave's head
  - Wrote message on head
  - O Let hair grow back
  - Send slave to deliver message
  - Shave slave's head to expose message (warning of Persian invasion)
- OHistorically, Steganography has been used more than cryptography!



- OImages use 24 bits for color: **RGB** 
  - 8 bits for red, 8 for green, 8 for blue
- OFor example
  - $\bigcirc$  0x7E 0x52 0x90 is this color
  - $\bigcirc$  0xFE 0x52 0x90 is this color
- While
  - $\bigcirc$  **0xAB 0x33 0xF0** is this color
  - $\bigcirc$  **0xAB 0x33 0xF1** is this color
- OLow-order bits are unimportant!



- OGiven an uncompressed image file
  - O For example, BMP format
- OThen we can insert any information into loworder RGB bits
- OSince low-order RGB bits don't matter, result will be "invisible" to human eye
- OBut a computer program can "see" the bits







OLeft side: plain Alice image

ORight side: Alice with entire *Alice in Wonderland* (pdf) "hidden" in image



# Non-Steganography Example

## Walrus.html in web browser

"The time has come," the Walrus said,
"To talk of many things:
Of shoes and ships and sealing wax
Of cabbages and kings
And why the sea is boiling hot
And whether pigs have wings."

#### OView source

```
<font color="#000000">"The time has come," the Walrus said,</font>dr>
<font color="#000000">"To talk of many things:</font>dr>
<font color="#000000">Of shoes and ships and sealing wax</font>dr>
<font color="#000000">Of cabbages and kings</font>dr>
<font color="#000000">And why the sea is boiling hot</font>dr>
<font color="#000000">And whether pigs have wings."</font>dr>
```



## stegoWalrus.html in web browser

"The time has come," the Walrus said,
"To talk of many things:
Of shoes and ships and sealing wax
Of cabbages and kings
And why the sea is boiling hot
And whether pigs have wings."

#### O View source

```
<font color="#010100">"The time has come," the Walrus said,</font>dr>
<font color="#000100">"To talk of many things:</font>dr>
<font color="#010100">Of shoes and ships and sealing wax</font>dr>
<font color="#000101">Of cabbages and kings</font>dr>
<font color="#000000">And why the sea is boiling hot</font>dr>
<font color="#010001">And whether pigs have wings."</font>dr>
```

# • "Hidden" message: 110 010 110 011 000 101



- OSome formats (jpg, gif, wav, etc.) are more difficult (than html) for humans to read
- OEasy to hide information in unimportant bits
- Easy to **destroy** or remove info stored in unimportant bits!



- To be robust, information must be stored in important bits
- OBut stored information must not damage data!
- OCollusion attacks also a major concern
  - The original and watermarked object can be compared
- ORobust steganography is trickier than it seems

#### THE BOTTOM LINE OF INF HIDING



- OIf information hiding is suspected
  - OAttacker can probably make information/watermark unreadable
  - Attacker may be able to read the information, given the original document (image, audio, etc.)



# CHAPTER 5 HASH FUNCTIONS

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- SHA -Secure Hash Algorithm
- MD5 Message Digest
- The process
  - Sender use MD5
  - Append Message Digest to plain text
  - Send it to receiver
  - Receiver compute with MD5
  - O Receiver compare MD5, MD5

# MD5 ALGORITHM (128 BIT)



- 1. The Message is padded to an exact multiple of 512 bit blocks.
  - a. Append 64 bit representation
- 2. Initiate the MD buffers (32-bit, 4 buffer, A, B, C, D)
- 3. Process the each block (512)
- 4. Output (message digest in buffers)



# MAIN MD5 LOOP


IVs


A = 0x01234567

B = 0x89abcdef

C = 0xfedcba98

D = 0x76543210





#### DIFFICULTY IN CRACKING



- OMd5, with its 128bit encryption algorithm has 1,280,000,000,000,000,000 possible combinations.
- OEven if the exact same hash value found, possible other string combination could have created it.
- OIt is considered that the md5 message digest would take an unrealistic time to crack via brute force attack.

## PROS/CONS MD5



- OEasy to use
- OWidely used
- OConsidered secure
- ODifficult to crack

- OIs susceptible to brute force attacks
- OHash collisions is a known flaw
- OQuantum computers
   would make such an
   algorithm
   worthless