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Tue, Nov 22, 2022 12:53PM · 1:04:04

SUMMARY KEYWORDS

moral judgments, people, god, culture, question, meta ethics, objective moral, true, cultural relativism, moral, epistemic, theories, properties, cultural, normative ethics, world, truth, meta ethical, divine command theory, objective

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00:48

He knows not to leave us with all gone ah well if it's this time of the day does it mean that it's lunch strangely

01:16

no one else is here just yet there was one person but they disappeared

01:26

here's Luke right Luke Why is it making you full screen this is annoying

01:49

okay Hang on a second I'll fix this in a moment Luke, Luke and bask in the glory of being center stage in the meantime

02:49

ah yes

02:50

indeed WHERE are you? Thank you Mike

02:54

host alright peoples Hey Bill online can you hear me typing in the chat? We can great on fire

mute all right now

 04:05

so if for some reason one of these pendants

 04:06

is why, Luke, why are you

 04:18

locked in zoom permanently as the as the speaker you know? Look, can you hear me and leave the meeting and come back.

 04:29

We'll see if that fixes it. Thank you so much.

 04:34

Okay, and now Clarissa Congratulations, you have been upgraded to the Speaker of the Zoom meeting.

 04:41

Oh hang on.

 04:47

I'll see you. Yeah, but I'm trying to make my screen big because we need to see a lot of whiteboard today. Oh, no. Am I

 04:54

doing? It's just more

 04:57

so nobody else sees you. You don't see yourself unless you

05:03

How do I muted myself

05:06

if you want to be as painful what a spotlight engage what that does

05:18

that let's do that the next so much. Brilliant.

05:23

Okay all right thank you Tom

05:32

we don't need that much my hope we'll be doing

05:34

a little bit so this is an optimize the world of whiteboard Okay, ah let's get going.

06:05

Hello everyone, for those who have arrived late there is chocolate. So don't be shy. Thank you so much for being here on such a wonderfully warm day where it's so warm,

06:17

I'm gonna pop open this door then I might even do the same thing with this tool, we'll get what's known as the old fashioned circle property there we go. And I feel extra loudly. So that okay here. All right, well, so I have been quiet,

07:00

sneakily skimming through and spying on a lot of your essays. And while there are some really good ones, well done, all of you worked extremely hard on on them. The marks should be released in about two weeks or so when the marks are released, there will always be a small

group whose marks aren't quite ready yet. But you know, in about three weeks from the submission date if you want to release the majority of them. So for those of you whose marks are not immediate released in that first round, please feel free to send me an email, I promise you though everything is okay. From what I can tell every possible problem is submission has has been overcome. And we've triumphed over all of them. This remains to be seen, at least one of you submitted your Latech log file instead of your essay, but we fixed that. So it's all okay. Which is remarkable given that everyone is a computer science student, you've got to check the files you upload, like go back afterwards. And check top tip your career during the back end of web development. Don't just punch in some HTML and say I fixed it, go to the front end and look as well. Because eight times out of 10 You haven't fixed it, and the person who's paying you to fix it will get really, really sad. I've been that person like, Please just think your way. Okay. Now, I have a huge favor to ask of all of you, and all of you online as well. And watching the recordings. Please, please. pretty pleased with cream and a cherry on top. To fill out the my experience surveys, I'm begging you on behalf of myself and for and all of your tutors. It's so important for us to get your feedback when flora and I rebuilt this course from the ground up basically, it wasn't just stuff that we made up on the back of a napkin at the pub, it was a function of all of these conversations that I had with my tutorial classes when I was a tutor for this course in first term. And I wrote everything down like I said, well what would you really like to see more of and what would you like to see less of and everyone said less participation marks? Is that okay? That was easy. But also chat to your tutors, they're going to ask it as well. You can come and see me whenever you want with feedback that the my experience stuff is relatively anonymous. I say relatively anonymous, I can't find out who you are. But if you reach out and say I'm gonna burn down Sebs office, then the university can find out who you are. Because every now and again, even saying horrible things in my experience. I just say horrible things to my face. I enjoy it. Okay.

09:51

No. Well, we've been through a lot of material. In this course.

09:58

We've looked at normative ethics. We've looked at utilitarianism and Kantian role based ethics and virtue ethics. We've looked at ethical principles as they emerge in industry, we've looked at the sort of concerns that we should have about the motivations, and also the effects of such principles. From the perspective of moral reasoning. We've looked at bias in AI, we've looked at more things than we will be able to remember at this stage. And we've got two more weeks to go. Next week, we're going to look at Casper. So we're not going to last year we're going to look at Casper, but with Casper, we're all going to be looking at transparency in AI, and the black box problems. But today, we're going to look at the code of ethical statements themselves. What do I mean by this? Well, think about everything that we have been doing. So far. We started out with normative ethics. And there's three theories. And what these three theories are theories of, are really theories of how it is that we can arguably be confidence that the moral judgments that we are making, and the moral propositions that we believe are, in fact, the right ones to be making, and the right ones to be believing. In other words, what we'll be doing pretty much all the way up until this point in the course, in one way or another, has been this thing called a pistol Knology. Who knows who's heard of a pistol Knology before? Right, it's basically the concern about how it is that you can know some stuff or know that you

know it, as opposed to just having some lucky guesses. Otherwise, or being wrong. Having a whole bunch of beliefs about stuff doesn't mean squat, you want those two belief beliefs to be true, and probably true in some kind of reliable ways you can get more of them at the same salt is the difference between this happening upon thing when you're doing a coding exercise, and you get it right the first time and everything works, and you're like, that's fantastic. I don't know why that worked. And then you do the next time it doesn't work like well, now it doesn't work. But I don't know why one is working. And one is not as like good luck and bad luck. If you don't have the right type of epistemic access yet, or epistemic skill to be said to be knowledgeable about that area of codes have been worried about so far, is not code in general around rather moral judgments. And how it is that we can know that we're making the right moral judgments. That's why it is in all of your presentations that you've been you'll be doing shortly if you've not done them already this week. And in your essays, you've been told to give reasons and evidence for your plans. Evidence is within the field of epistemology or epistemic study. Okay?

13:07

If you find epistemic stuff,

13:08

fascinating, there's a whole world of epistemic logics out there and knowledge representation and reasoning and theoretical AI stay up all night doing. But here's something that we haven't looked at yet at all. And that's this, when we make a moral judgments along the lines of learning puppies is wrong, whatever. What are we doing? What is the nature of the phenomena with which it looks like we are engaging when we are engaging in moral discussions? And this area is not a pistol Knology rather, it's known as ontology is also ontology in formal methods and ontology in computer

13:59

science. All right, that ontology. ontology

14:08

is the worry or the concern or the interest in just what the nature is of the stuff with which we are engaging. So think of for example, mathematics, algebra, calculus, whatever.

14:27

The epistemic there

14:29

is the concern about what the true theories might be, say, of a particular algebra, what the axioms might be, what sort of reasons we can give, give them what sort of functions that might be able to perform. The on top the ontological concern, there would be something more along the lines of what the hell are abstract objects in the first place. What are these things that we're talking about when I'm talking about cats and dogs and tables and chairs and trees? It's relatively straightforward when I'm talking about numbers and functions and so on. I mean, what are them in the lazy responses all they're just formal conventions for symbols on the page. That's fantastic. But it doesn't seem to go very far when it comes to explaining how it is that every single culture on the face of God's good Earth has arrived at the very same logical mathematical knowledge. It's a bit weird. Now we want to ask the same sort of question of moral judgments that we just asked of numbers. So when we make moral judgments, what we're doing, and what we're talking about,

○ 15:41

now is a very basic example of something that is not a moral judgment, right. Here we go. Grass is green. What this looks like,

○ 16:05

is a good old fashioned subject predicate

○ 16:09

clause, I have the subject here. Subject harass, and the predicate is great.

○ 16:20

Subject predicate clause, that expresses what we call a proposition because it is able to be true and able to be false. Contrast propositions with things like commands or requests, or other types of expressions, which can't be true or false, we say of statements that they express propositions, because they are truth at they are able to avail themselves of a truth value of some sort. So far, so good. Now unproblematically, we might assume that all and any subject predicate clauses that are well formed, have truth values, and that is express propositions. Before I go any further. Are there any questions about propositions statements, truth Atmos or truth values?

○ 17:17

Any online any Catholic? Service and focus? Okay, yes.

○ 17:29

Why did I say that commands can't be true or false? This is an absolutely fantastic question. Does anyone know the answer? I do. I'm not trying to dodge it here. It's just genuine

Does anyone know the answer? I do. I'm not trying to dodge it here. It's just genuine.

17:41

Okay, here's why. If I say, Sorry, what is your name? Debbie. If I say, Debbie, stand up and shut the door at once. Well, that's a command but it's not true or false. Based on perspective,

18:01

ah, you can't say daddy stand up and shut the door is false. It's a categoria. It doesn't make any sense. Similarly, with requests, may I please have the chili source? Yes, you're right. But it's neither true nor false. So they have satisfaction conditions, but not truth conditions, they're not making claims about the way that things are. And that is what statements do they make statements of fact?

18:33

Tom,

18:35

that's gonna sound very similar in programming. You can have a function that returns true Poppy overturn a Boolean. That's like, propositions, like is great. Even call them propositions in programming. Yeah, they are. But you could also have, like, a void function is something which doesn't return anything because it's doing something. And that feels weird. It's almost exactly exactly

18:55

that almost certainly, oh, we got all of the theories of computation, the first computational machines and the design to them came out of worries about how it is that we could written the tiles the world of truth at objects in a relational ontology. In other words,

19:17

a Boolean structure.

19:19

There was a hand here somewhere out of my peripheral vision. Somebody had a hand up. No, okay, I'm hallucinating and I'm not even halfway through the lecture yet. You must have got to bring something it was water will be fine.

Okay. But consider the following. Avoiding is wrong morally speaking? Who thinks that this is true? Who thinks that it's false?

Who thinks that it doesn't have a truth value?

Some of you,

right? This is good, this dissension in the ranks now.

There has been

an argument that has been going on for literally 1000s and 1000s of years. And this argument is an argument about whether or not moral judgments are in fact, propositions. Now on the surface, I've got my subject, and I've got my predicate. When you look at the surface syntax, this looks no different to the subject predicate clause about grasses, green learning puppies is wrong. What could be so different about them? Well, the 1000s of years people have worried that moral judgments might not in fact, the truth apps because they might not be expressing propositions. And the other worry is that even if they do, if they do express propositions, then in virtue of what is it, that they have the truth values that

they have?

Is it something objective? Or is it not? And this area is known as meta ethics, or instead of worrying about which moral judgments to actually make and the reasons we have for making them that's the business of normative ethics. In meta ethics, we step outside of the ethical discussion itself, and we look at the ethical discussion as an objective study, not from within the

world of ethical considerations, but from outside scientifically sociologically, anthropologically, semantically and linguistically however, it is that you wanted to think about it. This area again is known as meta ethics and that's what we're going to look at today. Yes, Debbie.

22:31

Can Shakira Kira involvement as a meta ethical viewer? What is your perspective on the person we should hear

22:48

what I'm feeling very middle aged here everybody

22:56

knows what's

23:07

right. What's your Kira? No, I've never heard plus.

23:17

Night asleep now I'm

23:18

feeling pretty good kicked in like most people, but sure. And anyone who's a famous person, Al Capone, alto, who is Al Capone.

23:41

This taking

23:44

famous American gangster and bootlegger, and they couldn't get him on any of the gangster stuff he was doing during Prohibition. So but they got him on tax avoidance. That's how they finally got. So let's Alka POM will do she given that when I was a singer who avoided tax, that's all I need to know. All right. So now your question, thank you for filling me in. Run your question by me again.

I'm so as a person as a as a server, ethical point of view. What is your what's right or wrong? Oh,

I would now that's a great question. Can you remember to email me about this at the end of this course, because I really don't want to say what my meta ethical view is just yet. You'll you'll I know, because I don't want to bias any of you. I don't want to bias any of you. Because I'm already pretty sure what's going to happen. At the end of this session. When we do we're going to do a show of hands. And the show of hands has been the same. For the last 20 years. I've been teaching this sort of stuff. But I don't want to bias the show of hands by saying no anything about my position until they ask you what yours is anything else after that?

Sure. Okay. I

can tell you after that today. Yes.

I have a question on that question. Is your question like, What would a method matter? Ephesus believe? Yes. Right. Because I have trouble here is I don't have an accident that the whole point Internet of assets, but when asking the question, is that right?

Yeah. Well, I mean, depending on your stance on meta ethics, we're going to see how some different meta F and Cisco have different answers to this question.

So like, meta ethics isn't playing, you know, Kantianism, or whether or not it

is compatible with all of them. Any meta ethical? Well, actually, that's a lie.

25:40

But it's what it's like,

25:42

if you're a Kantian, or a utilitarian, you can do a lot of questions about meta ethics. Absolutely a different question. It's not about like, it's not about what I'm wrong. It is.

25:55

About is there an answer to what is right or wrong? answers that answer. You're about to Okay. Here we go. Here's the first few. So here's a question. Ah, Michael Jackson's are moral judgments. Notice that? Here's our credit.

26:25

Here's our Here's our first question. Our moral judgments are able to be true of us.

26:32

And the yes people and the know people. Now, the yes, people are called something they're called Cognitivists. If you think the answer is yes, then you are a cognitivist cognitivism? If your

27:02

answer is no, then you are a non cognitivist.

27:15

Ah. Okay,

27:19

so this is our taxonomy as things done.

27:31

All right, there

is more than one version of cognitivism. And there's more than one version of non cognitivism. And we're going to move through all of the main types today, slowly and carefully. And for any variety that there is, I can promise you that there are 10s of 1000s of people out there right now who believe it. This is not a debate that is settled at all, is very much ongoing. Now, where would you like to start with cognitivism? or non cognitivism?

cognitivism. Okay.

Let's start with this is in no particular order? Okay. No, it's in the order that is easiest for me to explain to everyone

right now. It's the first one. Divine Command Theory,

Divine Command Theory. Nearly everyone in this room would have heard of Divine Command Theory. Because it's probably been throughout the history of our species, the most popular meta ethical theory, how does Divine Command Theory work? It works like this.

moral judgments are truth that right because God makes it that way. Or the gods make it that way, if you go back to ancient Greece, or ancient whatever. But now, divine command theory leads to the following immediate question. Are the good things good? Because God makes them that way. Or does God recognize the goodness because they are good things. Now think of a relatively unreconstructed

Sunday School version of God. Right, where God has three properties.

God is omniscient. assumes that is God is all powerful.

○ 30:04

God is Omni benevolent. That is God is all good. And God is omniscient. That is God knows everything.

○ 30:16

Now leave aside omniscience perhaps for a moment, it looks like this question we're asking does God

○ 30:27

make the good things good? Because that's what God wants to do. Are they just good? Because God makes them that way? Or does God recognize the good things? Because that's the way that they are.

○ 30:40

It looks like

○ 30:44

these answers are mutually incompatible. And what's more, either one is going to threaten these three properties that God is supposed to have omniscience, omnipotence, and Omni benevolence. Now,

○ 30:59

it's known as the Euthyphro dilemma. You see pros,

○ 31:12

right? It's been around for 1000s of years has been worrying theologians for 1000s of years.

○ 31:19

Here's the thing. This is a problem for Divine Command Theory.

○ 31:25

Gonna be a problem for every, every one of these meta ethical theories.

If two things are good, simply because God makes them that way. Then it looks like

God is not on the benevolence at all. God could have made the evil things good and the good things evil, if his will have been otherwise. So Omni benevolence no longer looks like a property of God. That's one horn of the dilemma.

However,

if we choose the other home, and we say rather, God recognizes the good things as good because of his Omni benevolence, this looks like a threat to his omnipotence, because he's not able to make the good things evil or the evil things good.

This is known as the Euthyphro dilemma.

There are a lot of terrible, terrible responses to it, that are not actually designed to convince everybody. They're really just designed to get annoying, clever teenagers to stop asking annoying questions at religious schools. I'll give you an example of one of these responses. And if you are a theist, right now, I'm being entirely serious. If you are a theist of the vaguely Judeo Christian, so then the greatest gift that the Creator gave you is your intellect. So it would serve you well to exercise it properly. Yes. So you're

doing a reverse guard.

game a lot since I was seven

game a lot since I was seven.

33:25

Maybe I'm gonna take your word for it.

33:30

Okay, great. Arena rehearsing God is that's a book title. The first question we get here makes a lot of money. The terrible responses this all know, God is Omni benevolence. And he is omnipotent. And he could make the good things evil, and he could make the evil things good. But he'd never do that. Because he's Omni benevolent. And that's a stupid response. Right? It's a stupid response. Because all it does is it moves the Euthyphro dilemma, one step further along the conversation. And now you just asked the same question of God again, because the response is, God's character is such that he would never do that. Now go wash the dishes. But now of course, the response is, Does God have dominion over his own nature? And if the answer is yes, then God's Omni benevolent and if the answer is no, then God's not omnipotent. Right now there is a way out of the use of her dilemma. I only know of one person who is who has known this independently of philosophical musings, and they were a rabbi. I'm curious to see if any of you can work out how to get out of the Euthyphro dilemma. I'll give you a hint. It's got nothing to do with God being so awesome and wonderful that he's not troubled by the Euthyphro dilemma again, that stupid God gave you Your minds use them. There is a way are always really tricky. Yeah.

35:09

Whenever you're trying to

35:10

save all three properties, of course, I can just say God's not omnipotent. And God's really able. And God is also a bit dumb. And now he's not subject to the Euthyphro dilemma at all. But it seems like that's cheating and not entirely fair. We're trying to save this idea of God from this dilemma that emerges because of the very idea of God.

35:32

Yes. They say that wasn't God's virtue. It's not it's not inevitable. God's going to be part of why God created so.

36:07

Yeah, so then the quit. So if it's a matter of God's virtue, I'm not I'm not a huge fan of this argument. I just because I just I think it's a bit dumb. I think if the response is just God is so virtuous, he never makes good things good, bad and the bad things good. Okay. So does God

virtuous, he never makes good things good, bad and the bad things good. Okay. So does God have dominion over his own virtue? If the answer is no, then you've lost omniscience. It's the omniscient, omnipotent Surya,

there's a natural gestation. Okay,

so then that's not the original idea of omnipotence. If God is bound by natural laws, it's a different type of omnipotence. Oh, that's so close to the answer. Go. Now. Okay. So here's how the god complete make one plus one equals three. Now, suppose one was a Kantian. about moral facts. That is, you think that moral facts have the same status as logical mathematical claims, and they are knowable, a priori, that is by reason alone? Now, can you start to see a way out of the Euthyphro dilemma? Maybe think about I don't spend the whole two hours talking about the Euthyphro dilemma. But that's the direction in which to go. Yes, there was a hand here somewhere. So you're attracting your question. You're attached to your question. Was there a hand over here? Yes. Close. Could it be solchen inclusion all these are

the same. And if there are any one any questions

shot? Well, I mean, it would solve it at the cost of monotheism. And this is specifically a problem for a particular area had arose in the ancient Greek pantheon. But it you know, it's easy to get out of if you're a gnostic, or something if you're a Gnostic Christian, that God's not Oh, good. Have you paid any attention to the Bible? Have you read any of the Torah? They were visiting this crazy sort of middle 1400s Europeans sentiment that God is all good? That's a new thing that we came up with God was terrifying before that, who said God was only benevolent, I want to know who said that's an easy way up, but at the cost of throwing this particular conception of, of the holier out the window, you know, the only

other thing I was gonna say is the answer I always got when I was annoying that 18 year old was the nature of God is unknowable. And that's all something you can ask about. So go away. Oh,

yeah. Yeah. And that's, did you go away?

No. Yes. You will first sorry. You already knows and be able to demonstrate one's virtue. You know, praying can affect oneself. Right? Yeah. That's right.

If God's omniscient surely wouldn't have to work that hard work that hard to work out what I wanted, I could just sort of do it on the way to work quickly or something if he knows everything.

Everything's already said, there was a point oh, no, that's determinism that says, Wow, we don't have time to go into freewill in this show behind it. I guess in that doesn't make someone not nice. Notice both the good and the bad and choose the good

It makes somebody not only benevolent if they were capable of being bad

Ah, well,

we have to go back to normative ethics to work out what's good and what's bad and how we can know what is good and what is bad.

There's

that we're gonna look at a whole bunch of different answers here. The Divine Command Theory answer to that is the bad things or whatever God makes bad.

Right?

40:32

That's how they have the property. It's not like the property of redness because of the way light reflects reflects. refract, so anything like this. I had to kind of get on here. What time is it?

40:44

Oh, good. Yeah, really, I

40:45

need to move on. I can stick around sort of Athens for half an hour. If you want to keep going. Let the No need I'm sorry, everyone. It's great, though. I've never had to say, oh, no, we can't have any more discussion about why should we start talking about God at the beginning?

40:57

Wow. Okay. Okay, so the next theory is objective. Moral realism, objective moral realism.

41:10

What this says is that there are moral properties in the world, just like there are colors, or shapes.

41:18

Right. And they're

41:20

objective, they're objectively existent properties, whatever properties are, the moral ones are no weirder than any other properties. Right? And what's more, they're real. They're part of the natural order of things. We've got, we've got chlorophyll and uranium, and cats, and the good, you know, that is part of the natural order. Okay.

41:45

Now, the, the problem looking

41:51

for objective, more realism? Is that for something that exists, really and objectively, there seems to be an amazing amount of disagreement about when it's present. And when it's not. Right, unlike a lot of conversations about colors or, or heights or quantities or the, you know, you don't get people going to war over know, there's only three sheep in that in that field, like name, liars, apostates, there be but two, and then you know, civilizations crashed together. That's not how things work,

42:29

right. But Americans

42:33

killed itself over slavery, half the country like no, not paying people for tons and tons of work is fantastic. That's how we're so wealthy, we have no intention of stopping. The north of the country said you've been terrible. We're just basically going to start chilling you until you stop. And eventually they stop. And that happens every now and again, like Nazis. It just wouldn't stop until basically we killed them all. That's terrible. That's, that's the history of even a bunch of people. They disagree about a lot of things, and they're not going to agree and they just start killing each other over till eventually, either they're split apart, and they're not allowed to live together anymore, because they just can't get along. That happens a lot. And one might have to go off somewhere else, or they just kill each other until the other bunch happen. The most cursory examination of history will tell you that this is often what happens with moral disagreements. But if there are objective moral things, then why,

43:26

what why this weird disagreement? Now? If you were

43:33

the big question here for objective moral realism is how do you go about perceiving one of these moral properties or not? The question for objective moral realism? In the face of all of this moral disagreement is one of epistemology or one of moral perception.

43:51

If this is the case, how do we know what more properties are present? Which ones are not?

44:00

Well, if your accountant you'd say, just by thinking about it really hard. If you were a utilitarian, you might say by doing the right utilitarian calculation, and if you're a virtue ethicist, you might say, by attending properly to the multi multi dimensional facets of your character, yes. Ah, not according to objective moral realism. It's not. Not according to objective moral realism. We're talking about this view. This view says simply if you've got two different cultures, disagreeing about a moral judgment, at least one of them is wrong. Super wrong, like the number of sheep in the field

○ 44:46
is, you know,

○ 44:48
nothing to be said there at all. There's no room for cultural niceties, which is some people are a bunch of amoral savages and other people are not and they're the righteous, you know, it to this sort of debate tends to emerge within a culture as often as it does between cultures, and these days in these topsy turvy times, who knows where cultures begin? Anyhow? Yes?

○ 45:11
Objective.

○ 45:14
If objective moral properties do exist, and where do they come from, according to the objective, more realistic heart of the natural order, they're part of the natural world. Where does the natural world come from what you know, is is part of the greater question is why does anything exist as opposed to not as part of the scientific exit exercise? But don't worry, everyone is feeling sorry. For different cultures being heard. We're about to look at cultural relativism.

○ 45:51
Cultural relativism, okay. So, the rehash all of these theories, think that moral judgments are true that divine command theorists

○ 46:08
think that moral judgments are able to be true or false, the Cognitivists. And what's more, they think that they do what they do on that there's nothing mysterious about them. When we look at these moral judgments. There's subject predicate clauses, and they have the truth values that they have, because God

makes it that way. Now, the objective moral realists

agrees with everything that the Divine Command Theory says, except for that bit about God making it that way. Instead, the objective, more real estates, that moral judgments have the truth values that they do, because the situation's being described in the predicate part of the subject predicate clause, do in fact, or in fact, not possess the moral properties that they are said to possess by the moral judgment itself. So the truth maker is just the way that the natural world is. So they agree on the truth aptness, but disagree on what the truth make it is supernatural truth makeup, natural truth maker, supernatural truth maker, natural truth making.

Now,

the cultural relativist agrees that moral judgments are truth that because cultural relativist, I published this,

they say yes. They think that moral judgments have truth makers.

They agree with the objective moral realist and disagree with the divine command theorists, that the truth makers are part of the natural world. However, where they disagree with the objective moral realist is that they think that the part of the natural

world

to which the truth makers belong, are functions of the culture within which the moral judgment is being made. And that there is no Supra cultural truth maker to a moral judgment. Rather, cultural relativism, the truth makers, are relative to a culture. I'll give an example by way of

analogy, table manners.

48:28
There are facts of

48:29
the matter about what is polite, and what is impolite when one is sitting at a table and eating food. However, what those facts of the matter are, are relative to the conventions of the culture where the food has been eaten, except, you know, now you're at some food court, and people are coming from everywhere. But I mean, sort of, like traditionally

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traditional. So, you know, if I'm at my cousin's house on my mother's side, and I'm

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not crossing my knife and for the way that Anglo Celtic culture says you should when you're eating a meal, it's it's within that culture, it's objectively the wrong thing to do, given the convention, given the convention, but if I moved to,

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say, America, where is anyone

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here, American, and half my family's American, they do that thing with a knife and fork, I can't quite work it out. It's almost like an Escher diagram where one crosses over the other and it cuts on the inside of the fork and then they swap a knife the fork over to the other, and it happens so quick. I mean, wait, wait, what? And then the American at the table is left handed be like, Oh, my God, what has happened? And it's incredible. And it's very, I can, I can describe it. And by Australian standards, it's not just rude. It's insane. But what are they doing with them? I've been fooled, but by American standards, it's normal. It's completely normal. And within the Ultra Marathon right thing to do. That's that's how a lot of American spies got caught in the Second World War. The gentleman was impeccable. And they get to the table and they'd be like, eating eating their food and everyone would go well, hey, you are you are so not German. What are you doing with a knife and take what you do with your knife and fork will betray your culture like that? No matter where you are. It's fascinating. Especially Yes.

It was 123. So yeah, you get stung so quickly, like often you i referee a lot of journals, a lot of journal articles. And they're really anonymized. Right. And, and often one would just be full and full of grammatical errors. If it maybe I wrote it, I forgot. This is terrible spelling ever, we kind of know the person is a native speaker. And then you'll get another, another paper. And it's just impeccable. And there'll be just one mistake in there. Just one and you're not a native speaker, right? Because you can just tell it comes from this. It doesn't come from ignorance that native speakers have no idea what they're doing with language. It comes from a really firm belief about what to do. The belief is just super false. There's no way it could turn up by accident. It's just as crazy bit of syntax again, okay. I come from somewhere in Europe, right. But there's no way a native speaker could have possibly because it's sort of so proper, but also exists nowhere in the real world. A little things betray us all the time. It's fascinating. So cultural relativism about ethics, it's the same. It's the same moral facts or cultural conventions. Now, there might be all sorts of good reasons for the various cultural conventions that we have, right? In various cultures, but they are just conventions, yes. Or no, you think it's true that, but relative to the conventions of that culture. So here's here's, here's a great example. Eating whales in Japan is fine, completely normalized. People eat whale, no big deal. But no one would eat a kangaroo that would be like really mean like kangaroos are small and cute and fluffy. So like, eating kangaroos is morally wrong. Eating Wales is morally fine. In Australia, eating Wales is definitely not morally fine. If you're eating whale in Australia, take my advice as a native, don't tell anyone. Right? It's frowned upon. And eating whales is wrong is true relative to Australian culture, but false relative to Japanese culture. And there is no supernatural fact about it whatsoever. None. Nothing ever. I'm in super, super cultural. So I was confusing to Nash nationality was culture that in my right, there's no super cultural fact of the matter like Supra. All right, that there's no transcendent truth maker that escapes the pool of different cultures, when it comes to the truth maker for any moral judgment. And the motivations for cultural relativism are fantastic. Firstly, in case you haven't noticed, often, the moral judgments that people ascribe to and deny are really similar within one culture, right? And really different when you move different cultures. Now, here's a great example. Look up the age of consent for different countries around the world. And I don't care how progressive you think you are. Right? You will come away from that wiki page. But Mother God, you know, because it's shocking, right? age of consent is something that we think of in the West is incredibly moral. It's like the one of the most moral issues that there are, have huge discussions about

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this every day.

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But other places disagree. Now so what I'll get to in just a second is no one says

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it's related. Yes. Okay.

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It's just just point out like,

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isn't it?

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Not Not a chance not in other cultures.

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So, that's your person. In today's world, how do you not appear as a racist? Ah,

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how do you not appear as a racist? To answer that question is one moment. It's such a great question. I'm going to give you preempted me, you're one step ahead. To Debbie give me one moment.

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Okay. So we don't have the The best

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history as a species when it comes to encountering the cultural practices of other cultures. History is full of examples of a bunch of people turning up somewhere else and saying, Make ways savages civilization is here. And you know, lopping everyone's heads off and setting fire to people and destroying temples and basically, completely destroying the lives of everyone who lives there and going, Oh, my God, be civilized everyone, and then marching off now.

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And it took a while, and then the world's on fire.

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If you don't believe me, ask Iraq. Right? Don't worry, the West is here to save you and give you democracy will keep the whole Middle East is still on fire, because you think we'd love right, but we don't know the motivations of cultural relativism and meta ethics of the really good, they're

we don't know the motivations of cultural relativism and meta ethics of the really good, they're really good. They're just like, stop, stop doing this. You know, it arose in the 60s, in the West, in academia in the West, especially in France, where the Cultural Revolution was a big deal across western Western Europe, and in the West, as well, and is also an attempt to explain, it's got a lot of explanatory virtue, it's trying to explain why it is that there's so much moral disagreement between cultures. And the explanation is there is no super cultural fact of the matter as to what the right, our truth value is for a moral judgment. These are conventions like

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that, you know. But now, of course,

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there's a little bit of what we might think of as a problem. And that is if somebody is from a different culture, and there's a certain practice that is very well entrenched in their culture, maybe it looks like it's open to them to say, Oh, if you're from another country, you can't criticize what I'm doing here, because it's a valuable cultural practice. Every one of my culture likes doing this. And I'm going to carry on, I don't know cutting little kids heads up and kicking them down the mountain. So where does imagine some terrible thing probably has happened, someone

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you know, anything.

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You know, beating children, is a great example to today on the planet. In Australia, it's like a no, no beating your children with sticks, and so on. Basically, you'll get arrested in other culture, everyone beats the living hell out of their children with sticks and stuff. And it's just how people sort of get on.

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And let's, so here, here's what it

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looks like maybe cultural relativism might stop us from doing and that's engaging in any sort of intercultural modal dialogue. Maybe maybe now Debbie's getting very close to your concern, I think, would you like to restate it for I said, if cultural relevance if this is true, then then how do you not appear racist? Yes, yes. Maybe How do you not appear like a cultural chauvinist? How do

you develop this does leave it open.

For Bernie have to say you're absolutely right.

It's all of us relative to a culture. Sure, you know, but I'm also a cultural chauvinist.

I think that my culture is better than other people like us, like a chauvinist is usually a contraction of male chauvinist these days, just like you just a woman talking again, but you know, that's sort of that's like madmen sort of stuff. Like Like, that's a male chauvinist, a cultural chauvinist, it sounds like who cares if these other you know, these other cultures, they'll come around with the Australian way of life soon enough. And until then, you know, it is living in the dark, something like this, you know, pretty much every culture thinks this about themselves to some extent, right? But there's nothing that cultural relativism, per se is saying, that would stop you from being a mad dog, cultural chauvinist. I think absolutely, it's all relative to culture. And I much prefer my culture to other cultures. So I'm gonna go around and just convert all the other cultures to my way or just kill mean That's every empire that the human race is of a hat,

convert or die I think that's what most people

who are cultural relevance today at relativist today are trying to do. I think you know, what's what's what started out with the best of intentions? Looks like then it needs to stay silent on things like child prostitution and human trafficking and slavery and all these and you put that the cultural relativist, like a no no, of course not. Never, never those things are terrible and wow, okay, this is a lot harder than I thought. And you have to go back to the drawing. But the motivation is the motivation Since I think one of the things that utilitarianism will let you do is the show we can all be cultural relativist about the status of better at least. But when it comes to actual suffering, that's an objective fact about

the world.

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Plus the maybe there are all these different ways that and in actual the world of real politic moral discussions, is something like that's probably the least harmful thing.

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To to do. We might all

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countries will just and cultures will rip themselves in to have one group of a two groups of people trying to completely change the way of life of another group of people. Exhibit A right now would be America. Was this debate over federal oversight versus federal regulation versus states rights to carry on how they like, is Teton once a teetering on the brink of civil war, but it's not insane to go? Well, it's it's looking a bit a bit edgy over there

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at the moment, yes. Sure.

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Sure, so the concern here, I'm just going to repeat this to the people watching online, is that what happens what happens when we have a culture that says, Look, suffering is great. And that's a really popular view. For a certain type of theists suffering in the present guarantees paradise in the afterlife. That's why Mother Teresa was a huge fan of people suffering in huge amounts of physical pain before they died, who said it's less time that you need to spend in purgatory before invited into the kingdom of the law, there are plenty of people who justify their horrible behavior towards other people, this thing is actually going to suit you, it's going to do you Well, at some at some other point, that's usually been the justification for terrible behavior. You know, I'm beating my child, it hurts me more than it helps you. You're gonna thank me for this later, it's going to make you a better person. The ends justify the means all of this, this, this, this sort of stuff. So that cultural relativism when left unreconstructed has its work cut out for it. It has its work cut out for it, because what it's looking like it's doing

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is making moral disagreements

very difficult to do. Very, maybe too difficult. Maybe in an effort to explain the difficulty of moral agreements. It's made moral agreements, impossible, by definition. Right. And that is one of the criticisms of an unreconstructed sort of naive cultural relativism. What time is it? All right, let's have a break and come back at 10 or 12. Last, but not even through all of the cognitive isms yet? Oh, wow. We've got we've got subjectivism and error theory to go there are two sorts of error theory. There's nihilism and functionalism and then we move over to non cognitivism Alright, we're getting there Yes, so for different cultural backgrounds simply chose not to answer that question because they were thinking