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## SUMMARY KEYWORDS

moral judgments, subjectivism, internal, true, truth, state, moral, expressive, morality, false, judgment, ism, god, reporting, people, behavior, world, thinks, theory, makers

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00:24

I think it might have been one of those weird post updates. Okay, when you say can you just see me in the screen as I normally would. Okay, and Can people hear me? Yes they can. So something something. Okay, I now know. Walter who Shakira is. So thank you, everybody. Something something



00:45

not okay. Now subjectivism? subjectivism is another variety



01:07

of cognitivism. So again subjectivist believed that moral judgments are truths that



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the way it works is this.



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They think the moral judgments have truth makers. However, however, they disagree with divine command theory because they don't think those truth makers are God's will. They disagree with objective moral realism because they don't think that the truth makers are objective parts of the mind independent natural wall. They disagree with cultural relativist, because they don't think that the truth makers are majority opinions within a culture. Instead, they think that the truth makers of moral judgments are our own internal states, namely, either our emotions or our preferences. And what it is that we are doing, when we are making moral judgments is we are not making a claim about the way that things are out there in the world, or what the majority of opinions might happen to be within our culture. Rather, what it is that we are doing is that we are reporting our own internal states. So when I say something like burning hobbies



02:45

is wrong. The truth makeup



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of this statement has nothing to do with the puppies that are or are not on fire. The truth maker for this statement is something about me and my internal states. And even though moral judgments are real judgments, and moral judgments make real statements about matters of fact, those matters of fact, are not the ones that we would think they are if these judgments were doing what it is that they look like they are doing, given the surface syntax of the statement that expresses the judgments in question. Rather when I say burning puppies is wrong. Oh my god, what is that? Uh huh. Okay, sorry, everyone that comes. It doesn't even matter what that was. When I say burning puppies is wrong. What I'm really doing is reporting a fact about myself. I am reporting either the fact that I would prefer you not to burn puppies. That's one version of subjectivism. That's preferential listed subjectivism. And then when I say burning puppies is wrong. That will be true if and only if I really do prefer that you not burn puppies and false otherwise. Now, I might not be a preferential a subjectivist rather, I might be what is known as an emotive list. subjectivist and in this case, when I say burning puppies is wrong. What I'm really doing is reporting my internal emotional state as to the burning of the puppies. And my statement that burning puppies is wrong. We'll be true on this view. If and only if I am in fact upset greatly by the burning of the puppies and false otherwise. So this view subjectivism is still a cognitivist theory of meta ethics, it is still a view that sees all moral judgments as being truth at just not objectively at all, not even relative to a culture, but rather subjectively, given my internal states, that true if my internal states are in fact, as I report them to be a moral judgments are false otherwise, as to which of the internal states matter. That is a function of which variety of subjectivist that you are. And of course, there are hybrid versions, because this is philosophy. And we if we can split it, oh, we will, every time, right. So we vote and say like either or either emotional your preference you might just have, maybe it's just a matter of taste, matters of taste of very strong things, matters of taste, might unite and divide us as groups of people, perhaps more strongly than anything else at all.



06:06

Now, if you're trying to hang



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out with our stuck in Polish together on my shiny, everyone's like, Hi, great to me, it was hanging out in college and try to be friends. And then, you know, you find out that I hate your favorite band, and I hate your favorite film director. And you're super into Shakira, and I've never heard of secure. And you're really into soccer, I don't even know what the offside rule is, I don't even care, I don't care who has the ball, let whoever wants it most of the thing, then we can all just go home, it looks exhausting. Everyone go home with a beat up, you know, I you know, and instead, I want to sit around all day, playing video games, and I don't know burning up, it's who cares. But it's something you really don't like doing. And you're just like, You know

what, I'm not going to be friends with him. Not because I think he's an asshole or anything, but we just don't really have any matters of taste in common. And think about how friends form at university in high school, and so on. It's not about who's good or bad at this subject or anything like that, it's about what you're into, it's about your matters of taste, your matters of taste you express for your interests. So maybe people have the same similar moral stance, flock together. But I'm all that a moral stances is a function of one's matters of taste, one's preferences. And who's to say where these come from? I mean, there's probably some long complicated socio chemical, biological historical explanation for why it is that we have the preferences that we do that good luck chasing a causal connection through that logic. You know, everyone thinks that all of our preferences and all of our matters of tastes are purely a function of socialization until they have kids, right? Until they have kids. And then it's like, whoa, hey, no. She had that personality at Harper Dale's height. She's 15. Now, and it's only gotten worse, right? That's every parent will tell you the same thing. Do you have twins that Wow. So is the nature of subjectivism? Clear is the type of view it is. When I say this is the right thing to do? Morally I am reporting either my preferences or my emotions, I'm reporting some kind of state that is internal to me, that is subjective to me. And that moral judgment will be true if in fact, I am in that state and false otherwise.



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Yes. So. So the statement itself or phrase is not in and of itself. True. But when spoken by a subject? That's not going to either mean?



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Sure. Well, yeah, I think you may think there's no objective fact of the matter about what his truth is. It is only true subjectively, you know, relative to a subject or an agent making the claim given facts about the nature of that agent themselves. Absolutely. That subjectivism on it goes so far to explaining some so much phenomena about the intractability of moral disagreements of these these these sorts of things. And subjectivism. Here's a little bit of here's a thought experiment for everyone.



09:33

If I bring my



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laptop to one of you, someone who's really good at hardware, and you say to me, ah, you know, don't worry. It's not your whole motherboard. It's just a RAM chips. You know, that way I can replace those because I got a special tool that apple won't let anyone else had. I work at Burger King or something and I know how to take your laptop. And I'll price it often so that the RAM chip on these sorts of See? And then a friend asked me, and this is what's wrong? Was it your was it? Was it your whole motherboard? I say, No, it's just the RAM chip. And they How would you know, you don't know anything about hardware? Sir? I see. No, you're right. But the computer person does. I asked her, you know, I'm deferring to an expert. And it seems in the

case of, say, getting a computer fixed, that's a perfectly reasonable justification for my belief that it's the RAM chip and on the motherboard. You know, I didn't know the first thing about climate change. I can't read any of these papers on the on the research papers and analyze them myself. So you know, when some lunatic comes up to me and says, You don't understand any of this, it's all allies. Oh, god, you're right. I don't. But you know, you look knots. And these people look really sensible. And they, you know, they've just spent 20 years of their lives learning all of this stuff. The chances of them coming together to deceive me, since I'm pretty slim. I'm just going to defer to the experts. So we defer to the experts all the time.



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But I consider this example. I



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am doing something it doesn't matter what it is. And it strikes you as really bizarre. And you say, Sir, why are you doing that? And I say, oh, it's because it's the right thing to do. And you say, What do you mean? I say what's the right thing to do? Morally? Speaking of being an ethically upright person? I said, Can you explain to me why is the right thing to do? I said, I said, No, no, I don't understand that that is stopped at all. It's really tricky. But I met Peter Singer at the pub last night. And he's an expert with ethics, just like my friend who fix my computer. He's an expert. And he said, it's the right thing to do. And he knows more than about ethics than we do. So like he's got to be right, right? Just like the climate scientists, just like the motor mechanic, just like the computer repair person, right? Who thinks that that's a suitable way for me to justify my beliefs about morality, to just defer to what Peter Singer said, even if I don't really understand any of it myself. While there's not a huge vote of confidence here for moral objectivism



12:16

not huge. Tom, with a waffle. Yeah.



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Of course, if you defer to me in your moral judgments, that's fine. Just not Peter Singer. advantage to say, you know, what, one of the motivations to subjectivism is to explain all of this sort of phenomenon about attitudes to, to serve to dissenting moral judgments. The problem is that it might not seem like it's all that usable when it comes to arbitrating between different different moral views. But this objective was to say, no, it's perfectly it's perfectly good for that. Think about how we actually learn to have a moral compass, you know, to have an actual moral compass. And that's because your parents should sit us down and say, how does that make you feel? They encourage us to embody a certain subjective internal state, and raise us to learn to use that internal state to recognize moral situations in the world. Okay, so you can see how something like subjectivism and virtue ethics might be friends even though virtue ethics is an epistemic view. And subjectivism is an ontological or metaphysical view.



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They might fit together quite neat.



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Okay, still not finished. Okay.



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Era theory. Era theorists are Cognitivists. They think that moral judgments are truth out. Now, what



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they agree with is with the objective moral realist is that the only thing that could possibly be a truth maker for a moral judgment are objective properties out there in the world, because they're the only sorts of things that can be truth makers are the only sorts of things that can be truth makers. So they're cognitivist. They think that moral judgments or truth ups they agree with what the truth makers have to be



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a lot.



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Along with the objective moral realists The difference is the objective moral realist saying that there are such moral properties in the world. The arrow theorists say that there are no moral properties whatsoever, not one And what that means is that every single Laurel judgment is false. None of them are true no matter what they are, because the only thing that could make them true, the only thing that could be their truth makeup will be objective, naturally existent, mind independent, more properties that are part of the natural order, like uranium tables, chairs and cats. But there are no such things. Therefore, all moral judgments are false, strictly speaking,



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there are two sorts of Yes.



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Many success films that

many success firms that



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ah, then they if then you're an objective moral realist, and you just think that that particular moral judgment is false.



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All actions cannot have



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associated with them.



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Oh, then I'm not sure what work that is this some fringe version of error theory? Yeah, I mean, that's not inconsistent with their theory. I'm just not sure whether any existent error theorists would bother believing it. Usually at the standard version of error theory, is simply that we need more properties, because they're the only things that could be truth makers, butter on answer or false. Maybe you could also say, yeah, there are lots of more properties, but none of them attached to the state of affairs and the right ways for them to perform the truth. Make a role. So there's still holes. There's a version of our theory, I'm not sure if anyone who actually holds that version of it.



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But yes, but there are two main sorts of Arrow theory. One thought is fictionalism. One type of error theory, fictional,



17:04

fictional is say, Yeah, look, all judgments are false. But we should keep making them anyway. Because how the hell else? Do you get people to stop doing stupid stuff? Right? I mean, it's kind of like, I'm in the kind of, it's kind of like a like, you could be you could be an atheist. fictionalist. You know, like, yeah, I don't believe in any of this god stuff. But I'm gonna keep talking about all of the gods stuff, and hell and heaven stuff and this particular culture, because it's only when you start talking about eternal damnation, that people stop murdering, and raping and stealing and everything, who the hell else knows how to get humans to behave properly, let's just keep telling them they'll suffer eternally afterwards. And hopefully, civilization will exist. But between you and I, we don't really believe any of this. But let's keep making up fictional stories about this great God stuff, and people will keep behaving the right way. And I say it's a way to get people to behave like Santa Claus and little kids. And that's

what error theorists who are Fitch analysts think about the entire story that we tell about the good and the bad, as far as they're concerned. It's just a useful fiction. The good and the bad. All this story about morality. None of it's true. None of it. It's make believe it's like the Easter Bunny or the tooth fairy. But it is super useful when it comes to modifying the behavior of other humans. So we should continue to engage in the discourse because frankly, we don't know what else to do. Right? That's fictionalism. In arithmetic.



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Contrast the fictionalist with nihilists. No one's afraid of the nihilists, no less than airfares do. They agree with everything



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that the fictionalist says except for that bit where we should keep engaging in the moral discourse? The last side note we should never use these terms again. They're like a desk thumping atheist. Let God never be spoken of again. There is no such thing we have to emerge from this childish world of fictions that like this morality stuff is just nonsense. It's bullshit. It's not real. I'm not quoting anyone. I'm making this up as I'm winging this, and we Wow, I'm definitely making this up. I have to emerge from this world of childless fictionalism about the good and the bad and about morality, morality, there is no such thing. And instead, we should replace all of this superstitious discourse about the right and the wrong ethical thing to do with some other discourse that makes no recourse at all, to a bunch of make believe about this magical land of morality, which just doesn't exist anywhere. Whereas this moral stuff if it's so real, why haven't scientists found it yet? It's like it's not real, just nonsense stuff we make up to modify people's behavior, all of it, and we could do better and we should. So let us never speak of this childish world fictional morality again, see how the nihilists think the error theorists just like the fictionalist they disagree, they disagree, more pragmatically about how it is that we should behave towards each other, linguistically speaking, than anything else. And that's the end of cognitivism I promise, but there are others but I'm just gonna be still What time is it?



21:06

Non cognitivism remember, the cognitive estate that moral judgments are truths that for 15 different reasons and a whole bunch of different ways. And oh, my God, then is not just realism and anti realism about moral properties is realism and anti realism about moral statements that they have gotten a hold on the world who's got shine as a tutor as anyone here got Xiang Liu is one of the tutors. Get Shang wrote his whole doctoral thesis on this stuff. I've got a copy in my office, if anyone would like to read it. It begins long after this happens. There's whole other there's a whole second season have this done. Right. Okay. Non Cognitivists answer no to the question our moral judgments truth that they say no, even though burning puppies is wrong, walks like a proposition, and it quacks like a proposition. It's not a proposition at all. moral judgments are not statements of fact, moral judgments do not make judgments about anything. moral judgments do not express propositions. moral judgments are not truth out. moral judgments have no truth makers at all, because they cannot be true, and neither can they be false. They cannot possess a truth value.



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Why would you think such a thing?



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Well, because of the intractable nature of moral disagreement.



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That's why the intractable nature of moral disagreement



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has led to a whole bunch of people to say, You know what, there's all of these crazy blest and cognitivist theory, each one is weirder than worse. And I have believed each one, and then they end up thinking half of it's true, and the other half is not. And it gets to the end of like, hang on. We've been doing this for 2000 years now. And we still can't make up our minds, then maybe the entire research project of trying to work out what the truth maker is for a moral judgment is wrongheaded from the start. Maybe the best explanation for this lack of success is that there simply is no truth maker there to begin with. And that even though moral judgments look like any other type of judgments, well, they're just not judgments at all. Instead, what they are are expressions and the parent version of non cognitivism is known as expressive ism.



24:05

Expressive ism. Okay. Now, what we mean by that you already know what we mean by this is not in pretentious, philosophical jargon, what we mean is this. Now, suppose that one of you comes along with a large stick, and hits me in my shin really hard. Now, there are two things I can do. Firstly, like this Objectivists down here, I can report to you my internal state. I can say, oh, goodness, that really hurts. And wouldn't you know, my shin is throbbing and aching right now. Please don't do it again. And what I'm doing then is I am reporting to you my internal state, but I don't have to do that. In fact, I might not do that I might not make any truth out to John statement about my internal state. Instead, I might just behave in a certain way that betrays to you what my internal state is, even though I'm not making any truth that report of it. Instead, for example, if you run out behind me sneak around and smack as hard as you can, with a big stick in my shin, I might just shout out fuck. Right? Now, that's not a report. That's not a judgment, right? Instead, it's an expression of my internal state. I might just go out, right, and I'm expressing my internal state, right? I'm not making a judgment about the way that things are. I'm performing expressively in such a way as my internal state has now been betrayed to the external world, in spite of the fact that I haven't gone and made a judgement. Now you can test this theory for yourself.



24:11





26:11

Babies can't make statements.



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So you can get a baby and stick a pin in it. Right? It will still express its internal state. If you don't want to do it with a baby because that's a bit mean. Do it with say, a pitbull or, you know, a large angry dog, Tiger Lion anything large and savage will do it will behave in such a way is that it you can pretty be pretty sure of the nature of its internal state. Even though you know the crocodile that you just whacked across the head can't turn around and say I say sir, that did but my noggin Would you mind knocking it up? Right? It's gonna turn around a beat upset. Animals are pretty reliable. Like this. And cultures of humans are interesting. Like the students. Some cultures don't express their internal states at all. Um, growing up means that you never do you just report them all the time. Right? Other cultures are very expressive when it comes to internal standards. Now, expressive ism in meta ethics is this view that when we make moral judgments, we're not actually making a judgement about anything at all ever. Not even once. Instead, what it is that we are doing is we are expressing an internal state. So when I say to you, burning puppies is wrong. It looks like I'm making a judgment, but I'm really not. I mean, not at all. I mean, instead, what I'm doing is is more more like burning nappies. Oh, no. It's like this. Like burning puppies. No, that's that's what expressive a stick but it's disguised in subject predicate form. But there's no predicate. There's no property being predicated of the objects being referred to by the subject. In the goes at all. That's not what's happening, and neither are we making a report of that or a judgment of it. Instead, we're simply expressing our internal states just like we do a yell or cry or laugh or swear, or roll our eyes or sigh or look fidgety, or look bored. We are betraying our internal state in a really misleading way. And that's just a function of linguistic socialization. There are no more for that. Okay. Forget that last sentence. We'll come back.



28:54

Just for now,



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who's having trouble seeing the difference between expressive ism on the one hand and subjectivism on the other? This your question this year? Who? Yeah. Okay, who thinks they can they can explain what the difference is between expressive ism and subjectivism?



29:14

Powers think you got him first?



29:16

Yeah. Good, subjectivism. It's still true that because as an example, I would say is great. It tastes good. That's still true that but it depends on the context by isolation I will say best

tastes good. That's still true that but it depends on the extent by isolating I will say best specimens alone on the other hand is not true. Because as you said, it's just expressing how you feel about something that's not true or false by saying something like I need to be angry. But it is true to me but being angry this itself is so expression of



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yours. That's pretty good. Yeah, I think that's spot on. Yeah.



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That's, that's pretty close. So the, what the difference here really gets at is that with subjectivism, you are making a declarative truth app report about your internal state. When I say burning puppies is wrong, what that means is, I would prefer that you don't burn puppies. And that will be true if you have that preference and false otherwise, yes.



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Isn't because behavior doesn't have a clear truth value, whereas saying a statement does. Yeah,



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absolutely. Having a behavior or behaving in a certain way, it's not true that whereas reporting the internal state that would cause you to behave that way? Well, that's a judgment. It's a statement about the internal state that's causing your behavior. And that's subjectivism. With expressive ism. According to expressiveness. There is no report of the internal state being made. Rather, the judgment is merely an expression. It is just like us saying out when you see Burning puppies, but the owl is disguised as a judgment. And it's not there is no judgment there at all, either about the puppies, on the one hand, or about your internal states



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be clear. For you, you had your hand up before? Kind of,



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can we keep working? Yes?



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Or are you scared? What about the you are exposed to evil forming in a way that isn't connected to your internal state? Is that that also has no



32:07

children? Ah, so the question, of course, we can all fake our behavior, right? We can I, I got a great example. Right, I was on a research project in Belgium, and the leader of this research project, quit. And he thought it would all be okay, someone else could just take the role. But because of the way the funding was tied to him and everything, what that meant was that the project was shut down, and everybody got fired.



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And



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when I was being given that the bad news about this, the person telling me was quite apologetic. And they were telling me that your I will get paid off anyway.



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I said, Oh, for



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for how long? You're going for how much of my contract they said, Oh, you know, for six months, and in my head, I'm going all my god, that is a lot of money. And what they didn't know is that I was about half a week away from resigning anyway. Right? And of course, this, this, I'm so sorry, this is such a shame. And in my head, I'm being honest. Well, when they go, I'm like, yes. You know, like, I can't just start laughing and cackling as I walk out the door, you know, a half a year's salary, you know, in 30 seconds. And if I resigned a bit earlier, I wouldn't have got any of it, you know, so I'm just sitting there thinking, thank you, God, thank you. This was fine. But of course, that would be really improper and a little bit insane given the context, because because they didn't know that. So of course, we can do this. Now your whole question is, if you're an expressiveness and someone is feigning an expression of an internal state, is that truth? Is that truth act in any sense? Or is it false? The expressiveness will say, No, it's not false. It's just misleading. It's still not something that is propositional is structured. Rather, it's something that would cause somebody else to have a false belief about my internal state. Now, there are tricky edge cases, I think, where my goal when I'm acting that way is to cause or what I'm really thinking is my internal state is really, I would like this person to have a false belief about my internal state. And then in that case, maybe the expresses expresses will say, Yeah, sure, that's true thoughts, but it's not actually an expression of your internal state. It's something else it's a contrived artifact or or something like that. Yeah, the the expressive ism. I think the earliest versions that someone will always say there was someone else ahead of us. But it was David Hume to which this view is attributed most unfrequently. And it was David

Hume, at least in in, in Western academia, who's credited with giving the first psychological explanations for behaviors of people. This is what we're talking about psychological states here, because what are we expressing? Usually, our emotion.



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Motive ism is



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a variety of expressive ism is probably the most well known one, until David Humes had no look, there's all this linguistic behavior. There's all the entire sort of structures of culture around particular moral stances, but at the root of the are expressions of our psychologies, as opposed to the manifestations of God's will recognize our rational recognition of natural, the natural order of things or anything like this. No, no, no, they're just animals. And, you know, we have a lot of emotional when there's probably a great bio biochemical explanation for why it is that we have the emotional reactions to things that we do see them. Most, most, most mammals will be disgusted by the smell of rotting things, because those who weren't aged and died. You know, that's, that's a, it's various naturalistic in the sense that it refers to our emotions, our emotions upon a part of the natural world, but not realistic in the psychological sense. Not in the sense that allows us to, to locate truth makers in the natural audit, instead of just expressing our emotions. It's like crying, but disguised as a judgment, or is a statement of matters of fact. But that's not what we're doing at all, when we engage in the linguistic behavior of making moral or sense judgments, because they're not really judgments about anything. They're just expressions. And of course, it's completely consistent. The whole the hydro view to say was sometimes when we make moral judgments, were expressing internal states, and other times we were making moral judgments. We are reporting moral, moral judgments. There's nothing consistent about a motorist and subjected to this hybrid view here at



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all. Okay. All right. Again,



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moral judgments. Are they truth that Hands up if you think yes.



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Hands up if you think no.



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Hands up if you have no idea anymore. Okay. For those of you who think no, who thinks

expressive ism is probably the right story to tell about what is we're doing when we make moral judgments? Oh, three people. Okay. If you are talking to this, that is if you answered yes, a moment go hands up. If you think that divine command theory is true. Well, it's not terribly obvious with sad uses a few people and yes, my car, I'm just going to be might be so false A priori, that's for sure. Who thinks that objective moral realism is true? Who thinks that cultural relativism is true? Who thinks that subjectivism is true?



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Who thinks that error theory is true? Okay, functionalism. Nihilism.



39:07

The problem is you think there's something right about all of them.



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Here's my problem. When I,



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every time I explain each one of these theories, despite what they might not be false, you know. So, my take my take away out of worrying about this for a very long time, is that we probably still don't know what we're doing when we're making bold judgments. I think that's the if the evidence is that we're half persuaded by each one as we go past. Then my best explanation for that evidence is that we still don't know what the underlying nature is of the phenomena about which we've just been talking for the last two hours. I think that's the right mature, sort of sober response to the state of affairs. Whatever it is that we're doing when we're making moral judgments, it could be a different one of these things each time But there's nothing. There's nothing in any of these theories that that that said, there's not, there's nothing about any of these theories that commits any of them, given their own theories, to disallowing a particular outlay of all judgment happening to be happening to be a manifestation of some, you know, unfamiliar. If God exists that ends up being part of the natural order. You know, rather than God turns up and says, Hi, God has been part of this multiverse, and I created it on. Look, it's really tricky, but you're getting close to understanding it. So come on, I'll take you for a ride. I don't know, then the objective more realistic, so it's gonna have to go far out. Okay, objective, more realism is still true. I just never crossed my mind that God will be part of that story. But here's God right now. So I need to revise what I thought were the edges of the domain of the natural. That could happen. There's nothing about objective, more realism that rules that out. It just so happens that sociologically, as a matter of happenstance, there might not be very many objective more realist who happen to think that, but that's sociological, psychological happenstance. That's a matter of taste more than anything else. There's no commitment there. So commitment.



41:22

Okay. Are there any,



41:26

any questions at all about any of the theories which we've learned? Yes. Can I elaborate on my solution to Divine Command Theory? Yeah, it's pretty straightforward. If you are a content about ethics, if you think that knowing what the good is, is simply a matter of thinking about it really, really carefully, just like mathematics, right? Well, God's omniscience, right? So God's never going to be wrong about what the moral facts are. Because God is omniscient. And God's being Omni benevolent, just means that he he can always act in in in line with the good because he's never wrong. About what the good is, the nature of the good is something that is subsumed within God's rationality, because the nature of the good is something that is subsumed within rationales. Now, can we be mistaken about what the right and wrong thing is through? Sure, we're done. We get mistaken about like the 11, timetables and stuff, morality is a lot harder than that, you know, but that's just because we're stupid. Not because we're bad, right? Morality is of like a function of our moral behavior is a function of our rational behavior. And when not logically on this end, we make errors of reasoning all the time. And it is those errors of reasoning on which errors of moral judgment supervene If one is accounting, yeah, then you're what would can't say about someone who is super clever and can work out what they shouldn't shouldn't be doing given the given the categorical imperative and a whole bunch of given caters, but just choose to do analyze out and say, Well, you know, they're just being irrational is a problem. They're, they're mentally ill, but it's being insane. There are a lot of men, that sounds really extreme, but there are a lot of contemporary ethicist who do think that if you genuinely if you genuinely believe that x is the right thing to do, and you don't do it, so that means that you are being irrational, as opposed to just having a whole bunch of conflicting desires. Like yes, I think that veganism is the right thing to do. It's morally the right thing to do. And I have a really strong desire to do the right thing. But I also have a really strong desire to eat tasty, tasty animals. And that desire to eat tasty animals is stronger than theirs. And I'm weak willed, you know. They don't buy into that story at all. They say no, you're just, you're just being irrational, that there's literally a problem with your mind. You're, you're unable to exercise executive control over your behavior. I'm just like the person who cartwheels down the street making noises and saying the world's gonna end tomorrow. Like it's just irrational behavior. You can't exercise, executive control. It's not a terribly popular view outside of philosophy, but it's probably might be dominant in Australian moral philosophy. I don't subscribe is anything irrational about that at all?



44:43

That's that's just me. flexitarian Sure.



44:51

I think being a flexitarian is a better thing. If you think that veganism is the right thing to do that being a flexitarian is it is closer to the good thing?



45:06

 45:00

Oh, yeah, well, no, I don't, maybe you don't think there's anything, I think it's completely rational to say that there's nothing morally good about eating animals. But there's something enjoyable about it. There's all sorts of things that are not morally good, like sleeping in. But my God, it feels so good. Turning an alarm off and going back. But there are there are all sorts of things that are enjoyable that we want to do that just have no obvious connection with morality one way or the other. If we say that everything is moral, then the predicate of is moral loses its traction. We use predicates to make distinctions in our experience. So it sounds trendy to say everything is political. Yeah, but then like, then the word is political doesn't mean anything in

 45:59

the data 30

 46:01

You know, you know how logarithms work data is a function of a distinction, right? And forgiveness is a function of a distinction with salsa. Okay, so the good, it's gotta be, it's gotta be, there's got to get traction somehow by making a distinction between things that matter and things that don't morally surely. Okay. Any other questions about the wide world of meta ethics? Okay, they're just before you go, oh, please fill out the my experience survey. pretty pleased again, as I'm going to ask you again next week, and next week as well. We really really need your feedback for for for us so that when we revise this course again, for next time, next year, 2023 and 21 we need to incorporate all of your all or all of your opinions that worth their weight in chocolate. Okay. Thank you, everybody, and have a great Wednesday afternoon.

 46:58

Thank you everyone online. See you