

# Balancing Privacy, Fairness, and Accuracy: A Comparative Study of Standard and Selective DP-SGD on the UCI Adult Income Dataset.

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## Introduction


### Motivation:

- ML models in healthcare, finance, and government use sensitive personal data
- Standard DP-SGD protects ALL features equally → unnecessary utility loss
- Recent work shows DP can worsen algorithmic bias for minority groups
- Need methods that balance privacy, accuracy, AND fairness

### Research Question:

Can Selective DP-SGD (protecting only race/sex features) achieve better utility and fairness than Standard DP-SGD (protecting all features)?

### Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD)



### Selective DP-SGD (S-DP-SGD)

It applies privacy protection ONLY to gradients of sensitive features (race and sex related) and leaving non-sensitive features unperturbed.

**Connection to DATA 259** ← privacy (DP)  
fairness (race and sex)

## Data

We used the UCI Adult Census Income dataset, which is one of the most studied benchmarks in fairness and privacy research.

This dataset included some missing values in categorical columns. To address this, we imputing using the mode of each column to fill missing values.

## Methodology

| Baseline      | DP-SGD                          | S-DP-SGD                        |
|---------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| - No clipping | - Clip ALL features             | - Clip sensitive features only  |
| - No noise    | - Noise ALL features            | - Noise sensitive features only |
| - No privacy  | - Uniform $\epsilon$ protection | - Uniform $\epsilon$ protection |

**Analysis 1 (Fixed Configuration Comparison)**  
compared all three models with one set of hyperparameters ( $C=1.0, \sigma=1.0$ )

**Analysis 2 (Sensitivity Analysis)**  
varied privacy parameters one at a time  
 $C \in \{0.05, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5\}$ ,  
 $\sigma \in \{0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5\}$

Note:  $C$  is clipping norm and  $\sigma$  is noise multiples

### Metrics:

**Utility:** Accuracy and AUC

**Fairness:** Disparate Impact (DI), TPR parity, and FPR parity

## Results

### Analysis 1 (Fixed Configuration Comparison) ( $C=1.0, \sigma=1.0$ )

| Model    | Accuracy | AUC    |
|----------|----------|--------|
| Baseline | 85.08%   | 90.42% |
| DP-SGD   | 83.19%   | 88.45% |
| S-DP-SGD | 84.48%   | 89.88% |

**Key Finding:** S-DP-SGD recovers 68% of utility loss from DP-SGD


### (C=1.0, $\sigma=1.0$ )

| Model    | Sex Fairness |                |                | Race Fairness |               |                |
|----------|--------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
|          | DI           | TPR difference | FPR difference | DI            | PR difference | FPR difference |
| Baseline | 0.298        | -0.102         | -0.074         | 0.537         | -0.106        | -0.032         |
| DP-SGD   | 0.149        | -0.305         | -0.084         | 0.704         | +0.009        | -0.007         |
| S-DP-SGD | 0.304        | -0.137         | -0.079         | 0.449         | -0.449        | -0.038         |

**Key Finding:** S-DP-SGD improves sex fairness but worsens race fairness

### Analysis 2 (Sensitivity Analysis)


#### C (Clipping Norm)



**DP-SGD:** Severely hurt by tight clipping (76.8% at  $C=0.05$ ), gradually recovers to 85% at  $C=5.0$

**S-DP-SGD:** Starts strong (84% at  $C=0.05$ ), stays stable, then unexpectedly drops at high  $C$

#### $\sigma$ (Noise Multiplier)



**DP-SGD:** Remarkably stable (83.0-83.3%) across ALL noise levels

**S-DP-SGD:** Strong until  $\sigma=2.0$  (84.3%), then crashes to 82.2% at  $\sigma \geq 3.0$  (~2pp drop)

## Conclusion

**Answer:** It depends. S-DP-SGD works better ONLY under carefully tuned, moderate privacy settings ( $C \leq 2.0$ ,  $\sigma \leq 1.5$ ).

### Implications:

- No universal "best" approach → depends on context
- Privacy-fairness-FAIRNESS triple trade-off (sex vs. race)
- Need careful validation before deployment

The right choice depends on the **fairness priorities** and **stability tolerance**.

## Pitfalls Avoided

| Pitfall                         | How We Avoided It   |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Data leakage                    | Same train/test split (80/20, seed=42) across ALL models                    |
| Unfair comparison               | Identical preprocessing, Logistic Regression architecture, training params  |
| Cherry-picking results          | Tested across 8 clipping norms × 7 noise levels = 56 configs                |
| Ignoring implementation details | Used per-sample gradients (not averaged), proper privacy accounting via RDP |
| Single fairness metric          | Evaluated 3 metrics (DI, TPR, FPR) × 2 groups (sex, race) = 6 dimensions    |
| Overstating findings            | Acknowledged S-DP-SGD's instability and race fairness failures              |

## Limitations

### Theoretical Limitations

#### Policy Function Choice

We hardcoded race/sex as sensitive, but optimal policy is context-dependent

#### Feature Correlation Ignored

Non-sensitive features (e.g., occupation) correlate with race/sex → potential indirect leakage

#### Privacy Accounting Uncertainty

Our calculation for S-DP-SGD uses standard RDP accountant, which may overestimate privacy cost, so not directly comparable to  $\epsilon$  for DP-SGD

### Experimental Limitations

#### Single Dataset

Results may not generalize to other domains/distributions

#### Linear Model Only

Deep networks may show different patterns

#### No Membership Inference Attacks

Didn't empirically validate privacy claims via attacks

| Fairness Limitations   |  |
|--|--|
| <b>Group Fairness Only</b>   | Didn't evaluate individual fairness or intersectional groups (e.g., Black women)   |
| <b>Binary Race Grouping</b>  | Collapsed to White/Non-White loses nuance (e.g., Asian, Native American subgroups) |
| <b>Fixed Fairness Definitions</b>  | Only tested on DI/TPR/FPR, other fairness metrics might be needed                  |
| Future Work:   |  |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adaptive policy functions that learn which features to protect</li> <li>Expanded fairness analysis beyond DI, TPR diff, and FPR diff</li> <li>Deep learning extensions and intersectional analysis (Black women, etc.)</li> <li>Empirical privacy testing via membership inference attacks</li> </ol> |  |

## References

- Ferdinando Fioretto et al. "Differential privacy and fairness in decisions and learning tasks: A survey". In: arXiv preprint arXiv:2202.08187 (2022).
- Weiyan Shi et al. "Selective differential privacy for language modeling". In: arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.12944 (2021).
- Martin Abadi et al. "Deep learning with differential privacy". In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2016, pp. 308–318.
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- Om Thakkar, Galen Andrew, and H Brendan McMahan. "Differentially private learning with adaptive clipping". In: arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.03871 (2019).
- Additional Sources referenced for our paper