

# Enrico Mattia Salonia

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## FIELDS

**Primary:** Microeconomic Theory, Decision Theory, Behavioural and Experimental Economics.  
**Secondary:** Political Economy, Welfare Criteria.

## EDUCATION

<b>PhD Economics</b> , <i>Toulouse School of Economics</i> , Toulouse	2019
Defence expected in May 2025	
<b>MA Economics</b> , <i>Collegio Carlo Alberto</i> , Turin	2018 - 2019
<b>Msc Economics</b> , <i>University of Amsterdam</i>	2017 - 2018
<b>Bsc Economics and Social Sciences</b> , <i>Bocconi University</i> , Milan	2014 - 2017
Exchange Semester: Renmin University of China, Beijing	

## VISITS

<b>Northwestern MEDS</b> , Host: <a href="#">David Austen-Smith</a>	Spring 2024
<b>University of Oxford</b> , Global Priorities Fellow	June 2023

## RESEARCH

### [Identifying Belief-dependent Preferences \(JMP\)](#)

Why are investors overconfident and trade excessively? Why do patients at health risk avoid testing? Why do voters choose different information sources? Possibly because their beliefs directly influence their well-being, i.e., they have belief-dependent preferences. However, existing theories of belief-dependent preferences struggle to generate testable predictions or to identify simultaneously beliefs and preferences. This paper addresses this issue by providing an axiomatic characterization of a class of preferences and belief-updating rules that deviate from Bayesian updating. Preferences, beliefs, and updating rules are identified from choices over contingent menus, each entailing a menu of acts available at a later time contingent on an uncertain state of the world. The results provide a theory-based approach to experimental designs to test information avoidance, distortion, and other behaviours consistent with belief-dependent preferences.

### [A Foundation for Universalisation in Games \(Submitted\)](#)

Revealed preference theory equates choices with preferences over the consequences the choice induces. Nevertheless, if a decision criterion prescribes an act for reasons unrelated to its consequences, the inference drawn regarding preferences is misleading. I study the behaviour of non-consequentialist individuals who have preferences for universalisation. They choose the action that, in a counterfactual scenario in which it is chosen by everyone else as well, leads to their preferred consequences. I develop a model for individuals who value their choices in light of a counterfactual consequence these induce. Choice is interpreted as revealing a preference for counterfactual consequences. I impose axioms to single out the most prominent models of universalisation, compare them, highlight and arguably overcome their limitations. I propose a unifying model of universalisation inspired by the equal sacrifice principle.

### [Can Pessimistic Beliefs Threaten Redistribution?](#) (with [Michele Bisceglia](#), [Pre-registration](#))

We develop and test a theory of how beliefs about other people's responsiveness to incentives shape preferences for redistribution. In a linear income taxation model where agents have heterogeneous prosocial preferences, more altruistic agents distort their labour supply to a lesser extent when the tax rate is higher. If agents have imperfect information on (the distribution of) preferences in the society, overly pessimistic beliefs imply a relatively low Condorcet-winner tax, even though most agents are poor and/or altruist. We develop an experimental design to test this prediction.

## Welfarist Meritocracy

I develop a framework to conceptualise different understandings of meritocracy. A meritocracy is characterised by a metric of merit and a related reward system. Individuals obtain a higher reward when they score higher on the metric of merit. I focus on a strictly welfarist understanding of these two elements. An individual's action scores higher in the metric of merit than another if it leads to a pareto improvement in welfare. The reward for merit is individual welfare. I show that, under these two assumptions, for any collective action profile, there is a meritocratic reward system implementing it. I thus argue that meritocracy is a vacuous allocation rule when conceptualised through a purely welfarist lens. As a result, I propose that meritocracy should be viewed as a fundamentally non welfarist criterion.

## TALKS

**Invited:** Frontiers of Economics and Philosophy, Paris School of Economics (2024).

**Seminars and Workshops:** Micro working group Universitat Autònoma Barcelona (2024), Theory Brown Bag Seminar, Northwestern (2024).

**Conferences:** European Workshop in Economic Theory, Manchester (2024), North American Summer Meeting Econometric Society, Nashville (2024), Canadian Economic Association Meeting, Toronto (2024), Social Choice and Welfare Meeting, Paris (2024), Formal Ethics, Greifswald (2024), World Congress of Philosophy, Rome (2024), Australasian Meeting of the Econometric Society, Sydney (2023), 34th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (2023), 12th Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications (2023), International Network for Economic Method conference, Venice (2023), 18th Doctorissimes conference, Paris (2023), XVII Social Choice Research Group (GRASS) Meeting, Florence (2023), 1st Naples School of Economics PhD Workshop (2022), European Meeting of the Economic Science Association, Bologna (2022), XVI Social Choice Research Group (GRASS) Meeting, Ancona (2022), Young Economist Symposium, Yale (2022), 10th Warwick PhD conference (2022).

## BOOK REVIEW

**Ivan Moscati's Measuring Utility: From the Marginal Revolution to Behavioral Economics** (2020). Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 13(1), 93–101. (with [Annalisa Costella](#))

## TEACHING

TA [Topics in Macroeconomics](#), TSE Third year of Bachelor  
Best TA award 21, 22 and 23 (students' vote, [TSE Economist](#)).

FALL 2020/21/22/23

## REFEREING

Journal of Public Economic Theory.

## REFERENCES

[INGELA ALGER](#) (main advisor)  
CNSR Senior Researcher  
Toulouse School of Economics  
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