



GOOD & MORALITY

SHOULD MORALITY BE BASED ON RELIGION?



INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES

- UNDERSTAND THE VARIOUS ROLES THAT GOD MAY PLAY IN MORALITY
- EVALUATE THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DIVINE COMMAND THEORY
- EXPLAIN HOW CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF MORALITY FIT BETTER WITH THEISM THAN WITH NATURALISM
- ASSESS THE NATURE OF GOD'S AUTHORITY IN ISSUING COMMANDS
- JUSTIFY HOW MORAL KNOWLEDGE CAN ONLY BE POSSIBLE WITH GOD

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND MORALITY

THE LINKAGE

- Many people have thought that the two are necessarily interconnected so that you cannot have morality without religion or vice versa. However, this dependence view, as we may call it, is quite controversial.
- On the view that religion necessarily requires moral rules, *the polytheistic religions of ancient Greeks and Romans can be cited as a counter-example.*
 - These religions serve to explain natural phenomena, not prescribe certain behaviors and categorizing them as right or wrong.
- Although the major religions of the world like Christianity are known for moral rules that their followers must obey, the fact that **some religions are not in the business of moralizing seem to show that religion is not necessarily tied to morality.**

THE LINKAGE

- Before we may ask whether morality is dependent on religion, it is therefore helpful to ask first, **“what religion are we talking about?”** But in fact, the question goes deeper than that.
- We are not simply asking whether morality is historically inseparable from religion but whether morality can in principle be separated from religion because as philosopher Robert Audi noted, *“The historically inseparable may be logically independent.”*
 - In other words, what we are asking is, ***“Is it in principle possible to make sense of morality apart from religion?”***

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WHAT IS RELIGION?

Now, defining religion is a messy affair and it is not necessary to define it for our purposes since **we shall focus only on the aspect of religion that refers to God**; after all, one defining characteristic of major religions is its *belief in supernatural beings, the greatest of whom is God*.

As such, the deeper question we are asking is:
“can we have morality without God?”

To answer this question, let us look at the three roles that God is assumed to play in the moral life and deliberation of people

Philosophers suggest three main roles God is thought to play in morality:

METAPHYSICAL ROLE

God plays a metaphysical role in morality such that **the objectivity of morality can only be grounded in God's commands and/or nature.**

EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROLE

God plays an epistemological role in morality such that **God provides us the way to know what is right and wrong.**

MOTIVATIONAL ROLE

God plays a motivational role in morality such that the proportionate incentive to be moral can only be given by God.


As David Brink stated: "It is a common view that if we reckon only the earthly costs and benefits of virtue, we cannot show that one is always better off being moral. **But if God rewards virtue and punishes vice in an afterlife, then he can provide a prudential motivation for morality.**"

As mentioned earlier, many argue that God plays a unique role in grounding morality and that no secular (non-religious) alternative can adequately perform this role. The first of these roles is metaphysical: God provides the very foundation or objective basis of morality.

The question is:

How does God actually ground the nature of objective morality?


One influential answer is provided by the Divine Command Theory (DCT).



THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY (DCT)



According to DCT:

- What is objectively good is ***what God commands as good.***
 - What is objectively bad is ***what God forbids as bad.***
 - ***Apart from God's commands***, there can be no objective moral rules binding on all human beings.
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THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY (DCT)



This implies that if God does not exist, morality would collapse into mere opinion or cultural preference, with no universal standard.

For many believers, this has strong intuitive appeal. After all, much of what is commonly recognized as moral law (e.g., The Ten Commandments) is presented as divine command.

From this perspective, **God alone has the authority to make morality objective.**

But here arises a problem:
can one really accept all the logical implications of this theory?

THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA

A classic objection to DCT is the **Euthyphro Dilemma**, originally raised by Socrates in his dialogue with Euthyphro. The dilemma is framed as a question:

Is something good because
God commands it, or does God
command it because **it is good**?



Applied to a specific case:

- Is murder wrong because God commands it to be wrong?
- Or does God command murder to be wrong because it is already wrong in itself?

This creates two possible “horns” of the dilemma, both of which are problematic for defenders of DCT.

FIRST HORN

- Things are good because God commands them.
- If this is true, then morality seems arbitrary.
- God could, in principle, *command cruelty, dishonesty, or injustice, and they would become good simply because He commanded them.*
- This undermines the idea that God is wise and good, making *morality dependent only on divine will, without rational basis.*

SECOND HORN

- God commands things because *they are already good.*
- If this is true, then morality exists independently of God.
- Actions like murder would be wrong in themselves, regardless of whether God exists or commands otherwise.
 - This view is called the *Divine Independence Theory.*
- But here lies the issue: if morality is independent, then God is no longer the sovereign source of moral truth.
- He is subject to a moral order higher than Himself. Many theists reject this idea because it limits God's authority.

RESPONSES TO THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA

Theists strive to **preserve both the sovereignty of God and the objectivity of morality** without collapsing into arbitrariness or independence.

AQUINAS' NATURAL LAW RESPONSE

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), a central figure in medieval philosophy and theology, provided one of the most influential responses. He argued that morality is **not grounded in arbitrary divine commands, but rather in God's very nature.**

- God's nature is perfectly good, rational, and loving.
- God's commands are not random decrees; they are expressions of His unchanging nature.
- For example, God commands honesty and justice not because He could have chosen otherwise, but because honesty and justice are reflections of His very essence.

Thus, the dilemma is avoided: goodness is neither arbitrary nor independent of God. Instead, **goodness is identical with God's nature.** Commands are simply the way God communicates His nature to human beings.

This view is sometimes called the **Modified Divine Command Theory** or the **Natural Law approach.**




RICHARD SWINBURNE'S COHERENCE MODEL

Richard Swinburne, a modern philosopher of religion, agrees that morality cannot be arbitrary. He emphasizes that **God's commands always reflect His wisdom and rationality.**

- Swinburne argues that there are certain necessary moral truths (e.g., "It is wrong to cause unnecessary suffering") that even God could not make false, because they are rooted in the very logic of moral reasoning.
- God's role is not to create these truths but to clarify and reinforce them through revelation and divine law.
- In this way, God's authority is not undermined but is seen as consistent with rational moral truths.

For Swinburne, morality without God may still exist in principle, but **God ensures its clarity, universality, and motivational power.**



IDENTITY THESIS / PERFECT BEING THEOLOGY

Some contemporary philosophers propose a third way out of the dilemma by rejecting the two horns altogether. They argue that:

- Goodness is neither independent of God nor arbitrary.
- Instead, **goodness is identical with God Himself.**
- God does not “follow” morality (as if it existed outside Him), nor does He “invent” morality arbitrarily. Rather, **morality is the perfect expression of His being.**

If God’s very essence is goodness, then **His commands naturally flow from who He is.** In this sense, the Euthyphro Dilemma is a false dichotomy... it assumes two options when, in fact, there is a third.




MODIFIED DIVINE COMMAND THEORY

Robert Merrihew Adams, a 20th-century philosopher, developed another influential response. He argued that:

- Moral obligations are grounded in the commands of a **loving God**.
- Even if morality depends on divine commands, it is not arbitrary because **God's essential nature is perfectly good and loving.**
- Therefore, it is impossible for God to command cruelty or injustice, since such commands would **contradict His nature.**

This makes moral obligation both dependent on God and non-arbitrary.



SIX PROBLEMS FOR DIVINE COMMAND THEORY

THE PROBLEM OF ARBITRARINESS

- If morality is dependent on God's commands, then moral laws (such as thou shall not kill) are arbitrary since God could have commanded their opposite or not command them at all.
- But if morality is arbitrary, then there seems to be no strong reason to abide by it (even if it's commanded by God), much less override other considerations.

CHESS ANALOGY

- Imagine two chess players tied in a championship match.
- Instead of determining the winner by skill, the referee tosses a coin. Whoever gets "heads" is declared the champion.
- While the process yields a result, **it feels unfair and arbitrary.**
- It doesn't truly measure who deserves to win.

IMPLICATION FOR MORALITY

- If right and wrong are determined solely by God's will, without any reason beyond "God commanded it," then morality has no solid grounding.
- We would have **no compelling reason to follow these rules except fear or obedience.** This undermines the meaningfulness of morality itself.





THE PROBLEM OF MORAL ABHORRENCE

If morality is defined entirely by God's commands, then even actions we universally consider evil — like rape, torture, or genocide — could become good if God were to command them.


- Certain acts seem to have an **inherent moral quality** (cruelty is wrong, kindness is good) regardless of who commands them.
- To suggest that rape could become morally acceptable just because God decreed it **offends our deepest moral intuitions.**
- Critics argue that this makes morality unstable, subject to divine “fiat” (decree), rather than grounded in any rational or intrinsic principle of goodness.



THE PROBLEM OF EMPTINESS

If “good” simply means “what God commands,” then saying “God is good” becomes an empty statement. It collapses into the **tautology**: *God does what God commands.*

- Imagine redefining “champion” to mean “whoever the referee says is the winner.” Then saying, “The referee’s choice is the champion” becomes meaningless because the concept of champion has lost any independent meaning (skill, merit, etc.).
- If goodness is emptied of real content, believers lose the ability to meaningfully distinguish between God’s supposed goodness and acts we would otherwise condemn (e.g., arbitrary torture or injustice). As philosophers Baggett and Walls put it: “Goodness that’s consistent with everything is meaningless.”



THE PROBLEM OF EQUIVOCATION

Equivocation happens when **the same word is used in two different senses within the same argument.**

- In DCT, believers claim that “God is good.” If “good” means “whatever God commands,” then God is good even if He commands genocide. But most believers recoil from this implication, *insisting that God’s goodness cannot include cruelty.*
- **This inconsistency shows equivocation** — shifting between two meanings of “good” (one defined by DCT, the other by ordinary moral understanding).
- It suggests that **believers aren’t truly committed to DCT in practice, because they still rely on human moral intuitions when evaluating God’s character.**



THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY

Commands are human actions. We know what it means for a person to issue a command. But God, in classical theism, is **nonspatial, nontemporal, and beyond human comprehension.**

- How can such a being literally “command”?
 - If commands are inherently human-like acts (spoken words, written laws, gestures), then attributing commands to God seems **anthropomorphic** (projecting human traits onto the divine).
- This problem is exacerbated by a working assumption in science called **methodological naturalism**: the idea that only natural, as opposed to supernatural, explanations are acceptable in science.
 - Any supposed revelation from God is likely to be assumed by the methodological naturalist as a currently unknown phenomenon with a yet to be discovered natural explanation.



THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE HERMENEUTICS

Even if God does command, and even if humans can somehow receive these commands, the next issue is **interpretation**. Religious traditions *disagree widely on what God's commandments actually mean.*

- **Example 1:** The commandment “Thou shall not kill” has been interpreted variously: some say it condemns the death penalty, others allow it; some see it as forbidding all violence, others limit it to murder.
- **Example 2:** Debates over the Reproductive Health (RH) Law reveal how different Christians claim opposing interpretations of “God’s commandment on the sanctity of life.” Some Catholics reject the RH Law as unbiblical, while others support it and still identify as faithful Catholics.
- If God’s supposed commands are ***so unclear and open to contradiction, then they fail to provide the stable foundation for morality that DCT promises.***

RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEMS

RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM OF ARBITRARINESS

Critics argue that if morality depends only on God's will, then moral laws become arbitrary like a coin toss. However, defenders reply that this misunderstands the nature of God.

God's commands are not random or whimsical. They are grounded in God's very nature, which is **perfectly just, perfectly good, and perfectly loving**.

In Christian philosophy, God is not just one "good being" among many. Rather, **God is the ultimate standard of goodness itself**. Thus, what He commands reflects His moral perfection.

Humans often will things contrary to reason or goodness (e.g., choosing unhealthy food even when we know it's bad). But in God, there is no such conflict. **God's will, knowledge, and moral nature are perfectly unified.**



RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM OF MORAL ABHORRENT

What about the objection that God could command atrocities, like genocide or rape, and make them good?

Defenders argue that this is a false or “**impossible conditional.**” God commanding such things **would contradict His very nature**, just as creating a “square circle” is logically impossible.

Since God is all-loving, He **cannot command cruelty, rape, or injustice, because these contradict His essence.**

Just as it makes no sense to ask, “What if a triangle had four sides?” it makes no sense to ask, “What if God commanded rape?”

Thus, the problem of abhorrent commands collapses. They are **not genuine possibilities** within the framework of DCT.

5 4 RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEMS OF EMPTINESS AND EQUIVOCATION


Both of these problems depend on the moral abhorrence objection, so once that is answered, they are weakened.

Problem of Emptiness

- Saying “God is good” is not an empty tautology because **“goodness” has real content in God’s nature (justice, love, mercy).**
- It is not merely “what God commands,” but rather **“what God is.”**

Problem of Equivocation

Believers are not shifting between two meanings of goodness; instead, they consistently define **goodness as what flows from God’s nature.** God is good in the highest and most perfect sense.



RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY

How can an eternal, nonspatial, nontemporal God issue “commands”?


From the theist’s perspective, if God is powerful enough to create human beings,
He must also be capable of communicating with them.

While God is incomprehensible in His essence, He can choose ***to reveal Himself in ways that humans understand.***

The Christian worldview proposes that God did precisely this in the **incarnation** by taking on human form in Jesus Christ.

This response does not solve every issue (for example, debates about whether Jesus is truly divine), but it shows that **there is nothing logically incoherent about the idea of divine revelation.**

Thus, divine incomprehensibility is **NOT an insurmountable objection** but an **invitation to consider the possibility of revelation.**



RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE HERMENEUTICS

The diversity of interpretations of God's commands seems to undermine DCT. For example, Christians disagree on whether "Thou shall not kill" forbids capital punishment, war, or only murder.

Disagreement does not automatically mean that all interpretations are false. Contradictory claims cannot both be true.

If one interpretation is correct, its opposite must be false.

Defenders suggest that the reliability of an interpretation depends on factors such as:

- Internal consistency (does it fit with other truths?)
- Historical accuracy (is it well-grounded in the tradition?)
- Coherence with God's character (does it align with His justice and love?)

In other words, the fact of disagreement ***shows the difficulty of interpretation***, but *NOT necessarily the failure of divine commands themselves.*

TU QUOQUE RESPONDE

Defenders of DCT sometimes argue that atheists face similar problems. **Even without God, we still must answer:**

- What makes something right or wrong?
- Is it the consequences (utilitarianism)?
- The act itself (deontology)?
- The agent's character (virtue ethics)?
- Or a mix of all of these?

In this sense, moral knowledge is challenging for both theists and atheists.

The difference is that DCT grounds morality in a **transcendent, unchanging source**, i.e., God's nature.

GOD AS THE
METAPHYSICAL BASIS
FOR MORALITY

GOD AS THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS FOR MORALITY

The question of morality is not merely about what we believe to be right or wrong but about whether **there are real, objective moral truths that bind us all.**

- If morality is real, we need to ask: **What is its foundation?**
- Divine Command Theorists and theists argue that ***only God provides a secure metaphysical basis for morality.*** This can be understood by looking at three essential elements of morality:
 1. Objective Moral Values
 2. Objective Moral Duties
 3. Moral Accountability

OBJECTIVE MORAL VALUES

Objective moral values are moral truths that exist independently of human opinion.

They are **valid and binding whether anyone believes in them or not.**

- Example: Rape, torture, or genocide is morally wrong regardless of whether an individual, society, or culture thinks otherwise. Even if a criminal justifies his action, we say he is mistaken, not that morality has changed.

J. L. Mackie, an atheist philosopher, famously described moral values as “queer” (strange) since they cannot be located in the physical universe.


From a secular view, morality is invented rather than discovered. **But if morality is purely a human invention, then Hitler's ethics would be just as valid as Mother Teresa's.** This relativism seems absurd.

OBJECTIVE MORAL VALUE

Theistic Response

William Lane Craig and others argue that objective moral values **must be grounded in something beyond human subjectivity.**

- God is not only good but the very standard of goodness. **His holy and loving nature supplies the absolute benchmark against which all actions are judged.**
- God's attributes — love, justice, mercy, generosity — are not arbitrary traits but **eternal realities that anchor our moral intuitions.**



If there were no God, would there be any ultimate reason to say Mother Teresa's compassion is morally superior to Hitler's cruelty?

OBJECTIVE MORAL DUTIES

Moral duties are obligations about what we ought to do, regardless of personal preference or convenience.

Human vs. Animal Behavior

- In the animal kingdom, predators kill prey *without committing “murder,”* and *vultures steal food without committing “theft.”*
- By contrast, humans recognize these actions as **morally wrong when applied to us because they violate duties we owe to one another.**

Problem Without God

- If humans are nothing more than advanced animals, then **why should we have duties that go beyond survival instincts?**
- Atheism struggles to explain *why humans ought to treat each other with dignity and respect.*

OBJECTIVE MORAL DUTIES

Argument from Human Rights

- Many duties (e.g., don't kill, don't steal) are rooted in respect for human rights.
- Secular approaches often ground rights in capacities like rationality (Kant's view).
- **But this is problematic....**
 - People possess rationality to different degrees (does that mean some have more worth?).
 - Infants or the severely disabled lack full rational capacity (does that mean they lack rights?).

Christian Theism's Response

- Human rights are grounded in the fact that every human is made ***in the image and likeness of God (Imago Dei)***.
- This bestows **inherent dignity on every person**, regardless of capacity.



OBJECTIVE MORAL DUTIES

Argument from Overriding Normativity

- Moral duties are unique because they **override** other considerations (e.g., self-interest, convenience, cultural norms).
- Commands require a **commander**; impersonal nature cannot issue duties.
- God, as Creator, is the **rightful authority behind moral duties**.
- Every duty to other humans is **ultimately a duty to God**.

If humans are just highly evolved primates, why should we treat each other as having inviolable dignity instead of simply competing for survival?



MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The Secular Problem

- In a godless universe, there is **no ultimate accountability**.
- Mao Zedong and Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) both die; *nature does not distinguish between them*.
- This makes it tempting to believe that **morality is only a matter of “not getting caught.”**

Russellian World (Bertrand Russell)

- The universe is **purposeless and destined for extinction**.
- All achievements, sacrifices, and acts of justice vanish in the end.
- Atheists like Kai Nielsen and Kurt Baier still defend morality but without ultimate accountability, it is unclear why one should consistently follow moral duties if immorality benefits self-interest.



MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Theistic Response

- In Christianity, every act will be judged by God. *No evil goes unpunished, and no act of heroism or sacrifice goes unnoticed.*

Cosmic Justice

- God ensures ultimate justice, providing both deterrence against evil and motivation for moral living.

Positive Accountability


- Not only will the wicked be punished, but the righteous will be rewarded.
- Sacrifices that seem “foolish” in a secular worldview (e.g., missionaries risking death, firefighters dying to save others) are honored in God’s eternal perspective.

**Why be moral if you can escape human punishment?
Does belief in ultimate accountability change how we act?**



THE AUTHORITY OF GOD'S COMMANDS

- Religious believers have followed God's commands throughout history, but the reasons for obedience differ greatly.
 - Some follow out of **tradition** (what they inherited from family or community), others out of **fear of punishment** (particularly the threat of hell), and some out of **trust in divine authority**.
- But philosophers argue that the true force behind God's commands lies not merely in fear or tradition, but in the belief that **God is perfectly and essentially good**.
 - This claim as emphasized by thinkers like **Alasdair MacIntyre**, suggests that ***if God were not perfectly good, His commands would lose moral authority.***



WHY BELIEVE THAT GOD IS GOOD?

Definitional Argument (Anselm's Ontological Basis)

- God is traditionally defined as the **greatest conceivable being**.
- A being that is not good cannot be “the greatest,” because goodness is a great-making attribute (a quality that makes a being more perfect).
- Therefore, God **must be supremely and perfectly good**, otherwise He would not be God.



WHY BELIEVE THAT GOD IS GOOD?

The Problem of False Prophets (Kai Nielsen's Challenge)

- Nielsen raises an important objection: *How do we know that the commandments we receive are genuinely from God?*
- Just because a being is **powerful and intelligent** does not make it God. A being could be powerful but wicked.
- If someone simply claims, "I am God, so obey me," this is **not sufficient proof**.
 - We must use an **independent ethical standard** to judge whether such a being's commands are good.

Example: History is full of false prophets and leaders who claimed divine authority but caused harm (e.g., cult leaders who justified violence). Their actions are judged against pre-existing human moral intuitions, showing that believers already rely on an independent sense of good and bad.

THE ROLE OF CONSCIENCE AND MORAL INTUITION



Nielsen's point reveals a tension: **If humans already have standards of morality, then perhaps morality is independent of God.**

However, classical theism responds differently:

- According to Christian teaching, humans possess **conscience**, understood as the law *written on their hearts* (Romans 2:14-15).
- Conscience is not separate from God but is **God's voice within humans**, a reflection of divine law.
- Therefore, when people use moral intuitions, **they may actually be drawing from God's imprint on their nature** even if they *do not explicitly acknowledge God*.

Imagine a computer program installed by its creator. Even if the user denies the programmer exists, the program still runs according to the creator's design. Similarly, humans operate with moral intuitions that reflect God's law, even if they deny God's existence.

THE CHALLENGE OF NONBELIEVERS

IF GOD IS THE BASIS OF MORALITY, DOES THAT MEAN NONBELIEVERS CANNOT BE MORAL?

Philosophers argue NO.

- Atheists and agnostics *can live moral lives without believing in God.*
- They can recognize moral truths like “murder is wrong” through reason, conscience, and experience, even without reference to Scripture.
- **Nonbelief does not automatically mean immorality, just as religiosity does not guarantee virtue.**

THE CHALLENGE OF NONBELIEVERS

IF GOD IS THE BASIS OF MORALITY, DOES THAT MEAN NONBELIEVERS CANNOT BE MORAL?

This distinction is crucial:

- Divine Command Theory explains the **existence of moral facts** (metaphysics), why there is objective morality.
- But how we come to know these facts (epistemology) **can be shared by both believers and nonbelievers.**




DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND MORAL GROUNDING

Moral Knowledge (Epistemology)

- How humans come to know right from wrong.
- This can happen through reason, conscience, and lived experience—and is ***accessible to both believers and atheists.***

Moral Grounding (Metaphysics)

- Why moral facts exist objectively at all.
- This is where DCT claims **only God provides the ultimate foundation.**



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**WITHOUT GOD,
EVERYTHING IS PERMITTED.**

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MORAL KNOWLEDGE

THE EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING ARGUMENT (EDA)

One of the strongest secular objections to moral knowledge is the Evolutionary Debunking Argument (EDA).

- **Evolutionary theory** suggests that our minds evolved not primarily to discover truth, but to enhance survival and reproduction.
- This means our cognitive faculties are “**fitness-tracking**,” not “**truth-tracking**.”
- Applied to morality, our moral beliefs evolved **because they were useful for survival** (e.g., cooperation helps tribes thrive), and NOT because they were objectively true.

Example:

Suppose evolution “teaches” us to value parental care because offspring survival increases with nurturing behavior. This doesn’t prove that parental care is objectively good; only that it is useful for survival.



THE EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING ARGUMENT (EDA)

- Thus, under a purely naturalistic account, we have no assurance that our moral beliefs correspond to independent moral truths.
- They might simply be **adaptive illusions**.

As philosopher Sharon Street states:

“There is no relation between the forces of natural selection and independent moral facts.”


In other words, evolution might produce creatures who believe kindness is good; but **that doesn't show kindness really is good in an objective sense.**



THE EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING ARGUMENT (EDA)

Theism offers a contrasting picture:

- If God exists, He **designed human beings with cognitive faculties aimed at truth**, not simply for survival.
- Our moral intuitions, reason, and conscience are part of a **truth-tracking system** given by a perfectly good Creator.
- Therefore, **moral knowledge is trustworthy** under theism.



THE EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING ARGUMENT (EDA)

WATCH ANALOGY

- Think of two compasses.
- One is *manufactured by accident*, thrown together by blind forces of nature; it might point north, **but we can't trust it consistently.**
- The other is *carefully designed by a skilled maker* to point north. **Which would you trust?**
- Theism says *our moral faculties are like the second compass*,
 - it is designed by God **to guide us toward truth.**

