

# Cybersecurity in TIC-Scientist Network Infrastructures by Honeypots: Catching Cyber Threat Passively

Juan Luis Martin Acal, Pedro A. Castillo Valdivieso, Gustavo Romero López, and  
Juan Julián Merelo Guervós

Springer-Verlag, Computer Science Editorial III, Postfach 10 52 80,  
69042 Heidelberg, Germany  
jlmacal@correo.ugr.es  
{pcv, gustavo}@ugr.es  
jjmerelo@gmail.com  
<http://www.springer.de/comp/lncs/index.html>

**Abstract.** It should be a balance between security concerns and the right to privacy in the use of IT infrastructures. Scientist networks have a high risk of attack as a source of valuable information and resources because they were designed with an open and decentralized philosophy, in favour of the transmission of knowledge when security wasn't a critical section[1] Private and scientific information have a enormous value for an attacker but the end user is worried about his privacy too. For this reason passive detection methods in cybersecurity like honeypots are the cornerstone in its defence plan. We expose the practical case of the University of Granada in the application of honeypots for the detection and study of intrusions which avoid intrusive techniques like the direct analysis of the traffic through networking devices. Also we explain weaknesses found during operation as is possible through machine learning improvement.

## 1 Introduction

From the earliest days, networks have been experiencing an increasing number of attacks. Nowadays, the number of attacks increases continuously[3][2] and scientist networks are a special and interesting case. There is a strong demand of security in the network and the services which are listening. On the other hand, the end users demand privacy in his network traffic. In this scene the honeypots have an important role in the detection and protection against cyber attacks.

### 1.1 Cyber-Space and Cyber-Threats

The cyberspace is a virtual space that wraps all types of digital communication infrastructures and the entities that use them. The hostile actions from these entities against the security and safety of the information and others entities are ciberthreats. Internet is the most popular inhabitant of this space and for years we have seen how the number and complexity of attacks against information and resources has increased. This increase is motivated by for economic, politic or military interests or by the same entities interested in exercise a bigger control over communication freedom in the cyberspace.

## 1.2 Scientist Networks

In contrast to the corporate networks which usually have grown from the inside to outside and which have most hosts behind the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the scientist networks were born with a open philosophy without focusing on security but on technical requirements due to the limited number of public IPs, were expanding private services to the intranet.

The information related to research, patents, computer and human resources is a juicy target for hostile agents. Also, the big size of the DMZ makes it prone to a massive attack and increases the possibility of finding a security breach or hidden advance vectors of attack.

## 1.3 Privacy and Passive Sensors

A honeypot is a trap that exposes itself, while is scanned, probed or compromised by a hostile entity, the trap collect information about the malicious activity.

We differentiate between hierarchy and interaction in our taxonomy. The hierarchy is the complexity goes from a simple service like ssh, through a network, to a cloud. The interaction is the degree of fidelity in the response of the trap and goes from low to high.

TABLE HERE.

There isn't a ideal configuration of features because is the nature of the threats and the infrastructure which we want to protect, the key for a correct selection of them. In a software development environment, high interactions is used for test a new product with *fuzzers* or another type of pentesting<sup>1</sup> tool in order to discover potential vulnerabilities. On the other hand, low interaction honeypots are used like intrusion detection systems, warning about activity of scans or jumping attempts from compromised internal hosts. Both share a common point: they are not intrusive with the network traffic.

# 2 Deployment of a Security System Based in Honeypots

The architecture of the system is divided in two fronts: detection and management of the cyberthreats. The detection front usually are based on honeypots, one the most valuable tools at hand for this purpose.

## 2.1 Sensors and Collector

Sensors were deployed in different production subnets and each content honeypot software. Specifically Diona[4] and Kippo[5] which are low and medium interaction honeypot respectively. Each sensor has local data bases for save the information attacks efficiently in space while is waiting for its saved in the collector in order to keep the information by duplicate and not to increase the network traffic in case of massive scans or attacks. Obviously, in the time space between information dumps each sensor sends by telegram incidents defined by the security operator like critical.

The collector is a corporate database that feeds the incidents management system and is the core of all information analysis.

---

<sup>1</sup> Penetration Testing.

## **2.2 Attacks Profiles**

For three years each sensor collects information of more of half million of connections. The information analysis shows that prevail external attacks for all types of the vulnerabilities emulates by the honeypots.

## **3 Weaknesses and Strengths of Honeypots**

## **4 Honeypots, Elements in Hybrid Machine Learning S.I.E.M**

## **5 Conclusions and Future Works**

### **References**

1. Subdirección General de Organización y Automación, Secretaría General Técnica, Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia: Proyecto IRIS. November 1985.  
URL: <https://www.rediris.es/rediris/historia/programa-iris.pdf>
2. ESSET Latino América: Tendencias 2015: El mundo corporativo en la mira. January 2015.  
URL: [http://http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/tendencias\\_2015\\_eset\\_mundo\\_corporativo.pdf](http://http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/tendencias_2015_eset_mundo_corporativo.pdf)  
Note: Chapter 2, page 6
3. CNI-Centro Criptográfico Nacional: Informe de Amenazas CCN-CERT IA-03/14: Ciberamenazas 2013 y Tendencias 2014. October 2014  
URL: [https://www.ccn-cert.cni.es/publico/dmpublidocuments/CCN-CERT\\_IA-03-14-Ciberamenazas\\_2013\\_Tendencias\\_2014-publico.pdf](https://www.ccn-cert.cni.es/publico/dmpublidocuments/CCN-CERT_IA-03-14-Ciberamenazas_2013_Tendencias_2014-publico.pdf) Note: Prologue, page 7
4. Mark Schloesser: Comparing Object Encodings. In: Abadi, M., Ito, T. (eds.): Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1281. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg New York (1997) 415–438
5. Bruce, K.B., Cardelli, L., Pierce, B.C.: Comparing Object Encodings. In: Abadi, M., Ito, T. (eds.): Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1281. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg New York (1997) 415–438