

The Land Redevelopment Problem

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Abstract

- **The land redevelopment problem:** Quite common in the real lives.
- **Methodology:** Mechanism design, modelling and simulation(MATLAB).
- **Application:** Real world land related problems.(Especially the land redevelopment problem).
- **Keywords:** Mechanism design, auction, implementation, non-convex optimization.

Literature Review

- **Main textbooks:** Mechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach and An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design.
- **Previous presentation paper:** A Conic Approach to the Implementation of Reduced-Form Allocation Rules, working paper, 2019.
- **The statement of the problem and feasible mechanisms:** The land redevelopment problem, 2017.

Preliminary

- A set of agents $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$, each owns a separate plot of land.
- The value to agent i of his plot, v_i , is private information, with distribution F_i on the support $[\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$. We assume that v_i is independently distributed across owners.
- The redevelopment will yield a payoff of W to a land developer.
- We assume that $W \in (n\underline{v}, n\bar{v})$ is common knowledge among all market participants.
- Consider a direct mechanism $\mathcal{M} = \{\rho, t_1, \dots, t_n\}$.

Admissible mechanism requirements

1. Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility constraint (DIC)

$$t_i(v) - \rho(v)v_i \geq t_i(v'_i, v_{-i}) - \rho(v'_i, v_{-i})v_i.$$

2. No naked expropriation (NNE)

$$\rho(v) = 0 \implies t_i(v) = 0.$$

3. IR constraints (IR)

$$IR(v) = \{i : t_i(v) - \rho(v)v_i \geq 0\}, \#IR(v) \geq m.$$

4. Adequate compensation (AC)

$$t_j(v) \geq \frac{1}{\#IR(v)} \sum_{i \in IR(v)} t_i(v).$$

Admissible mechanism requirements

5. *Ex-post budget balance* (EPBB)

$$\sum_i t_i(v) \leq W.$$

6. *Ex-ante budget balance* (EABB)

$$E[\rho(v) (\sum_i t_i(v) - W)] \leq 0.$$

We say that a mechanism is admissible if it satisfies DIC, NNE, IR-m, AC, and EPBB.

Definition

Here, we set $n = 3$ and $m = 2$.

For any v , define (note: not sure about sup or max)

$$f_i(v) = \max\{v'_i : \rho(v'_i) = 1, \forall i\}$$

$$V^* = \{v : \rho(v) = 1\}$$

$$V_0^* = \{v \in V^* : f_i(v) < 1, \forall i\}$$

$$V_i^* = \{v \in V^* : f_i(v) = 1, f_j(v) < 1, j \neq i\}$$

$$V_{i,j}^* = \{v \in V^* : f_k(v) = 1, k = i, j; f_k(v) < 1, k \neq i, j\}$$

Venn illustration




Figure 1: Venn diagram

Triple extension




Figure 2: Conceptual graph of triple extension case

Triple extension

- As we all known, the function $\phi(v)$ is the social surplus function, which means $\phi(v) = 3w - v_1 - v_2 - v_3$. And here we set $w = 0.2$ as a constant.

$$M = \int_0^w \int_0^w \int_0^w \phi(v) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 + 3 \times \int_w^1 \int_0^L \int_0^L \phi(v) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \quad (1)$$

Simulation of triple extension




Figure 3: Simulation Results - Triple

Middle addition




Figure 4: Conceptual graph of middle addition case

Middle addition

$$\begin{aligned}
 M = & \int_0^L \int_0^L \int_0^L f(v) \, dv_3 \, dv_2 \, dv_1 + 3 \times \int_L^1 \int_0^L \int_0^L f(v) \, dv_3 \, dv_2 \, dv_1 \\
 & + 3 \times \int_0^L \int_L^{L+R} \int_L^{L+R} f(v) \, dv_3 \, dv_2 \, dv_1
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{2}$$

Simulation of middle addition




Figure 5: Simulation Results - Middle

Merged simulation




Figure 6: Simulation Results (Merged)

Density function




Figure 7: Probability density function

Density function

$$f_X(x) = \begin{cases} f_X^1(x) = 4 \times x, x \in [0, \frac{1}{2}] \\ f_X^2(x) = 4 - 4 \times x, x \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1] \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

- And we assume three variables (v_1, v_2, v_3) are i.i.d. random variables, which means $f_X(v_1, v_2, v_3) = f_X(v_1) \times f_X(v_2) \times f_X(v_3)$.
- We choose w from 0 to 0.2, and the integral can be divided into the following parts(W.L.G.)

Density function(triple extension)

$$\begin{aligned}
 M &= \int_0^w \int_0^w \int_0^w \phi(v) f_X(v_1, v_2, v_3) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \\
 &+ 3 \times \int_{\frac{1}{2}}^1 \int_0^L \int_0^L \phi(v) f_X(v_1, v_2, v_3) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \\
 &+ 3 \times \int_{\frac{1}{2}}^1 \int_0^L \int_0^L \phi(v) f_X(v_1, v_2, v_3) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \\
 &= \int_0^w \int_0^w \int_0^w \phi(v) f_X^1(v_1) f_X^1(v_2) f_X^1(v_3) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \\
 &+ 3 \int_{\frac{1}{2}}^1 \int_0^L \int_0^L \phi(v) f_X^1(v_1) f_X^1(v_2) f_X^1(v_3) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \\
 &+ 3 \times \int_{\frac{1}{2}}^1 \int_0^L \int_0^L \phi(v) f_X^2(v_1) f_X^1(v_2) f_X^1(v_3) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1
 \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

Density function(middle addition)

We choose w from 0 to 0.2, and the integral can be divided into the following parts(W.L.G.):

$$\begin{aligned}
 M' = & \int_0^L \int_0^L \int_0^L \phi(v) f_X^1(v_1) f_X^1(v_2) f_X^1(v_3) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \\
 & + 3 \times \int_{\frac{1}{2}}^L \int_0^L \int_0^L \phi(v) f_X^1(v_1) f_X^1(v_2) f_X^1(v_3) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \\
 & + 3 \times \int_{\frac{1}{2}}^1 \int_0^L \int_0^L \phi(v) f_X^2(v_1) f_X^1(v_2) f_X^1(v_3) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \\
 & + 3 \times \int_0^L \int_L^{L+R} \int_L^{L+R} \phi(v) f_X^1(v_1) f_X^1(v_2) f_X^1(v_3) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1
 \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Merged simulation




Figure 8: Plus probability density function

Review of previous results




Figure 9: Simulation Results (Merged)

Cutting of triple extension




Figure 10: Conceptual graph of triple extension cutting case

Cutting of triple extension

The integral on this area is as followed:

$$\begin{aligned}
 M_3 = & \int_0^w \int_0^w \int_0^w \phi(v) \, dv_3 \, dv_2 \, dv_1 + \int_0^L \int_0^L \int_w^1 \phi(v) \, dv_3 \, dv_2 \, dv_1 \\
 & - \int_{L-2T}^L \int_{2L-2T-v_1}^L \int_w^1 \phi(v) \, dv_3 \, dv_2 \, dv_1
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{6}$$

Cutting of middle addition




Figure 11: Conceptual graph of middle addition cutting case

Cutting of middle addition

$$\begin{aligned}
 M_4 = & 3 \times \int_{L-T}^{L+R'} \int_0^{L-T} \int_{L-T}^{L+R'} \phi(v) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \\
 & + 3 \times \int_0^L \int_0^L \int_{L+R'}^1 \phi(v) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \\
 & - 3 \times \int_{L-2T}^L \int_{2L-2T-v_1}^L \int_{L+R'}^1 \phi(v) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \quad (7) \\
 & + \int_0^{L-T} \int_0^{L-T} \int_0^{L-T} \phi(v) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1 \\
 & + 3 \times \int_{L-T}^{L+R'} \int_0^{L-T} \int_0^{L-T} \phi(v) dv_3 dv_2 dv_1
 \end{aligned}$$

Concrete simulation




Figure 12: Simulation Results: Triple extension(Updated)

Concrete simulation




Figure 13: Simulation Results: Middle addition(Updated)

Four shapes: $T=0.0025$ (T is exogenous variable)




Figure 14: Simulation results: four shapes

Tabular for the results

Table 1: The max of the four shapes respecly.(T=0.0025)

	Different shapes			
	Triple	Middle	Triple C	Middle C
subfigure 5(w=0.21)	0.002923	0.002848	0.002923	0.002744
subfigure 6(w=0.26)	0.007965	0.009212	0.007968	0.009126
subfigure 7(w=0.31)	0.02023	0.02255	0.02024	0.02251
subfigure 8(w=0.36)	0.0434	0.04584	0.04341	0.04588
subfigure 18(w=0.86)	1.066	1.073	1.066	1.073

Triple extension: (T is endogenous variable)




Figure 15: Cutting of triple extension

Middle addition: (T is endogenous variable)




Figure 16: Cutting of middle addition

Merged forms: $w=0.01$




Figure 17: Merged forms: $w=0.01$

Merged forms: $w=0.05$




Figure 18: Merged forms: $w=0.05$

Merged forms: $w=0.2$




Figure 19: Merged forms: $w=0.2$

Merged forms: $w=0.31$




Figure 20: Merged forms: $w=0.31$

Merged forms: $w=0.86$




Figure 21: Merged forms: $w=0.86$

Tabular for the results

Table 2: The maximum of two shapes respectively.(T is an endogenous variable)

Different shapes and according T and L						
Triple C	T	L	Middle C	T	L	
w=0.01–0.000003	0.001	0.002	–0.000003	0.001	0.002	
w=0.06 0.000002	0.001	0.002	0.00000010	0.001	0.002	
w=0.11 0.000218	0.001	0.002	0.00004	0.001	0.008	
w=0.31 0.021	0.136	0.274	0.0225	0.001	0.169	
w=0.86 1.0659	0.035	0.86	1.0734	0.001	0.483	

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