




Security Assessment

Equito Finance

CertiK Verified on Nov 28th, 2022





Certik Verified on Nov 28th, 2022

Equito Finance

The security assessment was prepared by Certik, the leader in Web3.0 security.

Executive Summary

TYPES

Bridge

ECOSYSTEM

Algorand

METHODS

Manual Review, Static Analysis

LANGUAGE

Python

TIMELINE

Delivered on 11/28/2022

KEY COMPONENTS

N/A

CODEBASE

<https://git.mobilesoft.it/equito-finance/contracts/equito-contract-v1>[...View All](#)

COMMITTS

3fd7e2ec167c372120e551dc88cd108413864c7b

[...View All](#)

Vulnerability Summary



5

Total Findings

2

Resolved

2

Mitigated

0

Partially Resolved

1

Acknowledged

0

Declined

0

Unresolved



0

Critical

Critical risks are those that impact the safe functioning of a platform and must be addressed before launch. Users should not invest in any project with outstanding critical risks.



0

Major

Major risks can include centralization issues and logical errors. Under specific circumstances, these major risks can lead to loss of funds and/or control of the project.



2

Medium

2 Mitigated



Medium risks may not pose a direct risk to users' funds, but they can affect the overall functioning of a platform.



0

Minor

Minor risks can be any of the above, but on a smaller scale. They generally do not compromise the overall integrity of the project, but they may be less efficient than other solutions.



3

Informational

2 Resolved, 1 Acknowledged



Informational errors are often recommendations to improve the style of the code or certain operations to fall within industry best practices. They usually do not affect the overall functioning of the code.

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I **Disclaimer**

CODEBASE | EQUITO FINANCE

Repository







<https://git.mobilesoft.it/equito-finance/contracts/equito-contract-v1>

Commit

3fd7e2ec167c372120e551dc88cd108413864c7b

AUDIT SCOPE | EQUITO FINANCE

6 files audited ● 1 file with Acknowledged findings ● 1 file with Mitigated findings ● 4 files without findings

ID	File	SHA256 Checksum
● BMC	 project/equito/contracts/bridge/BaseMinter.py	6c0ab4e53cfad010014fef04a5d9c81cb9a67472035c73c893fb928131756db9
● VCK	 project/equito/contracts/bridge/Vault.py	cbfba14a05c2f09aeba4d969dbc7621b9bd435b68f7359f17d720bc312599b3f
● BNB	 project/equito/contracts/bridge/BNBMinter.py	d1eb3ebe5ab84b08bb740d48c41f1e26ea5c44ab230b61372c6fa86a4b2d8b63
● BUM	 project/equito/contracts/bridge/BnbUsdcMinter.py	409f270e708dbf4c365e6d7815243b9b6e0940a58c73d90bc206d93c0fafa732
● ETH	 project/equito/contracts/bridge/ETHMinter.py	6ceac18cef9f971272cf87c8df5e77dfe1703e0ef4486d5d19cc7f3d2876b253
● EUM	 project/equito/contracts/bridge/EthUsdcMinter.py	9ac0882087b733b4ddf7e0fa72c4ef2885c0fda942e6e55e80f16ea97496dde8

APPROACH & METHODS | EQUITO FINANCE

This report has been prepared for Equito Finance to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the Equito Finance project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Manual Review and Static Analysis techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors;
- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts that are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.

FINDINGS | EQUITO FINANCE



5

Total Findings

0

Critical

0

Major

2

Medium

0

Minor

3

Informational

This report has been prepared to discover issues and vulnerabilities for Equito Finance . Through this audit, we have uncovered 5 issues ranging from different severity levels. Utilizing the techniques of Manual Review & Static Analysis to complement rigorous manual code reviews, we discovered the following findings:

ID	Title	Category	Severity	Status
<u>BMC-01</u>	Centralization Related Risks	Centralization / Privilege	Medium	● Mitigated
<u>VCK-01</u>	Centralization Related Risks	Centralization / Privilege	Medium	● Mitigated
<u>BMC-02</u>	Missing IPFS Check	Volatile Code	Informational	● Acknowledged
<u>BMC-03</u>	<code>on_burn</code> Sends Burned Token To Contract Address	Volatile Code	Informational	● Resolved
<u>VCK-02</u>	Unused Functions	Logical Issue	Informational	● Resolved

BMC-01 | CENTRALIZATION RELATED RISKS

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization / Privilege	● Medium	project/equito/contracts/bridge/BaseMinter.py: 90	● Mitigated

Description

In the contract BaseMinter.py, the role admin has authority over the following functions:

- on_mint Any compromise to the admin account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and send the created asset to addresses that has already opted in.

Recommendation

The risk describes the current project design and potentially makes iterations to improve in the security operation and level of decentralization, which in most cases cannot be resolved entirely at the present stage. We recommend carefully managing the privileged account's private key to avoid any potential risks of being hacked. In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol be improved via a decentralized mechanism or smart-contract-based accounts with enhanced security practices, e.g., multi-signature wallets.

Indicatively, here are some feasible suggestions that would also mitigate the potential risk at a different level in terms of short-term, long-term and permanent:

Long Term:

Multi sign ($\frac{2}{3}$, $\frac{3}{5}$) *mitigate* by avoiding a single point of key management failure.

- Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent a single point of failure due to the private key compromised;
AND
- A medium/blog link for sharing the multi-signers addresses information with the public audience.

Permanent:

Renouncing the ownership or removing the function can be considered *fully resolved*.

- Renounce the ownership and never claim back the privileged roles;
OR
- Remove the risky functionality.

Alleviation

[Equito Finance Team]: All transactions (create contracts, call contract functions...) of bridge are not signed by admin account, and they are signed by multi-signature wallet(2 of 3).

Multi-signature wallet is generated in backend, and it is used to sign all bridge transactions.

And individual private key of accounts that compose up the multi-sig wallet are stored in the individual backend instances.

Although one backend instance is hacked, the other backend instances are safe, and the bridge transactions are safe, too.

We are using Azure secret key vault service to store the private keys, its access control will be strictly done by management team.

VCK-01 | CENTRALIZATION RELATED RISKS

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization / Privilege	● Medium	project/equito/contracts/bridge/Vault.py: 91~125	● Mitigated

Description

In the contract BaseMinter.py, the role admin has authority over the following functions:

- on_release_algo
- on_release_usdc Any compromise to the admin account may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and send ALGO or USDC to other addresses.

Recommendation

The risk describes the current project design and potentially makes iterations to improve in the security operation and level of decentralization, which in most cases cannot be resolved entirely at the present stage. We recommend carefully managing the privileged account's private key to avoid any potential risks of being hacked. In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol be improved via a decentralized mechanism or smart-contract-based accounts with enhanced security practices, e.g., multi-signature wallets.

Indicatively, here are some feasible suggestions that would also mitigate the potential risk at a different level in terms of short-term, long-term and permanent:

Long Term:

Multi sign ($\frac{2}{3}$, $\frac{3}{5}$) *mitigate* by avoiding a single point of key management failure.

- Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent a single point of failure due to the private key compromised;
AND
- A medium/blog link for sharing the multi-signers addresses information with the public audience.

Permanent:

Renouncing the ownership or removing the function can be considered *fully resolved*.

- Renounce the ownership and never claim back the privileged roles;
OR
- Remove the risky functionality.

I Alleviation

[Equito Finance Team]: on_release_algo and on_release_usdc transactions are signed by multi-sig wallet.

It is the same with BMC-01 CENTRALIZATION RELATED RISKS issue.

BMC-02 | MISSING IPFS CHECK

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Volatile Code	● Informational	project/equito/contracts/bridge/BaseMinter.py: 14	● Acknowledged

Description

The `ASSET_URL` is using https instead of a valid IPFS location.

Recommendation

It's recommended to use IPFS for NFT token metadata rather than HTTP/HTTPS. For HTTP/HTTPS, the domain and web server owner can change token metadata at will to dramatically affect token value.

Reference: <https://developer.algorand.org/solutions/securely-share-files-algorand-ipfs/>

Alleviation

[Equito Finance Team]:

The ASSET_URL is not a real asset URL.

It is only normal string.

So it doesn't need to use IPFS for NFT token metadata.

BMC-03 | `on_burn` SENDS BURNED TOKEN TO CONTRACT ADDRESS

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Volatile Code	● Informational	project/equito/contracts/bridge/BaseMinter.py: 107	● Resolved

I Description

We noticed that tokens being burned are sent to the contract address, which is also the reserve address. Note that the burn operation is reversible in this case. The total supply is not changed in this case.

Reference: <https://forum.algorand.org/t/stablecoin-how-to-burn-the-asset-and-update-the-supply/1838>

I Recommendation

We would like the client to confirm that this is the intended design.

I Alleviation

[Equito Finance Team]:

Algorand can't create the asset dynamically.

The asset is created only once, and the initial amount of asset is fixed.

So burned assets are returned to the contract address, and it is reused later.

We confirm that this is intended by design.

VCK-02 | UNUSED FUNCTIONS

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	● Informational	project/equito/contracts/bridge/Vault.py: 81~89	● Resolved

I Description

The function `on_lock_algo` and `on_lock_usdc` are declared but never used in the contract.

I Recommendation

We advise the client to remove or comment out the functions.

I Alleviation

Functions are removed in commit 3fd7e2ec167c372120e551dc88cd108413864c7b.

APPENDIX | EQUITO FINANCE

Finding Categories

Categories	Description
Centralization / Privilege	Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that act against the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles in combination with a mechanism to relocate funds.
Logical Issue	Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how block.timestamp works.
Volatile Code	Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that may result in a vulnerability.

Checksum Calculation Method

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux "sha256sum" command against the target file.

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