A Survey on Agentic Security: Applications, Threats and Defenses

Asif Shahriar^{1*}, Md Nafiu Rahman^{1*}, Sadif Ahmed^{1*}, Farig Sadeque¹, Md Rizwan Parvez²

¹BRAC University, ²Qatar Computing Research Institute (QCRI)

Abstract

The rapid shift from passive LLMs to autonomous LLM-agents marks a new paradigm in cybersecurity. While these agents can act as powerful tools for both offensive and defensive operations, the very agentic context introduces a new class of inherent security risks. In this work we present the first holistic survey of the agentic security landscape, structuring the field around three interdependent pillars: Applications, Threats, and Defenses. We provide a comprehensive taxonomy of over 150 papers, explaining how agents are used, the vulnerabilities they possess, and the countermeasures designed to protect them. A detailed cross-cutting analysis shows emerging trends in agent architecture while revealing critical research gaps in model and modality coverage.

1 Introduction

Since their introduction, Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used in the domain of cybersecurity (Xu et al., 2025a; Wang et al., 2024; Deng et al., 2024a). The transition of research landscape from passive LLMs to autonomous LLM-agents (Yao et al., 2023; Shinn et al., 2023; Schick et al., 2023) has made these models significantly more capable, allowing them not just to describe a solution but to execute it.

Definition: LLM Agent

We define an **LLM Agent** as a system whose core decision module is an LLM that *plans*, *invokes tools/APIs*, and *acts* in an external environment while *observing* feedback and *adapting* subsequent actions. It maintains *state* (short/long-term memory or a knowledge store) and may include explicit *self-critique/verification* and *governance* layers to satisfy task goals and safety constraints.

This newfound agency has enabled LLM-agents to demonstrate remarkable capabilities across the security spectrum (Shen et al., 2025; Zhu et al., 2025b; Lin et al., 2025b). However, a number of studies have shown that the very act of wrapping an LLM in an agentic framework significantly increases its vulnerability (Saha et al., 2025; Kumar et al., 2025; Chiang et al., 2025). In response, a growing body of research has focused on developing countermeasures to harden these systems (Debenedetti et al., 2025; Udeshi et al., 2025).

The rapid development of agentic security research – with over 150 papers in 2024-2025 alone – has created a fragmented landscape that lacks comprehensive analysis. While existing surveys provide valuable insights into specific aspects like security threats (Deng et al., 2024c), trustworthiness (Yu et al., 2025), enterprise governance (Raza et al., 2025) and core LLM safety (Ma et al., 2025), they fail to capture the complete picture, as shown in Table 1. This fragmentation leaves practitioners and researchers without a unified framework for understanding how agent capabilities, vulnerabilities, and defenses interconnect.

In this work we present the first holistic survey of the agentic security landscape, structured to answer three key questions a security researcher would ask: "What can agents do for my security?" (Applications), "How can they be attacked?" (Threats), and "How do I stop them?" (Defenses). To this end, we define three pillars of taxonomy:

Applications (§2). Using LLM-agents in downstream cybersecurity tasks, including red teaming (autonomous vulnerability discovery), blue teaming (defending against threats), and domain-specific security (cloud, web).

Threats (§3). Security vulnerabilities inherent to agentic systems that attackers can exploit.

Defenses (§4). Techniques and countermeasures used to harden agentic systems against the threats.

By uniquely bridging these three pillars, our sur-

^{*}Equal contribution. Author order does not matter.

Table 1: Survey comparison. Legend: ✓ = covered; △ = partial/limited; ✗ = not covered. A: Applications, T: Threats, D: Defenses, B: Benchmarks/testbed surveyed.

Survey	A	T	D	В	Focus
Yu et al. (2025)	X	1	1	✓	Trustworthiness
Raza et al. (2025)	X	\triangle	\triangle	X	Enterprise governance & risk
Deng et al. (2024c)	X	1	\triangle	X	Security threats
He et al. (2024)	X	✓	✓	X	Technical vulnerabili- ties
Ma et al. (2025)	\triangle	1	✓	\triangle	Large-model safety (agents as subset)
This Survey	1	1	✓	1	Holistic agentic secu- rity

vey provides a complete picture of the current state of the art, transforming a scattered collection of individual research efforts into an actionable body of knowledge. Our contributions are threefold:

- **Holistic review.** We conduct an in-depth survey of agentic security through a comprehensive three-pillar taxonomy, as presented in Fig. 1.
- Focus on applications. We provide a detailed review focused on how agents are actually used by security teams—covering offensive, defensive, and domain-specific tasks, an area largely overlooked by prior surveys.
- Cross-cutting analysis. We analyze 150+ papers to identify key trends and critical gaps— for example, the migration from monolithic to planner-executor and multi-agent architectures, almost exclusive focus on single commercial LLM (GPT), uneven threat and modality coverage (RAG poisoning under-defended, few works on images), and benchmark fragmentation.

2 Applications of Agents in Security

This section describes how LLM agents are applied across the cybersecurity lifecycle, from offensive penetration testing and exploit generation to defensive detection, forensics, and automated remediation, showing their growing operational roles and domain specialization.

2.1 Offensive Security Agents (Red-Teaming)

This subsection describes autonomous and reasoning-driven red-team agentic systems that conduct penetration testing, vulnerability discovery, fuzzing, and exploit adaptation. It highlights how agents simulate adversarial workflows

and evaluate exploit intelligence in controlled environments.

2.1.1 Autonomous Penetration Testing

This area explores agents that autonomously perform end-to-end penetration testing such asreconnaissance, exploitation, and lateral movement—using adaptive planning and feedback. Deng et al. (2024a) propose PentestGPT, the first LLM-based framework with a Reasoning-Generation-Parsing design reducing context loss, while Shen et al. (2025) and Kong et al. (2025b) extend this with multi-agent RAG and task-graph coordination respectively. Nieponice et al. (2025) introduce an SSH-focused system, and Happe and Cito (2025a) show autonomous adaptation of LLM agents in enterprise testbeds. Evaluation works include HackSynth (Muzsai et al., 2024) and AutoPentest (Henke, 2025), which benchmark or integrate continuous exploit intelligence. Comparative and system-focused studies include Happe and Cito (2025b) on interactive vs autonomous agents, Singer et al. (2025) introducing Incalmo for reliable multi-host execution, and Luong et al. (2025), who achieves state-of-the-art results on AutoPenBench (Gioacchini et al., 2024) and AI-Pentest-Benchmark (Isozaki et al., 2024).

2.1.2 Automated Vulnerability Discovery & Fuzzing

This area studies agents that use reasoning to guide fuzzing like identifying bug-prone regions, generating targeted inputs, and adapting from feedback. Zhu et al. (2025a) propose Locus for deepstate exploration via predicate synthesis. Meng et al. (2024) extract protocol grammars to guide fuzzing, while Fang et al. (2024) show LLMs can autonomously exploit one-day flaws. Zhu et al. (2025d) extend this to multi-agent zero-day discovery. Wang and Zhou (2025) present a two-phase agentic system for Android vulnerability discovery and validation. Lee et al. (2025b); Zhu et al. (2025b); Wang et al. (2025c) introduce benchmarks to evaluate LLM agents on tasks like exploitation and repair, while ExCyTInBench(Wu et al., 2025b) highlights challenges in multi-step reasoning. LLMFuzzer (Yu et al., 2024), TitanFuzz(Deng et al., 2023), and FuzzGPT (Deng et al., 2024b) use fuzzing or reasoning-based input generation.

2.1.3 Exploit Generation & Adaptation

This area examines agents that generate environment-aware exploits or malware, of-




Figure 1: Overview of Agentic Security Taxonomy

ten polymorphic and evasive. Lupinacci et al. (2025) show that LLM agents can be coerced into autonomously executing malware via prompt injection, RAG backdoors, and inter-agent trust abuse. Saha and Shukla (2025) proposed a multi-agent system producing diverse malware samples for studying evasion tactics. He et al. (2025a) describe an Agent-in-the-Middle attack injecting malicious logic into multi-agent frameworks by intercepting and mutating messages, while Ullah et al. (2025) introduce CVE-Genie,

which rebuilds CVE environments and reproduces 51% of 841 exploits. Finally, Fakih et al. (2025) present a repair system combining fine-tuned LLMs and iterative validation to generate accurate vulnerability patches.

2.2 Defensive Security Agents (Blue-Teaming)

This subsection describes blue-team applications of LLM agents for continuous monitoring, threat detection, incident response, threat hunting, and automated patching.

2.2.1 Autonomous Threat Detection & Incident Response

This area studies agentic SOC frameworks that monitor alerts, analyze threats, and execute response playbooks. Tellache et al. (2025) propose a RAG-based agent combining CTI and SIEM data for automated triage, while Lin et al. (2025b) and Wei et al. (2025) propose IRCopilot, with rolebased agents for incident response, and CORTEX, a collaborative agent system reducing false positives. Liu (2025) explore centralized and hybrid agent models for team-based response, while Singh et al. (2025) find LLMs are mainly used as assistive tools in real-world SOCs. (Deason et al., 2025) benchmarks LLM threat reasoning, exposing performance gaps, while Molleti et al. (2024) survey log-analysis agents and highlight scalability and robustness challenges.

2.2.2 Intelligent Threat Hunting

This category studies proactive agents that analyze unstructured threat intelligence, form hypotheses, and query system data to uncover hidden adversaries like APTs. Mukherjee and Kantarcioglu (2025) present a provenance-forensics framework using RAG, chain-of-thought reasoning, and agent orchestration to refine and verify evidence, improving precision and recall over SOTA baselines. Meng et al. (2025a) analyze failures in LLM-assisted CTI workflows and propose fixes for contradictions and generalization gaps. Schwartz et al. (2025) introduce LLMCloudHunter, extracting cloud IoCs and generating high-precision detection rules convertible for platforms like Splunk.

2.2.3 Automated Forensics & Root Cause Analysis

This category examines agents that reconstruct attacks, trace entry points, and generate verifiable forensic reports. Guo et al. (2025a) introduce a repository-level auditing agent that uses memory and path-condition checks to reduce hallucinations. Alharthi and Yasaei (2025) and Fumero et al. (2025) develop LLM-powered tools for classifying logs, extracting forensic intelligence, and analyzing network traffic, while Tian et al. (2025) combine causal inference and LLM reasoning for iterative root-cause analysis. Pan et al. (2025) present the MAST taxonomy of multi-agent failure modes and an LLM-as-Judge pipeline for execution failure detection, while Alharthi and Garcia (2025) introduce CIAF, an ontology-driven framework for structur-

ing cloud logs and assembling incident narratives.

2.2.4 Autonomous Patching & Vulnerability Remediation

This category explores agents that detect and remediate vulnerabilities through automated patch synthesis and validation. Zhu et al. (2025c) benchmark LLM agents on real CVE repair using staticanalysis tools, while Bouzenia et al. (2025) introduce RepairAgent, an autonomous pipeline that achieves state-of-the-art results on Defects4J. Applied systems include Gemini-based patching workflow (Keller and Nowakowski, 2024) and an IaC agent (Toprani and Madisetti, 2025) that integrates automated remediation into CI/CD pipelines.

2.3 Domain-specific Applications

This section describes how agentic systems are being tailored to specialized domains such as cloud, web, IoT, finance, and healthcare. It highlights the use of LLM agents for automated configuration auditing, vulnerability detection, and policy-driven hardening within sector-specific environments.

2.3.1 Cloud and Infrastructure Security

This section covers agents securing cloud and infrastructure through automated scanning, hardening, and remediation. Yang et al. (2025b) propose a two-phase workflow—sandbox "exploration" followed by verified "exploitation"—to safely test CSPM remediations. Ardebili and Bartolini (2025) introduce an LLM supervisor coordinating subagents for log analysis, RBAC auditing, and debugging, while Ye et al. (2025) present LLMSec-Config, combining static analysis and RAG to fix Kubernetes misconfigurations. Diaf et al. (2025) propose BARTPredict for IoT traffic forecasting and anomaly detection, and Toprani and Madisetti (2025) describe an IaC-focused agent that autogenerates CI/CD-ready fixes for policy-compliant hardening.

2.3.2 Web and Application Security

This area investigates agentic systems for secure automation in web and OS environments. David and Gervais (2025) propose a multi-agent web pentesting framework with sandboxed PoC validation for safe, repeatable exploit testing. Mudryi et al. (2025) analyze browser-agent threats like prompt injection and credential leaks, introducing layered defenses like sanitization and formal analysis. At the OS level, Mei et al. (2025) design an agent-oriented OS that isolates LLMs and mediates tool access

via policy. Hu et al. (2025) formalize OS agent observation/action spaces to support structured risk analysis. Kim et al. (2025) validate control/data flows to prevent privilege escalation, while Shi et al. (2025) present Progent, a runtime enforcing deterministic, fine-grained permissions that eliminate attack success in red-team evaluations.

2.3.3 Specialized Applications

This section reviews agentic security across finance, healthcare, privacy, and embodied systems. In finance, Sun et al. (2025) present LISA, a smartcontract auditor outperforming static analyzers on logic flaws, while Kevin and Yugopuspito (2025) introduce SmartLLM, boosting Solidity vulnerability detection. Hybrid and conversational systems Ma et al. (2024); Xia et al. (2024) enhance explainability and exploit reproduction. In healthcare, Neupane et al. (2025) propose a HIPAA-compliant agent framework with PHI sanitization and immutable audit trails. Asthana et al. (2025) develop OneShield, a multilingual privacy-guardrail system for PII/PHI detection and OSS risk flagging. For embodied systems, Xing et al. (2025) expose threats from adversarial prompts, sensor spoofing, and instruction misuse, noting that runtime validation reduces but cannot eliminate physical safety

3 Threats to Agentic Systems

The transition from standalone LLMs to autonomous agents introduces a more severe set of security challenges (Saha et al., 2025; Chiang et al., 2025), as the safety alignment (refusal training) of a base LLM does not reliably transfer to the agentic context (Kumar et al., 2025). In this section we discuss the threat landscape targeting agentic systems and the frameworks used to evaluate their resilience.

3.1 Attack Surface

3.1.1 Injection Attacks

Prompt injection attacks embed malicious instructions within the prompt fed to an LLM to manipulate it into performing unintended actions (Liu et al., 2024c,a; Yi et al., 2025; Shao et al., 2024). Wang et al. (2025e) identify that the static and predictable structure of an agent's system prompt is a key vulnerability that enables prompt injection attacks to agentic systems. Debenedetti et al. (2024) introduce a benchmark comprising of 97 realistic tasks (e.g., email management, online banking)

which reveals a fundamental trade-off: security defenses that reduce vulnerability also degrade the agent's task-completion utility. Liu et al. (2024b) propose split-payload injection attack and find 31 LLM-integrated applications to be vulnerable, including Notion. Several studies show the vulnerability of LLM agents to indirect prompt injection attacks (Zhan et al., 2024; Li et al., 2025a; Yi et al., 2025).

Lee and Tiwari (2024) develop a novel prompt injection attack where a malicious prompt selfreplicates across interconnected agents in a multiagent system like a computer virus and causes system-wide disruption. Dong et al. (2025) propose a memory injection attack that uses crafted prompts to indirectly poison an agent's long-term memory for later malicious execution. Alizadeh et al. (2025) demonstrate that such attacks can cause tool-calling agents to leak sensitive personal data observed during their tasks. Wang et al. (2025f) develop a black-box fuzzing technique that uses Monte Carlo Tree Search to automatically discover indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities by iteratively mutating prompts and environmental observations. Zhang et al. (2025a) and Andriushchenko et al. (2025) design benchmarks that reveal high vulnerability of LLM agents to prompt injection attacks. Zhan et al. (2025) systematically evaluate eight different defenses for LLM agents and demonstrate that all of them can be successfully bypassed by crafting adaptive attacks using established jailbreaking techniques such as GCG (Zou et al., 2023) and AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024a).

3.1.2 Poisoning and Extraction Attacks

Poisoning attacks present another critical vulnerability for LLM agents by corrupting their memory or knowledge retrieval systems. Fendley et al. (2025) categorize these attacks by their specifications (poison set, trigger, poison behavior, deployment) and define key metrics for evaluation (success rate, stealthiness, persistence). Dong et al. (2025) demonstrate a practical attack that poisons an agent's memory through seemingly benign queries, causing it to execute malicious actions when the poisoned memory is later retrieved by a victim. Similarly, Chen et al. (2024) develop AgentPoison, which poisons an agent's memory or knowledge base by optimizing a backdoor trigger that forces the retrieval of malicious records to hijack its behavior. Zhang et al. (2025a) provide a comprehensive framework for measuring agent

vulnerabilities to various attacks, including data poisoning. Several benchmarks (Fu et al., 2025b; Bowen et al., 2025) reveal that larger models do not gain resilience and may even be more susceptible to data poisoning.

Guo et al. (2025b) show that adversaries can repeatedly query an agent's API to obtain a large set of input-output pairs, which can then be used to train an unauthorized "clone" or derivative model, effectively stealing the intellectual property and competitive advantage of the original model provider. These types of attacks are called **model** extraction attacks.

3.1.3 Jailbreak Attacks

Jailbreak attacks attempt to bypass a model's builtin safety measures to force it to produce harmful or unintended content (Wei et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2024; Lin et al., 2025a). Kumar et al. (2025) and Chiang et al. (2025) both demonstrate that AI agents are significantly more vulnerable to jailbreak attacks than their underlying LLMs. Kumar et al. (2025) and Andriushchenko et al. (2025) show that simple jailbreaking techniques designed for chatbots are highly effective against browser agents, while Chiang et al. (2025) identify three critical design factors (embedding goal directly into system prompt, iterative action generation, and processing environment feedback through event stream) that increase an agent's susceptibility. Andriushchenko et al. (2025) discover that leading LLMs are surprisingly compliant with malicious agent requests even without jailbreaking. Saha et al. (2025) find that LLM coding agents are highly vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that produce executable malicious code, with attack success rates reaching 75% in multi-file codebases. Yu et al. (2024) use fuzzing techniques to automatically generate novel jailbreak prompts from human-written seeds. Anil et al. (2024) demonstrate a many-shot jailbreak where numerous in-context examples of harmful question answering override a model's safety training. Robey et al. (2024) present a comprehensive exploration of jailbreak attacks on robotic systems powered by LLM agents.

3.1.4 Agent Manipulation Attacks

This class of attacks targets the higher-level cognitive functions of the agent: its planning, reasoning, and goal-setting modules. **Goal hijacking attacks** subtly or overtly alter an agent's objectives, causing it to subvert its original goal (e.g., summariz-

ing a document) to include a secondary, malicious goal (e.g., including advertisements) defined by the attacker (Perez and Ribeiro, 2022; Guo et al., 2025b). Pham and Le (2025) introduce a black-box algorithm that automatically generates malicious system prompts to hijack an LLM's behavior for specific targeted questions, while Chen and Yao (2024) leverage an LLM's weakness in role identification to trick the model into executing a new, malicious task instead of the original one.

Zhang et al. (2025b) introduce an action hijacking attack where an agent is tricked into assembling seemingly information data from its own knowledge base into harmful instructions, bypassing input filters. Another class of hijacking attacks is reward hacking, which exploits the reward mechanisms in RL-trained agents (Skalse et al., 2022; Pan et al., 2021; Miao et al., 2024; Fu et al., 2025a). These can be caused by reward misgeneralization where models learn from spurious features (Miao et al., 2024), or by agents exploiting reward model ambiguities to maximize their score without true alignment (Fu et al., 2025a). Bondarenko et al. (2025) demonstrate specification gaming vulnerabilities, where a capable LLM agent (e.g. OpenAI's o3) instructed to "win against a strong chess engine" hacks the game's environment to ensure victory rather than play fairly, thus satisfying the literal instruction while violating user intent. Finally, a novel threat on multi-agent systems is the presence of a Byzantine agent, which is a single compromised or malicious agent that can disrupt the collective's ability to complete a task securely and correctly (Li et al., 2024; Jo and Park, 2025).

3.1.5 Red-Teaming Attacks

Perez et al. (2022) first showed that is is possible to use one LLM to automatically generate test-cases that uncovered harmful behaviors like offensive content and data leakage in a target model. Ge et al. (2023) elevated this to an multi-round iterative setting. He et al. (2025a) develop a directed greybox fuzzing framework designed specifically for detecting taint-style vulnerabilities (such as code injection) in LLM agents. Liu et al. (2025a) introduce the "Agent-in-the-Middle" attack, where an adversarial agent red-teams a system by intercepting and manipulating inter-agent communications. Zhang and Yang (2025) present a searchbased framework that simulates multi-turn interactions where an LLM optimizer adversarially coevolves the strategies of both attacking and defending agents to discover emergent risks.

3.2 Evaluation Frameworks

In this section we discuss broad, multi-faceted benchmarks that are designed to assess multifaceted vulnerabilities of agentic systems, as well as works that design and analyze specialized environments for the purpose of testing agent security.

3.2.1 Adversarial Benchmarking

Zhang et al. (2025a) introduce ASB benchmark with 10 scenarios and 27 attack classes. RASEval (Fu et al., 2025c) contains 80 attack scenarios in domains like healthcare and finance, demonstrating a 36.8% reduction in task completion under attack. AgentDojo (Debenedetti et al., 2024) uses 97 realistic tasks to highlight the fundamental trade-off between an agent's security and its task-completion utility, while AgentHarm (Andriushchenko et al., 2025) uses a dataset of 110 unique harmful tasks to reveal significant gaps in agent safety alignment. For web agents, SafeArena (Tur et al., 2025) measures completion rates on 250 malicious requests, finding agents complete 34.7% of them, while ST-WebAgentBench (Levy et al., 2025) introduces metrics for policy-compliant success, finding it is 38% lower than standard task completion. For code agents, JAWS-BENCH (Saha et al., 2025) finds up to 75% attack success rates in multi-file codebases, while SandboxEval (Rabin et al., 2025) assesses the security of the execution environment itself with 51 test-cases. InjecAgent (Zhan et al., 2024) offers a dedicated benchmark for indirect prompt injection attcaks, while BrowserART (Kumar et al., 2025) focuses on the susceptibility to jailbreaks.

3.2.2 Execution Environments

Zhu et al. (2025c) design a sandbox framework that enables LLM agents to interact with exploit vulnerable web applications. Debenedetti et al. (2024) provide a stateful environment with 97 realistic tasks to evaluate the robustness of LLM agents against prompt injection attacks. DoomArena (Boisvert et al., 2025) is a modular red-teaming platform for LLM agents that allows researchers to compose sequential attacks and to mix-and-match adaptive adversary strategies. Zhou et al. (2024) introduce a realistic web environment with 812 long-horizon tasks, where even best performing agents achieve less than 15% success rate.

4 Defense: Hardening the Agents

This section describes architectural, runtime, and formal-verification defenses that strengthen agentic systems against attacks. It explains how design-level safeguards, monitoring mechanisms, and provable guarantees collectively build resilience and trust in LLM-driven security agents.

4.1 Defense & Operations

Here we focus on secure-by-design frameworks that embed layered verification, isolation, and control-flow integrity into agent architectures.

4.1.1 Secure-by-Design

Recent works (Debenedetti et al., 2024; Li et al., 2025b; Rosario et al., 2025) advance modular and plan–execute isolation, cutting cross-context injection rates by over 40%. Task-level alignment and polymorphic prompting (Jia et al., 2025; Debenedetti et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025e) employ intent validation and adaptive obfuscation to resist evolving attacks. Governance-oriented frameworks (He et al., 2024; Narajala and Narayan, 2025; Raza et al., 2025; Adabara et al., 2025) extend Secure-by-Design principles through TRiSM-based trust calibration and layered threat modeling. Tang et al. (2024) introduce ModelGuard, constraining knowledge leakage via information-theoretic entropy bounds.

4.1.2 Multi-Agent Security

Secure multi-agent paradigms (Udeshi et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2025b) apply zero-trust and dynamic collaboration to minimize leakage under adversarial conditions. Core vulnerabilities—spoofing, trust delegation, and collusion—are detailed in Han et al. (2025); Ko et al. (2025), motivating formal crossagent verification. Debate-based collectives (HU et al., 2025; Li et al., 2025d) achieve over 90% phishing detection via randomized smoothing and adversarial consensus, while Lee and Tiwari (2024) uncover LLM-to-LLM prompt infection, highlighting provenance tracking for containment.

4.1.3 Runtime Protection

Reasoning- and knowledge-enhanced guardrails such as R²-Guard, AgentGuard, and AGrail (Kang and Li, 2024; Xiang et al., 2025; Chen and Cong, 2025; Luo et al., 2025) reduce jailbreak failures by up to 35%. Adaptive systems like PSG-Agent (Wu et al., 2025a) sustain accuracy under evolving threats via personality awareness and continual

learning. Deployment studies (Rad et al., 2025; Amazon Web Services, 2024) optimize latency and integrate layered safeguards in production ecosystems. Human-in-the-loop oversight (Wang et al., 2025a) embeds runtime policy enforcement and approval gates for accountability. Behavioral anomaly detectors such as Confront and SentinelAgent (Song et al., 2025; He et al., 2025b) leverage log and graph reasoning for interpretable detection.

4.1.4 Security Operations

Formal verification systems (Kouvaros et al., 2019; Crouse et al., 2024; Lee et al., 2025a; Chen and Cong, 2025) ensure behavioral correctness and runtime assurance through VeriPlan and AgentGuard. LLM-driven analyzers (Yang et al., 2025a; Li et al., 2025e) achieve over 92% accuracy in static analysis, while verification-driven pipelines such as Chain-of-Agents and RepoAudit (Li et al., 2025c; Guo et al., 2025a) operationalize formal assurance. Autonomous response pipelines (Tellache et al., 2025; Molleti et al., 2024) fuse LLM reasoning with threat intelligence, reducing MTTD by 30%. Collaborative frameworks (Liu, 2025; Lin et al., 2025b) like AutoBnB and IRCopilot coordinate triage and remediation. SOC studies (Singh et al., 2025; Wei et al., 2025; Deason et al., 2025) reveal hybrid agent models (e.g., CORTEX) that improve alert precision and reduce fatigue. Rule- and provenance-based threat hunters (Mukherjee and Kantarcioglu, 2025; Schwartz et al., 2025; Meng et al., 2025b; Wu et al., 2025b; Meng et al., 2025a) such as ProvSEEK, LLMCloudHunter, CyberTeam, and ExCyTIn-Bench enable explainable detection and blue-team benchmarking. Cloud-native forensic systems (Alharthi and Yasaei, 2025; Alharthi and Garcia, 2025; Fumero et al., 2025; Tian et al., 2025) like LLM-Powered Forensics, CIAF, Cyber-Sleuth, and GALA automate evidence extraction, reduce triage time by 40%, and improve causal reconstruction.

4.2 Evaluation Frameworks

This subsection describes benchmark ecosystems and sandbox environments used to test the resilience of LLM agents under attack.

4.2.1 Benchmarking Platforms

Core testbeds such as AgentDojo, τ -Bench, and TurkingBench (Debenedetti et al., 2024; Yao et al., 2024; Xu et al., 2025b) simulate real-world tasks to evaluate robustness and failure modes of tool-using

LLM agents. Safety-focused suites like SafeArena, ST-WebAgentBench, and RAS-Eval (Tur et al., 2025; Levy et al., 2025; Fu et al., 2025c) measure reliability under adversarial stress, while attack-driven frameworks—ASB, AgentHarm, and CVE-Bench (Zhang et al., 2025a; Andriushchenko et al., 2025; Zhu et al., 2025c)—quantify exploitability and vulnerability reproduction. Sandboxed environments such as DoomArena, ToolFuzz, and WebArena (Boisvert et al., 2025; Rabin et al., 2025; Milev et al., 2025; Zhou et al., 2024) further enhance reproducibility, and aiXamine (Deniz et al., 2025) offers a streamlined, modular suite for accessible LLM safety evaluation.

4.2.2 Defense Testing

Adaptive studies (Zhan et al., 2025; de Witt, 2025) expose defense fragility under evolving adversaries, urging continuous red-teaming. Broader surveys (Yu et al., 2025; Gan et al., 2024; Deng et al., 2024c) consolidate evolving countermeasures, while Ma et al. (2025) and Wang et al. (2025b) emphasize scalable assurance spanning system and governance layers.

4.2.3 Domain-Specific Frameworks

Agentic frameworks in healthcare increasingly embed native defenses against data leakage and policy non-compliance. Shehab (2025) propose Agentic-AI Healthcare, a multilingual, privacy-first system using the Model Context Protocol (MCP). Its "Privacy and Compliance Layer" enforces RBAC, AES-GCM field-level encryption, and tamper-evident audit logging, aligning with HIPAA, PIPEDA, and PHIPA standards; embedding compliance structurally rather than adding it post hoc. Beyond healthcare, Wang et al. (2025d) present PrivacyChecker and PrivacyLens-Live for multi-agent LLM environments. These model-agnostic tools use contextual-integrity reasoning and real-time monitoring to mitigate privacy risks dynamically. In legal domains, Watson et al. (2024) introduce LAW (LEGAL AGENTIC WORKFLOWS), which reduces hallucinations and clause omissions through tool orchestration and task partitioning. Mhia-Alddin and Hussein (2025) add a contract security layer for expiry tracking, compliance validation, and anomaly detection.

5 Cross-Cutting Analysis and Trends

A cross-cutting analysis of the 151 papers under survey reveals clear structural patterns, as shown




Figure 2: Cross-cutting analysis.

in Fig. 2. A more detailed analysis can be found in Appendix C.

Architecture. Planner–executor architectures (39.8%) and hybrid models (combining symbolic reasoning or retrieval with neural controllers, 14%) are now prevalent, replacing earlier monolithic designs that relied on a single LLM for end-to-end reasoning and action (24.6%).

Agent role. Executor and planner roles dominate (129 papers), reflecting the field's operational emphasis on task decomposition and control. Critics/verifiers appear in 95 papers, while tool-callers (42) and governors/mediators (24) remain sparse.

LLM backbones. GPT-family models appear in 83% of studies, establishing de facto benchmark status but raising concerns about monoculture and reproducibility. Claude (71) and LLaMA (63) constitute the next major clusters. The gradual rise of open-weight backbones reflects a push toward transparent and auditable research, but model-specific alignment differences create fragmentation: safety fine-tuning and evaluation pipelines are rarely transferable, hindering cross-model generalization and reproducibility.

Knowledge source. Static pre-trained remains the dominating knowledge source (132 papers), whereas adaptive knowledge methods like RAG and fine-tuning remain limited. This suggests a community preference for lightweight deployment over continual learning, which is practical but potentially insecure in dynamic threat environments.

6 Conclusion

In this survey we explore the current landscape of security involving LLM-agents, focusing on the three pillars of downstream applications, threats to agentic systems, and defense mechanisms. A deeper analysis of over 150 papers shows the prevalence of multi-agent systems over monolithic architecture, the de-facto status of GPT models as the core of agentic systems, and the community preference of pre-trained knowledge for practical deployment compared to fine-tuning or RAG based approaches. Future works in this domain should focus on the challenges in cross-domain systems, the economics of agentic security, and prioritize defense techniques with provable safety guarantees.

Limitations

This survey has a few key limitations. It mainly focuses on software-based threats and does not explore physical-world or embodied agent attacks (like those involving robots or sensors) in detail. Our coverage is also limited to English-language and mostly academic papers, so it may miss industrial or non-English research. In addition, many of the benchmarks we reviewed use synthetic or simplified test setups, which makes it hard to fully judge how well agents would perform in real-world environments. Finally, most studies emphasize accuracy and safety rather than practical aspects like cost, speed, or energy use, and our own taxonomy involves some subjective choices.

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A Paper Collection Methodology

To ensure a comprehensive and reproducible review of the agentic security landscape, we employed a multi-stage paper collection methodology combining automated searches, manual curation, and snowballing techniques.

Automated Database Search

We conducted an automated search across major academic repositories—including ACL Anthology, IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Library, and arXiv—covering publications from January 2023 to September 2025. Using a Boolean query, we combined two groups keywords related to agentic systems and security concepts.

Search Query Structure (Group 1 Keywords) AND (Group 2 Keywords)

• Group 1 (Agent-related): ("LLM agent" OR "AI agent" OR "agentic AI" OR

"autonomous agent" OR "multi-agent system")

• Group 2 (Security-related): ("security" OR "threat" OR "vulnerability" OR "attack" OR "defense" OR "red team" OR "blue team" OR "penetration testing" OR "fuzzing" OR "jailbreak" OR "prompt injection" OR "poisoning" OR "hardening" OR "adversarial")

Manual Curation

To identify relevant work that our keyword search may had missed, we manually scanned the proceedings of top-tier security (e.g., USENIX Security, ACM CCS, NDSS) and AI (e.g., ACL, EMNLP, NeurIPS, ICLR, ICML) conferences from the same period.

Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

We applied a strict set of criteria to the collected papers to ensure the relevance and focus of our survey.

Inclusion Criteria The paper's primary subject must be **LLM-based agents**. It must have a substantial focus on a **technical security aspect**, aligning with one of our three pillars. The work must be a peer-reviewed publication or a highly-cited preprint.

Exclusion Criteria We excluded papers on general LLM safety that do not address agentic systems, studies on non-LLM agents, works centered on high-level ethics or policy without technical details, and non-technical articles.

Snowballing

Finally, we performed backward and forward snowballing on the curated set of included papers. We reviewed the reference lists of these key papers to identify foundational or related works we might have missed.

B Related Works and Gap Analysis

Recent surveys have started exploring how large language models (LLMs) and agentic systems intersect, but most of them only cover part of the full picture. He et al. (2024) study concrete system-level vulnerabilities and practical defenses like sandbox settings, session management, and encryption schemes. While they provide useful technical insights, their scope is limited to specific systems.

Our work builds on such foundations by connecting these defenses to broader architectural and governance perspectives across multiple domains.

Yu et al. (2025) focus on trustworthiness, discussing issues like safety, privacy, fairness, and robustness. Their survey is strong in analyzing threats and defenses but lacks coverage of real-world applications. In comparison, we take a more direct security-focused approach, showing how these challenges play out in practice through concrete agent behaviors, attack vectors, and defensive mechanisms.

Raza et al. (2025) discuss the TRiSM framework (Trust, Risk, and Security Management) and view agentic AI through enterprise governance and compliance lenses. Their work highlights risk management and oversight but does not explore how security is built into agent design. Our survey complements this by examining technical, architectural, and behavioral aspects that directly influence security in operation.

Deng et al. (2024c) provide a good overview of LLM-agent threats such as prompt injection and data poisoning but do not connect these threats to autonomy levels or coordinated defenses. We extend this line of work by treating agentic security as a layered system, showing how design choices and coordination roles shape overall safety.

Ma et al. (2025) review safety across several model families, including agents, and present many threats, defenses, and benchmarks. However, their coverage of specific agent applications is limited. Our survey focuses on the unique behaviors of autonomous agents, exploring their dynamic decision-making, real-world risks, and operational defenses.

de Witt (2025) discuss multi-agent security conceptually and identify potential risks like collusion or oversight failure. They set an important theoretical base, and we build on it by connecting those ideas to measurable defenses and empirical evaluations in real agent environments.

Li et al. (2025a) show that commercial LLM agents can be easily manipulated in practice, offering valuable real-world evidence of vulnerabilities. We take these findings a step further by situating them in a broader taxonomy that explains why such failures occur and how defenses can be systematically designed.

Kong et al. (2025a) analyze communication protocols and the related security risks in how agents interact with users, other agents, and environments. Their work focuses mainly on communication-level

threats, while our survey connects these communication issues to higher-level coordination, control, and defense strategies across full agentic ecosystems.

Wang et al. (2025b) describe safety risks throughout the LLM lifecycle, from data and training to deployment. Their work captures the broader model development pipeline, whereas we focus on what happens after deployment—how agents behave, interact, and defend themselves in the real world.

C Cross-Cutting Analysis and Emerging Trends

In this section we analyze the architectural, functional, and knowledge-level trends from the quantitative distributions shown in Figures 3–7.

C.1 Architecture and Autonomy

As shown in Figure 3, the field exhibits a pronounced shift toward the **planner–executor** architectures (68 papers) and *hybrid models* (24). These replace earlier monolithic designs (42) relying on a single LLM for end-to-end reasoning and action. This shift reflects a growing appreciation of decomposed cognitive pipelines, where planning, execution, and verification can be modularized to improve interpretability and debugging. In terms of autonomy, more than half of the surveyed systems (71 papers) implement bounded automation, allowing agents to act independently within predefined limits, while 46 incorporate human approval gates and 18 restrict themselves to advisory roles.

C.2 Role Stratification

Functional role distributions in Figure 4 confirm the dominance of executor and planner roles (129 and 107 papers, respectively), reflecting the field's emphasis on task decomposition and control. Critics/verifiers appear in 95 papers, marking the rise of introspective subagents. In contrast, *tool-callers* (42) and *governors/mediators* (24) remain sparse but pivotal, typically employed in systems focused on self-regulation, ethical alignment, or conflict resolution. This emerging role ecology signals a slow shift from monolithic reasoning to layered, self-checking collectives.

C.3 LLM Ecosystem Fragmentation and Dependence

As illustrated in Figure 5, **GPT-family models** dominate the landscape (126 papers), establish-

ing de facto benchmark status but raising concerns about monoculture and reproducibility. *Claude* (71) and *LLaMA* (63) constitute the next major clusters, followed by *Gemini* (48), *Mistral* (30), *Qwen* (18), and *DeepSeek* (15). The gradual rise of open-weight backbones reflects a push toward transparent and auditable research, particularly for security-sensitive evaluation. However, model-specific alignment differences create fragmentation: safety fine-tuning and evaluation pipelines are rarely transferable, hindering cross-model generalization and reproducibility.

C.4 Modalities and Data Context Expansion

The input modality spectrum (Figure 6) reveals the centrality of text (141 papers), but with notable diversification into structured and operational data sources. Log analysis (101 papers) and code reasoning (93) dominate among non-text modalities, underscoring the dual nature of security agents as both interpreters and executors of programmatic artifacts. Fewer systems operate on network traces (38), images (11), or binaries (10), yet these categories are gaining traction in intrusion detection and reverse-engineering contexts. The integration of such multimodal signals represents a key direction for enabling agents to correlate telemetry, policy, and execution behavior within unified analytic pipelines.

C.5 Knowledge Sourcing and Adaptivity Gaps

Figure 7 highlights the dominance of static pretrained knowledge (132 papers), with limited adoption of adaptive learning paradigms. In-context learning (66) and RAG (43) show partial adoption, while fine-tuning (38) and reinforcement or preference optimization (8) remain niche. This imbalance constrains resilience to evolving threats and undermines reproducibility in adversarial contexts. Reliance on frozen priors suggests a community preference for lightweight deployment over continual learning, practical but potentially insecure in dynamic threat environments. Going forward, secure RAG pipelines with verified provenance, incremental fine-tuning, and model distillation will be key to balancing adaptivity with stability.

D Benchmark Inventory

Table 2 provides a detailed analysis of the existing adversarial benchmarks.




Figure 3: Agent Architecture Distribution across 151 papers




Figure 4: Agent role distribution across 151 papers




Figure 6: Data modality distribution across 151 papers




Figure 5: Most tested LLM backbones across 151 papers




Figure 7: Primary knowledge sources of agentic systems.

Table 2: Adversarial Benchmarks for LLM Agents

Benchmark	Environment	Attacks / Threat Model	Findings	Insights
ASB (Zhang et al., 2025a)	Multi-domain agent tasks with 400+ tools; 10 scenarios; standard- ized evaluation harness.	Prompt injection (primary), memory attacks, data poisoning, unauthorized tool invocation, privilege escalation; 27 attack/defense classes.	Existing agents highly vulnerable; many fail even simple attack tasks; reports refusal rate and a unified resilience metric.	Standardized, reproducible testbed spanning both offensive and defensive evaluation; clear taxonomy centered on prompt-injection surfaces.
RAS-Eval (Fu et al., 2025c)	Real-world domains (finance, healthcare); 80 scenarios / 3,802 tasks; simulation and real tool use.	11 CWE categories; broad adversarial stress across realistic work- flows.	Task completion drops by \sim 36.8% on average (up to 85.7%) under attack.	Maps agent failures to CWE; couples domain realism with measurable robustness deltas.
AgentDojo (Debenedetti et al., 2024)	Dynamic, stateful env.; 97 realistic multi-turn tool tasks (e.g., email, banking) with formal, deterministic checks.	Prompt injection via untrusted data/tools; security vs. utility trade-off analysis.	Defenses reduce attack success but degrade task utility; SOTA LLMs struggle on realistic pipelines.	Makes the <i>security—utility</i> trade-off explicit; judge is environment-state based (no LLM-as-judge).
AgentHarm (Andriushchenko et al., 2025)	Agent tasks spanning 110 harmful tasks across 11 harm categories.	Jailbreaks, indi- rect injections, self- compromising actions, unsafe code execution.	Significant gaps in compliance and contextual safety across agents.	Introduces robustness, re- fusal accuracy, and ethical consistency metrics focused on harm reduction.
SafeArena (Tur et al., 2025)	Web agents across multiple websites; 250 benign vs. 250 harmful tasks.	Malicious requests: mis- information, illegal ac- tions, malware-related behaviors.	SOTA (e.g., GPT-40) completes 34.7% of malicious requests.	Demonstrates real web- workflow risks; quantifies unsafe completions under realistic browsing.
ST- WebAgentBench (Levy et al., 2025)	Enterprise-like web tasks: 222 tasks with 646 policy instances.	Policy compliance (consent, data boundaries); defines CuP, pCuP, and Risk Ratio.	Policy-compliant success is $\approx 38\%$ lower than standard completion.	Shifts evaluation beyond raw success to <i>trust/safety-constrained</i> success.
JAWS- BENCH (Saha et al., 2025)	Code agents with executable-aware judging across JAWS-0/1/M (empty, single-file, multi-file).	Systematic jailbreaking to elicit harmful, <i>executable</i> code; tests compliance, attack success, compile, run.	Up to 75% attack success in multi-file codebases.	Execution-grounded judging prevents false safety from mere textual refusals; highlights multi-file risks.
SandboxEval (Rabin et al., 2025)	Code-execution testbeds; 51 hand-crafted sandbox test cases (applied to Dyff).	Dangerous behaviors: FS tampering, data exfiltration, network access, etc.	Naive sandbox configurations can be compromised by malicious code.	Security must include <i>run-time isolation posture</i> , not only agent policy.
BrowserART (Kumar et al., 2025)	Browser-agent red- teaming toolkit across synthetic & real sites (100 harmful behav- iors).	Jailbreaks against browser agents; transfer of chatbot jailbreaks to agentic setting.	Backbone LLM refusal does not transfer: with human rewrites, GPT-40 pursued 98/100, o1-preview 63/100 harmful behaviors.	Agentic, tool-using context weakens safety adherence even without exotic attacks.
InjecAgent (Zhan et al., 2024)	Tool-integrated agents; 1,054 test cases across 17 user tools and 62 attacker tools.	Indirect prompt injections via external content, API outputs, chained tools; pathaware categorization.	Well-aligned agents frequently execute compromised instructions under indirect injections.	Provides fine-grained, propagation-path metrics; standardizes indirectinjection stress for toolaugmented agents.