CS 161 Computer Security

Discussion 2

Question 1 Software Vulnerabilities

()

For the following code, assume an attacker can control the value of basket, n, and owner_name passed into search_basket.

This code contains several security vulnerabilities. **Circle** *three* **such vulnerabilities** in the code and briefly explain each of the three on the next page.

```
struct cat {
2
       char name [64];
3
       char owner [64];
4
       int age;
5
  };
  /* Searches through a BASKET of cats of length N (N should be less
      than 32). Adopts all cats with age less than 12 (kittens).
      Adopted kittens have their owner name overwritten with OWNER_NAME
      . Returns the number of kittens adopted. */
  size_t search_basket(struct cat *basket, int n, char *owner_name) {
       struct cat kittens [32];
9
10
       size_t num_kittens = 0;
       if (n > 32) return -1;
11
12
       for (size_t i = 0; i \le n; i++) {
           if (basket[i].age < 12) {</pre>
13
14
               /* Reassign the owner name. */
               strcpy(basket[i].owner, owner_name);
15
               /* Copy the kitten from the basket. */
16
               kittens[num kittens] = basket[i];
17
               num kittens++;
18
               /* Print helpful message. */
19
               printf("Adopting kitten: ");
20
               printf(basket[i].name);
21
               printf("\n");
22
23
           }
24
       /* Adopt kittens. */
25
       adopt_kittens(kittens, num_kittens); // Implementation not shown
26
27
       return num kittens;
28 }
```

1. Explanation:

Solution: Line **12** has a fencepost error: the conditional test should be i < n rather than i <= n. The test at line **11** assures that **n** doesn't exceed 32, but if it's equal to 32, and if all of the cats in **basket** are kittens, then the assignment at line **17** will write past the end of **kittens**, representing a buffer overflow vulnerability.

2. Explanation:

Solution: At line 12, we are checking if $i \le n$. i is an unsigned int and n is a signed int, so during the comparison n is cast to an unsigned int. We can pass in a value such as n = -1 and this would be cast to 0xffffffff which allows the for loop to keep going and write past the buffer.

3. Explanation:

Solution: On line **15** there is a call to strcpy which writes the contents of owner_name, which is controlled by the attacker, into the owner instance variable of the cat struct. There are no checks that the length of the destination buffer is greater than or equal to the source buffer owner_name and therefore the buffer can be overflown.

Solution: Another possible solution is that on line **21** there is a printf call which prints the value stored in the name instance variable of the cat struct. This input is controlled by the attacker and is therefore subject to format string vulnerabilities since the attacker could assign the cats names with string formats in them.

Some more minor issues concern the **name** strings in **basket** possibly not being correctly terminated with '\0' characters, which could lead to reading of memory outside of **basket** at line **21**.

Describe how an attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to obtain a shell:

Solution: Each vulnerability could lead to code execution. An attacker could also use the fencepost or the bound-checking error to overwrite the RIP and execute arbitrary code.

Consider the following vulnerable C code:

```
1 #include < stdio.h>
  #include < stdlib.h>
  char name [32];
  void echo(void) {
       char echo_str[16];
8
       printf("What do you want me to echo back?\n");
9
       gets (echo str);
       printf("%s\n", echo_str);
10
11
12
13 int main(void) {
14
       printf("What's your name?\n");
15
       fread (name, 1, 32, stdin);
       printf("Hi %s\n", name);
16
17
       while (1) {
18
19
           echo();
20
       }
21
22
       return 0;
23
```

Assume you are on a little-endian 32-bit x86 system. Assume that there is no compiler padding or additional saved registers in all questions. For the first 4 parts, assume that **no memory safety defenses** are enabled.

Q2.1 (2 min) Assume that execution has reached line 8. Fill in the following stack diagram. Assume that each row represents 4 bytes.

Stack					
1					
2					
RIP of echo					
SFP of echo					
3					
4					

- (A)(1) RIP of main; (2) SFP of main; (3) echo_str[0]; (4) echo_str[4]
- (B) (1) SFP of main; (2) RIP of main; (3) echo_str[0]; (4) echo_str[4]
- (C) (1) RIP of main; (2) SFP of main; (3) echo_str[12]; (4) echo_str[8]
- (D) ---
- (E) —
- (F) —

Solution: The first two items on the stack are the RIP and SFP of main, respectively. Since the stack grows down, lower addresses are at the bottom of the diagram, and arrays are filled from lower addresses to higher addresses and are zero-indexed. As such, row (3) contains echo_str[12], and row (4) contains echo_str[8].

Q2.2 (3 min) Using GDB, you find that the address of the RIP of echo is 0x9ff61fc4.

Construct an input to gets that would cause the program to execute malicious shellcode. Write your answer in Python syntax (like in Project 1). You may reference SHELLCODE as a 16-byte shellcode.

Solution: Where to put the SHELLCODE does not matter. This is a simple stack-smashing attack: we want to redirect execution to SHELLCODE when the **echo** function returns.

Approach 1: Place the Shellcode in the Buffer

SHELLCODE + 'A' * 4 + '\xb0\x1f\xf6\x9f'

Approach 2: Place the Shellcode above the RIP

 $'A' * 20 + '\xc8\x1f\xf6\x9f' + SHELLCODE$

There may be a few other correct answers here (with the shellcode placed at slightly different offsets within the buffer or above the RIP), but these are the most common.

Hacked EvanBot is running code to violate students' privacy, and it's up to you to disable it before it's too late!

```
#include < stdio .h>
3
  void spy_on_students(void) {
       char buffer[16];
4
5
       fread (buffer, 1, 24, stdin);
6
7
8
  int main() {
9
       spy_on_students();
10
       return 0;
11
```

The shutdown code for Hacked EvanBot is located at address <code>0xdeadbeef</code>, but there's just one problem—Bot has learned a new memory safety defense. Before returning from a function, it will check that its saved return address (rip) is not <code>0xdeadbeef</code>, and throw an error if the rip is <code>0xdeadbeef</code>.

Clarification during exam: Assume little-endian x86 for all questions.

Assume all x86 instructions are 8 bytes long. ¹Assume all compiler optimizations and buffer overflow defenses are disabled.

The address of buffer is 0xbffff110.

Q3.1 (3 points) In the next 3 subparts, you'll supply a malicious input to the fread call at line 5 that causes the program to execute instructions at 0xdeadbeef, without overwriting the rip with the value 0xdeadbeef.

The first part of your input should be a single assembly instruction. What is the instruction? x86 pseudocode or a brief description of what the instruction should do (5 words max) is fine.

Solution: jmp *0xdeadbeef

You can't overwrite the rip with <code>0xdeadbeef</code>, but you can still overwrite the rip to point at arbitrary instructions located somewhere else. The idea here is to overwrite the rip to execute instructions in the buffer, and write a single jump instruction that starts executing code at <code>0xdeadbeef</code>.

Grading: most likely all or nothing, with some leniency as long as you mention something about jumping to address Oxdeadbeef. We will consider alternate solutions, though.

¹In practice, x86 instructions are variable-length.

Q3.2	2 (3 points) The second part of your input should be some garbage bytes. How many garbage by do you need to write?						
	(G) 0	O (H) 4	(I) 8	● (J) 12	(K) 16	(L) ——	
	Solution: After the 8-byte instruction from the previous part, we need another 8 buffer, and then another 4 bytes to overwrite the sfp, for a total of 12 garbage byte						
Q3.3	(3 points) What are the last 4 bytes of your input? Write your answer in Project 1 Python syntax e.g. \x12\x34\x56\x78.						
	Solution: \x10\xf1\xff\xbf						
		This is the address of the jump instruction at the beginning of buffer. (The address may be slightly different on randomized versions of this exam.)					
	Partial credit for writing the address backwards.						
Q3.4	(3 points) Wh	3 points) When does your exploit start executing instructions at 0xdeadbeef?					
	 ○ (G) Immediately when the program starts ○ (H) When the main function returns ○ (I) When the spy_on_students function returns ○ (J) When the fread function returns ○ (K) — ○ (L) — 						
Solution: The exploit overwrites the rip of spy_on_students, so spy_on_students function returns, the program will jump to the over and start executing arbitrary instructions.							