




Managers' Political Beliefs and Gender Inequality among Subordinates: Does His Ideology Matter More Than Hers?

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Abstract

To explore whether managers' beliefs and attitudes influence gender inequality among their subordinates, we theorize about the relationship between managers' political ideology, situated on a liberal–conservative continuum, and differences in the hiring, work team selection, and promotion of male versus female subordinates, as well as how a manager's gender moderates this relationship. We analyze novel microdata from the U.S. legal industry from 2007 to 2012 and find that large law offices whose partners are more liberal hire a larger percentage of female associates, that more-liberal partners are more likely to select female associates to be members of their client teams, and that associates whose supervising partners are more liberal have greater gender parity in promotion rates. Further, we find that the ideology of male partners is significantly more influential than the ideology of female partners in affecting these differences. We find little evidence that sorting on the part of higher-quality female associates drives the results.

Keywords: gender, inequality, employment relation, labor markets, law firms

Scholars studying the role that firms play in influencing gender inequality have sought to understand why managers might vary in their use of subordinates' gender as a conscious or unconscious basis for selection and promotion decisions (Perry, Davis-Blake, and Kulik, 1994). While many researchers have called for work that examines managers' beliefs and attitudes, such as managers' reliance on gender stereotypes or managers' attitudes toward gender inequality (Bielby and Baron, 1986: 788), Reskin (1993: 250) noted that "[s]urprisingly little attention has been paid to the effect of employers' gender-role attitudes on their personnel decisions."

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Although work has begun to examine the connection between managerial characteristics and gender inequality among subordinates (see Huffman, 2013, for a review of work on the gender wage gap), such studies have focused almost exclusively on relatively coarse-grained comparisons between male and female managers, leaving direct theoretical and empirical examinations of managers' beliefs and attitudes unexplored (Reskin and Padavic, 1988; Gorman, 2005; Dahl, Dezsö, and Ross, 2012; Desai, Chugh, and Brief, 2014). Theory that simultaneously incorporates managers' gender and their attitudes and beliefs would paint a richer picture of the origins of gender inequality among subordinates. One promising source of managers' attitudes and beliefs is their political ideology, defined as a "set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved" (Erikson and Tedin, 2003: 64). A deep body of research in political psychology links political ideology to beliefs and attitudes toward gender roles, gender stereotypes, and gender inequality (Davis and Greenstein, 2009; Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009). Managers' political ideology can be situated on a liberal-conservative continuum (Jost, 2006) and is likely to influence gender inequality in hiring, promotion, and selection onto work teams—processes that are crucial to determining who enters an organization, who gets opportunities for skill development, and who ultimately obtains the status, compensation, and authority of managerial positions. We expect to see differences between liberal and conservative managers' attitudes about hiring, promoting, and selecting women for work teams.

Managers with a more-liberal political ideology should exhibit less gender inequality than conservative managers in hiring, work team selection, and promotion, for at least two reasons. First, liberal managers are more likely to hold nontraditional beliefs about gender roles and gender stereotypes (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004; Davis and Greenstein, 2009), making them less likely to believe that women lack the temperament needed to succeed in leadership roles and less likely to believe that women will eventually leave the firm to pursue family responsibilities (e.g., Phelps, 1972; Ridgeway, 2001; Eagly and Karau, 2002). Second, liberal managers may be more likely to believe that ameliorating gender inequality is an organizational imperative (e.g., Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño, 2013; Briscoe, Chin, and Hambrick, 2014; Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick, 2016), so they may evaluate female job candidates and subordinates more positively than other managers (e.g., Castilla, 2008) and may implement policies that make their organizations more attractive to female subordinates and more conducive to female subordinates' success (e.g., Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006).

Another body of work that examines managers' gender and subordinate inequality allows us to theorize about whether liberalism among male or female managers will have a stronger relationship with gender inequality in hiring and promotion. Male managers' liberalism is likely to reduce gender inequality more than that of female managers. Not only might liberal female managers have less power than liberal males to assert their preferences (e.g. Ridgeway, 2013), conservative female managers may have reasons to support female subordinates that dominate the influence of their political ideology, such as in-group and homophily preferences (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Reskin, 2000; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001) and direct exposure to gender discrimination in their personal lives. Male managers lack these influences, thereby increasing the importance of ideology in determining their beliefs and attitudes toward

gender inequality (Klein, 1986; Reingold and Foust, 1998). We test these ideas in the context of U.S.-based large corporate law firms, a rich and socially important setting in which gender inequality attracts significant interest from practitioners (e.g., Rikleen, 2013) and researchers (e.g., Ely, 1994, 1995; Beckman and Phillips, 2005; Gorman, 2005; Phillips, 2005).

MANAGERS AND GENDER DIFFERENCES IN ORGANIZATIONS

Inspired by Baron and Bielby's (1980) call to "bring firms back in" to the study of inequality, a growing body of research suggests that managers have a significant influence on organizational gender inequality through hiring, promotion, and compensation decisions. The interest in managers stems partly from the idea that they "us[e] some type of mental discriminant function" (Bielby and Baron, 1986: 781) when evaluating job candidates and subordinates (Perry, Davis-Blake, and Kulik, 1994; Gorman, 2005) and partly from the notion that their beliefs and attitudes about gender roles, stereotypes, and inequality might influence this evaluation (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004).

Work that focuses directly on managers' beliefs and attitudes remains elusive, however, with most research examining managers' gender or other ascriptive characteristics. Both Castilla (2011) and Tsui and O'Reilly (1989) found that managers provide better performance ratings to employees who share their gender, and many studies have found smaller gender differences in hiring, promotion, and compensation in organizations that have more female managers. Cohen and Broschak (2013) and Huffman (2013) have provided recent summaries of work examining female managers and gender gaps in hiring and wages, respectively. Though these results may be driven by differences between female and male managers in terms of their beliefs and attitudes, such as their use of gender stereotypes and/or their concern about gender inequality in the workplace (Cohen and Huffman, 2007), it is difficult to separate these beliefs and attitudes from other powerful motivators, such as in-group versus out-group categorization processes (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Reskin, 2000) or homophily/similarity-attraction preferences (Byrne, 1961; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). Reskin (2003: 4) emphasized the difficulty of inferring managers' motives based solely on their gender or other group characteristics because such explanations ignore variation within the group.

Political Ideology and Managers' Attitudes and Beliefs about Gender Differences

Political ideology provides a useful marker of a manager's beliefs and attitudes that, when combined with the manager's gender, can offer a more-complete theory of the role that the manager's "mental discriminant function" (Bielby and Baron, 1986: 781) plays in the production of gender inequality in organizations. Though multiple dimensions of ideology are possible (Jost, 2006), we follow prior literature by defining managers' political ideology on a liberal-conservative continuum (e.g., Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño, 2013). Our focus on political ideology is motivated by a body of political science research (Manza and Brooks, 1999; Brooks and Bolzendahl, 2004) that has shown marked differences among individuals with liberal versus conservative ideologies (see Jost

et al., 2003, for a review), with each ideology rooted in its own distinct set of moral foundations (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009). Liberals, for example, tend to take a more-optimistic view of human nature and hold what Sowell (2007) called an “unconstrained vision,” in which the perfectibility of society is theoretically possible. This point of view pushes liberals to favor social change, social justice, and equality in outcomes. Conservatives, by contrast, hold what Sowell (2007) called a “constrained vision” that emphasizes the imperfectability of human nature and the likelihood that changes to the social order often have unforeseeable negative consequences that may exacerbate social problems. This viewpoint pushes conservatives to place importance on stability, respect for authority, and tradition (Tetlock, 2000; Jost et al., 2003). Most important for our purposes, this work also shows that liberals and conservatives have markedly different beliefs and attitudes about gender roles in the family, personality-related gender stereotypes, and gender inequality as a social issue that organizations should solve.

With regard to gender roles in the family, conservatives often emphasize the value of a traditional division of household labor in which men work outside the home and women work inside the home, e.g., raising children (Klein, 1986; Mason and Lu, 1988; Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004; Davis and Greenstein, 2009). Surveys such as the General Social Survey (GSS), which is excerpted in table 1, indicate that conservatives value a traditional division of household labor in part because they feel that children may suffer unexpected negative consequences if their mothers work outside the home (Cotter, Hermesen, and Vanneman, 2011). Liberals are more likely to view a traditional division of household labor through the lens of inequality, insofar as they believe women working inside the home have diminished access to power and status (e.g., Jost et al., 2003).

Research further suggests that conservatives and liberals differ in the extent to which they believe gender may help signal an individual's personality traits and suitability for leadership (Sanbonmatsu, 2002; King and Matland, 2003; Lawless and Pearson, 2008). With regard to personality traits, traditional gender stereotypes depict men as decisive, assertive, and/or impulsive and women as friendly, cooperative, and/or weak (e.g., Eagly and Johnson, 1990). Political research suggests that individuals with a more conservative political ideology may be more likely to adhere to these stereotypes (Matland and King, 2002), perhaps because these stereotypes are traditional. With regard to suitability for leadership, conservatives may prefer leaders with a more “agentic” leadership style, while liberals may prefer leaders who exhibit more “communal” characteristics (Winter, 2010). Because agentic qualities are more often associated with men and communal qualities are more often associated with women (Eagly and Johnson, 1990), liberals may view female leaders more positively than conservatives. Table 1 provides support for these observations, as it shows that liberals are less likely to believe that men are emotionally better suited for politics, an opinion that prior scholars have used to infer respondents' attitudes toward gender differences in leadership characteristics (e.g., Rosenwasser and Dean, 1989).

Perhaps because reducing inequality is a key concern of liberalism, political ideology also correlates with individuals' attitudes and beliefs about the role that organizations should play in influencing gender inequality (e.g., Kane and Whipkey, 2009; Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño, 2013; Gupta, Briscoe, and

Table 1. Gender-role Attitudes and Political Ideology of Respondents to the General Social Survey, 2000–2014*

Survey item	% Respondents Supporting / Agreeing with the Statement							N
	Extremely liberal	Liberal	Slightly liberal	Moderate	Slightly conserv.	Conserv.	Extremely conserv.	
Gender and economic roles within the family								
1. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.	72%	76%	73%	73%	68%	60%	49%	10,891
2. A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.	32%	30%	35%	35%	41%	50%	61%	10,809
3. It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.	26%	24%	27%	33%	34%	50%	64%	10,805
4. A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family.	34%	26%	23%	37%	39%	52%	61%	1,215
Organizational responses to gender inequality								
5. Because of past discrimination, employers should make special efforts to hire and promote qualified women.	85%	72%	62%	69%	61%	55%	55%	5,344
6. Do you support the preferential hiring and promotion of women?	41%	38%	33%	34%	26%	24%	29%	5,213
Differences in leadership characteristics by gender								
7. Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women.	13%	16%	17%	20%	24%	32%	43%	10,350
* Source: General Social Survey http://www3.norc.org/Gsswebsite/ . Bolded cells are different from “Moderate” respondents at $p < .05$. Calculations include survey weights (wtssall). Unweighted trends are similar. Table includes gender role questions with at least 1,000 responses during the sample period. For additional questions with smaller samples, see the GSS website.								

Hambrick, 2016). Liberals are more likely than conservatives to agree with the GSS item in table 1 that "because of past discrimination, employers should make special efforts to hire and promote qualified women," which implies that liberals may feel justified using their managerial power and authority to pursue a social preference for less gender inequality. Conservatives, in contrast, may view such pursuits as unfair, preferring instead to hire and promote based solely on perceived merit (Baunach, 2002; Garcia et al., 2005; Hing et al., 2011).

Managers' Political Ideology and the Influence of Subordinates' Gender in Career Outcomes

A manager's political ideology might influence the role subordinates' gender plays in three critical organizational processes: hiring, work team selection, and

promotion. Researchers interested in the effect of gender on personnel outcomes often make a distinction between interactional and structural mechanisms (e.g., Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin, 1999), a frame that we follow when theorizing as to why political ideology might influence each of these processes. We follow Gorman (2005: 703) in defining interactional mechanisms as those that “occur when organizational decision makers repeatedly form impressions and evaluations of employees or candidates in face-to-face or mediated social encounters, and then use those impressions and evaluations as bases for selection decisions” and defining structural mechanisms as “established, often formalized, [organizational] policies and practices—job descriptions, eligibility requirements, recruitment practices, and so on.”

Hiring. When considering how political ideology might influence hiring via interactional mechanisms, it is important to emphasize that hiring decisions are often based on uncertain projections of a candidate’s future behavior. A candidate’s gender enters these projections via the “injunctive” or “prescriptive” nature of gender roles and stereotypes, meaning that a manager’s expectations about male and female candidates’ future behavior often reflect the manager’s preferences about the way that men and women should behave (Cialdini and Trost, 1998; Eagly, 2013). Political ideology is prescriptive, defining how society “should” be organized, so we can make clear connections between a manager’s political ideology and his or her evaluation of male versus female candidates. Consider the relationship between political ideology and attitudes about division of labor in the household. Liberal managers are less likely than conservative managers to believe that households should be characterized by a traditional, gender-based division of labor, so liberal managers may be less likely to believe that female job candidates will miss work or quit the organization to fulfill family responsibilities. This may increase liberal managers’ willingness, on the margin, to invest in female job candidates by hiring them.

In addition, interactional evaluations of job candidates may influence a manager’s belief that a candidate fits with the manager’s preferred version of a job candidate (Chatman, 1991; Gorman, 2005; Rivera, 2012). To the extent that managers may use job candidates’ gender as a proxy for their personality traits, these preferences may cause liberal managers to view female job candidates more positively than might conservative managers, because conservatives may value stereotypically masculine traits more (e.g., decisiveness, aggressiveness), while liberals may be more positive about stereotypically feminine traits (e.g., friendliness, inclusiveness; Winter, 2010).

In addition, liberal managers may be motivated to view female job candidates more positively than equally qualified male candidates because they may view gender inequality as a social problem that organizations should solve (Kane and Whipkey, 2009; Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño, 2013; Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick, 2016). Consciously or unconsciously, liberal managers may see the hiring of female candidates as a micro-level reduction in inequality, helping to advance a group that is typically underrepresented in high-status professional positions. Conservative managers, in contrast, may view prioritizing one group over another based on concerns about ascriptive inequality to be unfair (Sowell, 2007).

To the extent that liberal managers view gender inequality as a problem that organizations should help solve, they may also put in place different structural mechanisms—organizational policies and processes—aimed toward reducing gender inequality in hiring. Such policies and processes may be directly related to how hiring works in the organization, such as gender-blind candidate screening techniques (Goldin and Rouse, 2000). They might also include family-leave policies (Kelly and Dobbin, 1999; Briscoe and Kellogg, 2011), which are targeted toward women already inside the organization but also have the effect of making the organization more attractive to female job seekers. For example, Salesforce.com CEO Marc Benioff, well known for his support for liberal politicians, recently announced an organizational policy to review the pay of all 16,000 employees, stating that “My job is to make sure that women are treated 100 percent equally at Salesforce in pay, opportunity and advancement . . . when I’m done, there will be no [gender pay] gap” (Peck, 2015).

Other policies and processes may not be directly targeted at gender differences per se but may have the effect of changing the organization’s attractiveness for female candidates. For example, female candidates may prefer fixed as opposed to risk-based variable pay policies (e.g., Dohmen and Falk, 2011) and may prefer flatter authority structures (Kalev, 2009). Liberal managers may be less likely to link pay with performance (Gupta and Wowak, 2017) or use hierarchical authority structures in their organizations (e.g., Lakoff, 2010; see also Chin and Semadeni, 2016). As a consequence of these policies, as well as the differences in organizational culture they may produce (e.g., Schein, 1983; Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar, 2015), female candidates may perceive a stronger fit with organizations that are led by liberal managers (e.g., Cable and Judge, 1996). Thus we propose:

Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Organizations with more-liberal managers will have a higher percentage of women among newly hired subordinates.

Work team selection. Managers’ political ideology can also affect whether they choose male or female subordinates as work team members. The organization of work around temporary teams is common in professional services firms, which often form teams around discrete client matters, such as a lawsuit or a consulting engagement (Chatain and Meyer-Doyle, 2017). Examining the influence of a manager’s personal political ideology on work team selection allows us to hold structural mechanisms (i.e., organizational policies and processes) relatively constant and examine whether interactional mechanisms help to connect a manager’s political ideology to gender inequality among subordinates at a dyadic level. Because work teams provide a crucial avenue for subordinates to develop the skills and social relationships they need to advance in the organization (Briscoe and Kellogg, 2011), examining work team selection creates a bridge between external hiring and promotion.

The interactional processes described above suggest that liberal managers may be more favorable toward the selection of female subordinates for their work teams. When a manager selects a subordinate for a work team, he or she implicitly invests in that person’s training and development, as work team members often work closely together to accomplish common tasks. Because liberal managers may be less likely to believe that female subordinates will

eventually leave the firm to raise children (e.g., Davis and Greenstein, 2009), they may consider training a female subordinate to be less risky than conservative managers would. In addition, liberal managers may perceive a stronger fit with female subordinates, as they may be more positively disposed to the communal qualities stereotypically associated with women (Winter, 2010). Further, liberal managers' interest in resolving inequality (e.g., Kane and Whipkey, 2009; Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño, 2013; Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick, 2016) may drive them to allocate more resources to female subordinates than to equally qualified male subordinates, to help female subordinates advance in their careers.

Hypothesis 1b (H1b): A manager's liberalism will increase the likelihood that he or she selects a female subordinate to be a member of his or her work team.

Promotion. The manner in which managers' political ideology influences gender inequality in promotion is similar to but theoretically distinct from hiring and work team selection, primarily due to the long-term nature of promotion outcomes. In the time before a promotion decision, managers' political ideology may determine whether male and female subordinates develop equivalent skills and display equivalent job performance. As a result of diverging levels of investment by their managers, initially equivalent candidates may not be equally competitive at the time of promotion. In addition, at the moment when promotion decisions are made, managers' political ideology may influence whether they view male and female subordinates with similar levels of skill and performance as equivalently qualified (Castilla, 2008). Both interactional and structural mechanisms may create gender differences in promotion via processes that occur during these two time periods.

In the period before subordinates are eligible for promotion, interactional and structural mechanisms may cause liberal and conservative managers to allocate training and developmental resources differently to male and female subordinates, which likely has an important effect on subordinates' ability to develop skills that make them competitive for promotion. If liberal managers are less likely to believe that female subordinates will leave the firm for family reasons, they may allocate more training and development resources to female subordinates than would conservative managers. Selection to work on client teams is one example of an allocation that might be influenced by such interactional mechanisms. The structural policies and processes that managers put in place to determine allocations may also play a role. Biogen, a biotech firm whose CEO George Scangos is known for his support for liberal causes, employs a program called "Raising the Bar" that is intended to identify and train female executives with the goal of preparing them for promotion (Leung, 2015). These interactional and structural differences likely allow female subordinates who work for more-liberal managers to perform at a level that is more similar to their male counterparts, making them competitive for future promotion.

At the promotion stage, managers' political ideology may cause male and female subordinates who have performed equivalently in their subordinate roles to differ in the rates at which they are promoted, an outcome Castilla (2008: 1479) referred to as "performance-reward bias." With regard to interactional judgments, conservative managers may exhibit a pro-male performance-

reward bias if they are more likely to reward male subordinates with promotions due to concerns that equivalently performing female subordinates lack the leadership qualities necessary for management (Sanbonmatsu, 2002; King and Matland, 2003; Lawless and Pearson, 2008). The same might be true if the conservative manager believes family responsibilities will prevent female subordinates from fulfilling the higher level of commitment required of managers. By contrast, liberal managers may exhibit a pro-female performance-reward bias, pushing for the promotion of female subordinates over equally qualified male subordinates to attempt to reduce gender inequality (e.g., Kane and Whipkey, 2009; Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño, 2013; Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick, 2016). Political ideology may also influence structural mechanisms that have an impact on performance-reward bias. Liberal managers' concern for gender inequality may cause them to push for more gender balance on committees that make promotion decisions, where female decision makers might be more supportive of female candidates for promotion. Thus we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): The positive relationship between being male and being promoted will be weaker when a subordinate's managers are more liberal.

Differences in the Effect of Ideology across Male and Female Managers

Our final set of hypotheses examines how ideology interacts with the managerial characteristic most scrutinized by prior literature: the manager's gender. Prior work suggests that female managers often have lower rates of gender inequality among subordinates, not only in hiring and promotion (Cohen, Broschak, and Haveman, 1998; Gorman, 2005) but also in other outcomes like wages and performance ratings (Castilla, 2011; Huffman, 2013). And scholars often argue that female managers have more motivation than male managers to reduce gender inequality among subordinates, perhaps due to individuals' tendency to support members of their ascriptive group (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Reskin, 2000), homophily/similarity-attraction preferences (Byrne, 1961; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001), or female managers' direct exposure to gender inequality in their own lives (Plutzer, 1988).

Because of these powerful influences, female managers may be more uniform in their support for female job candidates and subordinates, regardless of their ideology. In contrast, because male managers lack these influences, political ideology may be a more-important determinant of their attitudes and beliefs on gender-related issues, female job candidates, and female subordinates. Political science research provides support for the idea that political ideology will have a stronger effect on the views of individuals who lack direct experience with a particular social issue, such as gender inequality. Klein's (1986: 116–117) foundational study of why men and women differ in their support for feminism found that “[l]iberal political views lead men to feminism” while “[w]omen's views towards feminism were shaped by their current circumstances” and “group consciousness.” In addition, both Kravitz and Klineberg (2000) and Kinder and Sanders (1996) found that liberalism is more strongly associated with support for affirmative action programs among whites than among blacks.

Male and female managers may also differ in the power and discretion that they have to allow their ideological preferences to influence their personnel

decisions (Elliott and Smith, 2004; Abraham, 2017). In the male-dominated professional services context, male managers largely outnumber female managers, granting them power by virtue of group size. Further, scholars have emphasized that men tend to have more status than women in many firms (e.g., Ridgeway, 2013), particularly in male-dominated professions (e.g., Ely, 1995). Thus men may be more comfortable pressing their ideological preferences when making hiring decisions, allocating training opportunities to subordinates, and making promotion recommendations. Even if liberal female managers are more inclined to support female subordinates than their liberal male counterparts, they may lack the ability to assert their preferences. These differences in power and status likely make the ideological preferences of male managers more important than those of female managers in influencing rates of gender inequality in hiring and promotion. We propose:

Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The negative relationship between managers' liberalism and gender inequality in hiring will be stronger for male managers than for female managers.

Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The negative relationship between managers' liberalism and gender inequality in work team selection will be stronger for male managers than for female managers.

Hypothesis 3c (H3c): The negative relationship between managers' liberalism and gender inequality in promotion will be stronger for male managers than for female managers.

METHODS

We tested these hypotheses in the context of large U.S. law firms, a setting that has been used extensively in prior work examining the role of gender in organizations (e.g., Ely, 1995; Beckman and Phillips, 2005; Gorman, 2005; Phillips, 2005) and in which gender issues are highly salient (e.g., Williams and Richardson, 2010). The primary data source for our analysis is the national legal directory published by Martindale-Hubbell (henceforth *Martindale*) from 1999 to 2012. Our analyses cover 2007–2012, for reasons discussed below. Used extensively in organization theory (Phillips, 2002, 2005) and economics (Baker and Parkin, 2006), *Martindale* has been in print since 1868 with the purpose of providing a listing of lawyers so that clients and other members of the legal services community can locate talent. Providing an accurate and up-to-date listing in *Martindale* is a strong norm in the legal services industry, particularly for the large firms that are the basis of our analysis.

The basic unit in the data is the attorney-quarter, which we collapsed to the year level because early years of the data do not contain data in every quarter. For each entry, *Martindale* captures name, firm affiliation, street address location, miscellaneous personal information (e.g., birth year, law school name, and year of graduation), and practice area (e.g., criminal or corporate law). *Martindale* and the American Bar Association furnish attorneys with an International Standard Lawyer Number (ISLN) that allowed us to track attorneys

¹ A small number of attorneys are assigned to multiple firms or multiple offices (defined at the city level) in the same year. We assign attorneys to unique firms and unique offices in each year using the procedure outlined in Baker and Parkin (2006).

over time and across firms.¹ To calculate variables from other sources (e.g., profits, client gender), our sample consists of attorneys working for the largest 200 law firms by revenue (the “Am Law 200”).

Dependent Variables

We calculated all dependent variables for year $t + 1$, effectively lagging independent variables by one year and ensuring an appropriate time ordering in our analyses.

Percent of newly hired subordinates who are female. To test H1a and H3a we measured the *% law students hired who are female* at the office-year level. This variable identifies associates who appear in the data for the first time within two years of completing law school. We also include analyses in which we examined lateral hires: associates who join the office after appearing in a different firm in the previous year. We focused on law graduates for data reasons, e.g., we may under-measure lateral hires if associates join the firm after working in a non-listed organization. In robustness tests, we moved to the individual level to examine matching between law graduates and law offices.

Manager selects subordinate to be member of work team. To test H1b and H3b, we measured whether particular partners select particular associates to be members of small work teams that are organized around legal work on clients’ corporate transactions/deals, such as mergers and acquisitions and initial public offerings. We provide more detail on these data below, which expand beyond the *Martindale* directory. These data allowed us to identify the full universe of associates whom a partner might select for his or her client team, along with the actual associate(s) chosen by the partner. The unit of analysis is the partner-associate-deal, and the DV is a dummy that takes a value of one if the *associate is selected to client team*.

Promotion. To test H2 and H3c, we measured promotion at the individual-year level, using a dummy that indicates whether an *associate is promoted to partner* in the following year. We captured these events when an attorney’s title changes from associate to partner while remaining with the same firm. We verified these promotion events by linking *Martindale* data to the New Partner Promotions database maintained by *American Lawyer*. We used the New Partner Promotions information to identify promotions that occur in 2013, because our *Martindale* sample ends in 2012.

Independent Variables

Manager liberalism. Following Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño (2013), Briscoe, Chin, and Hambrick (2014), Christensen et al. (2015), and Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick (2016), we measured political ideology using attorneys’ political donation behavior. We calculated the liberalism of an office, practice area, or individual partner using *% of partners’ donations to Democrats (\$)*. With some differences among individual politicians, Democrats consistently

occupy the liberal side of American politics while Republicans occupy the conservative side during our sample period. We included donations to candidates, party committees, and political action committees (PACs). We obtained donation data from Bonica's 2013 Database on Ideology, Money in Politics and Elections ("DIME"; data.stanford.edu/dime). See Bonica (2014) for a detailed discussion of these data. In robustness checks we also considered alternate measures of ideology, such as Bonica's (2014) campaign finance score (CFScore), a measure that eschews party affiliation and measures an individual's ideology based on patterns of political giving.

An attractive feature of our research design is our ability to examine the influence of partners' ideology at three different levels of aggregation: the office, the practice area, and the individual. For the hiring analyses (H1a), we measured partner liberalism at the office-year level because newly hired associates may not commit to a particular area of practice when joining a firm (e.g., Sterling and Rider, 2014). Offices are defined by the city listed in an attorney's *Martindale* entry. To test H1b, we calculated the client team selection variable at the level of the individual partner. For the promotion analyses (H2), our unit of analysis is the associate-year, and we calculated the political ideology of the associate's managers in his or her office. We identified managers as partner attorneys in the office who share at least one of the associate's practice areas (e.g., criminal or corporate law). These individuals allocate opportunities for training and development to associates and provide important evaluations of an associate's suitability for partnership.

One critical consideration relates to the timing of political donations relative to the timing of the tests of our hypotheses. We followed Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño (2013) by measuring an attorney's political donations for ten years, 1996–2006. We then tested our hypotheses during the period 2007–2012. This approach ensures that donations occur prior to the outcomes that we study. We describe our linkage between the DIME donation data and *Martindale* data in Online Appendix A (<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0001839217708780>).

Gender. *Martindale* does not contain explicit information about gender. To measure gender, we followed prior research and used attorneys' first names (e.g., Gorman, 2005; Phillips, 2005), matching them to the dominant gender indicated by U.S. Social Security Data and then to the more than 95,000 first names in the Gender Checker Directory. Consistent with prior literature, we excluded unclassified or unisex names (e.g., Pat; < ~4 percent) from the analyses.

Controls

Our analyses account for time trends, which may be correlated with increased gender equality and increased liberalism, with year dummies and, depending on the model, contain state, office, or partner-deal fixed effects. In each case, our goal is to control for heterogeneity that might be correlated with our key independent variables and with our outcomes. Table A1 in the Online Appendix provides a detailed list of variables and how we measured them.

Individual associate controls. We controlled for associates' experience using *years since JD*, *tenure with firm*, and *age*. We have numerous controls for associate quality, which control for potential differences in human capital across male and female associates who work with liberal and conservative partners. *Martindale* contains short biographies in which attorneys can list their accomplishments. We included dummies that indicate whether an associate (1) earned membership in the *Order of the Coif*, a prestigious law school honor society open to no more than 10 percent of graduates, (2) participated as an editor of a *law review*, (3) participated in *moot court*, a club in which students practice faux litigation proceedings, (4) served as a *law clerk* for a judge, or (5) earned *Phi Beta Kappa* as an undergraduate. We complemented these self-reported measures of quality with *law school ranking*. We controlled for social ties using *% of shared law school among office partners*, and we controlled for associates' political ideology using *donations to Democrats by associate (\$)* and *donations to Republicans by associate (\$)*. Further, we controlled for the type of law practiced by the associate using 25 separate *practice area dummies* (see Online Appendix A). Finally, in the associate's practice area, we included controls for size (*# partners in attorney's practice area*), gender (*% partners in practice area who are female*, *% associates in practice area who are female*), and age (*average age of partners in the practice area*). These controls are important as they might correlate with partners' political ideology and with women's promotion chances.

Office controls. The hiring analysis takes place at the office-year level and includes controls for office-specific size (*# of partners in office*), age (*average age of partners in the office*), gender composition (*% of partners in office who are female*), partner quality (*% partners in office from top law schools*), and hiring needs (*# of new associate hires*). We included 25 variables that record the *% of office partners working in each practice area*, which are listed in Online Appendix table A2. *Office fixed effects* absorb stable differences across offices. These controls are important because they might correlate with partners' political ideology and with the organization's attractiveness to female job candidates.

Firm-level controls. Across the promotion and hiring analyses, we controlled for firm performance (*profit per equity partner*) and client-driven (e.g., Beckman and Phillips, 2005) motivation to donate to liberal politicians and support gender equality (*% female leadership among client personnel*). A dummy indicates whether the *firm acquires another firm*.

To account for geographic differences, we used *state fixed effects* in models in which we did not use office fixed effects (note that office fixed effects absorb state fixed effects), which account for differences in local politics and local labor markets. We also performed robustness tests in which we dropped highly liberal and highly conservative locales.

RESULTS

Estimation and Results for Associate Hiring (H1 and H3a)

A law office in our sample typically hires about five new associates each year. Entry-level hires join the firm either directly after graduating from law school or

after clerking for a judge. Lateral hires join following experience in another firm or a government agency. The process for identifying entry-level candidates is routinized, with law offices sending representatives to conduct interviews at a selected set of law schools (Oyer and Schaefer, 2016). To identify potential lateral hires, offices may use the social networks of existing members, place formal calls for résumés, or enlist the services of recruiting firms (Gorman, 2005). Offices also receive unsolicited applications. For both entry-level and lateral hires, firms invite promising candidates to visit the office to interview with members of the firm, and typically a hiring committee will take the input of interviewers before making offers to favored candidates (Gorman, 2005).

Our primary analysis for hiring takes place at the office-year level. We began with a sample of all Am Law 200 offices from 2007 to 2011 that employ at least one associate and have political donation information for at least one partner of each gender (see table A3, column 1 in the Online Appendix). Our sample is then limited to the years in which these offices hire law students (table A3, column 2). Predictably, we see that hiring office-years tend to consist of larger, more-profitable offices. We do not see other significant differences across hiring and non-hiring office-years. Descriptive statistics based on office ideology indicate that liberal offices hire 48 percent female law students, while conservative offices hire 44 percent female law students, providing initial support for H1a. Liberal offices also tend to be larger and more profitable, and they are less likely to be located in the southern United States. Offices are similar in terms of the representation of female partners, reliance on female-led clients, and age of partners. Correlations provided in table A4 in the Online Appendix reveal similar patterns.

Our dependent variable is a percentage bounded by 0 and 1, so we estimated a tobit model using the full sample, with standard errors clustered by offices to account for dependence across observations. Estimations using fractional logit and probit models provide results similar to those shown in table 2. Model 1 contains no control variables and indicates a statistically significant relationship between partner liberalism and representation of women among hired associates, as indicated by *% donations to Democrats by partners in office (\$)*, supporting H1a. Model 2 adds control variables. Although the R-squared increases significantly, the point estimate of partner liberalism does not greatly change, giving us confidence that the results are not sensitive to overfitting. Model 3 provides dummy variables indicating whether an office is liberal or conservative, with the excluded group being centrist offices. We see that liberal offices are not statistically different from centrist offices, while conservative offices have hiring classes that are about 9 percent less female than centrist offices. This effect size is practically significant, given that the average hiring class is 47 percent female. This effect is displayed graphically in figure 1. Models 4 and 5 test H3a, comparing the liberalism of male partners with the liberalism of female partners. We see that the liberalism of female partners—*% donations to Democrats by female partners in office (\$)*—has a very small point estimate and is not statistically different from zero. Importantly, a Wald test indicates that the two coefficients are different from each other ($p < .05$), providing support for H3a.

Table 2. Tobit Models of Associate Hiring (H1a and H3a)*

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% donations to Dem. by part. in office (\$)	.1159** (.0401)	.1563** (.0433)			
Liberal office (> 66% donated to Dem.)			.0221 (.0227)		
Conservative office (< 33% donated to Dem.)			-.0894** (.0335)		
% donations to Dem. by male part. in office (\$)				.0907* (.0430)	.1057* (.0467)
% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in office (\$)				-.0073 (.0345)	.0032 (.0354)
# law student hires		.0025** (.0008)	.0025** (.0008)		.0023** (.0008)
% partners from top law schools		.0248 (.0702)	.0298 (.0705)		-.1205 (.0825)
% female partners in office		.0413 (.1018)	.0441 (.1023)		.1620 (.1367)
# partners in office		-.0003 (.0004)	-.0005 (.0004)		.0003 (.0004)
Office size (# attorneys)		-.0002 (.0002)	-.0001 (.0002)		-.0002 (.0002)
Avg. age of partners in office		-.0006 (.0040)	-.0008 (.0040)		.0067 (.0045)
Firm size (# attorneys, 1000s)		.0450 (.0318)	.0379 (.0317)		.0101 (.0297)
Profit per equity partner (\$1M)		-.0828*** (.0249)	-.0834*** (.0247)		-.0521* (.0266)
% of female leadership among client personnel		-.2847 (.1639)	-.2824 (.1643)		-.2900 (.1620)
Firm acquires another firm		-.0436 (.0324)	-.0426 (.0325)		-.0574 (.0307)
Office is acquired		.0555 (.1229)	.0603 (.1232)		.0932 (.1214)
25 legal specialty controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Year dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
N office-year observations	4,015	4,015	4,015	2,760	2,760
R ²	.00	.03	.03	.00	.04
Log likelihood	-3809.2	-3706.4	-3707.5	-2303.2	-2223.7
Mean of DV	.472	.472	.472	.471	.471


* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; two-tailed tests.

* DV: % female law students hired in $t + 1$. Full sample is used in all models. Level of analysis is the office-year.

Robust standard errors clustered on offices are in parentheses. State fixed effects are included in models 2, 3, and 5.

Estimation and Results for Associate Selection to Client Teams (H1b and H3b)

Similar to many professional services organizations, law firms often form client teams around specific legal matters (e.g., Chatain and Meyer-Doyle, 2017). For associates, working on client teams is a critical avenue for developing skills and creating social ties to clients and other attorneys (Briscoe and Kellogg, 2011). Because associates who are not selected for teams have difficulty advancing in the firm, selection for a client team can be usefully thought of as a type of

Figure 1. Gender inequality in hiring across liberal and conservative practice areas.*

* Results are from model 3 in table 2. 95% CI. Comparison group is centrist offices.

“internal hiring” that serves as an intermediate step between hiring into the firm and promotion.

We examined team formation around clients’ corporate transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and initial public offerings (IPOs). Clients often engage law firms to perform a variety of tasks around mergers, such as completing due diligence, negotiating price and terms, analyzing tax implications, and preparing regulatory documents. To obtain client team formation data, we used Mergermarket, a private firm that tracks worldwide M&A deals and records the attorneys who serve on transactions (Chatain and Meyer-Doyle, 2017).² We linked attorneys to the *Martindale* data and DIME donation data using firm and person names. Our analysis covers 4,316 deals completed from 2007 to 2012 with a median value of \$437 million and contains 2,146 unique partners, each of whom makes at least one political donation, working with 7,695 unique associates. Each team in the sample has an average of 1.2 partners and 2.5 associates. Two attractive features of this analysis are that we can identify the full set of associates that a partner might plausibly select for his or her client team, and we can measure the impact of individual partner ideology on an individual partner’s personnel decisions.³

² Mergermarket maintains the worldwide “league tables” for M&A advisors, showing an up-to-the-moment listing of the top M&A attorneys by deal count and deal value. Headhunters and rival firms track these league tables closely, so attorneys have an incentive to ensure that their information (and that of their competitors) is reported accurately. See http://www.mergermarket.com/pdf/deal_criteria.pdf for more information.

³ Interviews with M&A advisors indicate that firms differ in how they allocate associates to teams. Some firms allow HR to perform this allocation, with input from partners and associates, while others use a less formal system. Firms also differ in the extent to which associates have input in the allocation. Our modeling strategy is predicated on the assumption that partners’ preferences have at least some influence in the allocation process, which seems reasonable given partners’ rank and authority.

We identified a partner's choice set of associates as those who share a partner's office location and practice area and who have served on an M&A deal (with any partner) at some point in the last year. Each observation is at the partner-associate-deal level. Our analyses consist of linear probability and conditional logit models, each with a highly restrictive partner-deal fixed effect. Including such controls absorbs not only variation in common to the same partner and same transaction (i.e., practice area, age) but also variation that is common across office-years or firm-years.

Results are shown in table 3. Model 1 shows that female associates are less likely to be selected for client teams but that gender inequality disappears when partners make 100 percent of their political donations to Democrats. Model 2 indicates that the estimate is stable after controls are added. Model 3 examines a three-way interaction among associate gender, partner gender, and partner ideology. We see that the interaction is negative ($p = .09$), suggesting that the effect of partner ideology is weaker for female partners, supporting H3b at the individual level. Model 4 replicates this result with a conditional logit model. Models 5 and 6 split the sample according to partner gender. We see that liberalism among male partners reduces gender inequality in associate selection, while the effect is not statistically significant for female partners.

Estimation and Results for Associate Promotion (H2 and H3b)

Six to ten years following an associate's graduation from law school, the partners in the firm decide whether to offer the associate admission to the partnership. If an associate is not offered partnership, he or she is often asked to leave the firm, though firms sometimes offer associates the option to move "off partnership track" to a position that provides less power and compensation but does not have the same pressures to generate client business (e.g., Sherer and Lee, 2002). The decision to offer admission to the partnership is based on a mixture of relatively subjective criteria, including the associate's ability to attract and retain clients, technical legal expertise, and ability to manage other associates (e.g., Phillips, 2001; Shinnars, 2012). The partnership evaluation process differs from firm to firm but usually entails an assessment by the partners who work most closely with the associate, followed by voting by members of the partnership. This vote might take place among all members of the firm's partnership, or it might be limited to members of a promotion committee or executive committee, depending on the firm's policies (e.g., Galantar and Palay, 1994).

When testing our hypotheses on promotion to partnership, our level of analysis is the associate-year. This sample consists of all associates working for Am Law 200 firms who are at least five years removed from law school, as promotion rarely occurs among individuals with less experience (results are similar with a four- or six-year cutoff). Consistent with prior research examining mobility at the individual level, we used a combination of linear probability and conditional logit models with office fixed effects.

Table 4 presents the summary statistics for this sample, broken out by gender and the ideology of partners in the associate's practice area. To allow readers to cleanly assess differences in associates' characteristics based on partner ideology, we report female and male associate-years working in liberal and conservative practice areas. The regressions also contain associate-years for

Table 3. Client Team Selection (H1a and H3b)*

Variable	(1) Full sample	(2) Full sample	(3) Full sample	(4) Full sample	(5) Male partners	(6) Female partners
Fem. associate*% donated to Dem. by partner (\$)	.0081* (.0040)	.0080* (.0040)	.0094* (.0042)	.1162* (.0515)	.0093* (.0042)	-.0119 (.0137)
Female associate*Female partner			.0309** (.0117)	.3540** (.1268)		
Fem. associate*Fem. partner*% donated to Dem. by partner (\$)			-.0235 (.0143)	-.2636 (.1554)		
Female associate	-.0080** (.0031)	-.0067* (.0031)	-.0090** (.0032)	-.1129** (.0396)	-.0089** (.0032)	.0197 (.0113)
Deals by associate last year		.0065*** (.0005)	.0065*** (.0005)	.0739*** (.0056)	.0061*** (.0005)	.0085*** (.0017)
Top 18 law school		.0005 (.0015)	.0005 (.0015)	.0094 (.0197)	.0004 (.0016)	.0010 (.0051)
Order of the Coif		.0074* (.0036)	.0074* (.0036)	.0911* (.0400)	.0100** (.0038)	-.0166 (.0121)
Judicial clerkship		-.0081 (.0048)	-.0080 (.0048)	-.0851 (.0533)	-.0135** (.0049)	.0561** (.0212)
Law review		.0007 (.0032)	.0007 (.0032)	.0151 (.0372)	.0014 (.0034)	-.0044 (.0095)
Moot court		.0076 (.0080)	.0078 (.0080)	.0866 (.0854)	.0137 (.0088)	-.0247 (.0186)
Phi Beta Kappa		.0140** (.0046)	.0140** (.0046)	.1662*** (.0503)	.0186*** (.0049)	-.0388** (.0143)
Donations to Rep. by associate (log\$)		-.0005 (.0004)	-.0005 (.0004)	-.0062 (.0053)	-.0003 (.0005)	-.0018 (.0014)
Donations to Dem. by associate (log\$)		-.0008* (.0003)	-.0008* (.0003)	-.0107* (.0042)	-.0007* (.0003)	-.0017 (.0011)
Associate and partner, same law school		.0046 (.0029)	.0046 (.0029)	.0589 (.0373)	.0046 (.0030)	.0055 (.0113)
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	CLogit	OLS	OLS
N associate-deal observations	163,750	163,750	163,750	163,750	147,388	16,362
R ²	.00	.02	.02	.03	.02	.02
Log likelihood	-21129.3	-21011.8	-21006.8	-35158.3	-18345.6	-2617.1
Mean of DV	.098	.098	.098	.098	.097	.104

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; two-tailed tests.

* DV: 0/1, Associate attorney is a member of partner attorney's team for a client deal (e.g., M&A, IPO transaction). Partner-deal fixed effects are included in all models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered on partner-deals.

centrist practice areas, but this group is unreported in the interest of space. Results indicate that men are more likely than women to be promoted in liberal as well as conservative practice areas, but this difference is practically and statistically larger in the conservative practice areas: a male advantage of 3.6 percent when managers are conservative versus 2.2 percent when managers are liberal, an initial indication of support for H2.

Table 4 tabulates differences in associates' signals of quality across liberal and conservative practice areas to ascertain whether the highest-quality female associates sort into practice areas with more-liberal partners. We do not see strong evidence of this type of sorting. Female associates in conservative

Table 4. Summary Statistics: Associate Attorneys in Promotion Analyses*

Variable	Male Associates					Female Associates					Diff in Diff.
	Liberal practice area		Conservative practice area		Diff.	Liberal practice area		Conservative practice area		Diff.	
	N	Mean	N	Mean		N	Mean	N	Mean		
Promoted to partner, $t + 1$	26,780	.057	8,352	.078	-.021***	21,949	.035	6,181	.042	-.007**	-.014**
% donations to Dem. by part. in prac. area (\$)	26,780	.835	8,352	.169	.666***	21,949	.843	6,181	.166	.677***	-.011***
Avg. donations to Dem. by part. in prac. area (\$)	26,780	8,344.6	8,352	1,027	7,317***	21,949	10,530	6,181	990	9,540***	-2,222.4
Avg. donations to Repub. by part. in prac. area (\$)	26,780	1,236	8,352	5,133	-3,897***	21,949	1,222	6,181	5,283	-4,061***	164
% donations to Dem. by male part. in prac. area (\$)	26,478	.815	8,267	.164	.651***	21,579	.825	6,072	.163	.662***	-.011***
% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in prac. area (\$)	20,309	.843	4,526	.465	.378***	16,865	.848	3,522	.449	.399***	-.021**
Tenure with firm	26,780	3.637	8,352	3.784	-.147***	21,949	3.944	6,181	4.048	-.104**	-.043
Tenure is left-censored	26,780	.013	8,352	.012	.001	21,949	.022	6,181	.029	-.007**	.008**
Years since JD	26,780	7.953	8,352	7.934	.019	21,949	8.069	6,181	8.102	-.033	.052
Age	26,780	35.184	8,352	35.320	-.136***	21,949	34.845	6,181	35.085	-.24***	.104
Top 18 law school	26,780	.357	8,352	.237	.12***	21,949	.347	6,181	.224	.123***	-.003
Order of the Coif	26,780	.070	8,352	.087	-.017***	21,949	.066	6,181	.082	-.016***	-.001
Judicial clerkship	26,780	.109	8,352	.098	.011***	21,949	.096	6,181	.099	-.003	.014**
Law review	26,780	.131	8,352	.141	-.01**	21,949	.125	6,181	.136	-.011**	.001
Moot court	26,780	.046	8,352	.053	-.007**	21,949	.046	6,181	.068	-.022***	.015***
Phi Beta Kappa	26,780	.055	8,352	.049	.006	21,949	.067	6,181	.060	.007**	-.001
% partners in office from attorney's law school	26,780	.074	8,352	.100	-.026***	21,949	.076	6,181	.099	-.023***	-.003
Donations to Dem. by attorney (\$)	26,780	829	8,352	513	316***	21,949	697	6,181	301	396***	-80
Donations to Rep. by attorney (\$)	26,780	491	8,352	388	103	21,949	565	6,181	499	66	37
Exits firms (any destination)	26,780	.127	8,352	.118	.009*	21,949	.123	6,181	.119	.004	.005
% associates in office who are female	26,780	.421	8,352	.392	.029***	21,949	.435	6,181	.404	.031***	-.002
# partners in practice area	26,780	27.829	8,352	17.168	10.66***	21,949	26.560	6,181	15.570	10.99***	-.329
% partners in practice area who are female	26,780	.183	8,352	.153	.03***	21,949	.197	6,181	.180	.017***	.013***
Avg. age of partners in office	26,780	50.428	8,352	50.059	.369***	21,949	50.599	6,181	50.228	.371***	-.002
Firm size (# attorneys, 1000s)	26,780	.564	8,352	.558	.006	21,949	.568	6,181	.567	.001	.005
Profit per equity partner (\$1M)	26,780	1.176	8,352	.932	.244***	21,949	1.110	6,181	.919	.191***	.053***
% of female leadership among client personnel	26,780	.082	8,352	.078	.004***	21,949	.083	6,181	.079	.004***	0
Firm acquires another firm	26,780	.076	8,352	.099	-.023***	21,949	.076	6,181	.099	-.023***	0
Office is acquired	26,780	.008	8,352	.010	-.002**	21,949	.008	6,181	.009	-.001	-.001
San Francisco office	26,780	.049	8,352	.018	.031***	21,949	.065	6,181	.027	.038**	-.007
NYC office	26,780	.274	8,352	.067	.207***	21,949	.254	6,181	.084	.17**	.037***
Office located in southern U.S.	26,780	.113	8,352	.357	-.244***	21,949	.106	6,181	.339	-.233**	-.011
Attorney-year observations	26,780		8,352			21,949		6,181			

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; two-tailed tests.

* Liberal practice area: partners give two-thirds of donations to Democrats. Conservative practice area: partners give two-thirds of donations to Republicans. Sample consists of associates working for Am Law 200 firms with at least five years of experience. Regression models in tables 5 and 6 include additional associates in "centrist" (i.e., neither liberal nor conservative) practice areas.

practice areas are more likely to have earned Order of the Coif, served as law review editors, and served on moot court. Female associates in liberal practice areas are more likely to have graduated from top law schools and earned Phi Beta Kappa. It is likely that differences in graduation from top law schools are driven by geography, as highly ranked law schools tend to be located in larger liberal cities, and we see equivalent differences for male associates. The final column in table 4, which tabulates differences in differences for men and women across liberal and conservative practice areas, indicates few statistically significant comparisons. Correlations in table A5 in the Online Appendix are also informative, showing that women and men have similar signals of quality and that men are more likely to work in conservative practice areas, with fewer female partners, and in more-profitable firms.

Table 5 presents regression results for our promotion hypothesis (H2). Model 1 provides a linear probability model without control variables and includes only the interaction of *female associate* with *% donations to Democrats by partners in practice area (\$)* and office fixed effects. We see that gender inequality in promotion decreases when partners in the practice area are more liberal, supporting H2. Model 2 adds controls, and while the R-squared increases significantly, the point estimate of the interaction does not change much, giving us confidence that results are not sensitive to overfitting. Importantly, we also see predictable relationships with control variables and promotion. Associates with longer tenure, more experience, higher-ranked law degrees, Order of the Coif, law review editorial positions, and judicial clerkships are more likely to be promoted, suggesting that these variables are valuable markers of associates' and law students' quality.

Models 3–5 split the sample based on the political ideology of partners in the associate's practice area and provide the best opportunity for evaluating effect size. We see that gender inequality in promotion is about 73 percent higher (–.022 versus –.038) in conservative versus liberal practice areas—a practically large effect size that is almost identical to what we observed in the raw data in table 4. We display this result graphically in figure 2. Model 6 compares the liberalism of male partners with the liberalism of female partners, and we see results consistent with H3b: the liberalism of male partners is much more important than that of female partners in driving the results. A Wald test indicates that the slopes of these lines are different from each other at $p = .02$.

Figure 3 allows us to consider whether results are driven by female partners' tendency to support female subordinates regardless of ideology, perhaps due to homophily/exposure to gender discrimination, or due to female partners' inability to express their ideological preferences due to a lack of power or status in the firm. Figure 3 seems to lend more support to the power mechanism, because we see that male partners' ideology has a stronger effect on gender inequality on both the conservative and liberal ends of the ideological spectrum. Though both mechanisms might explain why male conservatives increase gender inequality more than female conservatives, the power mechanism seems to provide the simplest explanation for why male liberals reduce gender inequality more than female liberals. It is not immediately clear why male liberals would have stronger anti-inequality preferences than female liberals.

Table 5. OLS Estimates of Gender Inequality in Associate Promotion*

Variable	(1) Full sample	(2) Full sample	(3) Liberal practice area	(4) Centrist practice area	(5) Conservative practice area	(6) Full sample
Female*% donations to Dem. by part. in prac. area (\$)	.0226*** (.0058)	.0217*** (.0058)				
Female*% donations to Dem. by male part. in prac. area (\$)						.0237** (.0074)
Female*% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in prac. area (\$)						.0051 (.0058)
Female	-.0409*** (.0040)	-.0416*** (.0040)	-.0219*** (.0023)	-.0333*** (.0030)	-.0379*** (.0044)	-.0488*** (.0061)
% donations to Dem. by part. in prac. area (\$)	-.0133* (.0054)	-.0102 (.0054)				
% donations to Dem. by male part. in prac. area (\$)						-.0203** (.0075)
% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in prac. area (\$)						-.0043 (.0057)
Tenure with firm		.0102*** (.0006)	.0093*** (.0008)	.0105*** (.0009)	.0142*** (.0013)	.0105*** (.0007)
Tenure is left-censored		-.0583*** (.0095)	-.0703*** (.0128)	-.0454** (.0167)	-.0821** (.0264)	-.0562*** (.0114)
Years since JD		.0056*** (.0005)	.0052*** (.0005)	.0062*** (.0009)	.0077*** (.0012)	.0058*** (.0006)
Age		-.0019*** (.0003)	-.0020*** (.0003)	-.0021*** (.0005)	-.0010 (.0008)	-.0020*** (.0003)
% partners in office from attorney's law school		.0115 (.0084)	.0200 (.0114)	.0150 (.0173)	.0009 (.0183)	.0081 (.0101)
Top 18 law school		.0045** (.0016)	.0014 (.0020)	.0089** (.0032)	.0107* (.0051)	.0048* (.0019)
Order of the Coif		.0121*** (.0033)	.0126** (.0047)	.0162** (.0062)	.0095 (.0081)	.0158*** (.0040)
Judicial clerkship		.0068* (.0029)	.0048 (.0040)	.0057 (.0053)	.0187* (.0073)	.0044 (.0035)
Law review		.0080** (.0025)	.0057 (.0033)	.0109* (.0051)	.0111 (.0064)	.0087** (.0030)
Moot court		.0058 (.0040)	.0007 (.0052)	.0111 (.0077)	.0066 (.0105)	.0060 (.0049)
Phi Beta Kappa		.0015 (.0033)	.0045 (.0041)	.0024 (.0070)	-.0126 (.0098)	.0014 (.0039)
Donations to Dem. by attorney (log\$)		.0002 (.0003)	.0003 (.0004)	.0008 (.0007)	-.0011 (.0010)	.0003 (.0004)
Donations to Rep. by attorney (log\$)		.0008 (.0004)	.0002 (.0006)	.0005 (.0008)	.0038** (.0012)	.0010 (.0005)
% associates in office who are female		-.0068 (.0097)	-.0025 (.0127)	.0086 (.0206)	-.0314 (.0200)	-.0136 (.0141)
# partners in practice area		.0001 (.0001)	.0001 (.0001)	-.0001 (.0002)	-.0002 (.0003)	.0000 (.0001)
% partners in practice area who are female		-.0081 (.0074)	-.0015 (.0096)	-.0204 (.0222)	-.0334 (.0225)	.0022 (.0140)
Avg. age of partners in office		.0092*** (.0011)	.0102*** (.0013)	.0093*** (.0023)	.0115*** (.0026)	.0126*** (.0017)
Firm size (# attorneys, 1000s)		.0090 (.0217)	.0325 (.0237)	.0061 (.0473)	-.0187 (.0452)	.0168 (.0259)
Profit per equity partner (\$1M)		.0029 (.0113)	-.0007 (.0110)	-.0146 (.0263)	.0352* (.0171)	.0002 (.0147)


(continued)

Table 5. (continued)

Variable	(1) Full sample	(2) Full sample	(3) Liberal practice area	(4) Centrist practice area	(5) Conservative practice area	(6) Full sample
% of female leadership among client personnel		.0035 (.0198)	.0017 (.0238)	-.0154 (.0390)	.0282 (.0581)	-.0143 (.0242)
Firm acquires another firm		-.0072 (.0038)	-.0072 (.0048)	-.0044 (.0069)	-.0122 (.0087)	-.0060 (.0045)
Office is acquired		-.0390* (.0152)	-.0245*** (.0061)	-.0667 (.0360)	-.0450 (.0390)	-.0622** (.0233)
25 legal specialty dummies / Year dummies	No / No	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes
N attorney-year observations	90,107	90,107	48,729	26,845	14,533	65,429
Log likelihood	9055.1	10051.9	8594.5	1852.1	924.2	6150.6
Mean of DV / R ² within	.053 / .00	.053 / .03	.047 / .02	.060 / .03	.063 / .04	.056 / .03

• $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; two-tailed tests.

* DV: Associate attorney is promoted to partner in $t + 1$. Level of analysis is associate-year. Sample consists of all associates working for Am Law 200 firms who have been out of law school more than five years. Office fixed effects are included in all models. Robust standard errors clustered on offices are in parentheses.


Figure 2. Gender inequality in promotion across liberal, centrist, and conservative practice areas.*

* Results are from models 3–5 in table 5. 95% CI.

Additional Analyses to Examine Mechanisms

Mechanisms that influence the effect of female managers' ideology. To probe more deeply into the power versus homophily/exposure to gender discrimination explanations for H3, we also examined whether the influence of

Figure 3. Gender inequality in promotion comparing liberalism of male and female partners.*



* Results are from model 6 of table 5.

female partners’ ideology increases with the density of female partners in an office or practice area, under the assumption that female partners’ power will increase as their representation relative to men grows, and with the liberalism of male partners, under the assumption that liberal male partners may be more comfortable sharing power with their female colleagues.⁴ Each of these moderators should at least partially capture the power or status afforded to female partners. Unfortunately, we lack data that might allow us to obtain variation on the homophily/exposure to gender discrimination mechanism, such as female partners’ prior exposure to gender discrimination.

Table 6 contains results for hiring and promotion (client team selection results are similar). For simplicity of presentation, we provide split-sample analyses, splitting offices and practice areas at the sample median of *% partners who are female*, a proxy for the power of women in an office or practice area (median = .18), and *% donations to Democrats by male partners*, our measure of partners’ liberalism (median = .68). Results using three-way interactions are similar, as are results that split the sample at other relevant values. Comparing the effect of *% donations to Democrats by female partners in office (\$)* (hiring) and *female*% donations to Democrats by female partners in practice area (\$)* (promotion) across these different subsamples, we do not see significant differences.

These noisy results caution against an overinterpretation of the patterns in figure 3, suggesting that differences in female partners’ power and status may not be the drivers of H3a–H3c. But the noisy results may be driven by data limitations, because female managers are relatively scarce in our setting, and only a handful of offices/practice areas in our sample have a majority (> 50 percent) of female partners. Future work should examine settings with more-equal

⁴ We thank an anonymous reviewer for recommending these analyses.

distributions of power among male and female managers; we discuss this more below.

Sorting by higher-quality female associates. As discussed previously, our theorizing allows for the possibility that female job applicants and subordinates may prefer to work with liberal managers. If true, it is possible that the highest-quality female job applicants and female subordinates will work with liberal managers. Though our comparison of associates' quality signals across liberal and conservative practice areas (table 4) provides some evidence against this type of sorting, our data allow us to take this analysis a step further. We first conducted a law student–law office matching analysis to examine whether female job candidates with stronger observable signals of quality are more likely to join liberal law offices. Then we examined whether female associates receive higher returns to quality in promotion. Details of these analyses, along with results, are provided in Online Appendix B. To briefly summarize, we do not see evidence that higher-quality female law students are more likely to match with liberal offices, nor do we see that female associates' quality signals vary in their ability to predict promotion based on the liberalism of the associates' managers. Though not definitive, these results, combined with the lack of evidence of sorting in table 4, suggest sorting is unlikely to be the primary driver of our results. We discuss sorting in more detail in the Discussion section.

Robustness Tests

We performed numerous additional analyses to ensure the robustness of our results. First, we used a different measure of political ideology, Bonica's (2014) CFScore (campaign finance score), which we label *Bonica's conservatism score*. Using political donation patterns, Bonica's CFScore places an individual's ideology on a scale of -2 (highly liberal) to $+2$ (highly conservative), without using party affiliation. Bonica (2014) provided the details behind this measure, which has been increasingly adopted in political science. The intuition behind it is that individuals who donate to similar politicians have similar ideologies. The results are reported in Online Appendix C. We used Bonica's measure in model 1 of tables C1 and C2 and found consistent results.

Second, it is plausible that partners who are ethnic minorities may be more likely to support Democrats and more likely to support female associates. To test this possibility, we used the attorney's name to estimate his or her ethnicity using Origins Info (<https://www.originsinfo.eu/>; Belenzon, Chatterji, and Daley, 2014). These data assign an individual to one of several dozen ethnic categories using first and last name. In Online Appendix table C1, model 2, and table C2, model 4, we excluded partners flagged as likely to be American Black, African, Middle Eastern, Indian, East Asian, or Hispanic. Results are consistent.

Third, we ensured that results are not driven by geography by dropping the more-conservative southern offices and the more-liberal New York City offices from the analyses, and results are unchanged; see Online Appendix tables C1 and C2, models 5–6.

Table 6. Probing Mechanisms: When Does Female Partner Ideology Matter?*

Variable	DV: % female students hired in $t + 1$				DV: Promoted to partner, $t + 1$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
			% donations to Dem. by male partners	% donations to Dem. by male partners			% donations to Dem. by male partners	% donations to Dem. by male partners
	% female partners below median	% female partners above median	above median	below median	% female partners below median	% female partners above median	above median	below median
% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in office (\$)	.0162 (.0511)	-.0499 (.0542)	-.0138 (.0567)	-.0050 (.0453)				
% donations to Dem. by male part. in office (\$)	.0843	.1469* (.0645)	.3327* (.0706)	-.0243 (.1403)	(.1032)			
Female*% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in prac. area (\$)				.0105	-.0022 (.0084)	-.0021 (.0085)	.0116 (.0086)	(.0078)
Female*% donations to Dem. by male part. in prac. area (\$)					.0249* (.0111)	.0216* (.0099)	.0278 (.0241)	.0145 (.0143)
Female associate					-.0544*** (.0088)	-.0416*** (.0094)	-.0457* (.0215)	-.0511*** (.0081)
% donations to Dem. by male part. in prac. area (\$)					-.0288* (.0127)	-.0165 (.0095)	-.0074 (.0252)	-.0241 (.0164)
% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in prac. area (\$)					.0037 (.0087)	-.0105 (.0088)	.0067 (.0090)	-.0095 (.0086)
Other controls in table 2?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
25 legal specialty dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N observations	1,575	1,185	1,423	1,337	32,694	32,735	33,554	31,875
Log likelihood	-1314.3	-849.9	-1123.8	-1045.6	2989.7	3570.9	5355.3	1389.7
Mean of DV	.480	.458	.484	.456	.057	.055	.049	.063

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; two-tailed tests.

* Split sample analyses. Models 1–4 are tobit estimates and include state fixed effects. Models 5–8 are OLS estimates and include office fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on offices are in parentheses. % female partners and % donations to Dem. by male part. are measured at the office level in models 1–4 and the practice area level in models 5–8. Sample median for % female partners is .18; sample median for % donations to Dem. by male part. is .68. See table B3 in the Online Appendix for all control variables contained in these analyses.

Turning to hiring-specific robustness checks, though a fixed effects estimator is not available for the tobit model (Greene, 2007), we used an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator to compute a model with office fixed effects in table C1, model 3. Results remain consistent. We also included lateral hires in table C1, model 4, with similar results.

For promotion-specific robustness tests, Online Appendix table C2, model 3 uses a conditional logit instead of a linear probability model and shows similar results. In table C2, model 2, we calculated the change in % donations to Democrats by partners in practice area (\$) from the year that the associate joined the firm to the current year, to further address the concern that career-minded female associates may systematically select into more-liberal practice areas, and we see similar results. Finally, model 7 in table C2 uses turnover as a dependent variable (e.g., McGinn and Milkman, 2012). Consistent with expectation, we see

that gender inequality in turnover is lower when partners in the practice area are more liberal. We cannot cleanly distinguish voluntary and involuntary turnover, but this result further suggests that liberal practice areas may be more conducive to the attachment and advancement of female associates.

DISCUSSION

We develop theory that explains why and how managers' liberalism may reduce gender differences among subordinates in terms of hiring, work team selection, and promotion. We further theorize that male managers' liberalism will have a stronger effect on these outcomes than female managers' liberalism. We test this theory using a unique dataset of attorneys working for large U.S. law firms. Results suggest that the percentage of women among newly hired law students is 19 percent higher in liberal versus conservative law offices. Further, findings indicate that liberal law partners are more likely to select female associates for their client teams and that male associates' advantage over female associates in promotion rates decreases by about 74 percent in liberal practice areas as compared with conservative practice areas. Finally, we find that liberalism is more important for male partners, as compared with female partners, in driving these effects. There is limited evidence that these effects are driven by sorting on the part of higher-quality female associates.

This study contributes to the organizational literatures concerned with gender inequality and political ideology. Our examination of political ideology not only suggests that managers' attitudes and beliefs matter for gender inequality but also significantly expands current theory that links managerial characteristics to gender inequality among subordinates, as most models rely on simple comparisons across male and female managers. We demonstrate the importance of theory and data that examine variation within ascriptive categories of managers (Reskin, 2000). Prior work has mostly treated male managers as a uniform group, but we find that male managers vary widely in their influence on inequality among subordinates. This contribution allows us to shed light on a critical puzzle in the inequality literature. Though prior work has shown that female managers often reduce gender inequality among their subordinates, "it remains unclear how women initially attain managerial positions" (Cohen, Broschak, and Haveman, 1998: 723). Our results suggest that liberal male managers may help women attain such positions.

This paper also makes important contributions to research examining managers' political ideology. Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño's (2013) and Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick's (2016) findings that firms with liberal CEOs and liberal employees, respectively, are more likely to engage in socially responsible business practices are most closely related to this paper. Gender diversity in the workplace is a component of the KLD index that Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño (2013) used, and Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick (2016) used the presence of women in top management as one of three proxies for corporate social responsibility. Our study builds on their work in several ways. Whereas these researchers viewed gender inequality in the workplace through the lens of corporate social responsibility, our theorizing articulates the micro-level gender-related processes that may cause managers with differing political ideologies to vary in the way that they evaluate men and women in the workplace. Gupta and Wowak (2017) and Chin and Semadeni (2016) took similar approaches

when they described how board members' ideology influences the compensation of CEOs and how CEOs' ideology influences pay dispersion among other senior managers, respectively. Our data allow us to step inside the organization and explicitly examine how a manager's ideology shapes his or her dyadic interactions with male and female subordinates. In addition, we find that liberalism matters more for male managers than for female managers in shaping subordinates' gender inequality. This logic and result describe how individual demographic characteristics place important boundary conditions on the influence of managers' ideology.

Limitations

There are important limitations and alternate explanations for our findings. The first alternate explanation is political homophily. To the degree that women are more likely to be liberal, a plausible explanation for our results is that partners are rewarding associates who share their political views. We control for the political ideology of associates in our estimations, but this measure is imperfect because associates, being younger and less wealthy, have lower rates of political donations. The second is that female associates may prefer to work with more-liberal partners. Though our data contain strong observable measures of associates' quality, and we do not find much evidence that higher-quality female associates sort disproportionately into work relationships with more-liberal partners, we must emphasize that associates and partners are not matched randomly. Thus our promotion results might be affected by differences across associates that are weakly correlated with our control variables but strongly correlated with promotion chances. One such variable might be career ambition. We also lack data on job offers and job applicants, which would be the most persuasive way to address associates' preferences in our hiring analyses (Fernandez-Mateo and King, 2011). The third explanation involves resource dependence. If an attorney has more female clients, he or she may have incentives both to support liberal causes and to value greater gender diversity (see Beckman and Phillips, 2005). We account for this possibility in a relatively rich way, controlling for the female leadership of the firm's clients. Better data would allow us to control for female client personnel at the partner level, but these data are not currently available.

Our reliance on political donations to measure ideology creates an important limitation that affects many studies but might be particularly relevant for this paper because donations to Democrats may be a noisy indicator of ideology for the female attorneys in our sample. Democratic politicians tend to support issues that are particularly salient to women, such as reproductive health, so some women might donate to Democrats despite holding conservative views on other issues. If true, this limitation might increase the odds that we find support for H3a–H3c, as donations will be a noisier indicator of ideology for women than men.

Finally, it is worth noting the unique nature of our empirical context. Individual performance in professional services like law firms tends to be highly subjective, leaving substantial room for managerial discretion (and thus managerial ideology) to drive the allocation of job rewards. Our context also does not contain many female managers, which creates important limits to our ability to further explore why male managers' liberalism seems to matter more than female managers' in determining gender inequality among subordinates.

Opportunities for Future Work

This study highlights numerous exciting questions for future research. We also refer readers to a complementary study by Briscoe and Joshi (2016), who examined how law partners' political beliefs influence the cash bonuses received by their associates in a U.S. law firm. Does the relationship between managers' ideology and subordinates' gender inequality hold only in a setting like law, in which employees' quality and performance are subjective?

Research that has objective employee performance data, such as automobile or pharmaceutical sales, would make an important contribution. Furthermore, digitally mediated settings with detailed employee efficiency data are growing in importance, and firms increasingly have more information about job applicants due to applicants' digital footprint. Do these sources of information soften the influence of managers' ideology on subordinates' gender inequality? With regard to research design, we stress the need for research in settings in which the match between subordinates and managers is plausibly exogenous and/or in which researchers have access to data on job offers as opposed to only realized job matches.

Numerous questions remain about the interaction between managers' gender and their ideology. Why does a male manager's ideology seem to matter more than a female manager's? Do female managers have less power to assert their preferences? Under what conditions does female managers' ideology influence gender inequality among subordinates? Future work in settings with more parity between male and female managers can make significant progress.

While we examined gender inequality in hiring and promotion, future work can examine how managers' political ideology influences other gender-related processes in organizations. A promising avenue might combine the insights of Duguid (2011), Duguid, Loyd, and Tolbert (2012), and Srivastava and Sherman (2015) with the theory we develop in this paper. Those authors describe how female managers may feel pressure to withhold support from female subordinates. Do these effects vary with female managers' ideologies? Does the ideology of male managers influence the level of support that female managers feel comfortable providing to female subordinates?

We focused on managers' gender, but future work can examine other factors that might attenuate or exacerbate the relationship between managers' ideology and subordinate inequality. Other managerial characteristics such as age, functional background, and authority may be important. It is particularly appealing to examine the moderating effect of external shocks, such as the onset of a recession or a surprising election result, as these events might change the motivation and/or ability that managers have to allow their political beliefs to influence their personnel decisions. Researchers could also examine whether organizational policies, particularly those aimed at reducing gender inequality, are more or less effective depending on the managers' ideology.

There is a clear need for more work that examines how political ideology influences personnel issues in organizations. In particular, researchers have little understanding of the extent to which employees consider a firm's or a manager's ideology when making job choices. How much do employees and job seekers know about the ideologies of their managers, subordinates, and coworkers? How does this awareness develop (e.g., via social media or

personal interaction)? Do employees sort into firms or into manager relationships that share their ideology? Is an employee less likely to quit if the firm's ideology is congruent with his or her own? Will an employee take lower wages to work in a firm that shares his or her ideology? Does overlap with the ideology of one's manager and/or coworkers influence job satisfaction, and how do managers deal with ideological conflict in the workplace? These are critical questions that we hope future work will pursue. Examining them when elections are salient and when elections are not salient might be a useful empirical approach.

Finally, there is a valuable opportunity for future work that examines whether ideologically driven personnel decisions affect firms' performance. Theory and evidence suggest that organizations often "pay" for their ascriptive preferences (e.g., Becker, 2010; Siegel, Pyun, and Cheon, 2014). Future work could examine whether conservative and liberal managers accept lower performance in exchange for higher and lower rates of gender inequality among subordinates.

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