Beyond Particularity and Universality: Moishe Postone and the Possibilities of Jewish Marxism

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Abstract

Marx notoriously claimed that Judaism was particularistic and must be sacrificed in the process of universal human emancipation. In the past few decades, some Marxists have responded to Marx's alleged antisemitism and attempted to rethink his work in relation to Jewish identity by supplementing his theory with poststructuralist critiques of universality. However, such methods risk ontologizing both Jewish identity and universal emancipation, being blind to how their conditions change historically. Moishe Postone's rereading of Marx's work enables us to avoid the political pitfalls associated with both the violent teleology of the universal and the radical indeterminacy of the particular by historicizing them in relation to capitalism. This article brings Postone's work into dialogue with other Marxists and argues that he presents a Jewish, nonteleogical reading of Marx's theory of history, which is especially relevant for us today.

Key words: Marxism, Jewish identity, antisemitism, capitalism

Since its publication in 1844, Karl Marx's "On the Jewish Question" has haunted Marxism. Scholars have generally treated the text in one of two ways. At one extreme are those who claim that when Marx associates the Jews with money, he expresses an antisemitism that continues with him throughout his life and even reveals the

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source of his hatred of the bourgeoisie.[1] David Nirenberg presents a much more careful rendition of this point. Marx's writing, he notes, "certainly raised critical consciousness about important subjects like class and labor, but it only tended to reinforce basic conceptions about the role of Judaism in the world—for example, its alignment with money and alienation—and to confirm the sense that in a better world that role would disappear."[2] Nirenberg thus separates anti-Judaism from antisemitism. Anti-Judaism represents not just an attack on a group of people but a way of critically engaging the world, which associates Judaism with turning money into a god. From this perspective, anyone can become Jewish, an outcome that must be stopped. At the other extreme are Marxists who ignore the anti-Jewish tropes of the essay and focus on Marx's critique of civil society and the state. Paul Thomas's classic *Karl Marx and the Anarchists* (1990), Mark Neocleous's *Administering Civil Society: Towards a Theory of State Power* (1996), and Wendy Brown's *Politics Out of History* (2001) represent this approach, carefully outlining the arguments Marx makes about political and economic alienation in capitalist life with little attention to the so-called Jewish Question itself.[3]

The above antinomy shows the split between non-Marxists who use Marx's comments about Jews to discredit his theory and those who believe that Marx's remarks about Judaism are merely accidental and that Marxist theory itself can gain little from interrogating issues of anti-Judaism. There are of course some Marxists and critical theorists who have attempted to think about Marx's anti-Judaism/antisemitism and his theory together. Drawing on the Jewish philosopher Emil Fackenheim, Bill Martin argues that Marxism expressed a structural antisemitism because it stressed progress and totality, both of which were universals that suppressed the particular.[4] For Martin, combining Marxism with Judaism opens a way to go beyond Hegel and develop a critical theory sensitive to particularity and difference—a type of deconstructive Jewish Marxism as opposed to a Christian Marxism.

Martin's work, which is indebted to Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida, does not pose the question of what historical conditions made Marx's remarks about Judaism possible. More recently, Patchen Markell has brilliantly addressed the problem of history by examining the notion of recognition embedded in "On the Jewish Question" and claiming that Jews were subjected to violence precisely as they were being incorporated into the state.[5] Markell does not historicize in terms of capitalism but focuses on how the German nation-state forced Judaism into the mold of citizenship and consequently made Jews appear at once too particular and too universal/cosmopolitan.

Martin and Markell have opened our eyes to ways of rethinking critical theory in relation to antisemitism. They each point to structural violence against Jews or Judaism—violence produced by social, political, and epistemological frameworks—that usually goes unnoticed. Markell goes further in identifying some of the historical conditions for this violence by examining issues associated with the nation-state. The nation-state often involves a vision of progress, which connects to Martin's critique of how antisemitism is legitimated by the "march of history." Markell and Martin each grasp part of what could be a larger problem that affects not Jews alone but political life itself. Markell highlights the problem of recognition at the heart of modern politics and the nation-state, whereas Martin underscores the larger discourses of totality that legitimate the negation of particularity. In short, Markell criticizes the manner in which specific identities are affirmed by the nation-state and also by various theories, whereas Martin suggests that universal visions of history sacrifice the particularity of the Jews. Markel's argument is subtle, since he shows precisely how, when the nation-state recognizes the rights of Jews, it also redefines and limits them. However, neither of them explains the historical specificity of the problem of totality and the opposition between abstract universality and concrete particularity or how these oppositions would impinge on Jews and the project of socialism. In other words, what made possible, historically and theoretically, a world in which universal and particular were opposed in such a way that the Jews were both seen as too particular to join the nation-state and associated with money, which could undermine all forms of community? A related question concerns how the world must be transformed to avoid repeating violence against the particular.

Throughout his academic life, Moishe Postone worked to answer the above questions by rereading Marx's later work and especially *Das Kapital*. He asked how the analysis of anti-Judaism/antisemitism might change if we began with an analysis of capital. From Postone's perspective, Marxists had not been able to make sense of the problem of antisemitism not because they followed Marx too closely but rather because they had an incomplete understanding of Marx—and in this sense were insufficiently *Marx*ist.[6] Postone grounded the opposition between particularity and universality in a contradictory dynamic of capitalism. After grounding anti-Judaism/antisemitism in capitalism, he gestured toward the possibility of a new type of universality that is not opposed to the particular.

I contend that Postone critically continues Martin's attempt to create a Jewish Marxism as opposed to a Christian Marxism to the extent

that he argues that Marx saw socialism as a critique of totality and the logic of history ("History," in Postone's terminology), rather than an affirmation of it. Postone's framework reveals the historical conditions that make Martin's critique of totality possible and also points toward a world beyond capitalist totality. Moreover, his work suggests that there are resources in Judaism that, when properly combined with an understanding of capital, could illuminate precisely such a future. Postone and Martin agree that Jewish practices contain elements that cannot be completely subsumed within capitalism and embody a promise beyond—a messianic moment.[7] However, this promise will remain only a promise without a proper understanding of how a different future is possible. Postone's response to Markell would be slightly more complex, since it involves the problem of how nation-states recognize minorities. The basic thrust of Postone's response to Markel would be similar to his answer to Martin, namely, that one must understand the relationship between the nation-state and capital in order to fully grasp and overcome the problems of Marx's "On the Jewish Question." In short, we must comprehend the possibilities related to the reconstitution of Jewish identity in capitalist society.

In what follows, I begin by outlining Martin's and Markell's respective critiques of Marx and Marxism's treatment of the Jews. I then briefly invoke Isaac Deutscher's classic essay "The Non-Jewish Jew" before turning to Postone's analysis of antisemitism and his general theory, which I contend is a Jewish Marxism in Martin's sense.[8] The parts of the article do not follow chronologically upon one another.[9] Rather, the article is organized conceptually in a way that moves from large philosophical treatments of antisemitism in Marxism to attempts to construct a Marxism capable of responding to antisemitism and anti-Judaism while continuing the project of general human emancipation. Martin outlines a philosophical critique of totality in relation to Marx. Markell uncovers part of the historical conditions for this antisemitism. Deutscher takes us a step further by rethinking antisemitism in relation to the nation-state and capital. However, he reproduces the problem of totality and teleology that Martin clearly highlights. Postone provides a way to complete the project by offering a framework to explain antisemitism and totality in relation to capitalism and its possible overcoming. Given the totalizing nature of Postone's project, if my argument and Postone's position are in general persuasive, we should look at Martin's, Markell's, and Deutscher's respective positions differently by the end of the article. Each of them grasps part of the problem of antisemitism, which should be historicized in relation to capitalism. However, Postone's project is far from

complete, and part of continuing his project would involve understanding the nation-state in relation to capital. In the conclusion, I make some brief remarks about how one might address this problem.

Bill Martin and the Problem of Jewish Marxism

Marxists who first hear the proposition of adding the adjective *Jewish* to Marxism might be a bit alarmed. How can we add an adjective resembling an opiate to Marxism? However, Bill Martin uses the adjective *Jewish* to attack the teleology embedded in much of Marxism by drawing on theorists such as Emil Fackenheim and Jacques Derrida. From this perspective, *Jewish* becomes closely connected to poststructuralism. Martin opposes the Jew to Hegelian teleology, where the Jews are sacrificed in the name of progress.

Although Hegel was by no means antisemitic, there are passages in early works like *The Phenomenology of Spirit* in which he clearly expresses his belief that Judaism must be sublated by Christianity.

> As it can be said of the Jewish people that precisely because they immediately stand before the gates of salvation, they are both supposed to be and actually have been the most corrupted of all peoples. What this people should be in and for themselves, this being-themselves, is what in their own eyes they are not; instead, they shift it off into an other-worldly beyond of themselves. Through this self-relinquishing, they make a higher existence *possible* for themselves which they could achieve if only they could again take their object back into themselves rather than if they had remained within the immediacy of being. This is so because spirit is all the greater, the greater the opposition out of which it returns into itself.[10]

Here the question is not of any direct antisemitism but of a more general problem connected to Hegel's critique of non-Western or non-Christian cultures, namely, that they posit an immediately present absolute beyond this world—an "other-worldly beyond of themselves"—that undermines their ability to attain subjectivity. They must take this object back into themselves to make subjectivity possible. The ideal for such subjectivity is of course Christianity, where the mediation of Christ implies a necessary negative that lifts Judaism to a higher level. We do not need to get into the details of Hegel's analysis but should note how statements like the above could be read to support Martin's point that the Jews appear in Hegel as a type of problem, something that haunts his philosophy.

More than Hegel, young Hegelians like Bruno Bauer express this negation of the Jews as particular, the chosen people standing before the absolute. Bauer expresses this antisemitism in an essay entitled "The Jewish Question," to which Marx famously responded. Marx paraphrases from Bauer's essay:

> You Jews are *egoists* if you demand for yourselves, as Jews, a special emancipation. You should work, as Germans, for the political emancipation of Germany, as men, for the emancipation of mankind. . . . [The Jew] considers it his right to separate himself from the rest of humanity; as a matter of principle he takes no part in the historical movement and looks to a future which has nothing in common with the future of mankind as a whole.[11]

For Bauer, the Jews represent a particularity that must be overcome by the nation-state. He separates being Jewish, which is particular, from being a German citizen, which embodies a universal historical movement that ends in human emancipation. The mention of "the historical movement" of course echoes Hegel's position, where the Jews could be seen as standing in the way of the cold progressive movement of history and science because they hold onto their own identity recalcitrantly. Bauer (in Marx's paraphrase) further explains:

> The most stubborn form of the opposition between Jew and Christian is the *religious* opposition. How is an opposition resolved? By making it impossible. By abolishing *religion*. As soon as Jew and Christian come to see in their respective religions nothing more than *stages in the development of the human mind*—snake skins which have been cast off by *history*, and *man* as the snake who clothed himself in them—they will no longer find themselves in religious opposition, but in a purely critical *scientific* and human relationship. *Science* will then constitute their unity. But scientific oppositions are resolved by science itself.[12]

Bauer and the young Hegelians believe that as society progresses, Jews and Christians must overcome their religious particularity and embrace the universal. The above passage appears to attack both Christians and Jews, but as the previous passage suggests, Jews are more trapped in their particularity. Martin calls this systematic effacing of Jewish particularity before the march of history "structural anti-Semitism," which he finds in Hegel and Marx.

> If there is a structural anti-Semitism in Marx, an anti-Semitism that goes beneath the surface of one person's cultural vocabulary and that is indeed

> far more significant and dangerous, then we need to ask what in Marx(ism) allows for this. . . . Apart from specifying certain historical conditions, it is important to also lay bare the conceptual conditions. The key, I take it, is in understanding what becomes of historical totalization when it becomes a fully material(ist), practical project. The tendency of totalizations to repress their gaps, their essentially aporiatic structure, then becomes violent—and self-righteously so. No more Jews, no more Jewish problem.[13]

Notice this structural tendency goes deeper than merely cultural vocabulary. To get at this deeper structure, Martin separates historical conditions from conceptual conditions and contends that Marx's structural antisemitism lies in the latter. In Martin's view, the materialist conception of history implies progress since it presupposes a view of history in which religion, the opiate of the masses, is cast off like snake skins. Such a materialist conception turns into a universal that negates any particular religion from the standpoint of science but not surprisingly singles out non-Christian religions for special scrutiny.

We will return to the separation of conceptual and historical conditions when we come to Postone's work, but here we should note that Martin's argument presupposes a Kantianism present in much postmodern thinking. Both argue against totalization. Recall that for Kant no totalization could be complete because the *Ding an sich*, or thing-in-itself, would always remain. Our conceptual frameworks and categories only grasp phenomena and leave unknown what things are in themselves. But in more recent discourse, often influenced by postmodernism, this space between the thing-in-itself and conceptual totalization could refer to groups that resist the idea of a totalizing dynamic of progress and thus must be forcefully made to comply. The Jews represent precisely such a gap that could not be completely subsumed by historical totalization. Moreover, precisely because the Jews cannot be subsumed by historical totalization, they become a type of *pharmakon*: they are at once a problem for totality but also a beacon lighting the way to a new type of Marxism and messianism. With respect to the former, Martin further elaborates on the problem: "The point that I am pursuing here is that the cunning of history, in its attempt to overcome its fundamental gaps in a single movement of totalization, seems to come around, sooner or later, to violent forms of anti-Semitism."[14] With this phrase, Martin connects antisemitism with the cunning of history, which represents the unseen effects of totalization. He draws on the earlier attempt to connect Enlightenment narratives with antisemitism that we find in Adorno and Horkheimer's work.[15] Martin associates this type of totalizing narrative with Christianity

and consequently posits a Jewish Marxism against erstwhile Christian Marxism: "Can historical materialism function, theoretically and practically, without totalization, as an open-ended project? Another way of putting this is to ask whether Marxism can be reconceived along the lines of Jewish, rather than Christian, messianism."[16]

In the Jewish vision, the arrival of the Messiah is not the realization of history but a radical rupture with it. Another important point for understanding Martin's argument is that in the Jewish tradition, any messiah that comes is a false messiah, which is what allows for open-endedness.[17] Martin does not discuss Jewish messianism in detail, but I will address it here, since we will return to this theme in our discussion of Postone. Gershom Scholem's discussion of the topic is helpful. He writes,

> It is precisely the lack of transition between history and redemption which is always stressed by the prophets and the apocalyptists. The Bible and the apocalyptic writers know of no progress in history leading to the redemption. The redemption is not the production of developments such as we find it in modern Western reinterpretations of Messianism since the Enlightenment where, secularized as the belief in progress, Messianism still displayed unbroken and immense vigor.[18]

This Jewish perspective on messianism denotes a rupture in history. Scholem suggests that Jewish messianism might serve to resist Enlightenment developmentalism, which represents precisely the materialist closure that Martin criticizes.

Martin incorporates aspects of the above messianic perspective into his reading of Marx, but his analysis is primarily influenced by Derrida, who develops a similar interpretation of Marx in *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning, and the New International* (1994).[19] Postone's critique of Derrida highlights the relationship between history, ontology, and Hegel in such readings of Marx. He points out that the opposition between Jew and Christian is central to Derrida's text.

> Derrida's notion of the abstract messianic is the first indication in this work that, like his critique of logocentrism from the standpoint of the primacy of writing, one strand of the critical position he is developing is a critique of basic aspects of Christian Western thought from the secularized standpoint of its most fundamental other—the Jews.[20]

The opposition here of Jews to Christians lies at the heart of Martin's conception of Jewish Marxism. Christianity is connected

to logocentrism, and the fundamental other, namely, the Jews, can serve to disrupt this other. In short, Martin and Derrida respectively argue that if Marxists cannot shake off their logocentrism, they will constantly risk reproducing antisemitism. However, Postone contends that Derrida ontologizes the opposition between Jew and Christian and is incapable of historicizing these identities in relation to capitalism. He asserts that in the end, Derrida is too wedded to a Hegelian reading of Marx and therefore needs to rely on an outside ontological source.

> Derrida . . . assimilates Marx to Hegel and assumes that any notion of a directional historical dynamic must be linear, teleological and affirmative—hence, ultimately presentist. Consequently, Derrida opposes history as the linear stringing together of units of abstract homogenous time to eventness—an opposition that reproduces the classical antinomy of necessity and freedom.[21]

Postone contends that for all of deconstruction's claims of novelty, Derrida repeats a classical antinomy between linear teleology and a rupture. Linear teleological history represents necessity, and the rupture of the event stands for freedom. We can already see how a nonteleological reading of Marx could avoid the opposition that Derrida and Martin create, because in this case Marx would not be logocentric. In such a reading, there would be no definite goal to history/capitalism.

However, Martin faces another problem. His project is not that of Postone, which is to read Marx to bring out a nonteleological theory. As Postone remarks above, Derrida accepts the linear and teleological reading of Marx and then finds ways to supplement Marxism with alterity, otherness, and other terms that would disrupt totalization. Martin is more wedded to Marx than is Derrida, and consequently he must fuse the moment of rupture and alterity to a Marxism that is linear and teleological, thereby creating a nonlinear Marxism, that is, a Jewish Marxism. Martin does not reject totalization altogether and realizes that socialist messianism still involves a critique of the capitalist present and gestures toward the future. At this point, he gestures back toward Hegel but a Jewish Hegel. Martin quotes from Fackenheim, who had earlier attempted to construct a Jewish Hegelianism.

> First, like Hegel's philosophical comprehension and unlike much religious self-understanding—the Jewish religious self-understanding is itself historical: Jewish religious existence is *between* Creation (or Fall

> or Exodus) and the Messianic future. Second—again like Hegel's philosophical comprehension—this religious self-understanding is *world*-historical: the beginning and end of history are universal, and Jewish existence between these extremes is that of a *witness* in which the abstractions "particular" and "universal" are concretely intertwined. Third—and this is decisive—unless Jewish religious experience is to be not only in history but also somehow *of* it, it must sooner or later, and certainly in the modern world, relate itself not only to non-Jewish world history but also to non-Jewish ways of understanding it. But once it makes this attempt from its *own* point of view it comes face to face with the Hegelian mediation of *all* points of view from a world-historical point of view. Hegel's comprehension of world history therefore confronts the Jewish religious self-understanding with a radical challenge, and this does not vanish if Hegel's own point of view should prove to be less world-historical than he imagines.[22]

Unlike Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin and others, who claim that the Jews will always be resistant to (Christian) history,[23] Fackenheim suggests that by combining Hegel and Judaism we can create a new messianism, which Martin believes could be relevant for Marxism. This messianism is of a future that is not contained in the present or the past but implies an openness to something new.

The problem of alterity and the future emerge as Fackenheim turns Hegel against himself. He affirms elements of Hegel's reading of Judaism but draws different conclusions.

> Hegel has achieved a superb—among non-Jewish philosophers virtually unique—grasp of the incommensurability within Judaism of a divine Presence that is and remains infinite and universal to a humanity that remains unyieldingly finite and particular. That this togetherness can be anything but "strange, infinitely harsh, the harshest contrast"—a contrast unmediated and its own terms incapable of mediation—is a possibility that remains, and must remain, outside the Hegelian universe of discourse.[24]

In Fackenheim's view, the incommensurability between the divine and the human creates a rift in totality that can never quite be overcome. This system can never be completely closed, and out of this openness emerges the possibility of a new universality. Perhaps Franz Rosenzweig articulates this new universality best in his discussion of the All. "We have broken the All [*das All*] and now each part is an all for itself."[25] Rosenzweig projects a world beyond the opposition

between the universal and particular, where the universal exists a priori. He expresses a hope for a "new all" or universal that will only come in the future. This new universality would be constructed out of the various particulars.

Following Martin, we must think about the implications of such a reading of Judaism for social theory, namely, a historical vision that can account for both the emergence of present and past domination and the possibility of messianic redemption in the future. However, what is missing from Martin's narrative is the historical specificity of antisemitism, especially as it pertains to Marx's time and more recent periods.

Patchen Markell: Beyond the Jewish Question and the Nation-State

In the later sections of this paper, we will examine how Postone reads Marx to construct a historically specific understanding of capitalism. However, before jumping to Postone's alternative reading, which is not concerned with the anti-Judaism of the early Marx, we will touch briefly on Marx's early essay dealing with Jews, the state, and capitalism, in addition to the well-known Marxist Isaac Deutscher's essay "The Non-Jewish Jew." The subject of this next section, Patchen Markell, takes the early Marx to task for overlooking the particular vulnerability of Jews in the modern nation-state. Like Martin, Markell returns to Hegel in his analysis of Marx's antisemitism but focuses on an earlier, pre-Holocaust period. Moreover, Markell confronts Hegel and Marx where they are relatively strong in comparison to Martin, who focuses on linear time and teleology, often conceived of as Marx's and Hegel's respective Achilles' heels. Markell addresses Hegel's theory of recognition, which Charles Taylor and others have championed as a panacea for multicultural society.[26] He believes that Marx's "On the Jewish Question" entails a theory of recognition that enables antisemitism. Deutscher moves this discussion further since he centers his analysis around capitalism, but as we will see, he presupposes precisely the type of teleology that Martin and Derrida criticize as characteristic of Marxism. Marxism has constantly struggled with teleology and antisemitism/anti-Judaism. In short, Marxists have often espoused teleological visions of the history that sacrifice the Jews to progress.[27] On this reading, Jews represent a backward state that must eventually be sublated.

Like Martin, Markell criticizes this type of teleology in Marx and also connects it to Hegel. He focuses on the central argument of

Marx's "On the Jewish Question," which many Marxists have tried to save precisely because it is one of the few places where Marx deals with the nation-state. Markell examines the Prussian state's policies toward the Jews and shows how they undermined Jewish existence precisely as they were trying to preserve it. Markell's argument supplements Martin's because it is not about a direct antisemitism or even the more philosophical anti-Judaism but something more akin to the ruse of reason, in which the attempt to protect Jewish identity through the institutions of the nation-state undermines it. With Markell's work we a move a step closer to Postone's own analysis, as they both connect the oppression of Jews with historically specific institutions and processes.

Although Marx's "On the Jewish Question" has been outlined at great length in the literature, I will summarize its main points to highlight its appeal and teleological structure. Marx was responding to Bauer's above-mentioned essay, which argued for the separation of the state and religion. From this perspective, the Jews will be emancipated only when they accept that the state must be free from religion and relegate religion to their private lives. Against this, Marx famously argues that such political emancipation, though a step in the right direction, actually reproduces domination at a different level. He notes that the state may abolish private-property qualifications for citizenship, but such formal abolition does not prevent the reproduction of this distinction in the private sphere. In other words, wealthy citizens will wield more influence than citizens without property. With respect to religion, he writes,

> Furthermore, by emancipating himself *politically*, man emancipates himself in a *devious way*, through an intermediary, however *necessary* this intermediary may be. Finally, even when he proclaims himself an atheist through the intermediary of the state, that is, when he declares the state to be an atheist, he is still engrossed in religion, because he only recognizes himself an atheist in a roundabout way, through an intermediary.[28]

Marx contends that political emancipation from religion is not really emancipation and gestures toward a future anarchist world where humans will not need the mediation of the state. This is the Marxist telos of a genuinely and fully democratic future beyond capitalism that pervades his work. People might misrecognize political emancipation as a democratic future and by so doing allow the domination that was embodied in the state to continue in the private sphere. In other words, despite his critique of the state, Marx suggests that the state remains separate from the domination that continues in the

private sphere with respect to religion. For example, Marx might agree with the early nineteenth-century jurist Gustave de Beaumont on the position of religion in the United States: "There is not, in the United States, either a state religion or a religion declared to be that of a majority, or a predominance of one religion over another. The state remains aloof from all religions."[29] This suggests a certain neutrality of the state, which Charles Larmore and others have championed.[30] However, Christians would still dominate the Jews in the private sphere and, to use Hegelian terms, would not recognize them as equals.[31] Marx articulates the basic structure of this logic of oppression:

> The state abolishes, after its fashion, the distinctions established by *birth*, *social rank*, *education*, *occupation*, when it decrees that birth, social rank, education, occupation are *non-political distinctions*; when it proclaims without regard to these distinctions, that every member of society is an *equal* partner in popular sovereignty, and treats all the elements which compose the real life of the nation from the standpoint of the states. But the state none the less allows private property, education, occupation, to *act* after *their* own fashion, namely as private property, education, occupation and to manifest their *particular* nature.[32]

With these words, Marx develops a politics of depoliticization.[33] The state "abolishes" birth, rank, and occupation and pushes them to the private, nonpolitical realm of civil society, but in so doing it depoliticizes and naturalizes such relations. The separation between the political and nonpolitical spheres makes citizens blind to the subtly political nature of distinctions of religion and class. In "On the Jewish Question," Marx develops certain distinctions in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, especially the separation of modern society into the family, civil society or the market, and the state, which is the officially political realm. Political emancipation refers to the emancipation of man as abstract citizen. As Beaumont already suggested in his reference to the American case, the citizen represents man devoid of any concrete distinctions.

Using this framework, Marx supported political emancipation of the Jews.[34] In contrast to Bauer, who believed that the Jewish religion was inherently incompatible with emancipation, Marx argued that Judaism was like other religions. However, he also believed that political emancipation was in general one-sided and displaced rather than solved the problem of domination. Domination in society will continue until we have human emancipation, which will transform both civil society and the state.

Markell sympathizes with this telos of human emancipation but at the same time questions some of Marx's premises. He points out that Marx underestimates the power of the state. He charges Marx with not being historically specific about the concepts of state and civil society and therefore overlooking the fact that they are mutually constitutive:

> Marx writes as though political emancipation merely removes impediments to the operation of a civil society whose own logic had been there all along: the political state, Marx says, lets private property and other social structures "*act* after *their* own fashion"; it represents the "consummation of the materialism of civil society"; it removes the "bonds which had restrained the egoistic spirit of civil society."[35]

In Markell's view, civil society first comes into being with the emergence of its opposition to the state and with new conceptions of sovereignty and recognition. Regarding the Jews, Marx implies that political emancipation recognizes an already existing Jewish identity. However, he overlooks the extent to which the process of political emancipation transformed Jewish identity by bringing it into relation to the nation-state.

What Marx does not see is that the very notion of Judaism as a system of belief or as one faith among others—interchangeable, in that sense, with Christianity and equally representative of "religion in general"—was itself in important ways a product of the initial work of political emancipation, which did not just entrench Jewish religious consciousness by privatizing it but transformed the meaning of Jewishness itself, working to convert it *into* a matter of religious consciousness and doing so in service to the project of nation-state sovereignty.[36]

Put simply, during the period of political emancipation Jews appeared as a particularity that was opposed to the universality of the nation-state. Consequently, Jewish identity had to be remolded into a religious particularity compatible with the universality of the nation-state. Jews could be emancipated, but there was a gap between the Jew who was emancipated and actual, existing Jews and their practices. From this perspective, civic equality was actually "conceived first and foremost as a device for the reform and/or elimination of actually existing Judaism."[37] There were numerous ways in which Jewish practices would need to be transformed in order to conform to the nation-state. For example, rabbis could no longer be the judges of a community governing itself; the rabbi had to be a "religious leader alone."[38] To the extent that Jewish practices appeared unsubsumable

under the nation-state, they would be conceived of as either too particular or too universal or cosmopolitan.

Political emancipation involved a type of double recognition: the state would liberate and recognize the Jews, and through this the state would be recognized by the Jews. Jews would realize that their humanity came before their being Jewish, thereby recognizing and identifying with the state. As Hegel put it, if the Jews had not been granted civil rights, they "would have remained in that isolation with which they have been reproached, and this would rightly have brought blame and reproach upon the state which excluded them; for the state would thereby have failed to recognize [*verkannt*] its own principle as an objective institution with a power of its own."[39]

If Jews do not recognize the state and remain in isolation, the state's sovereign power will be brought into question. Markell's account supplements Martin's in the sense that we see that the Hegelian and Marxist overcoming of Jewish particularity can be subtle. Rather than resorting to physical violence, Marx and Hegel embark on a project of recognizing Jews in ways detrimental to their existence. This is because the right to recognition comes with an obligation to recognize the state and consequently does not leave the identity of the Jew who is recognized untouched. Markell's analysis complements Marx's own argument about political alienation and passivity or the politics of depoliticization. He explains his point in criticizing recognition toward the end of his *Bound by Recognition*:

> If, as I have suggested, the pursuit of recognition is at least in part cultivated by (and centered around) the institutions of the putatively sovereign state, then we would do well to ask why the relationship between citizens and state institutions tends to be figured as a relationship of *recognition*. The answer, I suggest, has something to do with the way democratic legitimation proceeds under circumstances that preclude meaningful political action and participation for many citizens.[40]

The structure of recognition is passive rather than active. We see this in the case of the Jewish community as well. Whereas Jews may initially have participated to varying degrees in their smaller communities, they are now reshaped to think of politics as involving identification with the state. The state as an organization then catalogues and governs them, transforming the types of subjects they are. In light of Markell's discussion, we might conclude that the goal of democracy or political practice conflicts with the process of modern history. In short, the dual structures of capitalism and the nation-state constantly

undermine the creation of an active citizenry. This of course does not mean that Jews were not open to new modes of participation in the institution of the nation-state. However, such new forms of participation were indirect and impoverished when compared to their earlier direct involvement in Jewish communal life.

Marxist theory has always struggled to come up with an adequate understanding of the state—by highlighting the nation-state, Markell's analysis of the violence of recognition is helpful. However, even in his early works, Marx himself saw that the solution to the problem of citizen passivity involves overcoming capitalism, which would imply transforming the distinction between civil society and the state. Marx sought a Rousseauian solution to the separation in which people would overcome the political alienation embodied in the modern concept of citizenship, civil society, and the state.

> Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen; when as an individual man in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has become a *species-being*; and when he has recognized and organized his own powers (*forces propres*) as *social* powers and so that he no longer separates this social power from himself as *political* power.[41]

Markell cites this passage but merely glosses over Marx's suggestion of "a kind of priority of civil society's relation over its mere shadow in the state."[42] As we have seen, to the extent that Marx cleanly separates civil society from the state, Markell's critiques are valid. However, Marx's primary point in the above passage is that citizens will remain passive as long as capitalism remains the dominant mode of production. Indeed, the apparent separation of political from social power encourages the politics of recognition that Markell outlines, because voting and identifying with the state dominate political practice and consciousness. The state conceals how it shapes identity and also reproduces a generally passive citizenry through the analytical separation of state and civil society.

While it might be true that Marx at times takes the ideological separation of state and civil society at face value, his critique of capitalism eventually points beyond the distinction of society into such spheres. In this early work, civil society is largely a stand-in for capitalism. Consequently, one must ask whether closer attention to Marx's later discussion of capitalism would cause us to rethink our analysis of the Jewish Question and perhaps enable us to conceive of a Jewish Marxism such as the one Martin delineates. Postone makes this turn,

but before we get there, we must briefly touch on Isaac Deutscher's famous essay "The Non-Jewish Jew," which develops themes from Marx's "On the Jewish Question," especially the opposition between human and political/religious emancipation.

Capitalism, Teleology, and the Non-Jewish Jew

Deutscher's essay is an excellent preface to Postone's intervention because Deutscher wrestled with the significance of Jewish identity in the context of Marxist theory. Writing in 1958, he did not connect human universality to the nation-state but envisioned a world beyond nation-states. In Deutscher's essay, what appears as a problem in Markell's work, namely, the inability of the nation-state to incorporate the Jews, turns into a sign of a future beyond nation-states. Nevertheless, given that this future also implies the overcoming of Jewish identity, Deutscher anticipates Martin's discussion of the Hegelian/Marxist narrative of progress that usually sacrifices the Jews even though the sacrifice is not conceived of as such. According to Deutscher, Jews themselves best exemplify this transcendence of the nation-state and consequently a move beyond their own identity. Jews have a tendency toward universality because of their social predicament. Speaking of such Jews as Spinoza, Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, and Leon Trotsky, Deutscher explains:

> They were *a priori* exceptional in that as Jews they dwelt on the borderlines of various civilizations, religions, and national cultures. They were born and brought up on the borderlines of various epochs. Their mind matured where the most diverse cultural influences crossed and fertilized each other. They lived on the margins or in the nooks and crannies of their respective nations. Each of them was in society and yet not in it, of it and yet not of it. It was this that enabled them to rise in thought above their societies, above their nations, above their times and generations, and to strike out mentally into wide new horizons and far into the future.[43]

According to Deutscher, Jews are "a priori" exceptions, which we should perhaps read as a historical a priori, entailing a type of upbringing that, just like the divine presence that Fackenheim describes, cannot be subsumed under systems such as the nation-state. Recall that people were concerned that the Jews would not be loyal to the nation and would consequently form a nation within a nation. However,

in Deutscher's view, the Jews' distance from the nation allows them to look toward a future beyond the nation-state. Their liminality becomes the material condition for the possibility of thinking about going beyond the present, which in turn informs practice to change the world. Such change in the world is again rooted in concrete developments that Deutscher believed were making the nation obsolete.

> Is it not clear that at a time when atomic energy daily reduces the globe in size, when man has started out on his interplanetary journey, when a sputnik flies over the territory of a great nation-state in a minute or in seconds, that at such a time technology renders the nation-state as ridiculous and outlived as little medieval princedoms were in the age of the steam-engine?[44]

The increasing speed of travel and the advancement of technology have made the nation-state obsolete. Progress makes the nation-state anachronistic, but people still cling to it as the major mode of political organization and consequently identify with it. By mentioning the medieval period, Deutscher shows clearly his evolutionary perspective—just as the medieval princedoms were superseded by the nation-state, the nation-state will become obsolete in a world of globalized capitalism. He notes that although the Jews have also become enmeshed in the politics of national identification, their cultural roots allow them to go beyond this and realize universal human emancipation.[45]

In making this evolutionary argument, Deutscher seconds aspects of Marx's position in "On the Jewish Question" and makes Marx's cosmopolitanism explicit. He credits the Jews themselves with being able to negate their own particularity and become cosmopolitan. Put dialectically, according to Deutscher the particularity of the Jews is precisely their supersession into universal humanity. He also connects Jews to finance, which both Marx and antisemites would do, and he does so in a way that anticipates Moishe Postone's interventions in Marxism:

> I suggest that what had enabled the Jews to survive as a separate community, the fact that they had represented the market economy amidst people living in a natural economy—that this fact and its popular memories have also been responsible, at least in part, for the *Schadenfreude* or the indifference with which the populace of Europe has witnessed the holocaust of the Jews. It has been the misfortune of the Jews that, when the nations of Europe turned against capitalism, they did so only very

> superficially, at any rate in the first half of this century. They attacked not the core of capitalism, not its productive relationship, not its organization of property and labour, but its externals and its largely archaic trappings which so often were indeed Jewish. This is the crux of the Jewish tragedy.[46]

With these brief remarks toward the end of his essay, Deutscher anticipates the heart of Postone's analysis of antisemitism and the Holocaust: people identified the Jews with the appearances of capitalism, such as money and finance. However, Deutscher does not take the next step and critique antisemitism grounded in capitalism. Moreover, he sees these forms as "archaic trappings," suggesting that antisemitism is not an integral part of capitalism but the result of its incomplete development. In another essay, he states plainly, "Nazism was nothing but the self-defense of the old order against communism,"[47] again suggesting that Nazism was an obstacle to the linear trajectory of historical development. In other parts of "The Non-Jewish Jew," he echoes Marx's remarks about Jews in "On the Jewish Question." This section is also worth quoting because it brings us back to Martin's initial concerns about Marx, which Postone confronts in a new framework. Deutscher writes,

> Yet, I think that Marx went to the heart of the matter when he said that Jewry had survived "not in spite of history but in history and through history," that it owed its survival to the distinctive role that the Jews had played as agents of a money economy in environments which lived in a natural economy; that Judaism was essentially the theoretical epitome of market relationships and the faith of the merchant; and that Christian Europe, as it developed from feudalism to capitalism, became Jewish in a sense. . . . Since he [Marx] treated Judaism as the religious reflection of the bourgeois way of thought, he saw bourgeois Europe as becoming assimilated to Jewry. His ideal was not the equality of Jew and German in a "Judaized" capitalist society, but the emancipation of Jew and non-Jew alike from the bourgeois way of life, or, as he put it provocatively in his somewhat overparadoxical Young Hegelian idiom, in the "emancipation of society from Jewry."[48]

Deutscher provides a sympathetic reading of Marx's infamous identification of Jews with the market, money, and finance. We see his unease with Marx's text, which he reveals, for example, in his assertion that when Europe transitioned to capitalism it "became Jewish in a sense." The phrase "in a sense" softens the anti-Judaism, but it belies

his earlier point, which suggests a difference between the money-form (the "archaic trappings") and capitalism. Nonetheless, in the following sentence, Deutscher expresses a key insight that Postone carries forward: "Decaying capitalism has overstayed its day and has morally dragged down mankind; and we, the Jews, have paid for it and may yet have to pay for it."[49] There are two crucial points contained in this short statement: capitalism has become anachronistic, and as capitalism becomes increasingly crisis-prone, Jews and other minorities will increasingly pay the price.

Moishe Postone: Capital, the Holocaust, and Jewish Marxism

In 1993, Moishe Postone published *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*, which contextualizes concepts such as identity, particularity, and universality by underscoring precisely what Markell left out of his analysis—the problem of capitalism. Postone's work on capitalism and identity focuses on antisemitism and not on Jewish thought. However, William Sewell, his colleague for many years, recently commented on Postone's Jewish upbringing and his reading of *Capital*:

> I believe that Moishe's deep Jewish heritage and his father's rabbinical vocation influenced much about his life and thought. . . . It is my hunch that Moishe's training in Torah interpretation must have unconsciously influenced his approach to Marx's *Capital* and the *Grundrisse* in his magnum opus, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory*. Whatever else it may be, Moishe's book is a profoundly exegetical work—in that it assumes the essential truth of Marx's text and relies on a close and meticulous reading and argument to disclose this truth to the reader.[50]

Here Sewell primarily highlights a possible influence on Postone's adherence to close reading, treating Marx's *Capital* and *Grundrisse* as a type of Torah. However, details of Postone's historical experience with Judaism suggest that there might be other ways in which Judaism inflects his Marxism. His father was a rabbi from Lithuania who emigrated to Canada shortly before the outbreak of World War II; all of the other members of his father's immediate family were killed in the Shoah. Postone attended a residential yeshiva and was an active member of Congregation Rodfei Zedek.[51] Although Postone was certainly immersed in Jewish texts, his and his family's experience places them on the borderlands, somewhat similarly to Deutscher's non-Jewish

Jew. But unlike Deutscher's non-Jewish Jew, Postone does not advocate that Jews negate their particularity and become universal. Rather, his response to Judaism and antisemitism could be considered a Marxist answer to Fackenheim's call to bring Hegel and Judaism together. The result is that Postone constantly asks about the conditions for the possibility of the oppositions that made antisemitisms possible, and he uses this overarching framework to discuss both Jewish identity and human emancipation. Moreover, echoing Scholem's remarks about Jewish messianism, his theory of emancipation is a negation rather than a realization of totality.

Postone, Antisemitism, and the Holocaust

I will not deal with Postone's writings about antisemitism in depth but will merely show how his theory connects a specific form of antisemitism to capitalism. From this perspective, he reiterates Isaac Deutscher's claim about the Jews paying the price for capitalism. Postone's reading of Marx also turns on a difference between the core and surface appearance of capitalism; he grounds antisemitism in forms of subjectivity produced by capitalism.

A key part of Postone's interpretation of Marx concerns an analogy he makes between Hegel's *Geist* (spirit) and Marx's capital. Just as for Hegel *Geist* represents a dynamic movement that makes different forms of subjectivity possible, in Postone's view capital represents a process of social mediation that enables certain types of consciousness and concepts. Postone stresses that for Marx, capitalism represents a historically specific form of mediation by labor that organizes the whole of social life. One of the most challenging and productive aspects of Postone's reading of Marx concerns the idea that this specific form of social mediation of labor in capitalism entails categorial oppositions, such as the opposition between the concrete and the abstract and the particular and the universal.[52]

In Marx's *Capital* we first glimpse this opposition between abstract and concrete in the concept of the commodity-form, expressed as the opposition between use-value and exchange-value. Almost everything we experience in capitalist society, from the clothes we wear to the space in which we live, is split between concrete, useful dimensions that are unique and abstract numbers or prices, which negate the concrete nature of useful objects and make them commensurable with other commodities. Postone takes seriously Marx's claim that the commodity-form is the cell-form of capitalist society and that consequently the oppositions embedded in it pervade the whole of society and

consciousness. The commodity-form is significant because it enables us to socially ground the conceptual antinomies in the specific forms of labor in capitalist society. In capitalist society, labor is separated, like the commodity, into abstract and concrete dimensions. Concrete labor refers to specific forms of labor used to make particular objects, which can be used in different ways. Abstract labor refers not only to labor that is abstracted from concrete instantiations but also the historically specific type of mediation that pervades capitalist society and takes on the form of an objectified social relation. As Postone explains, in capitalist society, abstract mediation by labor replaces overt forms of domination that we find in earlier societies.[53] For example, the relation of domination between feudal lord and serf is overt and personal. However, in capitalism, because domination is embedded in the form of labor, which enables capital to extract surplus-value, the dominating nature of capitalism remains concealed or often misrecognized in the form of a fetish or is seen as natural. Postone's concept of domination goes beyond the problems of exploitation or surplus appropriation. Marxists such as Ellen Wood have pointed out that unlike precapitalist societies, in capitalist societies exploitation is hidden behind the wage-form, which posits capitalists and workers as free individuals.[54] However, in Postone's view, Marx believes capitalist domination encompasses the whole of society, which results in general unfreedom. In short, capitalism creates a historical dynamic in which human beings become the playthings of alien forces. The goal of socialism is thus to transform the world so that people can for the first time make history.

Everyday practices are a key moment in the production and reproduction of capitalist domination. Simple daily routines, such as going to and returning from work, embed complex concepts of time and abstraction. For example, when one works for eight hours a day, one presupposes abstract time and experiences one's labor counting as abstract. For Postone, precisely because these concepts, processes, and social relations are embedded in the everyday, they affect our categories and consciousness more pervasively than in previous societies. In particular, consciousness in capitalist society is characterized by an antinomy that mimics the commodity-form, that is, an opposition between the concrete and the abstract. However, because capitalist social relations are objectified in labor and not embodied in a particular individual, the oppositions they produce appear natural.

Moreover, the significance and potential implications of such oppositions change as capitalism unfolds. As capitalism develops, production becomes increasingly organized, and the individual laborer becomes part of large-scale factories, which are associated with

industrialization. Postone contends that the form antisemitism takes is affected by the nature of capitalism. The type of antisemitism found in Nazism, which demands the eradication of the Jews, is specific to the industrial phase of capitalism. In Postone's analysis of the twentieth-century transformation of capitalism,

> capitalism increasingly appears as a pure process behind multiple manifest forms; its concrete dimension changes accordingly. Individual labors no longer constitute self-contained units. They increasingly become cellular components of a large, complex, dynamic system that encompasses people and machines and which is directed to only one goal, namely, production for the sake of production. The alienated social whole becomes greater than the sum of its constituting individuals and has a goal external to itself. The goal is open-ended process. The capital form of social relations has a blind, processual, quasi-organic character.[55]

A commodity can appear as either use-value (something that can be immediately used) or exchange-value (something that can be traded for an item of the same value or money); in the case of the former, the commodity appears as a mere material entity rather than as the embodiment of social relations. Similarly, in Postone's view, labor appears as a merely creative activity, which is separable from capitalism, rather than as the essential socially mediating activity enabling the entire system. From this perspective, industrial production can appear as part of the creative labor process as opposed to capitalism, which presents itself as rootless and parasitic and as finance capital.[56]

We see here that the stage is set for Postone to make his original conclusion, namely, that the Nazis identified the Jews with capitalism, which they conceived of in a one-sided manner. To some extent, this echoes the analysis by Deutscher and Martin. However, Postone attempts to bring a level of historical specificity to varieties of antisemitism. For example, in Martin's analysis, the Jews represent that which cannot be subsumed by the narrative of universal progress and therefore must be negated—in this reading, the Jews appear to hold back the progress to modernity (whose relation to capitalism is not specified). Postone would counter that during the interwar period, the Jews were actually seen as in some respects *too* modern, abstract, and identified with capitalism. In other words, Nazi antisemitism must be distinguished from earlier forms, which saw Jews as backward and premodern. During the interwar period, antisemitism was part of a romantic anticapitalist narrative that sought to affirm concrete identity against the abstraction of modern international capital.

Postone uses his concept of capital as dynamic and involving structural shifts to distinguish between forms of antisemitism. To understand the particular ideological configuration of Nazi antisemitism, we must grasp the shift from liberal to Fordist capitalism, which occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is precisely this shift that caused the abstract side of capitalism to be pervasive, because by this time capital manifested in large, impersonal, mechanized production processes backed by huge bureaucratic apparatuses. Jews were often associated with these abstract dimensions, given their prominence as lawyers, bankers, and other professionals connected to the state and capital. All of this echoes Deutscher's point that the Jews were identified with money and capital and that the Nazis misrecognized the surface forms of capital for capital itself. Deutscher further sees antisemitism as rising from the contradiction between feudal Europe and market-oriented Jews, who anticipated capitalism. However, though this argument is closer to grasping the temporality of Nazis to the extent that we are here dealing with a reaction against capitalist modernity, it mistakenly posits the Nazi reaction as premodern. Against this, Postone highlights the fact that Nazi romantic anticapitalism is fundamentally a product of capitalism, not feudalism. Moreover, Nazi ideology protects certain elements of capitalism, such as industrialization—which the Nazis identified with good, productive, concrete labor—from the label capitalist, associated with parasitism, which enabled them in a sense to conceive of themselves as both modern and anticapitalist. They dreamt, to use Slavoj Žižek's words, of "a capitalism without capitalism."[57] So we have a new version of Martin's phrase "no more Jews, no more Jewish problem," but the problem here is also capitalism.

Similarly, Postone enables us to reframe Markell's insightful critique of Marx and Hegel on the Jewish Question. As we have noted, Markell pointed out how Germans suspected the Jews of betraying the nation by being either too particular or too universal. Postone connects this analysis and the form of the nation-state to capitalism. In a passage that implicitly rethinks the early Marx, he writes,

> Just as the commodity understood as a social form expresses its character in the externalized opposition between the abstract (money) and the concrete (the commodity), so is bourgeois society characterized by a split between the state and civil society. For the individual the split is expressed as between the individual as citizen and as person. As a citizen, the individual is abstract—as expressed, for example, in the notion of equality before the (abstract) law, or in the principle of one person, one vote. As

> a person the individual is concrete, embedded in real class relations that are considered to be private, that is pertaining to civil society, and which do not find political expression. In Europe, however, the notion of the nation as a purely political entity, abstracted from the substantiality of civil society, was never fully realized. The nation was not only a political entity; it was also concrete, determined by a common language, history, traditions and religion. In this sense, the Jews following their political emancipation constituted the only group in Europe that fulfilled the determination of citizenship as a purely political abstraction. They were German or French citizens but were not really considered German or Frenchmen. . . . The quality of abstractness, characteristic not only of the value dimension in its immediacy but also, mediately, of the bourgeois state and law, became associated with the Jews. In a period when the concrete became glorified over the abstract, against capitalism and the bourgeois state, this became a fatal association. The Jews were international, rootless, and abstract.[58]

This passage shows that, according to Postone, parts of the early Marx's argument in "On the Jewish Question" adumbrate the Nazi critique of the abstract citizen. During the period that Marx was writing, this type of totalizing critique of the bourgeois state had not yet emerged, and the Jews were expected to identify as bourgeois citizens. However, Marx anticipated a Nazi critique that would become prevalent during the interwar years, and at this point, because of a reconceptualization of the state, the project of turning Jews into Germans was abandoned, and it was argued that the Jews had to be overcome as part of a process of going beyond both capitalism and the bourgeois state.

Postone's Jewish Marxism: The Possibility of a Different Future

The close connection that Deutscher and Postone see between the Holocaust and capitalism suggests that unless one overcomes capitalism, misrecognized forms of overcoming capitalism will continue to haunt not only the Jews but also other minorities around the world. Postone, like Fackenheim, demonstrates the wider significance of Jewish thought and experience. Around the time that the Nazis positioned the Jews as the personification of capitalism, Jewish Marxists like Erich Fromm read Jewish practices such as the Sabbath as potentially resisting and positing an alternative to capitalism.[59] Although Postone never explicitly followed this path, he does account for it by speaking about the possibility of remnants of the precapitalist period. In *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*, he writes,

> The approach I shall outline does not deny the existence or importance of residual, noncapitalist tendencies, which may introduce some heterogeneity into the dominant order and promote critical distance to it; but it *does* provide the basis for a critique of those theoretical attempts that focus exclusively on such tendencies *because* they consider capitalism to be a unitary whole.[60]

In this subtle passage, Postone admits the importance of residual practices, which could provide distance from contemporary domination. The problem concerns the next step of analysis and praxis. He draws our attention to the type of whole or totality that capitalism is. Postone suggests that capitalism is a contradictory dynamic that does not have a clear goal. This vision of capitalism breaks with the teleology that Martin ascribes to Christian Marxism. Socialism will not emerge as a simple outgrowth of capitalism's immanent dynamic—a socialist future cannot be derived from a capitalist present. Nevertheless, for Postone, there is something about capitalism's dynamic that makes socialism *possible* and consequently could make noncapitalist remnants meaningful in the struggle for socialism.

Unlike orthodox Marxists, Postone does not simply ground the possibility of postcapitalist society in a proletarian movement; rather, he locates the potential for historical transformation in the contradictions of capitalism related to the production of relative surplus-value. Marx points out that capitalists seek to maximize the difference between the money invested to buy raw materials and labor-power (M) and the money they make through selling the products that labor-power has created (M'). This difference (M' - M) is called surplus-value. Marx mentions two ways to maximize this value: *Absolute surplus-value* involves increasing the length of the workday, but this runs into certain natural limits. Hence the more salient way to create surplus-value is by increasing the productivity of labor. Capitalists do this by implementing new modes of organization and developing the use of machinery and technology—in short, the means for the creation of *relative surplus-value*.

In Postone's view, producing relative surplus-value involves a dialectic between two sorts of time operant in capitalism: *abstract time* and *historical time*. In capitalist society, wage laborers are paid by the hour, and since every hour has 60 minutes, we are dealing with abstract time, or in Postone's terms, time as an independent variable. Postone distinguishes this idea of time as an *independent variable*, or abstract time, from concrete time, or time as a *dependent variable*. For the most part, time as a dependent variable refers to time in precapitalist

societies in which time was a function of concrete changes, such as sunrise and sunset or the varying length of daylight through the different seasons.[61]

However, Postone claims that capitalism also has its own peculiar type of concrete time, which he calls *historical time*. Postone describes this movement in *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*:

> [The] movement resulting from the substantive determination of abstract time cannot be expressed in abstract temporal terms; it requires another frame of reference. That frame can be conceived as a mode of concrete time. Earlier, I defined concrete time as any sort of time that is a dependent variable—a function of events and actions. We have seen that the interaction of the two dimensions of commodity-determined labor is such that socially general increases in productivity move the abstract temporal unit "forward in time." Productivity, according to Marx, is grounded in the social character of the use value dimension of labor. Hence, this movement of time is a function of the use value dimension of labor as it interacts with the value frame, and can be understood as a sort of concrete time. In investigating the interaction of concrete and abstract labor, which lies at the heart of Marx's analysis of capital, we have uncovered that *a feature of capitalism is a mode of (concrete) time that expresses the motion of (abstract) time.*[62]

Concrete time as historical time refers to the following phenomenon: because of the development of technology, a single hour can become denser—the amount that one can and must produce in an hour can be increased. Postone refers to time becoming denser as a "substantive determination of abstract time." Historical time is a dependent variable to the extent that it is moved by the collective actions of peoples and institutions in capitalist society constantly producing faster through technological innovation. These advances in technology are linked to the production of relative surplus-value and reflect the use-value side of labor or the way in which labor produces wealth. Postone specifically refers to the following passage in Marx, which is worth quoting in full because it clarifies a crucial point, namely, the distinction between value and wealth, which corresponds to the difference between abstract and historical time.

> In itself, an increase in the quality of use-values constitutes an increase in material wealth [*stofflichen Reichtum*]. Two coats will clothe two men, one coat will only clothe one man, etc. Nevertheless, an increase in the amount of material wealth may correspond to a simultaneous fall in the

> magnitude of its value. This contradictory movement arises out of the twofold character of labour. By productivity of course, we always mean the productivity of concrete useful labour; in reality this determines only the degree of effectiveness of productive activity directed towards a given purpose within a given period of time. Useful labour becomes, therefore, a more or less abundant source of products in direct proportion as its productivity rises or falls. As against this, however, variations in productivity have no impact whatever on the labour itself represented in value. As productivity is an attribute of labour in its concrete useful form, it naturally ceases to have any bearing on that labour as soon as we abstract from its concrete useful form. The same labour, therefore, performed for the same length of time, always yields the same amount of value, independently of any variations in productivity. But it provides different quantities of use-values during equal periods of time; more, if productivity rises; fewer if it falls. For this reason, the same change in productivity which increases the fruitfulness of labor, and therefore the amount of use-values produced by it, also brings about a reduction of value of this increased total amount, if it cuts down the total amount of necessary labour-time necessary to produce the use-values. The converse also holds.[63]

When increases in technology are sporadic and limited to one firm or even a few firms, the average is not affected to a significant degree, and thus the firms with advanced technology can capitalize on their ability to produce more quickly and increase their surplus-value. They are able to exploit more labor-power in a given hour than their competitors. However, in Marx's view, the tendency in capitalist society is for the average labor time necessary to produce a given commodity to decrease because the other firms will need to increase their rate of productivity to remain in business and compete with capitalists who have greater technological capabilities. When this happens, the base for measuring value—socially necessary labor-time—changes. In this case, the value of individual commodities cheapens as the average necessary labor-time required to produce them decreases. As a result, the total value produced tends to remain constant, since even though one produces more commodities in an hour, each individual commodity embodies less value. This is what Postone calls the *treadmill effect*, since the average speed of production increases, and thus firms must produce more just to survive and produce the same amount of value.[64] Although the total amount of value produced tends to remain constant, the amount of wealth or use-values produced increases.

We can now return to Postone's definition of *historical time*. Echoing the passage cited above, Postone defines *historical time* in the following manner. "Historical time . . . is not an abstract continuum within which events take place and whose flow is apparently independent of human activity; rather, it is the movement *of time*, as opposed to the movement *in time*."[65]

The key distinction here is between a movement in time and a movement of time. Increases in productivity cannot be measured by abstract time. An hour is still 60 minutes. Moreover, changes in productivity do not really take place in time, but they change the nature of time itself. General increases in productivity are movements of time because, once such a movement happens, the whole rhythm of life changes and accelerates—one must move faster to stay in the same place, as if someone has increased the speed of the treadmill on which one is running. At first, one might wonder why such an acceleration or movement of time is called *historical time*, but we must keep in mind that in Postone's view, the vast historical changes in capitalism from liberal to Fordist to neoliberal modes have been driven by this dialectic between increases in productivity and the reconstitution of the standards of the labor hour. Specifically, as productivity and the speed of production increase, they cause crises related to overproduction and the inability to realize value on the market. To deal with such crises, states often initiate new forms of political organization.

In Postone's view, this dialectic between wealth and value, or historical and abstract time, embodies a contradiction that points the way to a new future. Technological advances make capitalism—a system organized around factory-oriented labor, capitalists, and surplus-value—obsolete, and this in turn makes it possible for people to unlink technological advances from the logic of surplus-value and democratically organize productive power for the benefit of humanity. In this sense, the goal of Marx's "On the Jewish Question" and Markell's active citizenry presupposes this determinate negation of capitalism and an alternative mode of creating wealth. Marx clearly expresses the contradictory way in which capitalism makes possible another mode of creating wealth in *Grundrisse*:

> Capital itself is the moving contradiction [in] that it presses to reduce labour time to a minimum, while it posits labour time, on the other side, as sole measure and source of wealth. Hence it diminishes labour time in the necessary form so as to increase it in the superfluous form; hence it posits the superfluous in growing measure as a condition—question of life and death—for the necessary. On the one side, then, it calls to

> life all the powers of science and of nature, as of social combination and of social intercourse in order to make the creation of wealth. On the other side, it wants to use labour time as the sole measuring rod for the giant social forces thereby created, and to confine them within the limits required to maintain the already created value as value.[66]

In Marx's eyes, and in Postone's as well, a glimmer of hope for a socialist future emerges because capital points beyond itself, at the same time closing off this future. As capital pushes for technological innovation to create surplus-value, proletarian labor becomes less necessary to produce material wealth. We can see this from the countless factories around the world where machines are doing the work previously done by humans. However, the capitalist mode of production and the creation of surplus-value are based on the exploitation of human labor. Consequently, capital both makes proletarian labor increasingly anachronistic and posits labor time as the sole measure of value.

In other words, as technology improves, wage labor, step by step, becomes obsolete. But, because value is measured in terms of labor time, increased productivity does not benefit the worker or the people at large but instead often leads to economic crisis. Within capitalist society, as technological advances reduce the need for wage labor, the natural result is unemployment and other problems, ordeals, and catastrophes, including antisemitism and genocides. From this perspective, we can see a Jewish dimension to Postone's Marxism, namely, a recognition that human emancipation will not naturally emerge out of historical time. Rather, from this perspective, historical time is a series of disasters and crises. It is this perspective that Walter Benjamin describes in his famous thesis on the angel of history:

> A Klee painting named "Angelus Novus" shows an angel looking as though he is moving away from something he is contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we see a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in its wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris grows skyward. The storm is what we call progress.[67]

In this passage, Benjamin presents a critique of progress that poetically encapsulates many dimensions of Postone's vision of historical time. The angel is depicted with his mouth open and his wings spread, which suggest that he is being pushed in spite of himself, as if by an external force. This in turn suggests that the dynamic of history entails heteronomy and passivity. Moreover, where we see a chain of events, the angel sees only one catastrophe. Although it might appear as if there are many events with different causes, they all must be connected to one dynamic, the logic of capital. Catastrophes and forms of domination that appear separate, such as the domination of capital and the Nazi extermination of the Jews, should not be understood as being separate in kind but as all stemming from the same fundamental catastrophic dynamic of capital. This catastrophe constantly piles wreckage upon wreckage, which implies the wholesale destruction of earlier social forms and relations. Wreckage also describes the enormous number of things that are created in the process of producing relative surplus-value and increasing technological mediation. These things become merely wreckage because they are superfluous to the extent that their value cannot be realized on the market. The difficulty in realizing value, often related to overproduction, makes it such that capitalism constantly falls into crises. In the midst of this, there arises the desire to make things whole again, perhaps imagining going back to an earlier time, before the apparent divisions of capitalist society. This is the dream of romantic anticapitalisms, including the antisemitic variation. These are would-be attempts to stay historical time or even turn it back. However, the storm from paradise, or the dynamic of capital, keeps propelling things forward in spite of such aspirations and backs such projects into a future that they do not completely comprehend. Postone explicitly discusses poststructuralists as being backed into a future they did not comprehend,[68] but Nazism and certain forms of romantic anticapitalism can be seen as another, more pernicious variant on this theme. They claim to be moving beyond capitalism and bringing back a past unity, but they actually represent the grim future of fascist forms of capitalism. This dialectic describes the rise of right-wing populism around the world today. To the extent that much right-wing ideology focuses on a particularistic vision of nationalism, it attempts to use the particular against the universalizing tendencies of capitalism, without realizing that capitalism already constitutes its particularity.

The last line of Benjamin's above statement cuts in the other direction and brings us back to some of the themes that Bill Martin criticized, especially the problem of a universal teleology. The passage

suggests that what we call progress is actually a misrecognition of the catastrophic process of capital, the creation of relative surplus-value, and the treadmill dynamic. Moreover, it allows us to make concrete the distinction between Jewish and Christian messianism with respect to the dynamic of capitalism and the possibility of socialism. Marxisms informed by Christian messianism, largely interpreted through readings of Hegel, base themselves on a misrecognized concept of progress and contend that its logic will lead us to socialism. In this dominant narrative, as history progresses, there is a logic that leads us to socialism. Against this, we can return to Scholem's discussion of messianism.

> It is rather transcendence breaking in upon history, an intrusion in which history itself perishes, transformed in its ruin because it is struck by a beam of light shining into it from an outside source. . . . Their [the apocalyptists'] optimism, their hope is not directed to what history will bring forth, but to that which will arise in its ruin, free at last and undisguised.[69]

Putting the above passage into a Postonian context, we can read the perishing of history as the negation of History (with a capital H), namely, the dynamic of capitalism, which could bring forth a new type of freedom and universality. Jewish messianism mediated by Marxism thus contends that socialism will emerge out of a radical negation of the existing historical dynamic, which constitutes both the contemporary abstract universal and the one-sided particular. We have shown above how the contradictory dynamic of capital itself makes possible this different future in which universality and particularity would no longer be opposed. *Pace* Martin, the problem is not just about conceptual conditions that we can change at will. Though a more open vision is definitely desirable, we must understand that the constraints on thought are inseparable from historical time. This is another sense in which we are part of a single catastrophe—domination at conceptual and social levels is part of the same dynamic of historical time, and the success of open-ended projects must be rethought in relation to the dynamic of historical time. Historical time both makes a different, more open, configuration possible and excludes this possibility, which brings us back to a traditional theme in Marxism, namely, struggle. But now struggle is not merely a class struggle that pushes history along but a struggle that will include other groups as well as classes and will strive to overcome the existing dynamic based on wage labor, while envisioning and practicing new forms of universality and particularity.

Postone does not deal with the problem of political practice and subjectivity at length but makes a prescient comment full of implications for theorizing Jewish identity in relation to capitalism:

> The notion of the different forms of socially constituted universality implied by Marx's analysis of the development of the structuring forms of the social formation could serve as the basis for a sociohistorical investigation of some strains of new social movements—for example, of the feminist movement—that are attempting to formulate a new form of universalism, beyond the opposition of homogeneous universality and particularity. This approach, then, could also serve as the point of departure for rethinking the relation of the new social movements and identity-based politics of recent decades to capitalism and its possible overcoming.[70]

In the view of most Marxists, the subject that will effect the transition to socialism is the working class. Consequently, Marxists such as Deutscher contend that Jews must negate their identity and join forces with the proletariat. Drawing on a different reading of Marx, Postone contends that working-class movements risk reproducing the basis of capitalism, namely, proletarian labor. Though Postone would not deny the importance of new forms of class struggle,[71] he decenters working-class politics and enables us to rethink the significance of identity politics. Postone mentions the feminist movement, and there has been much literature on the division of labor between the household and workplace, where, in capitalist society, only the latter counts as a site of "work."[72] Hence a feminist movement could call into question the categories of labor and work as part of a struggle to go beyond capitalism. One could make a similar argument with respect to movements based on Jewish identity. Postone is one of the few Marxists who has shown how the Holocaust and other violence against Jews is inextricably connected to capitalism and how various forms of fascism and antisemitism will continue to exist as long as society remains capitalist. Consequently, movements around Jewish identity would have to rethink their identity both within and beyond capitalism. Such an analysis must examine contemporary antisemitism in relation to a complex set of mediations related to capitalism, American imperialism, and conflict in the Middle East.[73]

The goal of any identity-based movement should be to unite with new forms of class struggle and stress going beyond both proletarian labor and the opposition between concrete particularity and abstract universality. Thus, the very meaning of *identity* in such movements

would have to be rethought to realize what Franz Rosenzweig describes as a new form of universality in which the all is constituted by its parts and the parts are already mediated by the all. This is a world in which the "concrete singularity of each is the condition for the possibility of the flourishing of all," and vice versa.[74] In a different way, through rethinking identity politics, universality, and particularity in relation to capitalism, Postone, like Deutscher, spirits Jewish identity beyond itself to universal issues. Indeed, Jewish identity and antisemitism turned out to be connected to the universal problems of capitalism and socialism. However, the key difference is that in Postone's view, the Jew does not renounce particularity for the sake of universality but points to a way to rethink the relation between the two. We can continue this theme by dialectically rereading a statement Deutscher makes in his essay "What Is a Jew?" After Deutscher denies that he himself is religious or nationalistic, he asserts,

> I am, however, a Jew by force of my unconditional solidarity with the persecuted and exterminated. I am a Jew because I feel the Jewish tragedy as my own tragedy; because I feel the pulse of Jewish history; because I should like to do all I can to assure the real, not spurious security and self-respect of the Jews.[75]

Deutscher's first sentence turns the identity of the Jew into a universal. Solidarity with all persecuted people becomes a condition for Jewishness. The second sentence speaks not only of the Jewish tragedy, which one could connect to the general tragedy of capital, but also of the "pulse of Jewish history," which brings particularity back to mediate the above universal gesture. Postone thinks of this history differently than does Deutscher. Postone was not religious to the extent that he did not believe in God; he saw Judaism as practice based.[76] Consequently, as Sewell's comments at the beginning of this section show, he affirmed the particularity of Jewish practices, which when rethought could have universal implications. For example, the different temporalities of some Jewish practices, such as the Sabbath, could be seen as gesturing beyond capitalist society.[77] Postone would suggest thinking of these practices in relation to a theory of capitalism as being fundamentally about not only class relations but also the basic rhythms of life. From this perspective, a rupture or caesura in these rhythms becomes potentially meaningful beyond its immediate context. At first, practices such as the Sabbath might seem like a strange candidate for thinking about overcoming capitalism. Marxists would usually look to practices of worker democracy and other related social

movements to kindle hopes of a postcapitalist future. The Sabbath's relation to capitalism does not work at this level. Rather, key elements of the Sabbath, especially refraining from work, could take on a new significance when interpreted in light of Postone's theory. It could then signify a future that would be possible with the negation of capitalism. Indeed, with such a future in mind, the actual movements associated with workers democracy could take on a new significance. In short, such movements would now be mobilized toward the eventual negation of proletarian labor rather than its realization.

Conclusion: Unfinished Projects—Capital and the Nation-State

We have seen in broad outlines how Postone could continue and respond to Martin's project of developing a Jewish as opposed to a Christian Marxism, which grounds existing teleologies in the logic of capital. In a Christian Marxism, socialism is considered the natural realization of a movement in history, whereas Jewish Marxism asserts that the dynamic of history must be negated to make freedom possible. Moreover, against Markell, Postone could emphasize that the dynamic of capital constitutes the condition for the possibility of different forms of antisemitism. However, the nation-state, which is perhaps the most important institution in Markell's analysis, is almost completely absent from Postone's analyses. From this perspective, it becomes difficult to assess the concrete prospects of various forms of nationalism, including Zionism and Arab nationalism, in the struggle for a world beyond the opposition between particularity and universality.

I cited above one of the few places where Postone deals with the nation-state in relation to capitalism, the passage begins as follows:

> Just as the commodity understood as a social form expresses its character in the externalized opposition between the abstract (money) and the concrete (the commodity), so is bourgeois society characterized by a split between the state and civil society. For the individual the split is expressed as between the individual as citizen and as person. As a citizen, the individual is abstract—as expressed, for example, in the notion of equality before the (abstract) law, or in the principle of one person, one vote.

Postone here draws an interesting analogy between the commodity-form and the split between the state and civil society. Clearly, the abstraction of the concept of the citizen is similar to the exchange-value side

of the commodity-form, which Postone posits against the use-value side, which is concrete, like the person in civil society. There are, however, problems with pushing this analogy too far. From Postone's own perspective, the distinction between state and civil society was characteristic of liberal capitalism but was eventually superseded during the Fordist period, when the state took over many of the earlier functions of civil society. In this analysis, although the abstract and concrete sides of citizenship persist, the distinction between civil society and the state may not be dominant.

We must think further about the relationship between nation, state, and capitalism. It seems clear that Postone would argue against recent attempts to conceive of the state and capital as embodying two different logics. However, at some level one would need to register the difference between them, even if at a higher level of abstraction they are part of the same dynamic. Jacques Bidet's recent analysis of capitalist modernity as involving two mediations—market and organizing—might be helpful in grasping the dialectics that condition modern Jewish identity.[78] This is especially relevant to Markell's analysis, which shows how the state overdetermined Jewish identity in relation to the modern citizen.

The nation-state retains its relevance even as capitalism becomes global. As Ellen Wood has recently pointed out, although capitalism is a potentially global system, it has no means of globalizing other than through the nation-state.[79] Indeed, throughout the world, we see the combination of a globalizing free-market capitalism with conservative narratives of the nation-state. In the contemporary context, new narratives of the nation-state that rethink identity, universality, and particularity might be the beginning of resistance to capitalism. Obviously, just as with the working class, the ultimate goal would be to go beyond the state and perhaps the nation as well, but both these institutions must also be thought of as moments of a larger struggle. Searching for answers to such questions should be part of the struggle to continue Postone's legacy.

Notes

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especially like to thank Prasenjit Duara, Sam Fleischacker, Richard Gunde, Martin Jay, Tony Michels, Patrick Murray, and Saul Thomas for commenting on or discussing aspects of this paper with me. In addition, the editors and anonymous reviewers of *Jewish Social Studies* provided helpful comments, which improved the quality of this paper.

1 Paul Johnson, *Intellectuals: From Marx and Tolstoy to Sartre and Chomsky* (New York, 1988), 57. He writes, "He [Marx] did not object to Bauer's anti-Semitism; indeed he shared it, endorsed it and quoted it with approval. But he disagreed with Bauer's solution. Marx rejected Bauer's belief that the anti-social nature of the Jew was religious in origin and could be remedied by tearing the Jew away from his faith."

2 David Nirenberg, *Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition* (New York, 2014), 4.

3 Paul Thomas, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists* (London, 1990); Mark Neocleous, *Administering Civil Society: Towards a Theory of State Power* (London, 1996); Wendy Brown, *Politics Out of History* (Princeton, 2001).

4 Bill Martin, *Matrix and Line: Derrida and the Possibilities of Postmodern Social Theory* (Albany, N.Y., 1992); idem, *Politics at the Impasse: Explorations in Postsecular Social Theory* (Albany, N.Y., 1996).

5 Patchen Markell, *Bound by Recognition* (Princeton, 2003).

6 Lars Fischer recently made this point in a presentation entitled "Jews and the Left"; YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, "(3 of 8) Jews and the Left, Day 1, Session 2," May 6, 2012, YouTube video, 1:50:24, https://youtu.be/6JCSjvMBFvQ, at 39:45. Fischer also deals with related issues in his *Socialist Response to Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, Engl., 2007).

7 On this point, Martin's position anticipates recent readings of Marx as stressing the incompleteness of real subsumption and the manner in which the past continues into the present. Harry Harootunian, *Marx after Marx: History and Time in the Expansion of Capitalism* (New York, 2017); Massimiliano Tomba, *Marx's Temporalities* (Chicago, 2013).

8 The term *Jewish Marxism*, of course, has many meanings and can even be derogatory. For example, Peter Hanebrink has brilliantly documented how through much of the twentieth century in Europe people conceived of communism as a Jewish plot. See Peter Hanebrink, *A Specter Haunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism* (Cambridge, Mass., 2018). This would be evidence of a type of right-wing antisemitism. Martin is, in contrast, concerned with left-wing antisemitism, which, in his view, might share a larger framework with right-wing antisemitism. More important, the Jewish Marxism that Martin discusses has nothing in common with what Hanebrink describes as Jewish bolshevism. I thank Martin Jay for bringing this issue to my attention.

9 Deutscher's essay was published in the late 1950s; Postone's *Time, Labor, and Social Domination* and Martin's *Matrix and Line* and *Politics at the Impasse* appeared in the 1990s; and Markell's *Bound by Recognition* appeared in 2003.

10 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, ed. and trans. Terry Pinkard (Cambridge, Engl., 2018), 199, paragraph 340.

11 Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. John Tucker (New York, 1978), 26–27 (emphasis original). For an insightful analysis of Bauer and Marx on the Jewish Question, see Yoav Peled, "From Theology to Sociology: Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on the Problem of Jewish Emancipation," *History of Political Thought* 13, no. 3 (1992): 463–85.

12 Marx, "On the Jewish Question," 28 (emphasis original).

13 Martin, *Politics at the Impasse*, 148.

14 Ibid., 149.

15 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, 2002).

16 Martin, *Politics at the Impasse*, 149.

17 For a discussion, see Gérard Bensussan, *Le temps messianique: Temps historique et temps vécu* (Paris, 2001), 45–56. Bensussan writes of Jewish messianism as a "messianism without a messiah" (46). He also contends that Jewish messianism is the "temporality of time," which suggests a more affective dimension that would need to be developed further in terms of Marxism.

18 Gershom Scholem, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays* (New York, 1995), 10.

19 Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning, and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York, 1994).

20 Moishe Postone, "Deconstruction as Social Critique: Derrida on Marx and the New World Order," *History and Theory* 37, no. 3 (1998): 372. For more on this use of the trope of the Jew in Derrida and other French poststructuralist thinkers, see Sarah Hammerschlag, *The Figural Jew: Politics and Identity in Postwar French Thought* (Chicago, 2010).

21 Postone, "Deconstruction as Social Critique," 383.

22 Emil Fackenheim, *Encounters between Judaism and Modern Philosophy: A Preface to Future Jewish Thought* (New York, 1980), 87, cited in Martin, *Matrix and Line*, 58–59 (emphasis original).

23 Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, "History, Exile, and Counter-History: Jewish Perspectives," in *Global Historical Thought*, ed. Prasenjit Duara, Viren Murthy, and Andrew Sartori (London, 2014), 122–37.

24 Emil L. Fackenheim, *To Mend the World: Foundations of Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought* (Bloomington, Ind., 1994), 139.

25 Franz Rosenzweig, *Der Stern der Erlösung* (Frankfurt, 1999), 28.

26 Charles Taylor et al., *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, 1994).

27 For a discussion of Marx's vision of the Jews in *Das Kapital*, see Chad Alan Goldberg, *Modernity and the Jews in Western Social Thought* (Chicago, 2017), 43–75.

28 Marx, "On the Jewish Question," 32 (emphasis original).
29 Ibid., 31. Here Marx is quoting from Gustave de Beaumont, *Marie ou l'esclavage aux États-Unis* (Paris, 1835).
30 Charles Larmore, *The Morals of Modernity* (Cambridge, Engl., 1996).
31 Recently, Navyug Gill has used this paradigm to discuss the problems facing the Dalits in India, where the state has tried to make Dalits legally equal to other castes, but domination still pervades the private sphere. Political emancipation, Gill argues, requires dismantling a larger structural oppression. Navyug Gill, "Limits of Conversion: Caste, Labor and the Question of Colonial Emancipation in Punjab," *Journal of Asian Studies* 78, no. 2 (2018): 1–20.
32 Marx, "On the Jewish Question," 33 (emphasis original).
33 See Wang Hui, "Depoliticized Politics from East to West," in *The End of Revolution*, ed. Rebecca Karl (London, 2009), 3–19.
34 Peled, "From Theology to Sociology," 463–85.
35 Markell, *Bound by Recognition*, 130.
36 Ibid., 136.
37 Ibid., 139.
38 Ibid., 136.
39 Cited in Markell, *Bound by Recognition*, 143.
40 Ibid., 187 (emphasis original).
41 Marx, "On the Jewish Question," 46 (emphasis original).
42 Markell, *Bound by Recognition*, 136.
43 Isaac Deutscher, *The Non-Jewish Jew* (London, 2017), 27.
44 Ibid., 40.
45 Deutscher's reference to Sputnik supports Tony Michels's reading of this essay, which argues that Deutscher's faith in evolution was linked to his belief in the Stalinist project of the Soviet Union despite its ruthlessness. See Tony Michels, "After Marx: Socialist Alternatives; Jewish Discoveries," chapter 5 of an unpublished book manuscript. Michels explains: "Stalin had ruthlessly suppressed the 'revolution from below' but, according to Deutscher, he had also executed a second revolution, one 'from above,' that succeeded in raising the masses up from 'barbarism.'"
46 Deutscher, *Non-Jewish Jew*, 39.
47 Ibid., 49.
48 Ibid., 32.
49 Ibid., 39.
50 William Sewell, "Remembering Moishe Postone," *Critical Historical Studies* 5, no. 2 (2018): 155–56.
51 Ibid., 155.
52 Moishe Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory* (Cambridge, Engl., 1993), 74.
53 Ibid., 125.
54 Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism* (London, 2016).

55 Moishe Postone, "The Holocaust and the Trajectory of the Twentieth Century," in *Catastrophe and Meaning: The Holocaust and the Twentieth Century*, ed. Moishe Postone and Eric Santner (Chicago, 2003), 92.
56 Ibid.
57 Slavoj Žižek, *Organs without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences* (London, 2012), 185.
58 Postone, "Holocaust and the Trajectory of the Twentieth Century," 94.
59 Michael Löwy, *Redemption and Utopia: Jewish Libertarian Thought in Central Europe*, trans. Hope Heaney (London, 2017).
60 Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*, 38 (emphasis original).
61 Ibid., 201.
62 Ibid., 293 (emphasis original).
63 Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Ben Fowkes, 3 vols. (London, 1990), 1: 137.
64 Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*, 289.
65 Ibid., 294.
66 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London, 1993), 706.
67 Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York, 2007), 257–58.
68 Moishe Postone, "The Subject and Social Theory: Marx and Lukács on Hegel," in *History and Heteronomy* (Tokyo, 2009), 82.
69 Scholem, *Messianic Idea*, 10.
70 Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*, 372.
71 Regarding workers' movements, Postone argues that "if a movement, concerned with workers, were to point beyond capitalism, it would have to defend workers' interests and have to participate in their transformation—for example, by calling into question the given structure of labor, not identifying any longer in terms of that structure, and participating in rethinking those interests" (Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*, 371–72).
72 See, for example, Cinzia Arruzza, "Social Reproduction Feminism and Its Critics," *Science and Society* 80, no. 1 (2016): 9–30.
73 This could be the beginning of a Postonian response to Enzo Traverso's recent and provocative book, *The End of Jewish Modernity*, trans. David Fernbach (London, 2016). Traverso argues that in many ways Muslims have replaced Jews on the margins of society and consequently Jews are no longer as critical as Deutscher once described them. There is obviously much truth to Traverso's thesis. However, a side effect of the plight of Muslims has been an increase in antisemitism in the Middle East and some confusion about how to deal with this from a Marxist perspective. From the above perspective, we could argue that one must simultaneously identify Muslim antisemitism and analyze its roots in American imperialism and the logic of global capitalism. Such a holistic perspective would suggest that there is still a role for critical Jewish (Marxist) thought.

74 Roy Bhaskar, *Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom* (London, 1994). I am grateful to the late Jim Tiles for reminding me to add the "vice versa" to Bhaskar's initial formulation.
75 Deutscher, *Non-Jewish Jew*, 51.
76 Personal conversation with Moishe Postone, Tokyo, Japan, July 26, 2009.
77 Of course, such work could be done with many religions that might have particular ways of theorizing alternatives. This might be what Bill Martin had in mind in thinking about "postsecular" visions of socialism; see Martin, *Politics at the Impasse*. The above line of thinking also echoes Löwy's earlier work—*Redemption and Utopia*—on German Jewish radicalism.
78 Jacques Bidet has written extensively on this point; readers might find his classic *Explication et reconstruction du Capital* (Paris, 2004) particularly helpful.
79 Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Empire of Capital* (Delhi, 2003).

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