# SECURING BLOCKCHAIN-BASED E-VOTING THROUGH SHAMIR'S SECRET SHARING ON ETHEREUM

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## OUTLINE

**Next Slides** 

Introduction
E-VOTE
Analysis
Conclusion
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END

## Secret Sharing

- A secret is split into pieces.
- Shamir' Algorithm

## Smart Contract

- Automatically execute without the need for third parties.
- is immutable
- Can be viewed and verified by anyone.

## Introduction

## Introduction

## -Voting systems


E-voting, or electronic voting, is the use of electronic systems to cast and count votes in an election. It aims to improve efficiency, accessibility, and security in the voting process.

## Analysis Metrics

- Technical Complexity
- Cost
- Privacy
- Accessibility

## E-VOTE


### **OWNER**



## VOTER

SHARE(1,17886430914)





#### the Lagrange basis polynomials:

```
\frac{x-x_1}{x-x_2} \cdot \frac{x-x_2}{x-x_3} = \frac{x-4}{3} \cdot \frac{x-5}{3} = \frac{1}{3}x^2 - \frac{1}{3}x^2 - \frac{1}{3}x^3 - \frac{1}{3}x
```

Solidity  $x_0 - x_1 - x_2 - x_3 - x_4 - x_5$ function generateSecretAndShares(address[] memory voterAddresses) private {
 secret = random();
 coefficients.push(secret);
 for (uint256 i = 1; i < threshold; i++) {
 coefficients.push(random());
 }

for (uint256 i = 0; i < voterAddresses.length; i++) {

Using the formula for polynomial interpolation, f(x) is:

```
function evaluatePolynomial(uint256 x) public view returns (uint256)
    uint256 result = coefficients[0];
    uint256 power = 1;

// P(x) = a0 + a1*x + a2*x^2 + ...
for (uint256 i = 1; i < coefficients.length; i++) {
        power *= x;
        result += coefficients[i] * power;
}

return result;
}</pre>
```


## E-VOTE


$$=\frac{1}{6}x^2-\frac{3}{2}x+\frac{3}{3}$$


```
function reconstructSecret() public view returns (uint256)
   require(shares length > 0, "Shares list is empty");
   int256 result = 0;
   for (uint256 i = 0; i < \text{shares, length}; i++)
      int256 numerator = 1;
      int256 denominator = 1;
      for (uint256 i = 0; i < \text{shares, length}; i++)
         if(i!=j)
           require(shares[i].x.!= shares[j].x, "Error: x values must be
           unique!");
           numerator = numerator * (0 - int256(shares[i].x));
           denominator = denominator * (int256(shares[i].x) - int256(shares[i].x)):
          require(denominator != 0, "Error: Denominator is zero!");
         int256 lagrangeCoefficient = numerator / denominator;
         result += int256(shares[i].y) * lagrangeCoefficient;
     return uint256(result):
```

$$= 1942 \left( \frac{1}{6}x^2 - \frac{3}{2}x + \frac{10}{3} \right) + 3402 \left( -\frac{1}{2}x^2 + \frac{7}{2}x - 5 \right) + 4414$$

## E-VOTE













## ERROR-FREE VOTING

## INVALID SECRET SHARE

#### **TABLE OF SCENARIO 1**



Candidates	Number of Voter	Voter Indices	Expected Result	Actual Result	Incorrect Input	Gas Fee
Shamir, Blakely	3	0 voters for shamir, 3 voters for blakely	"blakely" wins with majority votes	"blakely" wins with majority votes	No	0,004409 Sepolia ETH

#### **TABLE OF SCENARIO 2**

Candidates	Number of Voter	Voter Indices	Expected Result	Actual Result	Incorrect Input	Gas Fee
Crypto, Netsec	3	0 voters for crypto, 3 voters for netsec	ERROR	ERROR Non- termination of the contract	Yes	0,004300 Sepolia ETH



#### **TABLE OF SCENARIO 3**

# INVALID CANDIDATE INDEX

TIE

Candidates	Number of Voter	Voter Indices	Expected Result	Actual Result	Incorrect Input	Gas Fee
Crypto[0], Netsec [1]	3	Two: 1, Invalid Index: 3	"netsec" wins with majority votes	ERROR Then "netsec" wins with majority votes	Yes	0,005170 Sepolia ETH

#### **TABLE OF SCENARIO 4**

Candidates	Number of Voter	Voter Indices	Expected Result	Actual Result	Incorrect Input	Gas Fee
new[0], old[1]	4	Two: 0, Two: 1	"old" and "new" tie	tie	no	0,0478 Sepolia ETH

## ANALYSIS

## Technical Complexity

- Initialization (Deployment):  $O(v \cdot t)$ , where v is the number of voters and t is the
- Voting: Each voter is O(1)
- Finalization: The secret is reconstructed using Lagrange interpolation, O(s²),


## Comparison:

ShamirVoting contract 
$$O(v \cdot t + s^2 + c)$$

Simpler Ballot contract
$$O(v + c)$$

## Privacy











## Cost and Accessability



**Contract Deployment** 0.00361796SepoliaETH

**StartVoting** 0.00007032SepoliaETH

**Vote** 0.00017327SepoliaETH

3x

**EndVote** 0.00012059SepoliaETH

= 0,0043277SepoliaETH

15,91 USD

**Contract Deployment** 0.0303191SepoliaETH


**StartVoting** 0.00040588SepoliaETH

**Vote** 0.0018595SepoliaETH

3x

**EndVote** 0.00124812SepoliaETH

= 0,0375516SepoliaETH



138,03 USD

## **CONCLUSION**

### Conclusion

In blockchain systems based on transparency, external systems are needed to share data secretly. The current work is not sufficient in terms of security. It can be a suitable work for critical tasks by making improvements on privacy.

In terms of cost, it affects the number of people who will participate in the vote and the hours in which the vote will be held rather than the integration of the code. This also makes user access difficult.

Controls that can be done with code are sufficient for many scenarios. This feature, which was added for people to double-check, **if is really necessary except for situations that require high multi-stage security.** 





### References

Esma, "LastShamirSecretSharingEvote.sol" GitHub Repository, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/Esma222/EvotWithShamir/blob/main/LastShamirsEVoteSmartContract.sol [Accessed: 06-Jan-2025].

Remix IDE, "Remix Ethereum IDE," [Online]. Available: https://remix.ethereum.org/#lang=en&optimize=false&runs=200&ev mVersion=null&version=soljson-v0.8.26+commit.8a97fa7a.js. [Accessed: 13-Nov-2024].

#### **Ethereum Sepolia Faucet**

Get free Sepolia ETH to deploy smart contracts, debug transactions, and experiment on testnet.

△ Google Cloud Web3 Portal