Entitlement Justice and Measures of Algorithmic Fairness

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1 Introduction

The rise of algorithmic decision making in the public sector has caused significant public concern. Algorithms increasingly make decisions that affect individuals' lives, from determining creditworthiness to predicting criminal recidivism, and the public has grown cautious of their potential to perpetuate and exacerbate existing social inequalities. A 2018 study showed that 58% of Americans believe that algorithms will always have some level of bias (Smith, 2018), and as documented in the famed COMPAS case, these fears are not unfounded (Angwin et al., 2016).

In response to these concerns, a growing body of research has focused on developing algorithmic fairness measures to evaluate and mitigate the biases in algorithmic decision making. A large number of different measures have been proposed (Corbett-Davies et al., 2023) and applied to a wide range of problems. However, many questions remain unanswered about the theoretical foundations of these measures and their relationship to broader sociotechnical systems. In particular, the relationship of these measures to philosophically rigorous definitions of justice is not well understood.

In an effort to develop the theoretical foundations of algorithmic fairness, researchers have turned to the field of distributive justice for guidance. A distributive theory of justice is a normative framework that provides principles and criteria for allocating benefits and burdens among individuals or groups within a society, with the aim of achieving a just and fair distribution. The field can be seen as polarized along an axis from liberal egalitarianism to entitlement theory. Under the liberal view, commonly associated with John Rawls, the chief objective of justice is to equalize allocation across all individuals in a population. In contrast, the entitlement view, associated with Robert Nozick, emphasizes the importance of individual property rights and the freedom to exchange goods and services without interference.

Recent papers ((Binns, 2018), (Hertweck et al., 2024), and (Kuppler et al., 2021)) have explored the relationship between algorithmic fairness and theories of distributive justice. Efforts have largely focused on grounding fairness measures in liberal justice, while theories of libertarian justice have been largely overlooked in the literature. Given that libertarian justice is a prominent area of inquiry in political philosophy that addresses a broad range of concerns not covered in liberal justice, it is worth investigating how to close this gap. In particular, how do the concerns

of libertarian justice appear in algorithmic decision making? How can these concerns be encoded by algorithmic fairness measures? And what do we stand to lose or gain by conceptualizing algorithmic fairness through the libertarian lens?

In this paper, we will carefully examine the relationship between algorithmic fairness and libertarian justice, and develop a formalism that lays clear the relationship between the two. We will demonstrate that libertarian justice can be encoded within a measure of algorithmic fairness, and show that doing show offers a nuanced and context-sensitive means of understanding algorithmic fairness. We will argue that by conceptualizing algorithmic fairness through libertarian justice, system designers are made to clearly present the inherent normative reasoning and values embedded in their systems.

TODO: Sharped objectives in previous paragraph

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the existing literature on algorithmic fairness and distributive justice. We draw on the formalism from (Kuppler et al., 2021) and (Corbett-Davies et al., 2023) to create a unified model for understanding algorithmic fairness and distributive justice consistently with each other. In Section 3, we introduce the concept of entitlement justice and discuss its historical development. We contrast entitlement theory with liberal egalitarianism to identify the the critical elements of entitlement which must be represented in account of algorithmic fairness, and confront the traditional objections to entitlement theory. In Section 4, we propose a new framework for understanding algorithmic fairness through the lens of entitlement justice. We analyze the implications of this framework for existing algorithmic fairness measures and show an example of how it can be applied to a real-world case study. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of our work and suggest directions for future research.

2 Background

In this paper, we will center our attention on a class of decision problems corresponding to the following formalism. There exists some population of individuals $I = \{i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_n\}$ over whom we must distribute some resource R. A *decision rule* is a mapping $d \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, under which i_n receives R iff $d(i_n) = 1$. As an example, consider the process of allocating loans over a pool of applicants — for each individual in the applicant pool, we have a binary choice to either approve or deny the loan, and only on acceptance does the individual receive capital.

An algorithmic decision maker in this setup is a system, particularly a technical system, under which a decision rule is implemented as a set of steps which are applied identically to all individuals. This broadly consists of two tasks. First, a set of covariates X must be collected for each individual. Then, a classification scheme $f : X \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ must be used to map each individual to an outcome. Returning to the loan case, a simple example would be the following: Approve a loan to each individual whose household income exceeds the projected cost of living in the geographic location of their esidence by at least \$10,000 per year. Then our algorithm implementing the decision rule for each applicant takes the following shape:

- Collect covariates X = {household income, goegraphic location of residence}

- Let C = projected cost of living in location of residence, H = household income

- $f = H - C \geq 10000$

It is important to note that not all problem domains to which algorithmic decision making is applied can be formulated in this way. For example, applications of AI in natural language translation may not be easily formulated in terms of resource allocation, but the reader may still be concerned with the perpetuation of social biases through the decisions made in translation — for example, issues of underrepresentation of social groups in translated media. While these cases are significant, they do not fall simply within the domain of distributive justice, and so will not be considered here.

2.1 Algorithmic Fairness Measures

Algorithmic fairness measures as they're presented in the literature operate on the classification scheme f and a set of morally protected characteristics such as race or gender $A \subseteq X$, attempting to enforce contraints on how decisions can be sensitive to such characteristics. An overview of measures commonly discussed in the literature is presented below.

TODO: Elaborate/improve discussion of individual/group A critical point to note in the discussion of algorithmic fairness is the distinction between individual and group fairness. Individual fairness focuses on the fair treatment of a single individual, while group fairness focuses on the fair treatment of groups of people identified by some common morally protected characteristic. A typical approach to individual fairness is to require that similar individuals be treated similarly, while group fairness requires balancing statistical quantiites of outcomes across groups. For our purposes, both individual and group fairness can be characterized by what constraint they pose on the classification function, and so we will be able to analyze both through the same lens of distributive justice.

As a running example, consider the case of a hiring algorithm. The decision problem is to map a set of applicants to hiring decision. Our algorithm must implement a function to do so based only on the personal information presented in their resumes, which is their education, experience, and cover letter. We want to ensure that our hiring practices are fair with respect to race, and gender. This gives us the following setup:

TODO: Rework Figure

Fig. 1: A hiring decision algorithm as a decision problem

where a fairness measure will operate exclusively on the mapping from experience, education, cover letter, race, and gender to hiring decisions.

Some of the most commonly discussed measures in the literature are presented below together with their strengths critiques leveraging this lens. For a more exhaustive list of measures, see Corbett-Davies et al. (2023).

TODO: Revise definitions

Definition 1. *Fairness Through Unawarenss — f satisfies fairness through unawareness iff*

$$A = \emptyset$$

In other words, the classification function may not receive any morally protected covariates as inputs. So, for our hiring admissions case, we would be forced to remove race and gender from X and only consider education and experience.

This notion is intuitively appealing — how can the algorithm dicriminate against me based on my race if it doesn't know my race? However, it is clear that this measure is not sufficient to ensure fairness. For example, if one attended a historically black college, their education may function as a proxy for their race, allowing bias to remain in the algorithm.

Definition 2. *Demographic Parity — f satisfies demographic parity iff*

$$P[f(X) = 1 | A = a] = P[f(X) = 1] \ \forall a \in A$$

(Dwork et al., 2012).

Demographic parity holds that the probability of a positive output ($f(X) = 1$) should be statistically independent of the protected attributes. This is an easily understandable and measurable

criteria for fairness. At a first look, it is appealing — the same number of individuals from each race will be successful in seeking jobs at a particular company. However, a close look reveals difficulties.

Under demographic parity, we must balance the probability of success between groups, which becomes very difficult when the base rates of success are unequal. For example, if women are much more qualified for a job on average than men, then demographic parity will require that we hire less qualified men in place of more qualified women in order to balance the probability of being selected between gender groups. In other words, my false positive rate will be very high for men while my false negative rate will be very high for women, creating a severely unfair practice (Barocas et al., 2017).

Definition 3. *Equalized Odds* — f *satisfies equalized odds if given true outcomes D over all individuals, we have*

$$P[Y = 1|A = a, D = 1] = P[Y = 1|A = b, D = 1] \ \forall a, b \in A$$

$$P[Y = 1|A = a, D = 0] = P[Y = 1|A = b, D = 0] \ \forall a, b \in A$$

(Hardt et al., 2016).

Equalized odds requires that the true positive and false positive rates be balanced between groups. This is often thought to ensure there is no disparate mistreatment across groups. In our hiring case, for example, equalized odds ensures that no one racial group is more likely to be falsely rejected or erroneously hired than another. Given one has been rejected, the probability it was a wrongful rejection is equal regardless of their race or gender.

Equalized odds is often critiqued for struggling to deal with unequal base rates between groups. Consider the following example from criminal justice. We have a distribution rule which says to allocate a parole to a prisoner if they are very unlikely to recidivate. Due to a history of discriminatory practices and social marginalization, black prisoners have a base rate of recidivism much higher than white defendants (Crime and Alliance, 2023). As a result, allocating a parole to a white prisoner has a base line lower likelihood of being a false positive. Therefore, one could achieve equal false positive rates by *adding* false positives to the white portion of the dataset, resulting in an increase in the number of white prisoners receiving parole undeservingly.

As an example of equalized odds gone wrong, consider the COMPAS algorithm (Angwin et al., 2016). COMPAS was calibrated to have equal predictive accuracy across racial groups, but this resulted in a higher false positive rate for black defendants and a much lower false positive rate for white defendants due to unequal base rates.

Definition 4. *Counterfactual Fairness* — f *satisfies counterfactual fairness iff*

$$P[f_{A \leftarrow a}(X) = 1|X = x, A = a] = P[f_{A \leftarrow b}(X) = 1|X = x, A = a] \ \forall a, b \in A$$

(Kusner et al., 2018). Where $P(f_{A \leftarrow a})$ is the counterfactual value of f if A were set to a.

Borrowing from the language of causal inference, counterfactual fairness posits that the protected attributes may not have any causal effect on the outcome of the classification function.

Holding the other covariates constant, if we were to change the value of a protected attribute, the outcome of the classification function should not change. This is a highly appealing notion of fairness. If their protected characteristics do not in any way cause their outcome, then it is difficult to argue that one has been discriminated against. However, this measure is difficult to implement in practice.

Counterfactual fairness is often critiqued based on the difficulty and potential subjectivity of detecting causal links between variables. Recent work on the social construction of demographic variables reveals that causal modeling may have an inherently normative basis (Hu, forthcoming), and even if these issues are set aside, the computational expense of causal discovery can create issues of practicality.

This discussion of dominant algorithmic fairness measures and their critiques reveal that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the problem of algorithmic fairness. Each measure has its own strengths and weaknesses, and the choice of measure will depend on the specific context in which the algorithm is being applied. However, how should one select a measure? What are the normative considerations that should guide this choice? In hopes of developing a more nuanced and structured approach to these questions, we turn to work in the philosophy of distributive justice.

2.2 Theories of Distributive Justice

Distributive justice is a philosophical field of inquiry that examines how to define a fair allocation of goods and resources across a society. A fully fledged account of distributive justice must answer a number of questions. Who should receive those resources which are highly scarce? When and why is it allowed for one person to have more of something than another? By what mechanism can resources be redistributed to achieve justice?

Given that distributive justice defines how fair decisions about allocations can be made, within the formalism we've presented, its role is to broadly define the decision rule which may then be implemented algorithmically. As described in section 1, the dominant theory of distributive justice used in connection with algorithmic decision making is John Rawls' theory of liberal egalitarianism, which we will present here.

Rawls introduces his account of justice through a thought experiment called the veil of ignorance. In this experiment, one is asked to imagine themselves in a pre-societal world, working in collaboration with a number of others to determine how resources should be allocated across society once it begins. Critically, all those involved in designing this distribution of goods are unaware of what their own position and endowments in society will be. One may find themself endowed with a high level of intelligence, or a valuable skill, or wealth at birth, or one may find themself with none of these things, or the opposite. Without knowing which of these positions one will occupy, Rawls argues that one will be motivated to design a society in which the following two principles are satisfied:

1. Each person has an indefeasible right to the most extensive basic liberties compatible with equal liberty for all.

2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both to the greatest

benefit of the least advantaged, to offices open under fair equality of opportunity. (dubbed the *difference principle*).

Rawls refers to the group of individuals designing the society from behind the veil of ignorance as the *original position*. The argument from the original position results in citizens living under a social contract which is guided by the two principles given above. The principles allow us to measure, for any given distribution of resources across society, whether or not the distribution is fair. If the distribution is not fair, then Rawls endorses a program of redistribution to bring the distribution into line with the principles. For example, a soicety with a high-level of wealth inequality is in violation of the difference principle — the wealth gap represents an economic inequality which is not to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. In this case, Rawls would endorse a program of redistribution to balance the wealth across the society in accord with the principles given above.

This type of distributive justice theory is what we refer to as an *end-state* theory of justice. The distribution of goods across society represents a discretely evolving state of affairs, and the role of the theory is to determine whether or not each state is just. Let us consider this view in light of the decision problem we formalised above. Liberal egalitarianism tells us that the decision rule *d* must be such that either all individuals receive the resource of allocation equally, or that inequalities in the allocation of resources must be to the benefit of the least advantaged. Several of the fairness criteria in the literature on algorithmic fairness can be seen as implementing the first condition in terms of equality of opportunity — by regulating the extent and manner in which protected attributes can influence the outcome of the decision, we attempt to ensure that all individuals are entitled to equal basic rights of opportunity in the decision process. However, whether or not the difference principle is satisfied by these measures is less clear.

In our load case, for example, we may be concerned with ensuring that every individual receives equal opportunity to a loan. However, if the decision rule is such that only individuals with a household income above \$100,000 per year, or those who are members of a particular race, are able to receive a loan, then this clearly doesn't provide equal opportunity to all. A measure like demographic parity ensures that individuals from each protected group is equally likely to receive a loan, therefore balancing opportunity across groups. However, whether or not this satisfies the difference principle depends on the base rates of success across groups. If the base rate of loan default is higher for men than for women, demographic parity may require that we give loans to some men who are less likely to pay back their loans rather than qualified women, and in doing so, we are certainly not distributing inequalities to the less advantaged as we would need to under the difference principle.

3   Entitlement Justice

An entitlement theory of justice is a distributive theory of justice which posits the following distribution rule: Allocate amount R of resource X to agent A if and only if A is entitled to R of X. An entitlement in this context is a *property right* held by the agent over the resource. Different entitlement theories of justice differ in the criteria they use to determine entitlements, and the concept of property rights they endorse. Here we will detail the entitlement theory of justice as

proposed by Nozick (1974) its issues, and how it compares to the Rawlsian theory of justice, then discuss more recent efforts at reconciling the theory with the demands of justice.

3.1 Nozick's Entitlement Theory of Justice

Nozick's entitlement theory of justice, often called the concept of libertarian justice, is a theory of justice that was developed as a fundamental challenge to Rawl's liberal egalitarianism. On the liberal egalitarian view, ensuring justice is an inherently redistributive task. The justice of a distribution of resources is determined by the extent to which it is equal over individuals, and there is an implied moral responsibility to redistribute resources to those who lack them to increase the overall equality of the distribution. This ideology provides a strong defense of taxation and welfare programs, which redistribute resources in order to flatten the distribution of wealth (Rawls, 1971).

Libertarian justice takes issue with the consequences of adopting this view. Nozick asks us to consider a thought experiment. Suppose we began with an equal distribution of resources across society. People in this society have the freedom to choose how to use their resources, and to exchange them with others as they feel is fair. Many people are willing to pay to see Wilt Chamberlain play basketball, and so they each pay him a small amount of money to see him play. Over time, Chamberlain will accumulate a large sum of money though his efforts. The distribution of resources in the society will no longer be equal, but will be skewed towards Chamberlain. On the egalitarian account, this excess wealth that Chamberlain has accumulated is unjust, and must be taken and redistributed across society. On the libertarian view, however, Chamberlain has gained an entitlement to his accumulated wealth, and to take it away from him is akin to stealing. After all, if this wealth is taken away from him, then he will have received nothing for his efforts, and enjoyed no fruits of his labor.

In Nozick's theory, people gain entitlements over resources in accordance with 3 principles:

1. The principle of justice in acquisition: A person who acquires a resource through a just process is entitled to that resource. A process of acquisition is just if the acquisition is in accordance with Lockean proviso (discussed below).

2. The principle of justice in transfer: A person who acquires a resource through a just transfer is entitled to that resource. A transfer is just if the transfer is voluntary and the resource is transferred from someone who is entitled to it.

3. The principle of rectification: A person who acquires a resource through the rectification of a prior injustice is entitled to that resource. Rectification must be proportional to the injustice which is being rectified.

On analysis, one will see that a key difference between this libertarian view and the liberal egalitarian view is the fundamental unit of justice. For the liberal egalitarian, justice is realized in the distribution of resources itself. This approach is refered to as a patterned or *end-state* view of justice. For the libertarian, justice is realized in the process by which resources are acquired and transferred. This approach is refered to as a *historical* theory of justice. In order to determine if the current state of affairs is just with respect to a particular holding, one must trace the history

of that holding back to its original acquisition, and ensure that each step in the process was just. For Nozick, any end-state theory of justice is inherently flawed, as it requires the restriction of individual liberties (Henberg, 1977). It is plain that this view of justice hinges strongly on being able to identify and justify the initial acquisition of resources, else the theory can say nothing about the justice of the current distribution of resources.

3.2 The Justification of Acquisition

For Nozick the Lockean proviso underscored the principle of justice in acquisition. The proviso contains two parts. The first part is a mechanism for justifying the initial acquisition of resources. It begins with the inherent right of self-ownership that all individuals possess. Locke argued that when an individual mized their own labor with a resource, they transferred some of themself into the resource, and so extended their right of self-ownership over the resource, thereby obtaining an entitlement to it. The second part of the proviso, almost as an afterthought, is a restriction on the extent to which resources can be acquired. It states that a person can only acquire a resource if there is enough and as good left over for others. This restriction is necessary to ensure that the acquisition of resources does not infringe on the rights of others to acquire resources.

Other accounts of entitlement justice have used different mechanisms to justify the acquisition of resources. (Mack, 1990) proposed that the acquisition of resources could be justified as a separate unalienable right that all individuals possess. (van der Veen and Van Parijs, 1985) proposed that the acquisition of resources could be justified consequentially by the net utility that the acquisition brings to society In general, Van Der Veen showed that given a particular type of holding, one can specify a theory of entitlement justice with a corresponding utilitarian theory of acquisition that can be used as a basis for determining entitlements.

3.3 Critiques of Entitlement

Nozick's entitlement theory is heavily criticized for its foundation in the Lockean proviso. The final clause of the proviso provides a restriction on the extent to which resources can be acquired, but is a weak restriction that makes it difficult to justify the acquisition of resources in practice. There are two mechanisms by which the proviso as it pertains to Nozick's entitlement theory breaks down.

Firstly, the proviso is a weak and vague restriction. It was written in an era when it seemed plausible that individuals would frequently be staking claim over new posessions in the wilderness, in particular parcels of land. However, in the modern setting, there are few unclaimed natural resources, and those that exist come under heavy contention for acquisition. The proviso does not provide a clear mechanism for dividing up the resources in this case, and it seems entirely unlikely that one can satisfy both aspects of the proviso concurrently (Fried, 2004).

Secondly, the proviso has a problem dealing with the issue of surplus value. According to the proviso, when an individual acquires a resource, they acquire it by instilling some valuable portion of themself into the resource. There is thus a fixed amount of value transferred onto the resource through the person's labor. However, in a free market like the one Nozick describes in his theory of entitlement justice, the value of a resource is not fixed, it is dictated by market forces. If an individual acquires a resource and then the value of that resource increases due to scarcity

or high demand, then the individual can trade their resource and gain entitlement over property with a value greater than that which they instilled into their original acquisition (Fried, 1995).

These issues provide a strong challenge to Nozick's entitlement theory as they can result in disastrous consequences. Besides the proviso, Nozick's theory may be criticized for its potential to justify unacceptable outcomes through transfer. For example, someone who is starving may "voluntarily" agree to trade property for food whose value is far below the value of the property, and per Nozick, this trade might be considered just. Critically, this does not spell the end for the entitlement theory of justice, but it does suggest that the underlying theory of property rights for a successful entitlement theory of justice as well as the restrictions on the types of transfers it can justify must be more nuanced than what Nozick proposed.

3.4 Instrumental Property Rights

Successors of Nozick have sought to address these issues by replacing the Lockean proviso with an alternate theory of property rights. van der Veen and Van Parijs (1985) showed that entitlement systems existed on a spectrum such that the theory of property rights at the base could be tailored to the resource being distributed. For example, the precise theory of property rights for land might be different than that for money, or for a scarce natural resource. This observation suggests that a successful entitlement theory of justice must be based on a theory of property rights that is situated in the context of the resource being distributed. This observation is echoed by Fried (2004) who argues that the theory of property rights must be tailored to the resource being distributed, and that the theory must be created with the full scope of its consequences in mind.

Regardless of the thoery of property rights used, to overcome the challenges of Nozick's theory, one must prevent an entitlement theory from justifying morally unacceptable outcomes as Fried (1995) worried about in the case of Nozick's theory.. Sen (1988) shows that while the interpretation of property rights as inerently valuable and inalienable leads to severe issues of poverty and hunger, the interpretation of property rights as *instrumental* rights, which are valuable only insofar as they lead to particular desired outcomes, can be used to develop systems of entitlement without such issues. Instrumental property rights cannot supersede the demands of basic necessity for all agents, and so can be used to develop systems of entitlement which protect property rights while avoiding issues that arise alongside emergent wealth disparity from free market transactions.

Combining these lessons, we realize that a successful modern theory of entitlement justice is one situated atop a theory of domain specific and instrumental property rights. For a given type of holding or resource, the theory of property rights must be tailored to the resource, and must be created and enforced with the full scope of its consequences in mind. This approach allows for the development of a theory of entitlement justice that is both normatively justifiable and practically applicable in the modern world, and thus could be used to inform the design of algorithmic fairness measures.

3.5 Contrast with Liberal Approach

To begin to craft an account of algorithmic fairness through the lens of entitlement justice, it is useful to contrast entitlement theory and the liberal approach to see the critical dimensions along

which they differ. These differences provide a clear set of concerns of entitlement justice that must be addressed by a fairness measure designed to implement entitlement justice.

- Historical vs. end-state — Under an entitlement theory, the justice of a distribution is determined by the history of how the distribution came to be thorugh acquisition and transfer. In contrast under a liberal egalitarian approach, the justice of a distribution is determined by the current state of the distribution itself.

- Individual and collective responsibility — Under an entitlement theory, there is a heavy focus on the actions and properties of individuals which give rise to their entitlements. It is the individual who acquires or trades for resources, and thus it is the individual who is responsible for their own state of affairs. In contrast, under liberal egalitarianism, the only relevant properties of an individual are their current holdings or status in society, and it is a collective responsibility to ensure that resources are distributed according to the demands of justice.

- Redistribution — Under an entitlement theory, redistribution of resources from the more fortunate to the less fortunate is not a moral imperative. In fact, redistribution is unjust if it is not done willingly on the part of the more fortunate. In contrast, Rawls' difference principle explicitly mandates redistribution of resources to the less fortunate.

4   Entitlement Fairness

In order to understand the relationship between algorithmic fairness and entitlement justice, it is important to first analyze the role of the algorithmic decision-maker in the context of entitlement systems. On the entitlement approach, decisions about allocations are made entirely based on property rights. Therefore the task of a decision-maker within our decision problem is clear — the decision-maker becomes a *property rights oracle*. Given a resource and information about a population of individuals, the job of the decision-maker is to determine which individuals hold property rights over the resource. The role of fariness is thus a bit different than under other theories of justice, because we do not start from the assumption of any sort of equality across our population. What type of assumption should we start with instead? To understand this, we will analyze the points of contrast we have drawn between the Rawlsian and entitlement theories of justice.

4.1   Fairness in Process

One critical dimension of entitlement justice is that it governs the process that gives rise to a distribution of resources rather than the distribution itself. This means that decisions about allocation which govern whether a particular individual is able to acquire a given resource must be made in accordance with a fair process. Rather than answering whether or not a given decision-maker outputs a fair distribution, we must instead ask whether the manner in which decisions about allocations are made is fair. This is a subtle but important distinction. Under the entitlement approach, the output distribution is allowed to be heavily skewed in favor of some individuals

or groups if it represents the true distribution of property rights, but the process by which the output distribution is arrived at must be in accordance with the principles of just acquisition.

As an example, consider the case of college admissions. Under the liberal egalitarian approach, we mighty ask whether the output distribution of our algorithm is fair by asking whether it results in a roughly equal number of students admitted between race A and race B. Under the entitlement approach, however, there is no reason to ask this question — we might find that the students entitled to admissions are 90% members of race B. Instead, the relevant questions are how race is used in the admissions process — are students from race A subject to the same rules of acquisition? Drawing on the framework of the Lockean proviso, given that two students, one from each race, have expended equal effort in their applications and studies, are the values endowed in their applications treated as equal? It is evident that to encode entitlement fairness, we cannot simply measure the ouputs of an algorithm, but rather must analyze the treatment of protected features of individuals within the algorithm itself.

4.2   Individual Responsibility

Our second critical dimension of entitlement justice is that it places emphasis on the actions and properties of individuals, while de-emphasizing the role of group membership. Under the entitlement approach, individuals perform actions that give rise to or forfeit their property rights. Fairness must therefore be fundamentally based on a set of features of individuals which are relevant to the process of determining property rights. These features will generally not be simple demographic features or features encoded in the input covariates in a straightforward way, but rather will be a set of more nuanced features that must be predicted on the input data by a complicated high-deminsional model. For example, in the case of college admissions you may want to predict a feature like "cultural fit" which will be difficult to extract. These features can be sorted into two broad categories:

- *Positive Entitlement Features*: These are features of an individual that give rise to property rights. For example, an individual's effort in an application process might be a positive entitlement feature that gives rise to their right to be admitted to a college.

- *Negative Entitlement Features*: These are features of an individual that forfeit their property rights. For example, if an individual cheats on their application, or performs very poorly on an entrance exam, these might be negative entitlement features that forfeit their right to be admitted to a college.

Notice that given the full set of relevant positive and negative features of an individual that determine their property rights, we should be able to fully determine the individual's entitlement to a resource and complete the decision problem. In other words, once we have identified the features and computed them on an individual, the output of the decision maker can be fully specified by these features alone. This lends itself to a natural understanding of fairness in process — the process of mapping an individual to their decision should be fully decided through the morally relevant features identified. These features should be explicitly justified and made transparent to the individuals affected by the decision.

Returning to our discussion of modern entitlement theories, we can recognize that the identification of relevant features is how context-specificity will enter into our account of algorithmic fairness. In each problem domain for algorithmic decision-making, there will be a different set of positive and negative features that are relevant to the entitlement being decided. By identifying and justifying the set of features relevant in each domain, we allow our account of fairness to be sensitive to the context and nuances of the problem at hand. This is a powerful contrast to typical approaches to fairness under which we attempt to identify a universal measure of fairness that can be applied across all domains.

In application, this implies a particular set of structural conditions that must be followed to implement an algorithm which is fair under the entitlement approach. A classification scheme must be developed that first computes the value of each of the relevant positive and negative entitlement features for each individual in the population. Then a decision must be reached through only those computed features, in isolation from the full input data to the algorithm. This may seem to stand in stark contrast to the way that many machine learning algorithms are currently developed. For example, in a typical supervised learning setting, a model is trained to map a set of inputs to a set of outputs according to a high-dimensions loss funtion, with little regard for the manner in which the inputs are processed. However, the internal structure of neural networks and other machine learning models gives rise to a set of features computed by the model, constituting a lower-dimensional representation of the input data (Liu, 2018). The approach we suggest here can be thought of as a way of manually specifying a lower dimensional set of features that are morally relevant to implement individual fairness over as a way of exercising control over how the model makes decisions in order to implement fairness as a process.

What would selection of these features look like in practice? Consider again the case of college admissions, and in particular, how decision are made about admissions of students who have less access to resources and academic opportunities. There are several features that are not straightforwardly encoded in the input data but are certainly relevant to the entitlement

- Firstly, we might want to extract a feature that captures the notion of current academic performance. This is likely a function of GPA, test scores, and other typical academic indicators, and is justified by an appeal to the idea that students who perform well academically are more likely to succeed in college. Likelihood of success is made relevant by the fact that individuals who are likely to succeed at the university return gains to the university, and therefore justify their admissions in a free market of talent.

- In contrast, we should also say that a student is entitled to admissions if they have demonstrated a stronger work ethic and commitment level than their peers, even if they attended a lower income school and thereby has less access to advanced classes and tutoring resources. Effort and commitment demonstrate a greater value endowed into an application, and therefore a higher degree of entitlement.

- Finally, we might also want to consider a studen't cultural fit and addition to the campus community. This feature reflects a student's entitlement on the basis of more than just academic merit — a student who provides cultural value to a university provides similar, though reduced value to the univerisity as a student who provides academic value, and therefore has a similar, though lesser, entitlement.

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An algorithm meant to implement entitlement fairness in college admissions would then consist of predictors which extract each of these values for each individual, and then a system of mapping these values to a decision about admissions.

Now, one critical dimension of fairness remains to be discussed — how do we ensure that the predictors which compute the value of the relevant features for each individual are themselves fair? To understand this question, we should delve into the basis of the entitlement features themselves. Positive features of an individual give rise to property rights through the mixing of one's self with the subject of the entitlement itself. If one's college application demonstrates a strong work ethic, the individual has spent significant effort to endow their application with value derived from their own self-ownership. The right to self-ownership is a fundamental principle that does represent one form of equality baked into the entitlement approach — we are required to treat the endowment of value derived from self-ownership as equal across all individuals, irrespective of their characteristics or group membership. Notice that I care about this on an individual basis — if for just one person I value their self-ownership less than another, I have failed to respect their property rights. As a result, it seems clear that the appropriate way to ensure that predictors of positive entitlement features are fair is to ensure that they satisfy counterfactual fairness. Holding fixed those covariatates of an individual which give rise to the positive entitlement feature, we must ensure that the predictor outputs the same value regardless of the individual's other features.

For negative entitlement features, the situation is a bit different. Rather than gaining an entitlement through the mixing of one's self with the subject of the entitlement, the basis for negative entitlement features is the failure to respect the inherent rights of others. For example, if an individual cheats on entrance exam scores that they include in their application, they are attempting a coercive act that violates the rights of other students who are applying honestly and in doing so, they forfeit their ability to gain entitlement over admissions. In this case, our chief fairness concern is with errors in the predictor. Wrongful accusations of negative features result in the depriivation of one's property rights and therefore must be avoided. Similarly, mistakenly identifying an individual as not having a negative feature results in the unjust deprivation of someone else's property rights in the population. It is a property of algorithmic predictors that false positives and false negatives will occur, but critically, this risk should be distributed evenly across all persons, otherwise we will violate justice in acquisition, which, in Nozick's formulation, demands that all persons have opportunity to acquire holdings. As a result, we must ensure that the predictors of negative entitlement features balance false positive and false negative rates across groups.

4.3   Entitlement Fairness and Redistribution

A third critical dimension of entitlement justice is that it rejects the notion of redistribution. Under the entitlement approach, once property rights have been established, they must be respected and protected, and no attempt should be made to redistribute resources in order to achieve a more equal distribution. Note that this is already successfully encoded in the system we have described. Once the set of morally relevant features have been identified, the decision problem output must be entirely separated from the input data given the relevant features. This means that no redistributive scheme may be implemented after the property rights decision that attempts to balance the distribution of resources over less fortunate individuals.

We are, however, offered a mechanism through entitlement theory for improving outcomes for those who have been wrongfully disadvantaged through the principle of rectification. For example, if we find that a particular group of individuals has been systematically excluded from a resource due to a historical injustice, rectification allows us to then consider membership in that group to be a positive entitlement feature, and to thereby account for it within the decision problem. This is a powerful mechanism for addressing historical injustices and allows us to consider the broader social context in which our algorithm is situated.

4.4 Measuring Fairness

Having developed a qualitative account of entitlement fairness, we may now formalize our account in a way that allows us to measure it. We can define a measure of entitlement fairness as follows. Given our typical decision problem, identify a set of morally relevant features of each individual in the population, $V = \{v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_j\}$. These features should be partitioned into two sets, V^+ and V^- where V^+ contains the positive entitlement features and V^- contains the negative entitlement features relevant to the problem domain. Implement a predictor for each feature, $v_j = \hat{p}_j(X)$. Now, these are the conditions for entitlement fairness:

1. $P[f(X_1) = 1|V = v] = P[f(X_2) = 1|V = v]\ \forall X_1, X_2$ (Independence Condition)

2. $P[p_{j,A \leftarrow a}(X) = 1|X = x, A = a] = P[p_{j,A \leftarrow b}(X) = 1|X = x, A = a]\ \forall a, b \in A, v_j \in V^+$ (Positive Feature Counterfactual Condition)

3. $P[p_j(X) = 1|v_j(X) = 0, A = a] = P[p_j(X) = 1|v_j(X) = 0, A = b]\ \forall a, b \in A, v_j \in V^-$ and $P[p_j(X) = 0|v_j(X) = 1, A = a] = P[p_j(X) = 0|v_j(X) = 1, A = b]\ \forall a, b \in A, v_j \in V^-$ (Negative Feature Odds Condition)

TODO: College admissions example all the way through

5 Discussion

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