



ESPRESSO SYSTEMS

Optimism-Espresso Integration

Internal Security Audit: OP Streamer & TEE Contracts

Team:

Internal Security Team
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v1.0

Scope:

OP Streamer Component
TEE Contracts
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1 Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of a security audit of the Optimism-Espresso integration, focusing on the OP Streamer component and TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) contracts. The audit identified **14 vulnerabilities** (2 Critical, 4 High, 1 Medium, 7 Low) across batch streaming logic, TEE networking, and smart contract implementations.

Key findings from this assessment include 2 Critical, 4 High, 1 Medium, and 7 Low vulnerabilities identified. The critical and several high-severity issues have been addressed in PR #43 of the espresso-tee-contracts repository. The remaining findings require attention to strengthen the overall security posture of the integration.

We recommend addressing the identified findings through the standard development cycle and implementing the security recommendations outlined in the detailed findings section to further strengthen the overall security posture of the integrated platform.

1.1 Severity Distribution

Severity	Count	Fixed	Open
Critical	2	2	0
High	4	1	3
Medium	1	0	1
Low	7	0	7
Total	14	3	11

1.2 Key Findings Summary

ID	Vulnerability	Severity	Component	Status
V-4	Cross-Chain Deployment	Critical	TEE Contracts	Fixed
V-6	Missing Journal Validations	Critical	TEE Contracts	Fixed
V-2	Infinite Buffer Growth	High	OP Streamer	Open
V-3	TEE Networking MitM	High	TEE Enclave	Open
V-5	Signer Deletion DoS	High	TEE Contracts	Fixed
V-7	Type Mismatch in Refresh()	High	OP Streamer	Open
V-1	All-At-Once RPC Calls	Medium	OP Streamer	Open
V-8	Missing Duplicate Detection	Low	OP Streamer	Open
V-9	Misleading Log Messages	Low	OP Streamer	Open
V-10	Inefficient Batch Overwrite	Low	OP Streamer	Open



ID	Vulnerability	Severity	Component	Status
V-11	Confusing Variable Naming	Low	OP Streamer	Open
V-12	Unused Constant Declaration	Low	OP Streamer	Open
V-13	Missing Sort Order Validation	Low	OP Streamer	Open
V-14	No Network Failure Distinction	Low	OP Streamer	Open



2 Scope and Methodology

2.1 Audit Scope

This audit covers the following components:

- **OP Streamer Component** (espresso/)
 - batch_buffer.go – Batch buffering and ordering logic
 - streamer.go – Espresso block streaming and batch processing
 - buffered_streamer.go – Buffered streaming implementation
- **TEE Contracts** (espresso-tee-contracts)
 - EspressoNitroTEEVerifier.sol – AWS Nitro attestation verification
 - EspressoSGXTEEVerifier.sol – Intel SGX attestation verification
 - TEEHelper.sol – Shared TEE helper functionality
 - Related interfaces and libraries

2.2 Methodology

- **Static Code Analysis:** Manual review of Go and Solidity source code
- **Architecture Review:** Analysis of component interactions and data flow
- **Attack Scenario Modeling:** Threat modeling for potential exploits
- **Documentation Review:** Analysis of security documentation and deployment guides



3 OP Streamer Component Vulnerabilities

3.1 V-1: All-At-Once RPC Calls

Criticality: Medium

Status: Open

Component: espresso/streamer.go – CheckBatch() and processRemainingBatches()

3.1.1 Overview

The CheckBatch function makes synchronous L1 RPC calls (HeaderHashByNumber) when validating finalized batches. When multiple batches become finalized simultaneously, the system executes sequential synchronous RPC calls, causing the streamer to freeze.

3.1.2 Description

Vulnerable Code Path:

```
func CheckBatch(batch B, l10origin eth.BlockID) {
    if isFinalized(l10origin) {
        hash := HeaderHashByNumber(l10origin.Number) // Synchronous RPC
        // ... validation logic
    }
}
```

Attack Scenario:

1. Node accumulates 500 batches in RemainingBatches while waiting for L1 finality
2. L1 finalizes a new state
3. processRemainingBatches() iterates all 500 batches
4. Finalized check now passes for all batches
5. System executes **500 sequential synchronous RPC calls** inside the Update loop

3.1.3 Impact

- **Availability:** Streamer freezes for seconds to minutes
- **Denial of Service:** Node stops fetching new Espresso blocks
- **Cascading Failure:** Downstream components dependent on streamer become blocked

3.1.4 Recommendation

1. **Immediate:** Implement batch RPC calls using eth_getBlockByNumber with multicall
2. **Short-term:** Add asynchronous RPC call handling with worker pool



3. **Long-term:** Cache L1 block hashes and implement rate limiting



3.2 V-2: Infinite Buffer Growth

Criticality: High

Status: Open

Component: espresso/batch_buffer.go – BatchBuffer and HasNext()

3.2.1 Overview

The BatchBuffer has no size limit and will accept batches indefinitely while waiting for a missing batch, leading to memory exhaustion and node crashes.

3.2.2 Description

Vulnerable Logic:

```
func (b *BatchBuffer[B]) HasNext() bool {
    return b.Peek() == b.expectedBatchPos
}
```

Attack Scenario:

1. Node expects Batch #100
2. Espresso network delivers Batch #101, #102, ... #50,000
3. Batch #100 is missing (network partition, Byzantine node, etc.)
4. BatchBuffer accepts and stores Batches #101 through #50,000 in memory
5. Node waits indefinitely for Batch #100
6. Memory exhaustion leads to node crash

3.2.3 Impact

- **Availability:** Node crashes due to out-of-memory (OOM)
- **Denial of Service:** Missing batch prevents all downstream processing
- **No Recovery:** No mechanism to invalidate the stream and skip missing batch

3.2.4 Recommendation

1. **Critical:** Implement maximum buffer size (e.g., 1000 batches)
2. **Critical:** Add timeout for missing batches (e.g., 10 minutes)
3. **Important:** Implement gap detection and alerting
4. **Important:** Add mechanism to request missing batches from peers
5. **Long-term:** Implement stream reset when gap is detected beyond threshold

**Suggested Implementation:**

```
const MAX_BUFFER_SIZE = 1000
const MISSING_BATCH_TIMEOUT = 10 * time.Minute

func (b *BatchBuffer[B]) TryInsert(batch B) (int, bool) {
    if len(b.batches) >= MAX_BUFFER_SIZE {
        return 0, false // Reject new batches
    }

    if batch.Number > b.expectedBatchPos {
        if time.Since(b.lastProgressTime) > MISSING_BATCH_TIMEOUT {
            // Log critical error and reset stream
            return 0, false
        }
    }

    // ... existing logic
}
```



3.3 V-7: Type Mismatch in Refresh()

Criticality: High

Status: Open

Component: espresso/streamer.go – Refresh() function, Line 173

3.3.1 Overview

The Refresh() function contains a type mismatch where it compares `fallbackBatchPos` (representing a Batch Index) with `hotShotPos` (representing an Espresso Block Height). These are incompatible types that should not be directly compared.

3.3.2 Description

Vulnerable Code:

```
func (s *BatchStreamer[B]) Refresh(ctx context.Context,
    finalizedL1 eth.L1BlockRef, safeBatchNumber uint64,
    safeL1Origin eth.BlockID) error {
    // Line 173
    if fallbackBatchPos < hotShotPos { // Type mismatch!
        // ... logic
    }
}
```

Issue:

- `fallbackBatchPos` is a **Batch Index** (sequential batch number)
- `hotShotPos` is an **Espresso Block Height** (blockchain height)
- Comparing these directly may lead to logic errors

3.3.3 Impact

- **State Inconsistency:** Incorrect state transitions during batch processing
- **Logic Error:** May cause unexpected behavior in edge cases
- **Potential Data Loss:** Could skip or process wrong batches

3.3.4 Recommendation

1. Review the comparison logic and ensure type compatibility
2. Add type-safe wrappers or explicit conversions
3. Document the relationship between batch index and block height
4. Add assertions to validate the comparison is meaningful



3.4 V-8 through V-14: Additional Low Severity Issues

3.4.1 V-8: Missing Duplicate Detection

Criticality: [Low](#) **Status:** Open **Component:** batch_buffer.go

The Insert(batch B, i int) function unconditionally inserts a batch without checking for duplicates, potentially causing data redundancy and memory waste.

3.4.2 V-9: Misleading Log Messages

Criticality: [Low](#) **Status:** Open **Component:** streamer.go

Lines 304 and 435 contain misleading and redundant log messages that make debugging more difficult and could confuse operators.

3.4.3 V-10: Inefficient Batch Overwrite

Criticality: [Low](#) **Status:** Open **Component:** streamer.go

Line 435 unnecessarily overwrites a batch in the RemainingBatches map when the batch already exists, performing redundant work.

3.4.4 V-11: Confusing Variable Naming

Criticality: [Low](#) **Status:** Open **Component:** cli.go

The configuration variable PollingHotShotPollingInterval contains redundant naming that reduces code readability.

3.4.5 V-12: Unused Constant Declaration

Criticality: [Low](#) **Status:** Open **Component:** espresso/

The constant HOTSHOT_BLOCK_STREAM_LIMIT is defined but never used, leading to dead code.

3.4.6 V-13: Missing Sort Order Validation

Criticality: [Low](#) **Status:** Open **Component:** batch_buffer.go

The TryInsert() function assumes the batch list is sorted and uses binary search without verifying this invariant.

3.4.7 V-14: No Network Failure Distinction

Criticality: [Low](#) **Status:** Open **Component:** streamer.go

The confirmEspressoBlockHeight() function returns false when RPC calls fail, making it impossible to distinguish between actual state verification and network errors.



4 TEE Enclave Vulnerabilities

4.1 V-3: TEE Networking MitM Attack

Criticality: High

Status: Open

Component: TEE Enclave Networking Layer

4.1.1 Overview

The TEE enclave networking layer lacks sufficient protection against Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks, potentially allowing malicious actors to feed the enclave with arbitrary input, such as maliciously crafted HotShot blocks.

4.1.2 Description

Vulnerability:

- TEE networking layer does not enforce strict TLS certificate validation
- No certificate pinning implemented
- Enclave trusts any valid TLS certificate

Attack Scenario:

1. Attacker positions themselves between TEE enclave and HotShot network
2. Attacker presents valid TLS certificate (e.g., from compromised CA)
3. TEE accepts connection as legitimate
4. Attacker injects malicious HotShot blocks
5. TEE processes fraudulent data as authentic

4.1.3 Impact

- **Integrity:** TEE processes malicious input as authentic
- **Consensus Manipulation:** Fraudulent blocks could affect L2 state
- **Trust Violation:** Undermines security guarantees of TEE

4.1.4 Current Mitigation

Documentation exists at: <https://eng-wiki.espressosys.com/mainch36.html>

However, implementation remains vulnerable.



4.1.5 Recommendation

1. **Critical:** Implement certificate pinning
 - Embed expected certificates during enclave build
 - Include certificates in PCR0 hash measurement
 - Ensure enclave only trusts specific, validated endpoints
2. **Important:** Add certificate rotation mechanism
 - Design automatic certificate update process
 - Implement gradual rollover to avoid service interruption
3. **Long-term:** Implement attestation-based mutual authentication
 - Both endpoints verify each other's TEE attestations
 - Remove dependency on traditional PKI



5 TEE Contracts Vulnerabilities

The following vulnerabilities were identified and **fixed** in PR #43 of the espresso-tee-contracts repository.

PR #43 Summary

Title: Internal Audit #2 – Security Fixes

Merged: January 28, 2026

Commit: 1a5a179

Files Changed: 21 files (+1098, -250 lines)

Test Coverage: 624 new test lines added

5.1 V-4: Cross-Chain Deployment Vulnerability

Criticality: Critical

Status: Fixed

Component: EspressoNitroTEEVerifier.sol, EspressoSGXTEEVerifier.sol

Fix Reference: Commit 57bf5de, PR #43

5.1.1 Overview

TEE Verifier contracts maintain chain-specific on-chain state for registered enclaves and signers. However, attestations are not chain-specific by default, allowing replay attacks across different chains with inconsistent security policies.

5.1.2 Description

Vulnerable State Management:

```
// These mappings are stored ON-CHAIN (chain-specific):
mapping(ServiceType => mapping(bytes32 => bool))
    public registeredEnclaveHashes;
mapping(ServiceType => mapping(address => bool))
    public registeredServices;
```

Problem: State is local to each chain, but attestations can be replayed across chains.

5.1.3 Attack Scenarios

Attack 1: Uncoordinated Revocation

- Day 1: Enclave hash approved on Ethereum and Arbitrum
- Day 30: Vulnerability discovered in enclave
- Day 31: Hash revoked on Ethereum
- **Result:** Attacker blocked on Ethereum [OK] but still valid on Arbitrum [FAIL]



Attack 2: Attestation Replay

1. TEE generates single attestation
2. Attacker registers on Ethereum using attestation
3. Attacker reuses **same attestation** on Arbitrum
4. Attacker reuses **same attestation** on Optimism
5. All registrations succeed (if hash is approved on each chain)

Attack 3: Policy Inconsistency

- Ethereum: High security, only approves hash v2.0 (latest, secure)
- Arbitrum: Different governance, approves hash v1.0 (old, vulnerable)
- **Result:** Same codebase, different security across chains

5.1.4 Impact

- **Security Fragmentation:** Inconsistent security policies across chains
- **Delayed Response:** Vulnerability on one chain doesn't automatically propagate
- **Replay Attacks:** Single attestation usable on multiple chains

5.1.5 Fix Applied

Added Security Considerations section in README.md documenting multi-chain deployment risks and best practices.



5.2 V-5: Signer Deletion DoS Attack

Criticality: High

Status: Fixed

Component: TEEHelper.sol

Fix Reference: Commit 3026966, PR #43

5.2.1 Overview

The TEE Helper contract iterates over a list of registered signers in deletion operations. An attacker could exploit unbounded loops to cause denial of service by exceeding block gas limits.

5.2.2 Description

Attack Scenario:

1. Attacker registers many signers (e.g., 10,000 addresses)
2. Enclave is compromised
3. Operator tries to revoke by calling `setEnclaveHash(hash, false)` and `deleteRegisteredSigners()`
4. **Deletion fails due to gas limit** – transaction reverts
5. **Compromised signers remain active** – security breach!

5.2.3 Impact

- **Security Bypass:** Unable to fully revoke compromised enclave access
- **DoS on Critical Security Function:** Deletion operation required but impossible
- **Persistent Vulnerability:** Compromised signers remain valid indefinitely

5.2.4 Fix Applied in PR #43

Changed the security model so that **deleting signers is no longer required**. Revoking an enclave hash via `setEnclaveHash(hash, false)` is now sufficient to prevent new malicious registrations.

Signers	Gas Cost	Block Limit (30M)	Status
100	~500k	[OK] Safe	OK
1,000	~5M	[OK] Safe	OK
5,000	~25M	[WARN] Close	Risk
10,000	~50M	[FAIL] Over	DoS

Why This Works:

- When an enclave is compromised, the private keys are already exposed to attackers



- Existing signer addresses in the registry don't grant any additional attack surface
- The security boundary is enforced at enclave hash validation, not signer presence
- Revoking the hash immediately protects the system



5.3 V-6: Missing TEE Journal Struct Validations

Criticality: Critical

Status: Fixed

Component: EspressoNitroTEEVerifier.sol

Fix Reference: Commit c47d9aa, PR #43

5.3.1 Overview

The VerifierJournal struct contains critical cryptographic fields (PCRs, public key, nonce, timestamp, userData) that require comprehensive validation. Missing validations could allow malformed attestations to be accepted, potentially leading to predictable signer addresses or other cryptographic attacks.

5.3.2 Description

Journal Structure:

```
struct VerifierJournal {  
    bytes32[] pcrs;           // Platform Configuration Registers  
    bytes publicKey;         // Enclave public key (should be 65 bytes)  
    bytes nonce;             // Replay protection  
    uint256 timestamp;       // Attestation time  
    bytes userData;          // Application data  
    string moduleId;         // Nitro module identifier  
    VerificationResult result;  
}
```

5.3.3 Specific Vulnerabilities

V-6a: Empty PCR Array

- **Issue:** No validation that PCR array contains data
- **Impact:** Could accept attestations without platform measurements
- **Exploit:** Bypass hardware attestation requirements

V-6b: Invalid Public Key Format

- **Issue:** No check for correct public key length (65 bytes) and format
- **Impact:** Malformed public keys could lead to predictable addresses

V-6c: Predictable Signer Addresses

- **Issue:** Invalid public key formats can produce predictable Ethereum addresses
- **Impact:** Attacker could precompute and claim desirable addresses
- **Severity:** Enables address squatting and impersonation



5.3.4 Fix Applied

Added comprehensive `_validateJournal()` validation function:

```
function _validateJournal(VerifierJournal memory journal)
    internal view {
        // 1. Validate PCR array bounds
        require(journal.pcrs.length > 0, "PCR array cannot be empty");

        // 2. CRITICAL: Validate public key format
        require(journal.publicKey.length == 65,
            "Invalid public key length");
        require(journal.publicKey[0] == 0x04,
            "Public key must be uncompressed");

        // 3. Note: Nonce validation removed - AWS Nitro may have
        //       empty nonce. Implement nonce tracking separately
        //       if replay protection needed

        // 4. Timestamp validation already done by NitroEnclaveVerifier
        //       Result would be InvalidTimestamp if timestamp is bad
    }
```



6 Conclusion

This security audit identified 14 vulnerabilities across the Optimism-Espresso integration code-base. While 3 critical and high-severity issues have been successfully addressed in PR #43, 11 vulnerabilities remain open and require attention.

6.1 Priority Recommendations

1. Immediate Action Required:

- V-2: Implement buffer size limits to prevent memory exhaustion
- V-3: Implement certificate pinning for TEE networking
- V-7: Fix type mismatch in Refresh() function

2. Short-term Improvements:

- V-1: Optimize RPC call batching
- Low-severity code quality issues (V-8 through V-14)

3. Long-term Monitoring:

- Continue monitoring fixed vulnerabilities
- Implement comprehensive testing for edge cases
- Regular security audits of new features



7 List of Changes

Version	Date	Description	Author
0.1	2026-01-27	Initial draft with findings	Internal Security Team
0.5	2026-01-28	Added PR #43 fix details	Internal Security Team
1.0	2026-01-29	Final report	Internal Security Team

8 Disclaimer

This report is a comprehensive review of in-scope items and should not be considered an endorsement or disapproval of any facet of the Espresso Systems software platform. It does not guarantee or provide any warranty regarding the absolute continuity of the analyzed technologies. Nor does it reflect the economics, value, business model, or legal compliance of such products. This report should not be used to make any investment decisions, nor does it constitute investment advice. This report serves as a comprehensive evaluation of the technology and constituent components, aimed at improving the overall security posture of the platform.



9 Imprint

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