

h550 project - Security assessment of an AP

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1 Introduction

Nowadays most IOT devices contain some flavor of a vulnerability, backdoor or critical bug. However, those problems in some cases are never fixed as IoT devices are dependent on their vendors for firmware update due their code being proprietary (in most cases). Furthermore, some users might forget (or not know) that their device's software is not updated and by extension, vulnerable. The goal of this project is to show how easy or un-easy it is to dump, find and exploit an access point.

1.1 Context

In this section we will explain what the target is and what are the settings and boundaries of the analysis.

1.2 Device

The device is an access point from Cisco released in October 2008, aimed at small businesses. This products has been discontinued in 2019 and its sales ended back in 2014.




Figure 1: Pictures of of the WAP4410N

The device can be powered up using a barrel adapter or through PoE which hints at its purpose being ease of batch deployment. On the network side, it support 802.11n, 802.11g and 802.11b. With the time period in mind, and, for 802.11b and g, the only supported encryption protocol was WEP (64/128 bits in this case). Also, firmware updates were handled through the web portal (as there is no I/O sadly, they are down. On figure 1c, we can see a cable going outside of the device, this is the UART access which was enabled by default. Most of the remaining ICs are irrelevant/too old to be told apart because of wear of the imprint and/or arcane references.

1.3 Lab setup

The testing setup is made of the WAP4410N, a router and my computer : for simplicity sake, the router is out of scope from this analysis and all its security features are disabled. The computer has a wireless connection to the AP.




Figure 2: Lab setup

The equipment that I used was very minimal,

software	hardware
Wireshark, nmap GNU Screen, xxd, dd, binwalk squashfs-utils radare2, ghidra	FT232 board USB-A UART adapter Multimeter Dupont Cables

Figure 3: List of used software/hardware

At first, I intended to use a SPI programmer (CH341a) to dump the firmware more easily using [flashrom](#). However, as we will see in later section it was not feasible in this context without specialized hardware tools. On the software side, there are no real limitations as most of the state of the art tools are free and open source (with the exception of IDA).


2 Reconnaissance

In this section, we will discuss the reconnaissance of our device. This part was inspired by the first step in the cyber kill chain (which will be vaguely followed throughout the following sections). We will proceed in a bottom up approach in regards to the level of abstraction : from hardware to software

2.1 Physical

Teardown The device is held together by four 8-points screws under rubber feets which indicates that it wasn't meant to be opened (nor repaired ...). Once inside, most of the device is empty and everything is available without further need to dismantle it.

IC reconnaissance At this point we can start looking for interesting ICs like flash memory or processors :



- reference : [MX29LV640DBTC-90G](#)
- format : 48 TSOP
- manufacturer : Macronix
- size : 8MB



- family : Atheros 9100
- reference : Atheros9132
- manufacturer : Qualcomm
- architecture : MIPS 24K V7.4 32bits
- endianness : big endian
- bogomips : 265.21

The MIPS architecture is very common on embedded devices and very easy to reverse engineer its assembly. Regarding the NAND flash, it would as hinted before, it would require to de-solder the IC using a special SPI programmer (or an adapter for the ch341a).

Finding the UART There are 4 header pin on the board, we will try them using a multimeter : the UART has a very specific behavior.




Figure 4: UART connected through Dupont cables with labeled ports

Before taking measures, we must find the ground, to do so, can check continuity between a metal part (which should be grounded) and the ground pin from a known IC (in this case the flash). After making sure that a metal part is grounded we can start taking measurements,

pin	R_{VSS}	V	info
1	$8.6k\Omega$	$\approx 3.3V$	VCC
2	$\infty k\Omega$	$\approx 0V - VCC$	TX
3	$\infty k\Omega$	$\approx 0V$	RX
4	$0 k\Omega$	$0V$	GND

Figure 5: Multimeter measurements

The voltage goes from 0V to the VCC, at startup because of the boot log outputs a lot of data. The Rx has a voltage of 0 as its used to receive data and doesn't send any. The next step is to try connecting the UART to the computer using a FT232,




Figure 6: UART to USB-A

Regarding the baudrate, we can try 115200 as its the most common,

```
screen /dev/ttyUSB0 115200
```

This is indeed the correct baudrate however, if that wasn't the case we would have had to find it by trial and error or by using a logic analyzer.

2.2 Bootloader

2.2.1 Boot log

First, we will take a look at the boot log that is displayed before getting access to any console as analyzing it provides a lot of information about the hardware, software, ... One such information is the bootloader : U-Boot 1.1.4 which is a very common and open source bootloader. We can even tell that the bootloader was compiled the 19 of August 2009 at 14:53:37 which makes it very old

```
arg 1: console=ttyS0,115200
arg 2: root=31:02
arg 3: rootfstype=jffs2
arg 4: init=/sbin/init
arg 5: mtdparts=ar9100-nor0:256k(u-boot),
```

```

        64k(u-boot-env),
        6464k(rootfs),
        1280k(uImage),
        64k(nvram),
        64k(calibration)
arg 6: mem=32M

```

From the capture snippet above we see that the rootfs uses jffs2 however, this is not the case.

```

Kernel command line: console=ttyS0,
                    115200 root=31:02 rootfstype=squashfs init=/sbin/
                    init mtdparts=ar9100-nor0:256k(u-boot),
                    64k(u-boot-env),
                    6464k(rootfs),
                    1280k(uImage),
                    64k(nvram),
                    64k(calibration)
mem=32M

```

This snippet comes after the previous ones and tells us that rootfs uses squashfs. This information can be confirmed later using the console and/or by analyzing the dumped firmware. There is no further information on the use of jffs2 on the device : in normal use cases, a device would have two filesystems one for persistency of configuration (read write) and the other containing the software (read only). How the device handles persistency remains a mystery in our case.

2.2.2 U-boot

At some point we are prompted to interrupt the auto boot : by doing so, we get the U-boot console which allows us to get more information on the device,

```

ar7100> bdinfo
...
flashstart  = 0xBF000000
flashsize   = 0x00800000
flashoffset = 0x0002F690
...
baudrate    = 115200 bps

```

We now know the memory addresses of the start and of the flash storage : this will come handy during the firmware extraction in [3.1.1](#). There are other useful commands available to us such as tftpboot which allows us to boot over the network by serving an image on our computer. Assuming that the console is protected, this could allow us to get an unrestricted console by providing our own patched image (or using an open source one). Other than that, there are custom commands for testing purposes.

2.3 Console

If we leave the autoboot alone, we get into a root Linux ash shell. There are device specific CLI commands and a reduced busybox. There is a fwversion command which tell us that the firmware version is 2.0.4.2. As we are already root, we can't really do any privilege escalation. Furthermore, as the device only has a squashfs3 file system we can't get any persistency.

2.4 Network

We can run a port scan on the device using nmap,

```
Nmap scan report for wap86eb04 (192.168.1.3)
```

```
Host is up (0.012s latency).
```

```
Not shown: 65532 closed tcp ports (reset)
```

```
PORT      STATE      SERVICE
```

```
80/tcp    open       http
```

```
443/tcp    open       https
```

```
32764/tcp  open       unknown
```

```
MAC Address: CC:EF:48:86:EB:04 (Cisco Systems)
```

The http(s) ports are used for the web administrative portals : when using the http web portal the credential are sent through base64. However, this isn't really a problem as the http port will most likely be disabled by any competent IT staff in real use cases

3 Exploitation

In this section we will see how to exploit the device

3.1 Dumping the firmware

3.1.1 Through the bootloader

This is the most "classical" technique used to dump firmware because of its simplicity and lack of technical and material requirements. To perform it, we will leverage the memory display command using the adresse from [2.2.2](#) and capturing the output. The size is written in decimal and divided by 4 as it reads by blocks of dwords. When the read is done, the output has to be cleaned into a binary format (there is a script in the repo). However, this technique didn't work in our case. The reason, is unclear as the output is not entirely unreadable when using binwalk : some possible reasons might be,

- glitchy cable
- this version of U-Boot has a problem with memory display
- out of bound area on the NAND flash
- endianness problem

3.1.2 Through the console

To do so, we have to update the version of busybox : we will download pre-compiled busybox binary and serve it to our device through an ftp server. We download it in the /tmp directory as it the only location in a read only filesystem where we can write a file. From there, we use netcat to upload the mtd partitions : concatenate the partitions together to make the whole firmware image :

```

/home/aaaaaa/aaaaaaaa/aaa/aaaaaaaaaaaa/dump/firmware2.0.4.2.bin
-----

```

DECIMAL	HEXADECIMAL	DESCRIPTION
158992	0x26D10	CRC32 polynomial table, big endian
327680	0x50000	SquashFS file system, big endian, version: 3.0, compression: unknown, inode count: 794, block size: 65536, image size: 4761817 bytes, created: 2011-05-13 10:54:02
6946816	0x6A0000	uImage firmware image, header size: 64 bytes, data size: 875547 bytes, compression: gzip, CPU: MIPS32, OS: Linux, image type: OS Kernel Image, load address: 0x80002000, entry point: 0x801C2000, creation time: 2011-05-13 10:51:49, image name: "Linux Kernel Image"
8269351	0x7E2E27	PEM private key
8270238	0x7E319E	PEM certificate

```

-----

```

with this we can do some reverse engineering however, as the rootfs uses squashfs3 we can't patch binaries on the fly : we need to upload the entire firmware therefore we didn't path any binary.

3.2 CVE-2014-0659

This [CVE](#) is a backdoor planted by SerComm. To try it, we ping the 32764 using netcat : this opens a prompt in which after entering some random data and press enter will answer with ScMM, when analyzing the traffic we can notice

handshake	372	14.172231196	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.3	TCP	74	42870	-	32764	[SYN]	Seq=0	Win=64240	Len=0	MSS=1460	SACK_PERM	TSval=4153388813	TSecr=
	373	14.172927182	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.2	TCP	74	32764	-	42870	[SYN, ACK]	Seq=0	Ack=1	Win=5792	Len=0	MSS=1460	SACK_PERM	TSval=4551969
	374	14.172983182	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.3	TCP	66	42870	-	32764	[ACK]	Seq=1	Ack=1	Win=64256	Len=0	TSval=4153388817	TSecr=4551969	
	399	18.128215992	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.3	TCP	73	42870	-	32764	[PSH, ACK]	Seq=1	Ack=1	Win=64256	Len=7	TSval=4153392772	TSecr=4551969	
end of connection	400	18.131802343	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.2	TCP	66	32764	-	42870	[ACK]	Seq=1	Ack=8	Win=5792	Len=0	TSval=4555928	TSecr=4153392772	
	401	18.132315025	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.2	TCP	78	32764	-	42870	[PSH, ACK]	Seq=1	Ack=8	Win=5792	Len=12	TSval=4555928	TSecr=4153392772	
	402	18.132337521	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.3	TCP	66	42870	-	32764	[ACK]	Seq=8	Ack=13	Win=64256	Len=0	TSval=4153392776	TSecr=4555928	
	403	18.134825921	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.2	TCP	66	32764	-	42870	[FIN, ACK]	Seq=13	Ack=8	Win=5792	Len=0	TSval=4555938	TSecr=4153392776	
	404	18.134973867	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.3	TCP	66	42870	-	32764	[FIN, ACK]	Seq=8	Ack=14	Win=64256	Len=0	TSval=4153392779	TSecr=4555938	
	405	18.135580770	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.2	TCP	66	32764	-	42870	[ACK]	Seq=14	Ack=9	Win=5792	Len=0	TSval=4555931	TSecr=4153392779	

Figure 7: Capture of the exploit traffic

the data that we sent and as the answer we get, 53 63 4d 4d ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 which translates to ScMM. Based on the work of [Eloi Vanderbeken](#) : you can use this exploit to get remote code execution on the device. Going into some reverse engineering of the vulnerable binary.