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SMART CONTRACT

Security Audit Report

Customer: SwapXI

Website: https://swapxi.net Platform: Tron Blockchain

Language: Solidity

Date: August 24th, 2021

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THIS IS SECURITY AUDIT REPORT DOCUMENT AND WHICH MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION WHICH IS CONFIDENTIAL. WHICH INCLUDES ANY POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES AND MALICIOUS CODES WHICH CAN BE USED TO EXPLOIT THE SOFTWARE. THIS MUST BE REFERRED INTERNALLY AND ONLY SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO PUBLIC AFTER ISSUES ARE RESOLVED.

Introduction

EtherAuthority was contracted by the SwapXI team to perform the Security audit of the SwapXI Token smart contract code. The audit has been performed using manual analysis as well as using automated software tools. This report presents all the findings regarding the audit performed on August 24th, 2021.

The purpose of this audit was to address the following:

- Ensure that all claimed functions exist and function correctly.
- Identify any security vulnerabilities that may be present in the smart contract.

Project Background

SWAPXI (SXI) is a TRC20 token contract on the TRON blockchain. SwapXI creates a future-oriented ecosystem where people from all over the world can interact with a low transaction fee, enabling an extremely liberating, strategic and seamless trading experience in a decentralized way. The SwapXI DEX accesses all Peer2Peer platforms available worldwide.

Audit scope


Name	Code Review and Security Analysis Report for SwapXI Token Smart Contract	
Platform	Tron / Solidity	
File	Token.sol	
Smart Contract Online Code	https://tronscan.org/#/contract/TAAy1aZ5n1kZ6xsnPnEs QeifEd5GPzAfsf/code	
File MD5 Hash	3FB6429E76AD8BE7B514BDDC46243DB6	
Audit Date	August 24th, 2021	

Claimed Smart Contract Features

Claimed Feature Detail	Our Observation
 Name: SWAPXI Symbol: SXI Decimals: 12 Total Supply: 21,000,000 Type: TRC20 Platform: TRON Minting new tokens: not possible 	YES, This is valid.
Owner can pause / unpause entire tokenomics, including token transfer and token approval by calling toggleWhitelistRequired function	This brings the owner enormous control of token movement. If the owner's private key is compromised, then it puts the fate of this contract into the hands of an attacker.

Audit Summary

According to the standard audit assessment, Customer's solidity smart contracts are "Secured". These contracts also have owner functions (described in the centralization section below), which does not make everything 100% decentralized. Thus, the owner must execute those smart contract functions as per the business plan.



We used various tools like MythX, Slither and Remix IDE. At the same time this finding is based on critical analysis of the manual audit.

All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed and applicable vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit overview section. General overview is presented in AS-IS section and all identified issues can be found in the Audit overview section.

We found 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium and 1 low and some very low level issues.

Investors Advice: Technical audit of the smart contract does not guarantee the ethical nature of the project. Any owner controlled functions should be executed by the owner with responsibility. All investors/users are advised to do their due diligence before investing in the project.

Technical Quick Stats

Main Category	Subcategory	Result
Contract	Solidity version not specified	Passed
Programming	Solidity version too old	Moderated
	Integer overflow/underflow	Passed
	Function input parameters lack of check	Passed
	Function input parameters check bypass	Passed
	Function access control lacks management	Passed
	Critical operation lacks event log	Passed
	Human/contract checks bypass	Passed
	Random number generation/use vulnerability	Passed
	Fallback function misuse	Passed
	Race condition	Passed
	Logical vulnerability	Passed
	Features claimed	Passed
	Other programming issues	Passed
Code	Function visibility not explicitly declared	Passed
Specification	Var. storage location not explicitly declared	Passed
	Use keywords/functions to be deprecated	Passed
	Other code specification issues	Passed
Gas Optimization	"Out of Gas" Issue	Passed
	High consumption 'for/while' loop	Passed
	High consumption 'storage' storage	Passed
	Assert() misuse	Passed
Business Risk	The maximum limit for mintage not set	Passed
	"Short Address" Attack	Passed
	"Double Spend" Attack	Passed

Overall Audit Result: PASSED

Code Quality

This audit scope has 1 smart contract. This smart contract also contains Libraries, Smart

contracts inherits and Interfaces. These are compact and well written contracts.

The libraries in SwapXI are part of its logical algorithm. A library is a different type of smart

contract that contains reusable code. Once deployed on the blockchain (only once), it is

assigned a specific address and its properties / methods can be reused many times by

other contracts in the SwapXI Token token.

The SwapXI Token team has **not** provided scenario and unit test scripts, which would have

helped to determine the integrity of the code in an automated way.

Some code parts are well commented on smart contracts.

Documentation

We were given a SwapXI smart contracts code in the form of a TronScan web link. The

hash of that code is mentioned above in the table.

As mentioned above, some code parts are well commented. So it is easy to quickly

understand the programming flow as well as complex code logic. Comments are very

helpful in understanding the overall architecture of the protocol.

Another source of information was its official website https://swapxi.net/ which provided

rich information about the project architecture and tokenomics.

Use of Dependencies

As per our observation, the libraries are used in this smart contract infrastructure that are

based on well known industry standard open source projects. And their core code blocks

are written well.

Apart from libraries, its functions are not used in external smart contract calls.

AS-IS overview

Token.sol

(1) Interface

(a) IERC20

(2) Inherited contracts

- (a) ERC20
- (b) ERC20Detailed

(3) Usages

(a) using SafeMath for uint256;

(4) Events

- (a) event Transfer(address indexed from, address indexed to, uint256 value);
- (b) event Approval(address indexed owner, address indexed spender, uint256 value);

(5) Functions

SI.	Functions	Type	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	name	read	Passed	No Issue
3	symbol	read	Passed	No Issue
4	decimals	read	Passed	No Issue
5	totalSupply	read	Passed	No Issue
6	balanceOf	read	Passed	No Issue
7	transfer	write	Passed	No Issue
8	allowance	read	Passed	No Issue
9	approve	write	Passed	No Issue
10	transferFrom	write	Passed	No Issue
11	increaseAllowance	write	Passed	No Issue
12	decreaseAllowance	write	Passed	No Issue
13	transfer	internal	Passed	No Issue
14	_mint	internal	Passed	No Issue
15	burn	internal	Unused	No Issue
16	_approve	internal	Passed	No Issue
17	_burnFrom	internal	Unused	No Issue
18	addToWhitelist	external	Passed	No Issue
19	removeFromWhitelist	external	Passed	No Issue
20	toggleWhitelistRequired	external	Passed	No Issue
21	transferOwner	external	Passed	No Issue

Severity Definitions

Risk Level	Description
Critical	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to token loss etc.
High	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g. public access to crucial
Medium	Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to tokens lose
Low	Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused etc. code snippets, that can't have significant impact on execution
Lowest / Code Style / Best Practice	Lowest-level vulnerabilities, code style violations and info statements can't affect smart contract execution and can be ignored.

Audit Findings

Critical

No Critical severity vulnerabilities were found.

High

No High severity vulnerabilities were found.

Medium

No Medium severity vulnerabilities were found.

Low

(1) Consider using latest solidity compiler while deploying

```
pragma solidity ^0.5.0;
```

Although this does not create any security vulnerabilities, the latest solidity version has lots of improvements, so it's recommended to use the latest solidity version.

Very Low / Informational / Best practices:

(1) Make variables constant

```
string private _name;
string private _symbol;
uint8 private _decimals;
```

These variable's values will be unchanged. So, please make it constant. It will save some gas. Just put a constant keyword.

(2) Approve of ERC20 / TRC20 standard:

To prevent attack vectors regarding approve() like the one described here:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YLPtQxZu1UAvO9cZ1O2RPXBbT0mooh4DYKjA_jp_-RLM, clients SHOULD make sure to create user interfaces in such a way that they set the allowance first to 0 before setting it to another value for the same spender. THOUGH the contract itself shouldn't enforce it, to allow backwards compatibility with contracts deployed before

(3) All functions which are not called internally, must be declared as external. It is more efficient as sometimes it saves some gas.

https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/19380/external-vs-public-best-practices

(4) Unused functions

```
function _burn(address account, uint256 value) internal {
    require(account != address(0), "ERC20: burn from the zero address");

    _totalSupply = _totalSupply.sub(value);
    _balances[account] = _balances[account].sub(value);
    emit Transfer(account, address(0), value);
}
```

```
function _burnFrom(address account, uint256 amount) internal {
    _burn(account, amount);
    _approve(account, msg.sender, _allowances[account][msg.sender].sub(amount));
}
```

The functions _burn and _burnFrom are internal functions which are not used anywhere. Although this does not cause any security issues, it's recommended to remove unused functions to make the code clean.

Centralization

These smart contracts have some functions which can be executed by Admin (Owner) only. If the admin wallet private key would be compromised, then it would create trouble. Following are Admin functions:

- removeFromWhitelist: The Owner can remove an address from the whitelist.
- toggleWhitelistRequired: The Owner can access toggles if the contract can be used by only whitelisted addresses or by all addresses.
- addToWhitelist: The Owner can add an address from the whitelist.
- transferOwner: The Owner can transfer the ownership to another wallet.

Conclusion

We were given a contract code. And we have used all possible tests based on given

objects as files. We observed some issues in the smart contracts and those issues are not

critical ones. So, it's good to go to production.

Since possible test cases can be unlimited for such smart contracts protocol, we provide

no such guarantee of future outcomes. We have used all the latest static tools and manual

observations to cover maximum possible test cases to scan everything.

Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static

analysis tools. Smart Contract's high level description of functionality was presented in

As-is overview section of the report.

Audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed

code.

Security state of the reviewed contract, based on standard audit procedure scope, is

"Secured".

Our Methodology

We like to work with a transparent process and make our reviews a collaborative effort.

The goals of our security audits are to improve the quality of systems we review and aim

for sufficient remediation to help protect users. The following is the methodology we use in

our security audit process.

Manual Code Review:

In manually reviewing all of the code, we look for any potential issues with code logic, error

handling, protocol and header parsing, cryptographic errors, and random number

generators. We also watch for areas where more defensive programming could reduce the

risk of future mistakes and speed up future audits. Although our primary focus is on the

in-scope code, we examine dependency code and behavior when it is relevant to a

particular line of investigation.

Vulnerability Analysis:

Our audit techniques included manual code analysis, user interface interaction, and

whitebox penetration testing. We look at the project's web site to get a high level

understanding of what functionality the software under review provides. We then meet with

the developers to gain an appreciation of their vision of the software. We install and use

the relevant software, exploring the user interactions and roles. While we do this, we

brainstorm threat models and attack surfaces. We read design documentation, review

other audit results, search for similar projects, examine source code dependencies, skim

open issue tickets, and generally investigate details other than the implementation.

Documenting Results:

We follow a conservative, transparent process for analyzing potential security vulnerabilities and seeing them through successful remediation. Whenever a potential issue is discovered, we immediately create an Issue entry for it in this document, even though we have not yet verified the feasibility and impact of the issue. This process is conservative because we document our suspicions early even if they are later shown to not represent exploitable vulnerabilities. We generally follow a process of first documenting the suspicion with unresolved questions, then confirming the issue through code analysis, live experimentation, or automated tests. Code analysis is the most tentative, and we strive to provide test code, log captures, or screenshots demonstrating our confirmation. After this we analyze the feasibility of an attack in a live system.

Suggested Solutions:

We search for immediate mitigations that live deployments can take, and finally we suggest the requirements for remediation engineering for future releases. The mitigation and remediation recommendations should be scrutinized by the developers and deployment engineers, and successful mitigation and remediation is an ongoing collaborative process after we deliver our report, and before the details are made public.

Disclaimers

EtherAuthority.io Disclaimer

EtherAuthority team has analyzed this smart contract in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment and functionality (performing the intended functions).


Due to the fact that the total number of test cases are unlimited, the audit makes no statements or warranties on security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bugfree status or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only. We also suggest conducting a bug bounty program to confirm the high level of security of this smart contract.

Technical Disclaimer

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on the blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have their own vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee explicit security of the audited smart contracts.

Appendix

Code Flow Diagram - SwapXI



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Slither Results Log

Slither log >> Token.sol

```
INFO:Detectors:

ERC20Detailed.constructor(string,string,uint8).name (Token.sol#504) shadows:

- ERC20Detailed.name() (Token.sol#513-515) (function)

ERC20Detailed.constructor(string,string,uint8).symbol (Token.sol#504) shadows:

- ERC20Detailed.symbol() (Token.sol#521-523) (function)

ERC20Detailed.constructor(string,string,uint8).decimals (Token.sol#504) shadows:

- ERC20Detailed.decimals() (Token.sol#537-539) (function)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing

INFO:Detectors:
   Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wik//betector-bocumentationsmissing 22 a authorized by the control of the control
   Reference: https://github.com/
INFO:Detectors:
Pragma version^0.5.0 (Token.sol#1) allows old versions
solc-0.5.0 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
      INFO:Detectors:
Parameter ERC20.addToWhitelist(address). account (Token.sol#439) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ERC20.removeFromWhitelist(address)._account (Token.sol#448) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ERC20.transferOwner(address).__owner (Token.sol#470) is not in mixedCase
Pariable ERC20.owner (Token.sol#212) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
     INFO:Detectors:
totalSupply() should be declared external:
- ERC20.totalSupply() (Token.sol#226-228)
- ERC20.totalSupply() (Token.sol#226-228)

balanceOf(address) should be declared external:
- ERC20.balanceOf(address) (Token.sol#233-235)

transfer(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.transfer(address,uint256) (Token.sol#245-253)

allowance(address,address) should be declared external:
- ERC20.allowance(address,address) (Token.sol#288-260)

approve(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.approve(address,uint256) (Token.sol#289-277)

transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (Token.sol#269-277)

transferFrom(address,address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (Token.sol#291-300)

increaseAllowance(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.transferFrom(address,uint256) (Token.sol#314-322)

decreaseAllowance(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.decreaseAllowance(address,uint256) (Token.sol#338-346)

name() should be declared external:
- ERC20Detailed.name() (Token.sol#513-515)

symbol() should be declared external:
- ERC20Detailed.symbol() (Token.sol#537-539)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
INFO:Slither:Token.sol analyzed (5 contracts with 75 detectors), 27 result(s) found
INFO:Slither:Use https://crytic.io/ to get access to additional detectors and Github integration
```

Solidity static analysis

Token.sol

Security

Transaction origin:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Transaction origin: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

Check-effects-interaction:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Check-effects-interaction: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

Inline assembly:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Inline assembly: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

Block timestamp:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Block timestamp: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

Low level calls:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Low level calls: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

Selfdestruct:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Selfdestruct: can't convert undefined to object

Gas & Economy

This on local calls:

INTERNAL ERROR in module This on local calls: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

Delete dynamic array:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Delete dynamic array: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

For loop over dynamic array:

INTERNAL ERROR in module For loop over dynamic array: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

Ether transfer in loop:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Ether transfer in loop: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

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ERC

ERC20:

INTERNAL ERROR in module ERC20: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

Miscellaneous

Constant/View/Pure functions:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Constant/View/Pure functions: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

Similar variable names:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Similar variable names: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

No return:

INTERNAL ERROR in module No return: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

Guard conditions:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Guard conditions: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

String length:

INTERNAL ERROR in module String length: can't convert undefined to object Pos: not available

Solhint Linter

Token.sol

```
contracts/Token.sol:1:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.5.0 does not satisfy the r semver requirement contracts/Token.sol:218:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state contracts/Token.sol:219:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state
```

