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SMART CONTRACT

Security Audit Report

Customer: Vetter Token

Website: https://vetter.ai

Platform: Binance Smart Chain

Language: Solidity

Date: October 17th, 2021

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Introduction

EtherAuthority was contracted by the Vetter team to perform the Security audit of the Vetter Token smart contract code. The audit has been performed using manual analysis as well as using automated software tools. This report presents all the findings regarding the audit performed on October 17th, 2021.

The purpose of this audit was to address the following:

- Ensure that all claimed functions exist and function correctly.
- Identify any security vulnerabilities that may be present in the smart contract.

Project Background

Vetter Token (VETTER) reinvents the crypto-research industry allowing investors to sort for 2x to 100x gems and get paid to scout, vet and vote on projects in the crowdsourcing meets A.I. interface. With a proven use case, the dApp and intuitive oracle highlights projects worth researching by ranking the poster's performance. Add in compensation, points, tipping and a bad-ass interface, and you have the best crypto research tool at your fingertips.

Audit scope

Name	Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Vetter Token Smart Contract
Platform	BSC / Solidity
File	Vetter.sol
File MD5 Hash	449D613C8DC0C8618F0B87C4D8AB64AF
Audit Date	October 17th, 2021
Revised Code MD5	FD4B5EFE407187E51212552CDBBFC8E3
Revision Date	October 19th, 2021

Claimed Smart Contract Features

Claimed Feature Detail	Our Observation
Tokenomics: Name: Vetter Token Symbol: VETTER Decimals: 9 Total Tokens: 4 Billion Tokens	YES, This is valid.
 Initial Founder: 200 Million Tokens Initial Stable: 200 Million Tokens Initial Private Sale: 2.3 Billion Tokens Initial Pre Sale: 645 Million Tokens Initial Liquidity: 645 Million Tokens Number Of Tiers: 4 Initial Tier 1: 10,000 Initial Tier 2: 100,000 Initial Tier 3: 250,000 Initial Tier 4: 500,000 Stable Release: 90 days Stable Percent: 10 	YES, This is valid.
 Marketing Buy Tax: 5% Marketing Sell Tax: 5% Market Tax Cap: 5% Max Participatory Buy Tax: 2% Participatory Sell Tax: 5% Participatory Cap: 5% max Collect Vetter Pool: 100 Vetter Buy Tax: 2% Vetter Sell Tax: 5% Vetter Cap: 5% max Collect Liquidity: 100 Liquidity Buy Tax: 2% 	YES, This is valid. Owner authorized wallet (onlyArchitect) can set some percentages value and we suggest to handle the private key of that wallet securely.


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Liquidity Sell Tax: 2%	
 Liquidity Cap: 2% max 	
Collect Reflections: 100	
 Reflection Buy Tax: 1% 	
 Reflection Sell Tax: 1% 	
 Reflection Cap: 2% max 	
 Reflection Min: 1% min 	

Audit Summary

According to the standard audit assessment, Customer's solidity smart contracts are "Secured". This token contract does contain owner control, which does not make it fully decentralized.



We used various tools like Slither, Solhint and Remix IDE. At the same time this finding is based on critical analysis of the manual audit.

All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed and applicable vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit overview section. General overview is presented in AS-IS section and all identified issues can be found in the Audit overview section.

We found 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium and 1 low and some very low level issues. These issues are fixed in the revised smart contract.

Investors Advice: Technical audit of the smart contract does not guarantee the ethical nature of the project. Any owner controlled functions should be executed by the owner with responsibility. All investors/users are advised to do their due diligence before investing in the project.

Technical Quick Stats

Main Category	Main Category Subcategory	
Contract	Solidity version not specified	Passed
Programming	Solidity version too old	Moderated
	Integer overflow/underflow	Passed
	Function input parameters lack of check	Passed
	Function input parameters check bypass	Passed
	Function access control lacks management	Passed
	Critical operation lacks event log	Passed
	Human/contract checks bypass	Passed
	Random number generation/use vulnerability	N/A
	Fallback function misuse	Passed
	Race condition	Passed
	Logical vulnerability	Passed
	Features claimed	Passed
	Other programming issues	Passed
Code	Function visibility not explicitly declared	Passed
Specification	Var. storage location not explicitly declared	Passed
	Use keywords/functions to be deprecated	Passed
	Unused code	Passed
Gas Optimization	"Out of Gas" Issue	Passed
	High consumption 'for/while' loop	Passed
	High consumption 'storage' storage	Passed
	Assert() misuse	Passed
Business Risk	The maximum limit for mintage not set	Passed
	"Short Address" Attack	Passed
	"Double Spend" Attack	Passed

Overall Audit Result: PASSED

Code Quality

This audit scope has 1 smart contract file. Smart contracts contains Libraries, Smart

contracts, inherits and Interfaces. This is a compact and well written smart contract.

The libraries in Vetter Token are part of its logical algorithm. A library is a different type of

smart contract that contains reusable code. Once deployed on the blockchain (only once),

it is assigned a specific address and its properties / methods can be reused many times by

other contracts in the Vetter Token.

The Vetter Token team has not provided scenario and unit test scripts, which would have

helped to determine the integrity of the code in an automated way.

Code parts are **not** well commented on smart contracts.

Documentation

We were given a Vetter Token smart contracts code in the form of a file. The hashes of that

code are mentioned above in the table.

As mentioned above, code parts are **not well** commented. So it is not easy to quickly

understand the programming flow as well as complex code logic. Comments are very

helpful in understanding the overall architecture of the protocol.

Another source of information was its official website https://vetter.ai which provided rich

information about the project architecture and tokenomics.

Use of Dependencies

As per our observation, the libraries are used in this smart contract infrastructure that are

based on well known industry standard open source projects.

Apart from libraries, its functions are used in external smart contract calls.

AS-IS overview

Functions

SI.	Functions	Type	Observation	Conclusion
1	constructor	write	Passed	No Issue
2	lockTheSwap	modifier	Passed	No Issue
3	totalSupply	external	Passed	No Issue
4	balanceOf	read	Passed	No Issue
5	_preTaxAmount	read	Passed	No Issue
6	transfer	external	Passed	No Issue
7	allowance	read	Passed	No Issue
8	approve	write	Passed	No Issue
9	transferFrom	external	Passed	No Issue
10	name	external	Passed	No Issue
11	symbol	external	Passed	No Issue
12	decimals	external	Passed	No Issue
13	increaseAllowance	external	Passed	No Issue
14	decreaseAllowance	external	Passed	No Issue
15	addLiquidity	write	Passed	No Issue
16	_approve	write	Passed	No Issue
17	transfer	write	Passed	No Issue
18	swapMarketingTokens	write	Passed	No Issue
19	swapParticipatoryPoolToken	external	access only	No Issue
	S		Architect	
20	swapParticipatoryTokens	write	Passed	No Issue
21	swapVetterPoolTokens	external	Passed	No Issue
22	swapVetterTokens	write	Passed	No Issue
23	swapLiquidityPoolTokens	external	Passed	No Issue
24	swapLiquidityTokens	write	Passed	No Issue
25	swapReflectionPoolTokens	external	access only Architect	No Issue
26	swapReflectionTokens	write	Passed	No Issue
27	swapTokensForBNB	write	Passed	No Issue
28	getBuyTaxes	read	Passed	No Issue
29	getSellTaxes	read	Passed	No Issue
30	takeTaxes	external	Passed	No Issue
31	setAllTaxes	write	Passed	No Issue
32	setInitialLaunchTaxes	write	Passed	No Issue
33	getTotalBuyTax	read	Passed	No Issue
34	getTotalSellTax	read	Passed	No Issue
35	setAllCollectionRates	write	access only Architect	No Issue
36	setAllReserves	write	access only Architect	No Issue
37	rewardParticipatory	external	Passed	No Issue
38	rewardVetter	external	Passed	No Issue

40 distrib 41 isExcl 42 exclud 43 includ 44 getSe 45 setPa	udedFromFee deFromFee eInFee illBnBAmount rticipatoryAddress tterAddress	external external external external read external	Passed access only Architect Passed Passed Passed	No Issue No Issue No Issue No Issue No Issue No Issue
41 isExcl 42 exclud 43 includ 44 getSe 45 setPa	udedFromFee deFromFee leInFee llIBnBAmount rticipatoryAddress tterAddress	external external external read	Architect Passed Passed Passed	No Issue No Issue
42 exclud 43 includ 44 getSe 45 setPa	deFromFee eInFee IIBnBAmount rticipatoryAddress tterAddress	external external read	Passed Passed Passed	No Issue
42 exclud 43 includ 44 getSe 45 setPa	deFromFee eInFee IIBnBAmount rticipatoryAddress tterAddress	external external read	Passed Passed	No Issue
43 includ44 getSe45 setPa	eInFee IIBnBAmount rticipatoryAddress tterAddress	external read	Passed	
44 getSe45 setPa	llBnBAmount rticipatoryAddress tterAddress	read		110 155UE
45 setPa	rticipatoryAddress tterAddress		Passed	No Issue
	tterAddress		Passed	No Issue
I TU I OCIVC		external	Passed	No Issue
	uidityAddress	external	Passed	No Issue
	flectionAddress	external	Passed	No Issue
 	erBNBToAddress	write	Passed	No Issue
	irAddress	external	access only	No Issue
			Owner	
51 chang	geRouterVersion	external	Passed	No Issue
52 receiv		external	Passed	No Issue
53 transf	erForeignToken	external	Passed	No Issue
54 _setR	ankContract	external	Passed	No Issue
55 isArch	nitect	read	Passed	No Issue
 56 addAr	chitect	external	access only	No Issue
			Architect	
57 remov	/eArchitect	external	Passed	No Issue
58 adjust	Architect	external	Passed	No Issue
	outeFounderTokens	external	Passed	No Issue
	rchitect	modifier	Passed	No Issue
61 isAdm		read	Passed	No Issue
62 isFull		read	Passed	No Issue
63 addAd	dmin	external	Passed	No Issue
	<u>/eAdmin</u>	external	Passed	No Issue
65 onlyA		modifier	Passed	No Issue
66 isVette		read	Passed	No Issue
	Vetter	read	Passed	No Issue
68 isFull\		read	Passed	No Issue
69 addO	rAdjustVetter	write	access only Admin	No Issue
70 remov	/eVetter	write	Passed	No Issue
71 addTd	StableList	external	access only Admin	No Issue
72 getSta	ableListEntry	external	Passed	No Issue
	StableListEnrty	external	access only Admin	No Issue
74 getSta	ableShares	read	Passed	No Issue
	vateShares	read	Passed	No Issue
	outeStableTokens	external	Passed	No Issue
	pPrivateTokens	external	Passed	No Issue
	laxTier	read	Passed	No Issue
	ierLevel	read	Passed	No Issue
	llTiers	read	Passed	No Issue

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81	_setTierLevel	external	access only Architect	No Issue
82	_addNewTier	external	access only Architect	No Issue
83	_getWalletTier	read	Passed	No Issue
84	getUserInfo	external	Passed	No Issue
85	transferTipAmount	external	access only RankContract	No Issue
86	addToReflections	external	access only RankContract	No Issue
87	distributeReflectionTokens	external	Passed	No Issue
88	distributeVetterPoolTokens	external	Passed	No Issue
89	owner	read	Passed	No Issue
90	isOwner	read	Passed	No Issue
91	onlyOwner	modifier	Passed	No Issue
92	transferOwnership	write	access only Owner	No Issue
93	getTime	read	Passed	No Issue
94	pullLiquidityPoolTokens	external	Passed	No Issue
95	addLiquidityPoolTokensToL P	external	Passed	No Issue
96	setPresaleAddress	external	Passed	No Issue

Severity Definitions

Risk Level	Description	
Critical	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to token loss etc.	
High	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g. public access to crucial	
Medium	Medium level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to tokens lose	
Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused etc. code snippets, that can't have significant impact on execution		
Lowest / Code Style / Best Practice	Lowest-level vulnerabilities, code style violations and info statements can't affect smart contract execution and can be ignored.	

Audit Findings

Critical Severity

No Critical severity vulnerabilities were found.

High Severity

(1) Infinite loops, Out of Gas issue:

As array elements will increase, then it will cost more and more gas. And eventually, it will stop all the functionality. After several hundreds of transactions, all those functions depending on it will stop. We suggest avoiding loops. For example, use mapping to store the array index. And query that data directly, instead of looping through all the elements to find an element.

Resolution: Adjust logic to replace loops with mapping or other code structure.

- swapMarketingTokens() _founderList.length
- removeArchitect() _founderList.length
- adjustArchitect() founderList.length
- distributeFounderTokens() _founderList.length
- getStableShares() _stableList.length
- getPrivateShares() stableList.length
- distributeStableTokens() stableList.length
- airdropPrivateTokens() _stableList.length
- getAllTiers() maxTier = getMaxTier()
- distributeReflectionTokens() holders = _reflectionsTo.length
- distributeVetterPoolTokens() numVetters = _vetterList.length

Update: This issue is resolved in the revised contract code

Medium

No Medium severity vulnerabilities were found.

Low

(1) Critical operation lacks event log:

There are several places in the smart contracts, where a critical function call event log was not added. We suggest to add appropriate event log in the following functions:

- swapMarketingTokens(),
- swapVetterPoolTokens(),
- pullLiquidityPoolTokens(),
- swapLiquidityPoolTokens(),
- addLiquidityPoolTokensToLP(),
- takeTaxes(),
- setAllTaxes(),
- setInitialLaunchTaxes(),
- rewardParticipatory(),
- rewardVetter(),
- excludeFromFee(),
- includeInFee(),
- setParticipatoryAddress(),
- setVetterAddress(),
- setLiquidityAddress(),
- setReflectionAddress(),
- setPresaleAddress(),
- changeRouterVersion(),
- transferForeignToken(),
- setRankContract(),
- removeArchitect(),
- adjustArchitect(),
- addAdmin(),
- removeAdmin(),
- removeVetter(),
- distributeStableTokens()

Update: This issue is resolved in the revised contract code

Very Low / Informational / Best practices:

(1) VetterToken contract code size limit:

```
Warning: Contract code size exceeds 24576 bytes (a limit introduced in Spurious Dragon). This contract may not be deployable on mainnet. Consider enabling the optimizer (with a low "runs" value!), turning off revert strings, or using libraries.

--> vetter-token-smart-contract-main/VetterToken.sol:180:1:

100 | contract VetterToken is Context, Ownable, IERC20

101 | using Address for address; using SafeMath for uint256;

104 | 105 | RankAndPostTracker private _rankAndPost; address private _rankContract;

107 | Address private _rankContract;
```

Warning: Contract code size exceeds 24576 bytes (a limit introduced in Spurious Dragon). This contract may not be deployable on mainnet. Consider enabling the optimizer (with a low "runs" value!), turning off revert strings, or using libraries.

Resolution: We suggest removing unnecessary code blocks and optimizing the code.

Update: This issue is resolved in the revised contract code

(2) Unused variables:

There is a deadAddress variable defined but not used anywhere.

Resolution: Remove unwanted variables from the contract code.

Update: This issue is resolved in the revised contract code

(3) Hard coded Values:

Too many hard coded values.

Resolution: Must be double checked just before deploying to production.

Update: This issue is resolved in the revised contract code

Centralization

These smart contracts have some functions which can be executed by the Admin (Owner) only. If the admin wallet private key would be compromised, then it would create trouble. Following are Admin functions:

- swapParticipatoryPoolTokens: The Architect owner can swap participatory pool tokens.
- swapVetterPoolTokens: The Architect owner can swap vetter pool tokens.
- swapLiquidityPoolTokens: The Architect owner can swap liquidity pool tokens.
- swapReflectionPoolTokens: The Architect owner can swap reflection pool tokens.
- takeTaxes: The Architect owner can take taxes.
- setAllTaxes: The Architect owner can set all taxes.
- setInitialLaunchTaxes: The Architect owner can set initial launch taxes.
- setAllCollectionRates: The Architect owner can set all collection rates.
- setAllReserves: The Architect owner can set all reserves.
- rewardParticipatory: The RankContract owner can reward participants.
- rewardVetter: The RankContract owner can reward vetter.
- distributePresaleTokens: The Architect owner can distribute presale tokens.
- excludeFromFee: The Architect owner can exclude from fee.
- includeInFee: The Architect owner can include from fee.
- setParticipatoryAddress: The Architect owner can set a participatory address.
- setVetterAddress: The Architect owner can set a vetter address.
- setLiquidityAddress: The Architect owner can set a liquidity address.
- setReflectionAddress: The Architect owner can set a reflection address.
- changeRouterVersion: The Owner can change the router version.
- transferForeignToken: The Architect owner can transfer foreign tokens.
- setRankContract: The Owner can set rank contract address.
- addArchitect: The Architect owner can add the architect address.
- removeArchitect: The Architect owner can remove the architect address.
- adjustArchitect: The Architect owner can add a new wallet address to the list.
- distributeFounderTokens: The Architect owner can distribute founder tokens.
- addAdmin: The Architect owner can add a new wallet address to the list.
- removeAdmin: The Architect owner can remove wallet address to list.

- addOrAdjustVetter: The Admin owner can add a new wallet address to the list.
- removeVetter: The Admin owner can remove a wallet address from list.
- addToStableList: The Admin owner can add a stable address to the list.
- adjustStableListEnrty:The Admin owner can adjust a stable list entry.
- distributeStableTokens: The Architect owner can distribute stable tokens.
- airdropPrivateTokens: The Architect owner can airdrop private tokens.
- _setTierLevel: The Architect owner can set tier level.
- _addNewTier: The Architect owner can add a new tier level.
- transferTipAmount: The RankContract can transfer tip amount.
- addToReflections: The RankContract can add to reflection.
- distributeReflectionTokens: The Architect owner can distribute reflection tokens.
- distributeVetterPoolTokens: The Architect owner can distribute vetter pool tokens.

Conclusion

We were given a contract code. And we have used all possible tests based on given

objects as files. We observed some issues in the smart contracts and those issues are

fixed/acknowledged in the revised contract code. So, it's good to go to production.

Since possible test cases can be unlimited for such smart contracts protocol, we provide

no such guarantee of future outcomes. We have used all the latest static tools and manual

observations to cover maximum possible test cases to scan everything.

Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static

analysis tools. Smart Contract's high-level description of functionality was presented in the

As-is overview section of the report.

Audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed

code.

Security state of the reviewed contract, based on standard audit procedure scope, is

"Secured".

Our Methodology

We like to work with a transparent process and make our reviews a collaborative effort.

The goals of our security audits are to improve the quality of systems we review and aim

for sufficient remediation to help protect users. The following is the methodology we use in

our security audit process.

Manual Code Review:

In manually reviewing all of the code, we look for any potential issues with code logic, error

handling, protocol and header parsing, cryptographic errors, and random number

generators. We also watch for areas where more defensive programming could reduce the

risk of future mistakes and speed up future audits. Although our primary focus is on the

in-scope code, we examine dependency code and behavior when it is relevant to a

particular line of investigation.

Vulnerability Analysis:

Our audit techniques included manual code analysis, user interface interaction, and

whitebox penetration testing. We look at the project's web site to get a high level

understanding of what functionality the software under review provides. We then meet with

the developers to gain an appreciation of their vision of the software. We install and use

the relevant software, exploring the user interactions and roles. While we do this, we

brainstorm threat models and attack surfaces. We read design documentation, review

other audit results, search for similar projects, examine source code dependencies, skim

open issue tickets, and generally investigate details other than the implementation.

Documenting Results:

We follow a conservative, transparent process for analyzing potential security vulnerabilities and seeing them through successful remediation. Whenever a potential issue is discovered, we immediately create an Issue entry for it in this document, even though we have not yet verified the feasibility and impact of the issue. This process is conservative because we document our suspicions early even if they are later shown to not represent exploitable vulnerabilities. We generally follow a process of first documenting the suspicion with unresolved questions, then confirming the issue through code analysis, live experimentation, or automated tests. Code analysis is the most tentative, and we strive to provide test code, log captures, or screenshots demonstrating our confirmation. After this we analyze the feasibility of an attack in a live system.

Suggested Solutions:

We search for immediate mitigations that live deployments can take, and finally we suggest the requirements for remediation engineering for future releases. The mitigation and remediation recommendations should be scrutinized by the developers and deployment engineers, and successful mitigation and remediation is an ongoing collaborative process after we deliver our report, and before the details are made public.

Disclaimers

EtherAuthority.io Disclaimer

EtherAuthority team has analyzed this smart contract in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment and functionality (performing the intended functions).


Due to the fact that the total number of test cases are unlimited, the audit makes no statements or warranties on security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bugfree status or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only. We also suggest conducting a bug bounty program to confirm the high level of security of this smart contract.

Technical Disclaimer

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on the blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have their own vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee explicit security of the audited smart contracts.

Appendix

Code Flow Diagram - Vetter Token



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Slither Results Log

Slither log >> Vetter.sol

```
r(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)
om/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#functions-that-send-ether-to-arbitrary-destinations
                        es.marketing) (VetterToken.sol#692)
.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (
        )
kens(taxes.vetter) (VetterToken.sol#694)
calls:
rketingTokens(taxes.marketing) (VetterToken.sol#692)
- uniswapVZRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (\
            ryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)
V2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFee0nTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (V
```

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```
External calls sending eth:
- _transfer(sender,recipient,amount) (VetterToken.sol#581)
- recipient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)
- uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner(),block.timestamp) (VetterToken.s
-"uniswapvzkouter aude to the call(s):
ol#623-630)
State variables written after the call(s):
- approve(sender,recipient,_allowances[sender][recipient].sub(_preTaxAmount(sender,amount),ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance)(VetterToken.sol#583)
- allowances[owner][spender] = amount (VetterToken.sol#638)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities
- transferredBalance == 0 (VetterToken.sol#947)
Token.swapVetterPoolTokens(uint256) (VetterToken.sol#798-818) uses a dangerous strict equality:
                          https://qithub.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities
 INFO:Detectors:
                  ncy in VetterToken.swapLiquidityPoolTokens(uint256) (VetterToken.sol#857-870):
External calls:
                       ncy in VetterToken.swapPartictpatoryPootrokens
External calls:
- swapTokensForBNB(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#751)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (V
      - uncommerced to the call(s):
serToken.sol#973-986)
State variables written after the call(s):
- _participitoryTokens = _participitoryTokens.sub(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#756)
entrancy in VetterToken.swapParticipatoryTokens(uint256) (VetterToken.sol#761-796):
                  - _participitor
ncy in VetterTok
External calls:
- swapTokensFor
                                                ts:
ForBNB(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#784)
iswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFee0nTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (V
                                                 oo)
.es written after the call(s):
.oryTokens = _participitoryTokens.add(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#788)
Token.swapReflectionPoolTokens(uint256) (VetterToken.sol#900-920):
                                                FORTBNB(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#912)
iswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (V
  tterToken.sol#973-986)
                 State variables written after the call(s):
- _reflectionTokens = _reflectionTokens.sub(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#917)
ncy in VetterToken.swapReflectionTokens(uint256) (VetterToken.sol#922-957):
External calls:
                                      kensForBNB(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#945)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFee0nTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (V
 etterToken.sol#973-986)
State variables written after the call(s):
- _reflectionTokens = _reflectionTokens.add(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#949)
Reentrancy in VetterToken.swapVetterPoolTokens(uint256) (VetterToken.sol#798-818):
          Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector Botammine.
INFO:Detectors:
VetterToken._transfer(address,address,uint256).buyTax (VetterToken.sol#674) is a local variable never initialized
VetterToken._transfer(address,address,uint256).taxes (VetterToken.sol#663) is a local variable never initialized
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#uninitialized-local-variables
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#uninitialized-local-variables
                          ors:
.addLiquidity(uint256,uint256) (VetterToken.sol#617-631) ignores return value by uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmc
s(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner(),block.timestamp) (VetterToken.sol#623-630)
https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
       erence: https://github.com/crysto.
0:Detectors:
terToken.allowance(address,address).owner (VetterToken.sol#566) shadows:
- Ownable.owner() (VetterToken.sol#215-218) (function)
terToken._approve(address,address,uint256).owner (VetterToken.sol#633) shadows:
- Ownable.owner() (VetterToken.sol#215-218) (function)
erence: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-bocumentations/tocatival labels and services and services and services are services and services and services are services are services and services are services are services and services are services are services and services are services are services and services are services are services are services and services are s
```

```
INFO:Detectors:
VetterToken.distributeVetterPoolTokens() (VetterToken.sol#1687-1710) has external calls inside a loop: shares = _rankAndPost._getVetterRe
wardshares(_vetterList[index]) (VetterToken.sol#1699)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation/#calls-inside-a-loop
      Reentrancy in VetterToken._transfer(address,address,uint256) (VetterToken.sol#651-717):
External calls:
     INFO:Detectors:
                                                rternal calls:
swapMarketingTokens(taxes.marketing) (VetterToken.sol#692)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (V
     - uncampramoses
- uncampramoses
- uncampramoses
- uncampramoses
- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)
- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)
- uniswapVZRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (VetterTokens) (VetterTokens)
    etterToken.sol#973-986)
- swapVetterTokens(taxes.vetter) (VetterToken.sol#694)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (V
  - uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (V etterToken.sol#973-986)

External calls sending eth:
- swapMarketingTokens(taxes.marketing) (VetterToken.sol#692)
- recipient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#277)
- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)
- recipient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)
- swapVetterTokens(taxes.vetter) (VetterToken.sol#1277)
- swapVetterTokens(taxes.vetter) (VetterToken.sol#1277)

State variables written after the call(s):
- liquidityTokens = liquidityTokens.add(taxes.liquidity) (VetterToken.sol#698)

Reentrancy in VetterToken._transfer(address,address,uint256) (VetterToken.sol#651-717):
External calls:
- swapMarketingTokens(taxes.marketing) (VetterToken.sol#692)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (V etterToken.sol#973-986)
     etterToken.sol#973-986)
                                                 swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (V
     etterToken.sol#973-986)
                                                 swapVetterTokens(taxes.vetter) (VetterToken.sol#694)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (V
                                                n.soi#973-960)
swapLiquidityTokens(taxes.liquidity) (VetterToken.sol#697)
- uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner(),block.timestamp) (VetterToken.s
  - uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingreeunrans.croscom.
etterToken.sol#973-986)
- swapReflectionTokens(taxes.reflection) (VetterToken.sol#700)
- uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (VetterToken.sol#973-986)
External calls sending eth:
- swapMarketingTokens(taxes.marketing) (VetterToken.sol#692)
- recipient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)
- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)
- recipient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)
- swapVetterTokens(taxes.vetter) (VetterToken.sol#694)
- recipient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)
- swapLiquidityTokens(taxes.liquidity) (VetterToken.sol#697)
- swapLiquidityTokens(taxes.liquidity) (VetterToken.sol#697)
- uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}{(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner(),block.timestamp) (VetterToken.sol#623-630)
                                                                                        uniswap V2 Router.swap Exact Tokens For ETH Supporting Fee On Transfer Tokens (token Amount, 0, path, address (this), block.time stamp) (Value of the Company of the Comp
     ol#623-630)

- swapReflectionTokens(taxes.reflection) (VetterToken.sol#700)

- recipient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)

State variables written after the call(s):

- _stableList[_stableIndex[from]]._active = false (VetterToken.sol#709)

- _stableList[_ol._active = false (VetterToken.sol#714)

Reentrancy in VetterToken.changeRouterVersion(address) (VetterToken.sol#1286-1301):

External calls:

- _pair = IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory()).createPair(address(this),_uniswapV2Router.WETH()) (VetterToken.sol#1294)

State variables written after the call(s):

- _isExcludedFromFee[address(uniswapV2Router)] = true (VetterToken.sol#1300)

- uniswapV2Pair = _pair (VetterToken.sol#1298)

Reentrancy in VetterToken.constructor() (VetterToken.sol#1299)

Reentrancy in VetterToken.constructor() (VetterToken.sol#504-530):

External calls:

- uniswapV2Pair = IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory()).createPair(address(this), uniswapV2Router.WETH()) (VetterToken.sol#1204)

- uniswapV2Pair = IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory()).createPair(address(this), uniswapV2Router.WETH()) (VetterToken.sol#1204)

- uniswapV2Pair = IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory()).createPair(address(this), uniswapV2Router.WETH()) (VetterToken.sol#1204)
                                               uniswapV2Pair = IUniswapV2Factory(_uniswapV2Router.factory()).createPair(address(this),_uniswapV2Router.WETH()) (VetterToken.so
                                               - _isExcludedFromTeaf_reflectionAddress] = true (VetterToken.sol#520)
- _ters[2] = _initialTier2 (VetterToken.sol#523)
- _ters[3] = _initialTier2 (VetterToken.sol#523)
- _ters[3] = _initialTier3 (VetterToken.sol#523)
- _ters[4] = _initialTier4 (VetterToken.sol#523)
- _ters[4] = _initialTier4 (VetterToken.sol#525)
- _termToken.taunched = block.timestamp (VetterToken.sol#527)
- addOrAdjustVetter(owner().true) (VetterToken.sol#515)
- _vetter(st_push(who) (VetterToken.sol#478)
- _vetter(st_push(who) (VetterToken.sol#478)
- _vetters[who] = 2 (VetterToken.sol#477)
- uniswapVRRouter = _uniswapVZRouter (VetterToken.sol#477)
- uniswapVRRouter = _uniswapVZRouter (VetterToken.sol#478)
- _vetters[who] = 2 (VetterToken.sol#477)
- uniswapVZRouter = _uniswapVZRouter (VetterToken.sol#478)
- _vetters[who] = 2 (VetterToken.sol#886)
- _vetters[who] = 2 (VetterToken.sol#886)
- _tokensowned[address(this]] = tokensowned[address(this]].sub( [uquidityTokens) (VetterToken.sol#867)
- _tokensowned[address(this]] = tokensowned[address(this]].sub(_luquidityTokens) (VetterToken.sol#867)
- _tokensowned[address(this]] = tokensowned[address(this]].sub(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#894)
- _tokensowned[address(this]] = tokensowned[address(this]].sub(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#895)
- _vaspTokensForBBB(amount) (VetterToken.sol#725)
- _vaspTokensForBBB(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#751)
- _vaspTokensForBBB(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol
```

```
Postectors:

Pentrancy in VetterToken._transfer(address,address,uint256) (VetterToken.sol#651-717):

External calls:

- swapMarketingTokens(taxes.marketing) (VetterToken.sol#692)

- recipient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)

- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)

- recipient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)

State variables written after the call(s):

- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)

- allowances[owner][spender] = amount (VetterToken.sol#693)

- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#638)

- swapParticipatoryTokens = participitoryTokens.add(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#775)

- participitoryTokens = participitoryTokens.add(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#777)

- participitoryTokens = participitoryTokens.add(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#788)

- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)

- tokensOwned[address(this)] = _tokensOwned[address(this)].sub(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#793)

Event emitted after the call(s):

- Approval(owner.spender.amount) (VetterToken.sol#693)

- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#691)

- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)

- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#691)

- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)

- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#691)

- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)

- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)
                                                        ncy in VetterToken._transfer(address,address,uint256) (VetterToken.sol#651-717):

External calls:
- swapMarketingTokens(taxes.marketing) (VetterToken.sol#692)
- rectpient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)
- swapParticipatoryTokens(taxes.participatory) (VetterToken.sol#693)
- rectpient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)
- swapVetterTokens(taxes.vetter) (VetterToken.sol#694)
- rectpient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)

State variables written after the call(s):
- swapVetterTokens(taxes.vetter) (VetterToken.sol#694)
- allowances[owner][spender] = amount (VetterToken.sol#638)
- liquidityTokens = _liquidityTokens.add(taxes.liquidity) (VetterToken.sol#698)
- swapVetterTokens(taxes.vetter) (VetterToken.sol#694)
- _tokensOwned[address(this)] = _tokensOwned[address(this)].sub(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#852)
- swapVetterTokens(taxes.vetter) (VetterToken.sol#694)
- _vetterTokens = _vetterTokens.add(remaining) (VetterToken.sol#824)
- _vetterTokens = _vetterTokens.add(swapAmt) (VetterToken.sol#831)
                                                                External calls sending eth:
- _transfer(sender,recipient,amount) (VetterToken.sol#581)
- recipient.transfer(amount) (VetterToken.sol#1277)
- uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner(),block.timestamp) (VetterToken.s
         INFO:Detectors:
           VetterToken.sol#319)
Variable VetterToken._initialTier1 (VetterToken.sol#402) is too similar to VetterToken._initialTier2 (VetterToken.sol#403)
Variable VetterToken._initialTier1 (VetterToken.sol#402) is too similar to VetterToken._initialTier3 (VetterToken.sol#404)
Variable VetterToken._initialTier1 (VetterToken.sol#402) is too similar to VetterToken._initialTier4 (VetterToken.sol#405)
Variable VetterToken._initialTier2 (VetterToken.sol#403) is too similar to VetterToken._initialTier3 (VetterToken.sol#404)
Variable VetterToken._initialTier2 (VetterToken.sol#403) is too similar to VetterToken._initialTier4 (VetterToken.sol#404)
Variable VetterToken._initialTier3 (VetterToken.sol#404) is too similar to VetterToken._initialTier4 (VetterToken.sol#405)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-are-too-similar
        Reference: https://github.com/crytic/stither/wiki/Detector-Documentations in this community of the process of the community o
           inro.betettons.
VetterToken.deadAddress (VetterToken.sol#382) is never used in VetterToken (VetterToken.sol#362-1711)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-state-variables
         INFO:Detectors:
                etterToken. stablePercent (VetterToken.sol#445) should be constant
                                                                                       n_stablePercent (VetterToken.sol#445) should be constant
https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
VetterToken. Statute of the Statute 
- VetterToken.setAllTaxes(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint
```

Solidity Static Analysis

Vetter.sol

Security

Transaction origin:

Use of tx.origin: "tx.origin" is useful only in very exceptional cases.

If you use it for authentication, you usually want to replace it by "msg.sender", because otherwise any contract you call can act on your behalf.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 184:23:

Check-effects-interaction:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Check-effects-interaction: GA(...) is undefined

Poe: not available

Inline assembly:

The Contract uses inline assembly, this is only advised in rare cases.

Additionally static analysis modules do not parse inline Assembly, this can lead to wrong analysis results.

more

Pos: 15:8:

Inline assembly:

The Contract uses inline assembly, this is only advised in rare cases.

Additionally static analysis modules do not parse inline Assembly, this can lead to wrong analysis results.

more

Pos: 105:16:

Gas & Economy

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function VetterToken.totalSupply is infinite:

If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed.

Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage

(this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 533:4:

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function VetterToken.balanceOf is infinite:

If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed.

Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage

(this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 544:4:

Gas costs:

Gas requirement of function VetterToken.transfer is infinite:

If the gas requirement of a function is higher than the block gas limit, it cannot be executed.

Please avoid loops in your functions or actions that modify large areas of storage

(this includes clearing or copying arrays in storage)

Pos: 560:4:

For loop over dynamic array:

Loops that do not have a fixed number of iterations, for example, loops that depend on storage values, have to be used carefully. Due to the block gas limit, transactions can only consume a certain amount of gas. The number of iterations in a loop can grow beyond the block gas limit which can cause the complete contract to be stalled at a certain point.

Additionally, using unbounded loops incurs in a lot of avoidable gas costs. Carefully test how many items at maximum you can pass to such functions to make it successful.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 1575:8:

FRC

ERC20:

ERC20 contract's "decimals" function should have "uint8" as return type

more

Pos: 288:4:

ERC20:

ERC20 contract's "decimals" function should have "uint8" as return type

<u>more</u>

Pos: 600:4:

Miscellaneous

Constant/View/Pure functions:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Constant/View/Pure functions: GA(...) is undefined

Pos: not available

Similar variable names:

VetterToken.setAllReserves(uint256,uint256,uint256): Variables have very similar names "_vetters" and "vetter". Note: Modifiers are currently not considered by this static analysis.

Pos: 1142:25:

No return:

IERC20.totalSupply(): Defines a return type but never explicitly returns a value.

Pos: 253:4

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 1371:8:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 1419:8:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

more

Pos: 1444:8:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 1445:8:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 1445:8:

Guard conditions:

Use "assert(x)" if you never ever want x to be false, not in any circumstance (apart from a bug in your code). Use "require(x)" if x can be false, due to e.g. invalid input or a failing external component.

<u>more</u>

Pos: 1451:8:

Solhint Linter

Vetter.sol

```
VetterToken.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.8.4 does not satisfy
the r semver requirement
VetterToken.sol:94:51: Error: Avoid using low level calls.
VetterToken.sol:105:17: Error: Avoid using inline assembly. It is
acceptable only in rare cases
VetterToken.sol:184:24: Error: Avoid to use tx.origin
VetterToken.sol:208:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function
(Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
VetterToken.sol:247:16: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in
your business logic
VetterToken.sol:295:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase
VetterToken.sol:296:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase
VetterToken.sol:297:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase
VetterToken.sol:317:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase
VetterToken.sol:349:38: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in
list of modifiers
VetterToken.sol:349:63: Error: Code contains empty blocks
VetterToken.sol:350:39: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in
list of modifiers
VetterToken.sol:350:64: Error: Code contains empty blocks
VetterToken.sol:351:38: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in
list of modifiers
VetterToken.sol:351:63: Error: Code contains empty blocks
VetterToken.sol:352:47: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in
list of modifiers
VetterToken.sol:352:70: Error: Code contains empty blocks
VetterToken.sol:358:55: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in
list of modifiers
VetterToken.sol:358:78: Error: Code contains empty blocks
VetterToken.sol:359:49: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in
list of modifiers
VetterToken.sol:359:72: Error: Code contains empty blocks
VetterToken.sol:362:1: Error: Contract has 52 states declarations but
allowed no more than 15
VetterToken.sol:376:29: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:377:29: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:380:28: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:382:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:390:38: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:393:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:394:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:395:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:396:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
```

```
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:397:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:398:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:402:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:403:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:404:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:405:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:422:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:423:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:426:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:443:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:456:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:462:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:470:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:474:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state
VetterToken.sol:481:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:488:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:489:30: Error: Constant name must be in capitalized
SNAKE CASE
VetterToken.sol:492:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state
VetterToken.sol:504:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function
(Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)
VetterToken.sol:527:30: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in
your business logic
VetterToken.sol:629:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in
your business logic
VetterToken.sol:978:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in
your business logic
VetterToken.sol:1304:32: Error: Code contains empty blocks
VetterToken.sol:1387:12: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in
your business logic
VetterToken.sol:1391:41: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in
your business logic
VetterToken.sol:1497:51: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in
list of modifiers
VetterToken.sol:1538:12: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in
your business logic
VetterToken.sol:1597:33: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in
list of modifiers
VetterToken.sol:1603:48: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in
list of modifiers
VetterToken.sol:1610:34: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in
list of modifiers
VetterToken.sol:1636:47: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in
```

list of modifiers VetterToken.sol:1650:45: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in list of modifiers

Software analysis result:

These software reported many false positive results and some are informational issues. So, those issues can be safely ignored.



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