

Psychology and Diplomacy in the Analysis of Negotiation: the Unavoidable Links and the Inevitable Interdependencies.

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Abstract

The main purpose of my theoretic-empirical research is to define the close interdependencies between diplomacy and psychology in international negotiation. In analysing the major political and psychological aspects of negotiation I describe here the main theories and researches in psychology, political science, philosophy and sociology, carried out on this subject, as well as the results of my main empirical and theoretical researches. In addition, the close links between people, the world and interactions between States have been studied from a philosophical, psychological and political point of view (through the use of bilateral negotiations and in particular, permanent multilateral diplomatic negotiations - at the UN Security Council).

Keywords:

Competitive and integrative negotiation. Consensus and agreement. Cognition, communication, behavior and negotiating personality. Preventive and coercive diplomacy.

Introduction

The diplomacy is seen as an art capable of achieving mutual recognition between states through skill and courtesy. The diplomacy is a carrier of a long tradition, a history, a philosophy of the imaginary, of the symbolic, of the real of national identity and which has the function of making his country exist, as a well-defined entity, in the concert of other nations in the world. Negotiation (meeting, conference, summit, meeting, etc.) embraces almost the entire field of diplomacy and is the only type of relationship, which can prevail, for coexistence, par excellence over the interdependence relations of States between them. Diplomatic negotiation is part of a two-tier political game (national and international) and confronts politicians and their diplomats who represent both their government and their country, but also the interests of their country and their people. Diplomatic negotiation is therefore a process of interactions between two or more protagonists who aim to settle their differences of interests and goals, with an awareness of the situation of interdependence in which they find themselves. The psychology of diplomatic negotiation involves communication, cognition, intersubjective exchange and sharing solutions to reduce disputes, etc. The priorities of negotiation in psychological terms are persuasion, intellectual creativity and invention, the implementation of relational networks between diplomats to conform and find mutually acceptable agreements. It should be noted that it is also affected by cultural psychological phenomena: differences in goals, moral, political, economic and social differences, conflicts between countries in its dimension and temporality (past, present, future), etc. The search for an answer to a question, an idea or a project leads negotiators from different cultures to bond. The link is thus formed in intersubjectivity and everyone can expose or oppose his opinions. It should also be remembered that there are three essential stages of negotiation: the identification of the conflict and the relationship with its experience; the search for goals in the outcome of solutions; the prioritization of goals and their selection in decision-making and their consequences. The psychological dilemma of the

negotiator here, caught between ambivalent objectives, is to fiercely defend the positions of his own country and reach an agreement with his counterparts or his counterparts. Uncertainties about the opposing party's initiatives and reactions are also significant, and the negotiator should expect to act with great flexibility in the face of circumstances or counter-proposals that are sometimes difficult to predict. The personality of the negotiator and his ideology also influence the outcome of the negotiation and the consequences of the agreements reached at its conclusion. These psychological characteristics must therefore be taken into account and all means must be used to resolve disputes with other counterparts based on the interdependence of acceptable conduct, bilingual and multilingual constructive dialogues, cognitive reasoning and calming political discourse. In this sense the negotiation can be analyzed in terms of interactions between various basic choices that the parties must arbitrate, and certain basic movements, made by each party, to influence the choices of the other. The main objectives of my theoretic-empirical study is to analyze different interdependent links between psychology and diplomacy in order to understand the causes and consequences of decision-making in diplomatic negotiations (bilateral or multilateral). In my view to increase their room for manoeuvre, negotiators will prefer to develop a closer interpersonal and international interaction with their political power that could give them legitimacy, credibility, by participating in the development of the "psychological analysis framework" and political instructions to properly defend the country's interests. From my point of view, functional politicization (the internalization of the political objectives of political leaders of different countries in their options) or ideological, linked to the adherence to the political movement of their activity then displaces a constraint that is no longer experienced as such in international relations and negotiation. Therefore, the diplomacy has a very important function, it shows each state that it is not alone in the world and that it cannot act without taking into account other states; the diplomacy therefore makes them more accountable and united in global coexistence.

1. The Political Aspects of Diplomacy and Diplomatic Negotiation

Diplomacy is seen primarily as a positive action dedicated first to raising the profile of the accrediting state within the accrediting state, and determined to obtain information to be negotiated (cultural, economic, ecological, scientific, financial, etc.) and to protect their national expatriate community, etc. Its etymological source identity between the two terms that come from the term diploma (from the Greek *díplōma*, i.e. the official document folded in half) and finds its expression in the credentials presented to the head of state of the acceding country. Specifically, credentials are an official document that a head of state or government signs and entrusts to an ambassador he has just appointed, so that he can hand it over to the head of state or government (and on rare occasions to the Minister of Foreign Affairs) of the host country. Regarding the origins of diplomacy, as science (ancillary science of history) it must be said that they are based on the study of structure, classification, value, tradition and authenticity official documents. It should be remembered that the Benedictine Dom Jean Mabillon, of the abbey Saint-Germain-des-Prés, developed in 1681 the method, under the title *De re diplomatica* - the birth certificate of the diplomatic. Mabillon has therefore developed an approach on the one hand, on the other hand a vocabulary of the discipline. Its diplomatic approach involves two steps: 1. the analysis of the act: it is a question of precisely describing all the physical and intellectual components of the document studied (a) its external characters: the medium, the meaning of writing, the margins, the language, the paleographic habits; (b) its internal characters: the different parts of the document, the identification of the author of the deed, the

mentions of registration by the beneficiary, any additions or corrections, etc.) ; (c) describe the different elements arranged in relation to each other : (indication of the recipient, the position of the date and the signature in the document); (d) see the form of the document with existing drafting rules: chancery formulas or uses: personal, geographical, etc.) ; 2. criticism of the act (the comparison of the act studied with comparable elements: acts emanating from the same sovereign or ruler (of the same chancery), acts attributed to the same beneficiary, acts of the same period, the same geographical area or other relevant comparative criterion; diplomatic criticism must still, on this basis, define its legal scope and historical scope of the official document. To consolidate his approach, Mabillon defines a number of terms that can describe the concrete reality of the documents and allow the different people involved to speak the same language. For Neveu (1982): "Beyond a vocabulary centred on a small part of the potential scope of the critical approach of acts, the fundamental and universal message of Mabillon's *De re diplomatica* is in three points: 1) the act is framed by elements of identification of the author and recipient and elements of validation (signature, recording); 2) the speech is divided into three parts: a) the statement of the facts or context of the act, b) the actual decision or statement expressed by means of a verb of action (I give, we refuse, I have seen and I report that, I declare, etc.; c) the necessary comments for the implementation of the decision :conditions of execution, terms of appeal or action, timetable, etc.; 3) the ancillary and subsequent references that the life of the document will have to associate with the original document: the existence of another act questioning the effects of it, death and the absence of the act or other." [1] In reality, diplomacy is the eminently political field of action has not lost all relation to the diploma, its etymological origin. It has a threefold function: representation, information and negotiation. It should be noted that there is an important distinction between diplomacy and foreign policy, even if they are closely linked and inseparable from each other. Foreign policy corresponds to the strategic and political choices of the leaders of the State (Head of State, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs). Diplomacy is the implementation of foreign policy through diplomats who are in the embassies of foreign countries or within international organizations (e.g., UN, European Union, G20, BRICS, etc.). A set of privileges and immunities is put in place to enable diplomatic missions to carry out their functions in the best security conditions The way in which foreign policy is developed, but also of the publicly presented nature, testifies to the constraints (institutional, cultural, historical, political, economic, social, etc.) of which it is the object, but also of the security imagination that underlies it.

Moreover, to the extent that diplomatic conduct is dominated by the risk or preparation of war, it obeys the logic of rivalry and the defence of the interests of its State to the extent that they would be tested. The dual nature of the relationship between political and moral interests is the origin of conflicts between states. Politicians or those who represent them - diplomats - always try to justify themselves and put in place different strategies. Dissuasive diplomacy is a will of one who deters to protect the object to which he or she holds dear and to make the other hesitate. In a situation where deterrence prevails, it is up to the other to transform a state of peace into a state of war with all the real and symbolic risks. But preferring the uncertainties of war to status quo is a difficult choice. However, offensive diplomacy and defensive diplomacy are closely associated with the concept of a security dilemma. These fluctuations in the perceived degree of insecurity affect the trend towards the use of armed force. In his theory of the balance of the offensive and the defensive, Van Evera (1995) adds the diplomatic factors to the military and geographic factors and in doing so, he subsumes under the offense-defense when: "Collective security systems, defensive alliances, and balancing behavior by neutral states...", he also states that "war is more likely when conquest is easy or perceived (...) and that changes in the balance of the offensive and defensively have a significant effect on the risks of war." [2] Indeed, each state seeks first to ensure its security and the use of armed violence

is often a function of the feeling of insecurity and frustration towards the other. So it can be summarized that the balance of the offensive and the defensive could be a variant of the balance of power. On the other hand, Mearsheimer (2001) argues that states are guided by this desire to acquire power after power and in the hope of dominating others: "All states are influenced by this logic, which means that not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. (...) This inexorably leads to a world of constant security competition, where states are willing to lie, cheat, and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their rivals." He adds: "The 'security dilemma,' which is one of the most well-known concepts in the international relations literature, reflects the basic logic of offensive realism. The essence of the dilemma is that the measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decrease the security of other states. Thus, it is difficult for a state to increase its own chances of survival without threatening the survival of other states." [3] Analyzing these theories of offensive diplomacy, I can conclude that the state, which is eager to ensure its security, is forced to prevent the emergence of the other state (potential rival) and, to do so, must take the slightest opportunity to intensify its desire and weaken the other. Contrary to other theories, Waltz evokes, in its concept, the radical difference between the internal political system and the external political system of States, which promote the emergence of offensive diplomacy: "Internal political systems are centralized and hierarchical (...) International systems are decentralized and anarchic. The ordering principles of these two structures are distinct from each other; in fact, they are opposed to each other." For Waltz (1979), this emphasis is the stark difference between national politics: "domain of authority, administration and law and international politics: domain of power, struggle, and accommodation, self-help policy," rewards those who act to prosper and penalize those who do not act, weaken and become addicted. Waltz (1979) predict certain behaviors for States: "The international system is anarchic: there is no higher central authority that can enforce rules over individual States. Given this context, states act on the basis of *self-help*: They operate with the aim of survival and their interactions with other states reflect their desire to survive. The structure only changes if great powers take actions that will lead to a change. Most States have no power to change the structure (...) Balancing can take two forms: Internal and external. Internal balancing refers to the investment of military power to match up with other States. External balancing refers to the alliance of States to counter a stronger power, or a hegemon. States will choose the weaker of the available coalitions because of the understanding that the stronger side is the one threatening their security." [4] Accordingly, it can be concluded that diplomatic action tends to compel or convince another, who also has autonomous decisions, in order to increase or reduce that opposition.

Remember that a conflict is a clash between interests, values, acts or procedures and yet it involves a voluntary process, an effort to create that conflict. For Aron (1984), the balance of power is always approximate, equivocal, at every moment threatened either by the change of camp of a secondary unit or by the unequal development of the main States. He notes: "The conduct of hostilities in according diplomatic and strategic combinations adds additional uncertainties (...) Between the peace of power and the peace of powerlessness, a third term exists, at least conceptually: the peace of satisfaction." In this sense, Aron considers that "The peace by satisfaction and mutual trust are only possible if the diplomacy of different states finds a substitute for security by force." [5] On the other hand, Breuning (2007) believes that foreign policy has three levels of analysis the individual, the state, and the international system: "The individual level of analysis focuses on leaders and decision makers in an effort to explain foreign policy (...) the State level focuses on factors internal to the state as those that compel states to engage in specific foreign policy behaviors (institutional framework of the State; relationships between the executive and legislative branches of government, domestic

constituencies: such as interest groups, ethnic groups, or public opinion more generally, economic conditions, and also the State's national history and culture): international level asks questions about the relative power of States, the international system is defined as a set of States whose interactions are guided by their relative capabilities, such as their power and wealth, which influence their possibilities for action and for success on the global stage'' [6] Currently, modern digitization also has its impact on diplomacy and negotiation. The diplomacy of influence is increasingly using digital in all its variants (applications, sites, publications, social networks, etc.; the social web has become an essential element. The three axes of the digital communication strategy of diplomacy can be highlighted: 1) strengthening dialogue with civil society (from its country, foreign countries), 2) strengthening the "public service" dimension of diplomacy and more broadly the quality of service offered to the population, 3) supporting the network of diplomatic posts in digital communication. It must be added to this that the diplomatic can provide answers to the identification of authentic information and to the criticism of misinformation. In this sense, the diplomatic approach stands out both from a retrospective approach and from the historical objective in which it has been confined for so long. Without necessarily ignoring historiographical concerns, it focuses on management, quality and risk management objectives. For Chabin (2008) : "Digital diplomacy is not a retrospective critique of a documentary fund already set up for the exploitation of historical sources (although it can contribute to it), but rather a forward-looking assessment of the archivability of information, with remedies to, if necessary, optimize this archivability, for example by modelling upstream of the information to be archived." [7]

As well the negotiation is the first art of diplomacy. Pancrazio (2007) writes that: "...it then tends to design a system aimed at preventing conflicts from occurring or creating the conditions for their settlement." [8] Diplomatic negotiation has therefore studied from a wide variety of perspectives: diversity reflects the complexity of diplomatic negotiation situations, the structuring elements of which (actors, institutional political structure, issues and subjects of negotiation, etc.) are highly variable: negotiators representing a state or international organization; negotiation taking place outside any visible or claimed institutional framework or negotiation taking place under the aegis of an international organization; the purpose of negotiation (political, economic, commercial, military, cultural, environmental, etc.). Recall that Iklé writes, that the negotiation is a form of interaction in which individuals, organizations and governments explicitly attempt to order (or claim to do so) a new combination of their interests, which are both conflicting and common. Iklé (1964) adds that while negotiators rarely adhere strictly to an agenda, a preliminary plan is critical from the standpoint of defining issues and setting the tone for deliberation. The way in which issues are defined at the outset may have important ramifications for the course of negotiations. Rubin and Brown (1975) recommended: "Whenever possible, intangible issues should be recast in concrete dimensions, fractionated into their tangible components, and negotiated in operational terms." [9] Two kinds of common interests can be distinguished: 1) an identical interest in such a particular type of arrangement, or for such an objective, which the parties can only achieve - in any case, easily - if they join their efforts, 2) a complementary interest in an exchange of objects, which the parties cannot acquire on their own, but only concede to others. Most diplomatic negotiations combine these two kinds of interests, identical and complementary, while the only complementary interests prevail in business negotiations. Parties can link their conflicts and common interests explicitly or tacitly. A negotiation process may generate, or contain, side effects, not with the agreement ostensibly being negotiated. If a great effort is required to achieve a slight improvement, it may appear, at the end of the process, a substantial gain. Consequences of these uncertain assessments: first, the parties cannot know, before making their choice, where their breaking

point really is and at what level an agreement would be acceptable. The concept of a minimum threshold is only realistic for relatively short periods of time, which is rarely the case in diplomatic negotiations. Second, if the equilibrium point can be changed depending on the outcome of a negotiation, the point that separates, in equal parts, for each party, the gains and losses, can also assess. "Fair divisions" are therefore variables dependent on the negotiation process. Compromise is often seen as essential in negotiations. There are, however, several ways to reach an agreement; and regardless of the type of compromise, this degree of fairness depends on the intrinsic merits of each person's positions. The influence of mediators is largely due to the fact that by selecting a point of agreement among other possible points, they thus create a focal point. Here are a few that will make it possible to question what would underpin the specificity of the work of diplomats in this field: a) the inventory of points of dispute: it is a central facet of their day-to-day monitoring activity and for the preparation of particular meetings; b) recognition of the possibilities of agreement: both try to identify possible compromises, but also the room for manoeuvre of the other; etc.) the proposal for a pre-offer, presented in the form of drafts or "non-papers"; d) persuasion and argumentation, through logical demonstrations, scientific presentations, statistical data, etc. to hope to lead the opposing party to share the views that one wants to see adopted, etc.; e) the techniques, which have many variations, can be used between negotiators who are only brought to meet a few times; etc. Public diplomacy through communication with the media (concerned and international countries) the team of diplomats can try to influence the context of the negotiation. One (or more) of the parties may thus have no interest in seeing the negotiations succeed, preferring rather than remaining the status quo.

In bilateral negotiations, the rules are less well established and give way to diverse, more or less politicized ambassadorial roles. The complexity of multilateral negotiation lies in the fact that it takes place simultaneously on several levels: the symbolic game of meetings between leaders, regular interactions between experts and/or diplomats, negotiations and compromises within each government, etc. Bilateral negotiations are generally portrayed as direct contact between the political authorities of the two countries; the embassy and headquarters are supposed to have only a role to accompany and prepare ministerial delegations. First, they frame and limit agents, since they constitute their structure of action: within a state, a political leader is constrained both by his function and the level of the state to which he exercises it and by practices considered acceptable and legitimate in terms of the characteristics of the state. Second, agents communicate in order to legitimize their practices and may claim prerogatives associated with their function, national laws or international treaties. Meetings between high-ranking heads of state or politicians are generally prepared and negotiated in advance, including by diplomats from both countries. While the public and visible part of the major bilateral negotiations is between politicians, their behind-the-scenes are largely populated by diplomats. The negotiation itself is one of the instruments of diplomacy and, ipso facto, of foreign policy. In this regard, some major developments in modern international negotiations deserve to be clarified: 1) international negotiations are becoming less and less bilateral, 2) they expand to more and more technical areas, 3) they are increasingly done through a mediator, especially in the area of conflict resolution. Many reflections have been devoted to the question of power asymmetries. The majority of authors consider that the negotiation merely confirms the initial distribution of power between the parties, the most powerful being able to guide the process and the outcome of the process. They believe that beyond the actual power of each protagonist, it is important to take into account the power it is perceived by the parties. The behavioural

approach reminds us that the personality of the actors involved is also a decisive explanatory variable for the outcome of the negotiation. To these notions, some authors add that of "reasoned" negotiation. Fisher and Ury (1991) in *"Getting to Yes- Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In"* focused on the psychology of negotiation in their method, "principled negotiation", finding acceptable solutions by determining which needs are fixed and which are flexible for negotiators. Their method is based on five propositions: “ 1) “Separate the people from the problem”-applies to the interaction between the two parties to a negotiation; the principle is broken down into three subcategories: perception, emotion, and communication. 2) "Focus on interests, not positions"—is about the position that the parties hold and the interests that led them to that position; both parties should discuss their interests and keep an open mind to the other side of the argument. 3)"Invent options for mutual gain"-aims to help the parties find an option that will impact each party in a positive way; both parties should clearly explain their intentions and what they want out of the conversation. 4) "Insist on using objective criteria"-is about making sure that the conversation stays on topic and that it is productive; the parties are making deals based on objective and practical criteria. 5)"Know your BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement)"-emphasizes that no method can guarantee success if all the leverage lies on the other side.” The authors suggest two methods of going about negotiating from a position of power: first, each party should protect themselves first; second, each party should make the most of the power within their own assets to negotiate and win against the opposite party.” [10] For Mnookin (2010) the *innegotiable* nature of a position is, in other words, questionable; its credibility is in any case tangible only after the fact, the *innegotiable* only imposed itself when the negotiation has failed; another issue is the type of interlocutors to be faced with. In this logic, Mnookin (2010) explores the challenge of making such critical decisions. Using eight conflicts drawn from history and his own professional experience, he offers a framework that applies equally to international conflicts and everyday life: “There is no easy, categorical answer (...) Sometimes you should bargain with the Devil and other times you should refuse. How in particular circumstances should you decide? The challenge is making wise decisions.” [11]

In addition to these different factors (power relations, the skill and possible prisms of negotiators, strategies pursued, types of processes initiated, respectable or sulphurous personality of the negotiator, etc.), it is interesting to question the inevitably limited nature of formal negotiations to resolve a conflict. One of the practical applications of this broadening of perspective is to increase contacts between members from each camp, acting in a personal capacity, but close enough to decision-makers that their ideas can ultimately go back to the top. Although these steps are not directly related to formal negotiations, they are fully involved in the broad negotiation process necessary to bring the protagonists closer together (Kelman 1998). Also, Kelman (1998) summarises the social-psychological assumptions underlying, referring to : ‘1) the point in the societal and intersocietal process of international conflict at which the individual is the appropriate unit of analysis, 2) the intersocietal character of international conflict and its resolution, 3) conflict as an interactive process with an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic, 4) the need to use a wide range of influence processes in international conflict relationships, 5) conflict as a dynamic phenomenon, marked by the occurrence and possibility of change.” [12] For Kelman, these interactions are decisive before, during and after the formal negotiations stage. They are crucial before formal procedures are initiated (phase-in) as they contribute to the fact that the representatives of each party agree to sit down at the negotiating table. Once these have begun, informal exchanges between already

trusted participants allow for further discussion of the most sensitive issues on the issue. Finally, these meetings are just as useful after obtaining an agreement (post-negotiation phase). Finally, in diplomacy, there are conflicting points of view. Zartman (1978) makes negotiation one of the identifiable modes of social decision-making. Unlike the first mode of decision-making, coalition, zero-sum process, and second, judicially, a hierarchical process based on the power of one, negotiation characterizes a process in which two or more parties combine their conflicting views to make a single decision. First, where negotiation is used for propaganda purposes, the status quo may be preferred. Agreeing to discuss does not imply acceptance of negotiation. In this case, the stakeholders do not achieve a common result since this is not the objective of at least one of them: a common result cannot be achieved against the will of one of the parties. Second, according to Zartman (1978), the common result results: ‘...by changing the parties' evaluation of their values (...) by persuasion, coercion or force. (...) The concession/convergence approach has problems of symmetry, determinism, and power, but above all fails to reflect the nature of negotiation as practiced. Negotiators begin by groping for a jointly agreeable formula that will serve as a referent, provide a notion of justice, and define a common perception on which implementing details can be based.’ [13] Additionally, it must be concluded that the preference for a common outcome does not imply that an agreement will actually be reached.

2. The psychological aspects of diplomatic negotiation

Negotiation is a process of interactions between two or more protagonists who aim to settle their differences of interests/goals, with an awareness of the situation of interdependence in which they find themselves. Negotiation has several psychological aspects: cognitive and connotative aspects, behavioural aspects, communicative aspects and interactive aspects: intraindividual, interindividual, group and social, etc. From this point of view, negotiation usually refers to an explicit process of problem-solving or conflict and built around proposals and counter-proposals and the development of joint agreements with the adversary or the breakdown of negotiations in the absence of an agreement. These are cognitive aspects of negotiation. In addition, it can be considered if there is no agreement between the expected results and the subset of activated actions, then individuals will look for other types of possible action and the choice is made from a level of aspiration. In my opinion, the negotiator must engage in genuine internal negotiation (intrapersonal and intra-group) in order to maintain its effectiveness. Also, Simon (1997) developed the concepts of *Bounded Rationality* and satisficing, which are embedded in his behavioral theory of decision making: "Bounded Rationality" refers to the individual collective rational choice that takes into account "the limits of human capability to calculate, the severe deficiencies of human knowledge about the consequences of choice, and the limits of human ability to adjudicate among multiple goals. Precisely, if the alternatives for choice are not given initially to the decision maker, she must search for them; hence, a theory of bounded rationality must incorporate a theory of search." He adds: "Because predicting real-world human behavior from the optimal behavior in a given environment is but seldom possible, the actors' rationality will be defined by the processes they (presumably) actually use in making their decisions rather than the substance of the decisions they reach." [14] I think that, during negotiation opponents issue information and receive it differently. On this occasion, the work on the formation of people's impressions at the time of decision-making brings the complementary elements to the cognitive analysis of the

negotiation. I want to point out that many studies have already been done on the cognitive factors that contribute to the formation of judgment and the analysis of the information processing of negotiators during the problem-solving process. (Bazerman, Neale 1993; Tversky, Kahneman, 1981 and others). The analysis of individual thinking plays an important role in studies of the problem-solving process. Rubinstein's *global theory of thought* (1957) states that: "The thought is represented in two essential forms in interaction with the world: a) as the activity of the subject (of the individual or group), which is characterized by motivation (intrinsic/cognitive and extrinsic), the formation of goals, personal abilities, reflection, self-judgment, etc., b) as the dynamic and evolutionary process, consisting of the analysis, synthesis, generation, realization or globalization of the object (problem) studied, which are involved in the structure of the individual's activity, but which is also absolutely inseparable from the personal aspect of thought." [15] In the context of this theory of Rubinstein Bruschlinsky (1977) considers that during the process of thought, the subject anticipates or foresees the future resolution of the problem or its future actions, and at the same time it develops and evolves gradually. Moreover, the process of thought, according to Bruschlinsky, is carried out in the process consistent with his subjective-objective theory of the psyche: "The psyche is a continuous and non-disjunctive process (...) mainly vital, extremely plastic and flexible, never initially fully defined in advance and therefore in its training and development it generates certain products and results: mental images, states, concepts, feelings, solutions or lack of solutions in problem solving, etc. (...) the psyche itself develops, reflecting more and more the dynamic reality that surrounds it and participating in the regulation of all actions, acts and activities as a whole of his personality." [16]. It should be noted that the anticipation of problem solving and the development of the psyche were also analyzed by other researchers, who emphasize that the person, trying to achieve a goal, mentally and periodically records the results of his solutions or predictions and then compares them or adjusts them to the previously set goals and predictions (Rubinstein, 1976; Kulutkin & Sukhobskaya, 1977; Ponomarev, 1983; Radtchenko, 1988, Matyushkin, 2009 and others).

Princely, Radtchenko-Draillard (2011) analyzes the thought process of subjects in the experimental study of negotiation during the following phases: "1) incubation period-period illumination (creativity) of the thought process, 2) rigidity- flexibility of ideas, 3) divergence-convergence of thought, 4) impulsivity-hesitation in the development of proposals (anticipation), 5) fluidity of inferences-speed, 6) verification (acceptance, redefinition, abandonment)-lack of control of solutions, 7) decision-making (success)-refusal to make decision (failure), etc. Radtchenko-Draillard adds: "I should also point out that the anticipation of problem-solving dominates mainly in the preparation of the negotiations, precisely when drawing up the initial proposals, preliminaries and strategies used in the negotiation and pre-negotiation, and finally, the forecast analysis of the solutions proposed by the opposing party and the implementation of possible contractions during the negotiation." [17] Ponomarev (1976) considers that in the process of solving the problem, the use of complementary or auxiliary advice and proposals from his entourage or the opposing party can be effective: precisely in the vast majority of cases, individuals, who have worked long without success, quickly find effective solutions. Ponomarev (1976) establishes the necessary conditions for the use in problem-solving to become effective: "1) the very thorough analysis of plausible solutions for solving the problem, 2) the preserving personal interest in solving the problem, 3) the main indicators of problem solving analysed in the content of complementary or advice and proposals, 4) the novelty and objective circumstances necessary in the development of

solutions, through the use of advice and complementary or ancillary proposals.” [18] The search for an answer to a question, an idea or a project leads individuals to bond; everyone gets involved in order to reach a mutual agreement. Creative thinking is then used. Thus, during this necessary judgment, one must determine what good and useful of what is wrong or harmful in decision-making. Therefore, the cognitive aspect is a fundamental issue in the negotiations since no one can claim to negotiate without first defining the problem at stake. It is through confrontation that points of view can eventually be adjusted: it is necessary to know in depth the position of the other and to express one's position in order to promote mutual understanding. It should be noted that unlike the process of solving problems and scientific tasks by two or more individuals, the cognitive process of negotiation includes the presence of personal or group (national) priorities and interests in the common resolution of the various and the development of a common agreement by the negotiators (two or more). These personal and group priorities dominate the motivation of negotiators even if their positions are not always contradictory. It requires a strong commitment and the implication of denial. On the other hand, the motivation of the negotiators plays a major role in the development of solutions during the discussion. According to the *Self-Determination Theory*, motivation is based on two essential needs: a) the need for competence, b) the need for self-determination, Deci and Ryan (1985) also distinguish: “Intrinsic motivation is defined as the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable consequence; when intrinsically motivated a person is moved to act for the fun or challenge entailed rather than because of external prods, pressures, or rewards. Extrinsic motivation is a construct that pertains whenever an activity is done in order to attain some separable outcome; extrinsic motivation thus contrasts with intrinsic motivation, which refers to doing an activity simply for the enjoyment of the activity itself, rather than its instrumental value. The amotivation is the state of lacking an intention to act; when amotivated, a person's behavior lacks intentionality and a sense of personal causation: amotivation results from not valuing an activity not feeling competent to do it, etc.” [19]

On the other hand, Rubinstein (1957), who was particularly interested in the impact of intrinsic (cognitive) motivation in thought, gave his definition: "Whatever the initial motive for triggering thought at the beginning of its functioning, cognitive (intrinsic) motives necessarily begin to react in order to understand something previously unknown in the well-defined situation." Based on this definition, Radtchenko (1988) empirically analyzes it in the process of problem and find that: “Intrinsic motivation is very active at the time of maximum development of the thought process and is accompanied by a reorganization and redefinition of solutions (their presentation, their function or use), a complexity of ideas (a combination of conceptual structures) and an individual's confidence in their abilities. In most cases, the more original the solution, the more productive the intrinsic motivation.” [20] Moreover, in the empirical work carried out on the negotiation Radtchenko-Draillard (2011-2012, 2016) found that "this link between the originality of solutions and the productivity of intrinsic motivation can stimulate the emergence of *the mechanism of "optimal creativity"* that intervenes at the crucial moment for the problem-solving process, in order to promote its progression and block, at the same time , all other negative impacts at intrapersonal levels (doubts, fears, hesitations, fears of failure, undervalued self-assessment, etc.) interpersonal (concerns of being misunderstood or ridiculed, desires to keep solutions, for oneself, distance from each other and others, mutual distrust, hatred of the adversary, etc.) and situational (conflicts in the past or temporary conflicts, unstable or poorly chosen situations, political crises or etc.) prevent it from achieving its performance. It can also be added that cultural variables (values, prejudices,

stereotypes, past experiences with another country), reinforced by the taking of the particular decision-making strategy and personal feelings towards their opponents influence the behaviour and cognitive process of opponents, especially at the beginning of the negotiation. Radtchenko-Draillard also applies *the concept of Rubinstein's externalization* (1957) according to which ‘... all the psychic phenomena of personality find their explanation in the very unified node of internal conditions by which external influences are transformed and external causes act, in turn, by internal conditions that also develop as a result of external actions.’’[21] Similarly Radtchenko-Draillard (2020) elaborated the qualitative analysis grids for the choice of the decision-making strategies during an international negotiation which measures: ‘1) the valuation of distributivism (rigid), of interactivity (flexible) and of mixed behaviours; 2) the measurement of choice decision-making strategy (divergence-convergence; fluidity of rational inferences/ impulsiveness of wishes / scepticism; game of options of attitudes; 3) the result of the agreement). This grid includes three main types of negotiators' interventions in decision-making: a) interventions related to risk decision making strategy and based on the quick evaluation of proposals, divergent and fluid ideas, b) interventions related to realistic or optimal decision making strategy and based on the reasoned analysis of proposals, convergent solutions; c) interventions related to the decision making strategy of prudence, based on hesitation, exhaustive verification of proposals and difficult for these acceptance.’’[22]

Game theory has often been used by negotiation theorists. It should be noted that games are characterized by rules, which define the number and role of the players, as well as the variables, such as: choices, information (complete or incomplete), type of communication between players (communicating with each other or being interviewed separately), number of players (at least two), types of play and stages of the game (simultaneous or sequential, temporary or dynamic), possible strategies (pure or mixed) rewards (gains or losses); results (failure, compromise or success) etc. The main types of games are zero-sum games and positive or variable (non-zero) games. In game theory, a zero-sum game is a mathematical representation of a situation in which each participant's gain or loss of utility is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of the utility of the other participants. In contrast, non-zero-sum describes a situation in which the interacting parties' aggregate gains and losses can be less than or more than zero. A zero-sum game is also called a strictly competitive game while non-zero-sum games can be either competitive or non-competitive. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) were the first to construct a cooperative theory of n-person games; they assumed that various groups of players could join together to form coalitions, each of which has an associated value defined as the minimum amount that the coalition can ensure by its own efforts. It should also be noted that during the negotiation, each involved player increases his or her sensitivity and identity. In order to negotiate and get along with the other, you need to know them, understand their ways of doing things and your intentions; to allow the other to know our intentions and our ways of doing things. Negotiation therefore involves communication, dialogue, intersubjective exchange and sharing. Each must strive to make visible to the other the idea, the feeling, the way of making the negotiation. It is the negotiation that will allow the idea or project to emerge better to reach the agreement. Precisely, the link is formed in intersubjectivity and everyone can expose or oppose his opinions. You have to know how to listen and exchange in order to make alliances. Deliberation is a major and main time in the collective process and negotiation. At best, a consensus solution is reached. Otherwise, it is necessary to arbitrate by horizontal cooperation, but also vertical. On the other hand, we have to take on this arbitration because it gives advantage to some over others. It is at this time that the denial of unacceptable or

unfavourable solutions is denied, it should also be noted that in the theory of negotiation there are at least two essential characteristics: 1) negotiation is a conflict of interest between protagonists, which cannot be completely and simultaneously resolved; 2) negotiation is a situation of interdependence between two or more individuals/groups in order to possess the same purpose. In this sense, Deutsch (1949) affirms: "In a co-operative social situation: the goal regions for each of the individuals or sub-units in the situation are defined so that a goal region can be entered (to some degree) by any given individuals or sub-unit only if all the individual or sub-units under consideration can also enter their respective goal-region (to some degree)... the phase 'promotively interdependent goals'. In the competitive social situation: the goal regions for each the individuals or sub-units in the situation are defined so that if a goal-region is entered by any individual or sub-units (...), the other individual or sub-units will, to some degree, be unable to reach their respectable goals (....) the phase *contritly interdependent goals*.'" [23] Deutsch adds that there are probably very few, if any, real-life situation which, according to the definitions offered above are "purely "co-operative or competitive. On the other hand, Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) write: "Negotiation, defined as a process by which parties attempt to reach an accord that specifies how they will act toward one another (...) Leaders may convincingly claim they are not free to accept the proposals of the other party because their constituency would not support such an agreement.'" [24] Walton and McKersie (1965) have comprehensively and formalized the various aspects of the negotiation. Specifically, the Walton and McKersie model (1965) contains four systems of activity, each with its own internal logics, and its own set of instrumental acts or tactics: "These systems they call 'sub-processes' - 1° Distributive bargaining is the term used to describe the subprocess which a Party engages in when trying to achieve goals that are in conflict with those of Opponent. 2° Integrative bargaining is where one Party pursues goals that are not in conflict with those of the other; they have an area of common concern best identified as a problem, 3° Attitudinal structuring subprocess is to try to create a more desirable set off relationships for the Party. 4° Intraorganizational bargaining is a sub-process in which the parties try to achieve consensus within their respective organizations. Chief negotiators and principals engage in activities that bring their expectations into alignment.'" [25]

In general, in international negotiations, the three main phases: 1) pre-negotiation (the collection of information and information needed to negotiate, analysis of the background in dealings with future adversaries, the formulation and study of strategies to be implemented, the various preparation activities, etc.), 2) negotiation (the actual interaction and communication with the adversary, failure/success/compromise of a found agreement, etc.), and 3) post-negotiation perspectives, implementation and monitoring of the treaty signed for each party concerned, etc.). In the case of international negotiation of integrative strategic direction, negotiators can achieve their positive transfer to the adversary with positive feelings and other forms of influence or power. Finally, in international negotiations of the mixed strategic direction, adversaries generally resort to powers, based on the process of persuasion and accommodation, to try to demonstrate to the other that they are right to ask for what they are asking for, but that it is in their opponent's interest to yield to their demands. It should also be noted that, beyond this strategic and theoretical distinction, with exceptions, the concrete situations of diplomatic negotiation involve a balanced mix of distributiveness (competition) and integrativeness (cooperation). Research from this perspective is based primarily on the psychological and cognitive dimension of negotiation. They are devoted, on the one hand, to the attitude and traits of negotiators, the qualities most often mentioned in the literature being

realism, patience and flexibility. They also question the importance of perceptions, images and misunderstandings. After conducting several empirical studies on the negotiation Radtchenko-Draillard (2012-2016) has established the detailed strategic scheme of the negotiation that differs into three strategic types: ‘1) *Distributive negotiation* - competitive strategic orientation - conflict of interest; distributive tactics (treatment of problems point by point); distributive techniques (threats, over-bidding, bluffing, pressure, ultimatum, etc.); distributive behaviour (rigidity, perseverance, repetition, self-gain orientation, zero-sum play, etc.); formal communication (internal discussions, content analysis of exchanges); unfavourable attitudes (distrust, confrontation, lies, complacency, intransigence, apathy, etc.); negative emotions (anger, stress, frustration, criticism, aggression of the opponent, etc.). 2) *Integrative negotiation*- cooperative strategic orientation (common interest); integrative tactics (package method on several problems, etc.); integrative techniques (promises, concessions, "test balloons," reciprocity, etc.); integrative behaviour (flexibility, flexibility, exchange of concessions, common gain orientation, use of "multi-sum" play); informal communication (dialogues based on intercultural ethics); favourable attitudes (trust, diplomacy, sympathy, skill, respect for opponent, etc.); positive emotions (joy, satisfaction, pleasure, fulfilment, congratulations from the opponent, etc.). 3) *Mixed negotiation* - mixed strategic direction (seeking compromise); mixed tactics (method of segmenting one or more problems); mixed techniques (opportunity of circumstances, haggling, etc.); neutral behaviour (combination of confrontation/cooperation, orientation on partial gain, use of "complementary sum" play); mixed communication (reporting and specific information management); neutral attitudes (prudence, "let-up" and "cold-bloodedness," control, etc.); neutral emotions (insensitivity, sobriety, silence, reflection, lack of explicit emotions, etc.)’ [26]

When negotiators come into contact in this way, it is the relationship between groups but also the individuals who interact with others. Individual negotiators may more often come up with a constructive solution and lead to easier memorization of each other's unique characteristics. But in collective bargaining compromises are more difficult to develop and often the discussion continues until one or the other wins. The personality of the negotiators plays a decisive role in the process of reaching an agreement with its counterpart. Personal factors include all of the individual characteristics, needs, attributes, expectations, and other enduring provisions that the actors bring with them to the negotiation. The personality traits predispose the individual to certain perceptions and behavior, and include characteristics such as age, motivations and attitudes such as trusting, cooperativeness, authoritarianism, liberalism, etc. In addition, Bercovitch (1984) writes: ‘Role factors, on the other hand, describe a set of influences that stem from the negotiator's reference group, or from expectations attached to their position.’ [27] They determine the decision-latitude of the negotiator by producing a field of pressure in which each actor has to be responsive to the needs and expectations of their own constituency. Antsiferova (1990) has developed a dynamic approach to personality, predetermining her understanding as a self-developing system, the initiator of its active existence, change and progressive development as a movement forward and reverse, to the past). Antsiferova writes : ‘It is justified that the provision that the integration of the individual with the present and the future contributes to strengthening his energy and semantic capacities, to moving to new levels of development, overcoming human obstacles and determining adequate forms of response to positive or negative events, etc.’ [28] These assertions are comparable to the structure of the negotiation process with its confrontation/counter-confrontation phases or positive/negative developments in the ambivalence conflict. This

situation of the conflict of ambivalence is frequently observed among negotiators, who disagree with his delegation and who have discrepancies with their own convictions and impulse desires or ambiguous and ambivalent attitudes towards their international protagonists, etc. From a psychoanalytic point of view, in the resolution of the conflict of ambivalence, a certain measure of modification of the ego of the person by reaction formation becomes in various circumstances so impressive that it imposes itself on attention as a major symptom of that state of the anxiety. Freud gives his explanation in his essay *'Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety'* (1925-1926): "The conflict due to ambivalence, for instance, is resolved in hysteria by this means. (...). Either the state of anxiety reproduced itself automatically in situations analogous to the original situation and was thus an inexpedient form of reaction instead of an expedient one as it had been in the first situation of danger; or the ego acquired power over this affect, reproduced it on its own initiative, and employed it as a warning of danger and as a means of setting the pleasure-unpleasure mechanism in motion." [29] This is how the dynamics of the intrapersonal and interpersonal interaction are orchestrated on the basis of the points to be discussed. Their impact is felt in interpersonal and intercultural relations by the dissimilar importance they give to factors, such as: the composition and functioning of the powers recognized by negotiators, the duration and modalities of each person's decision-making. Compliance would then be the result of the confrontation between two opposing systems: that of the negotiator and his group/country and that of his opposing party. From Duroselle's point of view (1997): "The problem of the statesman in international relations and especially in negotiation can be presented in several facets: the personality of the statesman, the statesman and the national interest, the statesman and the deep forces in the decision." [30] Duroselle writes, albeit in a footnote, that the political scientists very often neglect the personality of the statesman.

It should be noted, however, many political psychology studies provide a significant step in understanding foreign policy decision-making and negotiation. Let's add that the personalization of power is an ancient phenomenon in the history of the political science and psychology. Precisely, in the book *"The Prince"* (1513), Machiavelli enunciates the pragmatism, describes the reality of power, and defines two styles of leadership leaders: a) the Prince-the ruler who relies on power and legitimate authority; b) the Leader-leader who relies on personal authority and charisma. Other relevant topics discussed by Machiavelli that apply to modern leadership theories include humility, information sharing, and power dynamics. Several other works on political leaders is analyzed by psychologists and experts in international negotiation (precisely, one examines Lewin's communication styles, 1951, Blake and Mouton's leadership styles, 1985, Barber's theory of presidential behavior, 1972; the peculiarities of Max Weber's charismatic political leader, 1921, which revived the question of relevance in situations of organizational crisis and the importance of charisma in national, international political action and negotiation). In addition, Dorna (1989) writes about it: "Psychologists have also questioned other determinants of the influence of political leaders, verbal behaviour and assurance seem to play a fundamental role in acquiring and maintaining leadership; performing the task or good interpersonal relationships; the degree of acceptance of leadership, moreover, several elements must be identified: the strength of his beliefs, the type of interaction he maintains with others, the way he acts to represent them, his reaction to stress, his resources to overcome it, the behaviors that led to success or failure in the past and their circumstances." [31] As Grawitz (1985) notes: "...the political psychology applied to international relations seeks in particular to understand "the influence of the personality of

heads of state on their conception of international politics and the way in which officials carry out their task: to inform themselves, negotiate, to decide.” [32] For Grawitz (1985) the added value of political psychology in international policy work is to be interested in the part of influence. As well as two trends can also be defined in the analysis of political leaders: a rather qualitative, governmental trend that remains close to the psychobiographical tradition; an academic, rather quantitative, trend that focuses on personality traits. The psychobiographical trend is mainly the work of psychiatrists who establish extremely comprehensive psychological profiles of political leaders. With regard to the academic trend, it differs more and more from the total approaches to personality, which allow above all to deepen the psychology of specific individuals; it is more interested in identifying personality traits, and to do so can work on samples of several politicians. For example Hermann (1980) develops a method that measures the impact of personality on politics based on the analysis of speeches and interviews given by politicians: “...the frequency of use of certain words then allows to highlight prominent personality traits; par exemple, belief in the ability to control events, the need for power, conceptual complexity, self-confidence, trust in others, etc.) and see what they reveal about foreign policy, etc.” [33]

Dominant, eccentric and self-centred political figures often behave negatively in international relations and negotiation (for example, with personality traits such as arrogance, neglect, jealousy, contempt, ignorance, stubbornness, etc.). These personalities can degrade relations with their counterparts and increase their conflict with their advisors and collaborators. Precisely, Milyavsky, Kruglanski, Chernikova and Schori-Eyal (2017), who empirically analyzed the effects of arrogance in individuals who reject advice from others, distinguish several types of arrogance vs. related constructs: “Arrogance, arrogance vs. hubristic pride, arrogance vs. contempt, arrogance vs. overconfidence; arrogance vs. stubbornness, arrogance vs. narcissism. The results show that when it comes to arrogance judgments, social concerns are more important than epistemic concerns.” [34] Although his work has been done in the laboratory and in another empirical field, it nevertheless gives us important information on the impact of the arrogance of political leaders in international relations and diplomatic negotiation. It is interesting to quote here Freud's approach, supported in this by Bullitt. This approach explores different possibilities: from the record of correlations, co-occurrences, coincidences in the autobiographical, journalistic, political and historical material collected and established by Bullitt on President Wilson. Subsequently, the psychological description made by Freud and Bullitt on the behavior of President Wilson (1930) in the preparation of the Treaty of Versailles is very meticulous: Wilson is caught between the promises made to each other, the expectations here and there of a just peace on the one hand and on the other hand the inflexible will of allied heads of government - anxious above all to realize their real and tacit war objectives. But instead of expressing himself, as he should and as he could, Wilson seeks only to avoid difficulty, conflict and confrontation. They note that Wilson's reaction to this is truly staggering and increasingly frozen as negotiations between the allies progress: “Wilson was indeed complex, and it will not be easy to discover the clue of the unity underlying the apparent contradictions of his character. Moreover, we should not leave with false hopes.” [35] According to Freud and Bullitt, it is Wilson's determination to find a reasoning, a compromise that will allow him to compromise, to give in, to concede, to renounce and also to remain the saviour of the world, in his own eyes and if possible in the eyes of nations and peoples. By analysing certain political figures during diplomatic negotiations, one can also account for the possible shift of the charismatic leader in his country into an enemy for a particular foreign country and with

disastrous consequences on international relations. On the other hand, "tacit bargaining" often occurs between political leaders of different countries, when they deliberately construct an arrangement between them in diplomatic negotiation, combining common interests and conflicting interests, through allusions and speculations, etc. Finally, diplomatic negotiation requires more complex forms of collaboration, different types of exchanges, and various arrangements and compromises; consequently, an explicit agreement is essential here.

3. Psychological and political interactions in diplomatic negotiation

Interactions in diplomacy and diplomatic negotiation result in a series of concrete acts, tactical movements, particular ideologies and each country has a repertoire, which is very special to it. By setting behavioural norms, limits between good and evil, it promotes some acts and prohibits others. An ideological tactic is an element of interaction that elicits an answer, an action in return and so on. From my point of view, we can distinguish, in each political ideology, the following dimensions: a) cognitive: dogmas, beliefs; b) morality: judgments, values; c) normative: standards and laws. Let us remember that ideology is etymologically a discourse on ideas. Ideology is also commonly interpreted as the logic of an idea in relation to its constraint; the logic of a vision; the logic of an image developed for group thinking. An ideology is, therefore, the set of ideas about the structure of concrete society, about the forces that act in the country, about the sources of conflict that are present there, and also about the modalities that enable these conflicts to be resolved. It is a set of ideas shared by a group, commonly known as a political party. To perceive a situation of conflict strategically therefore requires information, of course, but even more knowledge about the mechanisms of explanation, innovation and consensus in negotiation. A group or national conflict and a social conflict feed on themselves, for lack of clarity, and ignore the meaning of weakened identities and the need for their interpretations. As a result, members of society need to be at the heart of networks of interlocation and conflict in order to access, through these changes, an understanding of themselves and others in social representation. It should be remembered that *the theory of social representation* presents a structuring of knowledge, beliefs, opinions about the worldview and the social reality that surrounds individuals. The term Durkheimian, taken up by Moscovici (1961) defines: ‘‘ The modalities of practical thought oriented towards communication, understanding and social, material and ideal mastery.’’ [36] As a social mental production (such as science, myth, religion, ideology), social representation differs from others because of its modes of elaboration and functioning in societies, marked by the pluralism of doctrines or ideas, the isolation of science and intergroup and international conflicts. It should be noted that more durable identifications (less sensitive to political, economic and social change) and fluid identifications (depending on political circumstances and societal conflicts) are generally distinguished in intergroup and international relations. In my point of view, intersubjective interaction within a negotiation is one way of determining the term *negotiated identities*. These identities, including the strength of commitment to a country (group) and its values or ideology, are obviously influenced by the process of international relations. In these relationships, they converge or depart, having a habit of resolving or reinforcing the competing interests of the parties. And as a result, the result is achieved through a complex process, during which the parties can change their criteria for evaluating possible solutions, define new alternatives or conceptualize (with some creativity) the problem itself. Moreover, a diplomacy of a particular state can use its mandates as an "excuse" to be firm about a particular international problem.

On the other hand, the presence of mandates with more fluid identifications makes it easier for diplomacy to maneuver and "sell negotiated agreements" with foreign counterparts. Another very important indicator here is the reaction of citizens to their national powers or regimes. In fact, the dilemma here is related to the problem of finding a balance between adherence to values, national interests and sensitivity towards others within and outside the country (compared to foreign countries). Indeed, identity is established from the self-organizations of individuals and groups of belonging, as the cognitive structure linked to representational thinking. It is expressed through the discourse of politicians and through the process of representation and categorization of reality, proceeding by the identification of a common content, which positions this group and this nation in relation to the near and more distant environment. In international diplomatic interactions, men express themselves in different languages and this phenomenon of bilingualism and multilingualism evokes a double link: a) the connection to oneself and to the other, 2) to the other in itself. And this divergence for men can be integrative or distributive (which amounts to prejudice, loss of integrity in international relations). These experiences enrich above all, the knowledge of landmarks in human situations, that each one adapts it in his own way. No one experiences the same way being immersed alone in a foreign culture. More generally, the conjunction between bilingualism, interculturalism and psychoanalytic anthropology proposes to reflect on the agreement of an exchange. For Lacan (1964) "... being negotiated is not, for a human subject, a rare situation, unlike the verbiage that concerns human dignity (...). Everyone at all times and all levels is negotiable, since what gives us any serious apprehension of the social structure is the exchange." [37] From my point of view, whatever the definition of culture and its application to intragroup and intergroup or international relations, it must go through the interdependence of the identification and resistance of men.

The foreign interlocutor appears to us to be the holder of an identification and also of an originality, whose characteristics and stereotypes he shares with his group or the culture of his belonging. Stereotypes play the role of a double filter: one for perceptions, the other for actions. They are not only shaped by culture, they also affect it. Stereotypes are fictional not because they are false, but because they express a cultural imagination. As far as the security cultural imagination is concerned, it also includes a dimension that is part of the vision of a world hoped for or desired by the political leaders of different countries. The security imagination helps to shape the context in which the protagonists evolve through the practices it allows and, conversely, only makes sense in this context of intentionality. The characteristics of the reasoning of the international protagonists as well as their security imagination are detectable in their speeches. The analysis of political discourse is based on three theoretical premises: discourses are systems of meaning constructing social reality; speeches are the products of this social reality; speeches are articulated in the practices of the international protagonists. This imagination is built of systems of thought in which different types of knowledge are involved: pathos (knowledge as affect), ethos (knowledge as self-image), and logos (knowledge as rationality). It circulates in cultures, organizing itself into systems of thought as creator of norms, as well as depositing itself in the collective memory of peoples and nations. Each stereotype therefore corresponds to a prototypical individual and involves group cohesion: the more the group members deviate from the prototype, the more likely they are to be the cause of a long-entrenched stereotype. Stereotypes can also be analyzed as the expression of *doxa* and preconceived ideas. The *doxa*, the experience of the people and its inscription are in a dogmatism wanted by the governing ideology, which means that between the reality of a

phenomenon and its representation, there can be a significant gap, even a total opposition. Precisely, Angelot (1989) develops the notion of ideologema (in reference to Bakhtin's work) which is embodied in fixed formulas, close to stereotypes and takes its full value in political and social discourse: "... all that is said and written in a state of society all that is printed, all that is spoken publicly ... all that *narrow* and *arguments*, if we ask that 'narrating and arguing' are the two modes of discourse." [38] Following this logic, the theory of argumentation in language is associated with an "integrated pragmatic" and it is the *topoi* that configure discursive chaining. On his side, Anscombre (1993) defines *topoi* as: "...general principles that support reasoning (...). They are almost always presented as being the subject of consensus in the sense of a larger or smaller community (including reduced to an individual, for example, a speaker)." [39] Recall that there are two types of *topoi*: intrinsic *topoi* are those that underpin the meaning of a lexical unit and extrinsic *topoi* that come from the ideological reservoir that possesses any language at a given time. *Topoi* therefore appear as beliefs common to a certain culture or nation that guarantee the argumentative sequence of individuals in this culture or nation. The *doxa* or national cultural fund thus takes its source in a variety of ways with the recent or distant history between different countries at stake. The transmission of distorted information from another country or nation would show that in this case, the stated desire to achieve will be to reassure the population in those countries; while the hidden desire will be the maintenance of power in this country, and the means used refer to the denial of reality. While the modification of information transmitted by the media and official communications may be used by the powers in place in these countries, the semantic modification of certain terms or their constantly repetitive use are part of a policy strategy exercised by the political leader. In my opinion, this role is particularly important in the dualism of political leaders to preserve the legacy of one's own culture and to open it to other cultures or nations through diplomatic negotiations. Moreover, the difference of languages, the distinct perception of the other, the dissimilarity of cultures making each of their signs originally linked in their own difference, in fact approve of the discursive appropriation of these experiences. Finally, they are imbued in the imagination of understanding the phenomena of the world through the sedimentation of narrative and argumentative speeches of political leaders of different countries in diplomatic negotiation. I add that different secret, prior and informal behind-the-scenes communications are often used during these international meetings as tools of prior negotiation in order to adapt narrative and argumentative speeches of different political leaders and to explore the feasibility of their diplomatic negotiation. In diplomatic negotiation, non-verbal communication can also take an important place because of the symbolic part of representation. The point may be to convey a message in a less explicit mode (thus allowing a possible reversal; unlocking the negotiation due to insurmountable antagonistic interests, etc.). Different types of communication can be used as an addition or substitution to actual negotiations. This obviously provides more flexibility and future directions for bilateral and multilingual effective communications between different parties committed to resolving international conflicts.

On the other hand, phenomenology could shed specific light on the issues of diplomacy. It should be noted that the purpose of phenomenology is to describe in its entirety the integral essence of man in the world and his cognitive and emotional possibilities. Phenomenology studies structures of conscious experience as experienced from the first-person point of view, along with relevant conditions of experience. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, the way it is directed through its content or meaning toward a certain object in the world. Phenomenology traces the progressive and dialectical evolution of consciousness

since its opposition between it and the object. In this sense, a moment in the dialectic of consciousness may therefore be true for consciousness itself and false for one who brings together all the moments in one whole. In other words, all consciousness begins with error, but rises to the truth in the whole of its history. This story is a series of awareness (lived experiences) and active creation (transformations of reality). Hegel writes in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. (1807): “The differentiated, merely living, shape does indeed also supersede its independence in the process of Life, but it ceases with its distinctive difference to be what it is.” (...) The logic of self-consciousness demands, however, that we achieve self-certainty in relating to objects that retain their independence from us. We can satisfy this demand only by relating to an object that negates itself but that is “equally independent in this negativity of itself.” Such an object, Hegel maintains, cannot merely be a living thing (or an inorganic object), but must be another consciousness or self-consciousness. Consequently, “self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.” [40] For his part, in “*Ideas I*” (1913) Husserl (1913) defined phenomenology as “the science of the essence of consciousness,” centered on the defining trait of intentionality, explicitly addressed “in the first person. Husserl took the Kantian idiom of “transcendental idealism,” looking for conditions of the possibility of knowledge, or consciousness in general, and no doubt turn away from any reality beyond phenomena. In “*Being and Time*” (1927), Heidegger deploys his interpretation of phenomenology. For Heidegger, we and our activities are always “in the world”, our being is being in the world, so we do not study our activities in brackets the world, rather we interpret our activities and the meaning that things have for us by looking at our contextual relationships with things in the world. Thus, the human community therefore corresponds to the essence of man, as being who in the universe is capable of measuring. To measure is to order one's entire existence and its *being-in-the-world* to the various modalities of the political common being. It is, thus, the measure common to all individuals, which becomes the basis of the relationship to the other in the political logos and this common measure no longer leads the individual to consider his own intransigence, by which he was previously singular. From Merleau-Ponty's point of view (1993): ‘.... The first of the cultural objects is the one by which they all exist, it is the body of others as the bearer of a behavior.” He adds: “The constitution of others does not fully illuminate the constitution of society, which is not a two- or even three-way existence, but coexistence with an indefinite number of consciences.” [41]

The order of the world is, therefore, anthropologically founded and it is indeed the political logos that make it arise, at the very heart of the political act, as rationality immanent to the political body of the State. On the other hand, the state is a life in itself, but it is also a particular to other States. Thus, it is better understood that the cultural heritage and morals of international diplomacy are thus composed of inter-temporal exchanges and reappropriations, which include the possibility of distancing or breaking their links until war. Anchored in the process of justification, moral reason is based on two emblematic axes of new relational modes: it wants to make the rule of paid honesty work as true, and this profitability of virtue also concerns the political, diplomatic, economic and military domains. In my view, it is a moral evaluation operation and a test of the coherence of a legitimacy of international decision-making. Similarly, from one socio-cultural system to another, reality and its correlates are not represented in the same way. Rubinstein develops his original conception of psychophilosophical anthropology (in the essay “*Man and the World*” 1960) and proposes: “The original specificity of man and human existence is summed up in the fact that in his general determination existence does not include consciousness itself but man as a conscious

being in the world - the subject not only of consciousness, but also of action. Conscious regulation, which includes both the *consciente* of the environment and actions, aimed at its change, is an important link in the development of human existence.” [42] In accordance with this conception of Rubinstein and Shorokhova’s theory (1975), Zhuravlev (1999) gives his explanation of group phenomena: “It is theoretically necessary to take a serious step towards the differentiation and specification of the group phenomenon. It is therefore necessary and possible to use the term "collective subject" and to identify essential properties of the collective entity, including: 1. The interdependence of individuals in a group who contribute to the formation of a group state (as a state of preactivity: dynamic intensity, closeness of mutual relations, dependencies between individuals in a group and a significant state: content of mutual relationships and dependencies, etc.). 2. The quality and ability of the group to present joint forms of activity (communication within the group and with other groups, group activities, group behaviour, intragroup and intergroup interaction, etc.). 3. The quality and ability of the group to reflect itself, which creates feelings of "We" (mainly as experiences of belonging to a group and uniting with its group) and the image-“We” (as an imaginary of their group, etc.)”[43] Thus, to be interchangeable and to exchange effectively in the group, in the country, in the world, that is to say to put ourselves in the place of any other in an act of identifying and desingularizing consciousness, then becomes the mode of being first of man, who seeks above all to accomplish and give shape to the *being-with* that he constitutes and which constitutes it in a universal political action of reciprocity. In fact, practical rational consciousness strives to be realized in the world first, by posing and objectivizing in it as an immediate singularity seeking its pleasure, and then as an immediate unit of its particularity and the universal, denying itself in its effectiveness and idealized universality as the norm of group interaction and of international interaction.

I should also point out that most philosophical and gnostic systems are based as the source of knowledge on this perception of the individual unconscious and the collective unconscious. From a psychoanalytic point of view, Jung (1959) supports the thesis of the presence of the personal unconscious which as such have been repressed (memories, desires, trends, projects, etc.) and the collective unconscious (collective or group factors, in the form of inherited categories and archetypes in human activity. Jung (1959) sums up his thought: “The collective unconscious consists of universal heritable elements common to all humans, distinct from other species: It encapsulates fields of evolutionary biology, history of civilization, ethnology, brain and nervous system development and general psychological development. (...) Considering its composition in practical physiological and psychological terms, "it consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents.”[44] Jung (1959) considers that the collective unconscious acts as the frame where science can distinguish individual motivating urges, thought to be universal across all individuals of the human species, etc. In addition, the Jungian conception of the identification of men with the collective psyche brings us very interesting elements to analyze the intersubjective and intergroup conflicts that are at the origin of the malaise in civilization, conflicts in international relations. On the other hand, Freud (1930) asserts that the greatest difficulty of the social and international space of modernity lies in the confrontation with difference, insofar as individuals, ethnicities and social classes could not bear to live with anyone different. These visions would in fact be a vigil intended to hide the pursuit of narcissistic interests that political leaders would use within these countries to strengthen their influence and the outside to persuade their homologous. For Freud (1930), the feeling of control

and possession of object, the territory or the power, perhaps absolutely *narcissizing* as well as the narcissistic enjoyment can hide behind the unleashing of the impulse of destruction. In the essay "*Civilization and its Discontents*" Freud (1930) links this relation to the application of innate aggression in man to ethnic (and other) conflicts: "It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness. I once discussed the phenomenon that it is precisely communities with adjoining territories, and related to each other in other ways as well, who are engaged in constant feuds and in ridiculing each other (...) I gave this phenomenon the name of *the narcissism of minor differences*.'" [45]

In this sense, the situation of diplomatic negotiations that is taking place between the leaders of different countries would gradually reduce the impact of this phenomenon of the 'narcissism of minor differences' and neutralize their aggressiveness in international relations. In this situation, intersubjective consistency appears to be an essential factor in adapting the other's response. More specifically, it is necessary to look for ways to resolve these conflicts in the outcome of the "social contract" between the individual and collective requirements of his group (or his country) and that of another group (other country) - between "We" and "Them" in diplomatic negotiations. Thus, Druckman (2015) develops the concept of *boundary-role-conflict* that determines a negotiation through the psychological complexity of negotiators: "The concept of representation can also be understood in terms of its components. Demands made on negotiating representatives are usually conflicting: on the one hand, they are responsive to the interests of those being represented; on the other hand, they are responsive to the demands made by their negotiating opponents (...) Accountability competes with empathy. The challenge is to balance these demands, which are captured by Walton & McKersie's (1965) boundary role dilemma or conflict (BRC). This balancing act can be regarded as a defining feature of representative negotiation. The characteristic conflict and stress of boundary roles reflect the necessity of performing simultaneously two different functions: monitoring the other side for evidence of concessions and monitoring one's own side for evidence of preferences (...) The dual functions suggest another challenge, which is integrating the adjustments made during external bargaining with the changing internal priorities that occur within teams or delegations.'" [46] Consequently, each culture and nation impacts the negotiation through the negotiator: knowledge, beliefs, particular modes of communication, behaviors and identities of the negotiator are dependent on his culture. According to Dupont (1994), when negotiating with a foreign protagonist, three dimensions of this negotiation must be taken into account: "1) cultural differences (languages, norms, beliefs, and social values and practices); 2) differences in political and administrative systems, 3) differences in legal systems in the basis of the law; jurisdictions or regulation.'" [47] It can also be assumed that cultures are developing within international organizations or administrations that overlap with those of national structures. The position of diplomacy may also depend on the degree of fidelity to the national ideology of which it is the representative. Consequently, ideological alignments and proximities between countries allow political leaders to forge and strengthen coalitions in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Consequently, Zartman (2007) writes: "Like the strategic approach to bilateral negotiations, to which it is related, coalition analyses what happens between negotiations and impinges on them but does not capture the two preferences and scaling have been used in some different and imaginative ways (...) In multilateral negotiation as in the predominant bilateral mode, the two categories of ingredients are parties and stakes. Negotiated agreements are made of stakes by parties.

Multilateral negotiations need either to fit into that concept of process or invent its own basic model to enjoy the same benefits. “ [48] Therefore, the personal confidence enjoyed by a negotiator (political leader) with external interlocutors (his counterparts), built by his participation in a working group, a coalition and an alliance with certain countries is a resource that allows directly to be involved in diplomatic issues and to maintain some control over those own strategies. Psychological problems of precedence, defence of national identity or the culture of the country are then central to these diplomatic activities. But consensus must also be reached with countries that could, for different reasons, be opposed to various legal, economic, military and political innovations. When these countries are in a position to block bilateral or multilateral decisions (for example, if they sit on the UN Security Council), compromises must be found, reasonable arrangements must be found. Again, the existence of different psychological and political logics (economic, cultural, military cooperation, reciprocal interdependence, pressures of public opinion, different political interests, different temporalities, etc.) implies the existence of different levels of the diplomatic game in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

4. The Role of Permanent Multilateral Diplomatic Negotiations in Peacekeeping Global Peace

In the permanent multilateral negotiations, diplomats on the UN Security Council must resolve the multiple questions, including: characterization of conflict situations or crises and implementation of legitimate responses, mediation in various regional and domestic conflicts, strengthening of diplomatic affiliations (regional, global, economic, political, and military) activities, etc. In this sense, the UN Security Council is responsible for facilitating the peaceful resolution of conflicts through negotiation, mediation or judicial settlement (Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations) and the right to use force without declaring war. Legitimate defence replaces security to unite for peace and the authority of the Security Council is the guarantee of the world order. The concept of preventive diplomacy is envisioned by the Charter of the United Nations, which authorizes the Secretary-General to draw the attention of the Security Council to anything that might pose a threat to peace and security. Preventive diplomacy is one of the great ideas of the United Nations is based on the simple conviction that everything that can be done to prevent crises or conflicts, regional and sub-regional disputes in different parts of the world must be considered. Strengthening cooperation with regional and sub-regional conflict prevention mechanisms is particularly essential and useful. For Zartman (2009): “ Thus preventive efforts have two targets: prevention of the danger, and prevention of its negative effects (...) However, negotiation is a cooperative activity, and therefore these strategic goals have to be cooperativized. Negotiating parties have two cooperative strategies from which to choose: either reduce the element of uncertainty and deal directly with the danger, as a negotiation over normal stakes, or focus on the uncertainty and devise methods to deal with it.”[49] Strengthening human dignity is essential to diplomatic prevention. Moreover, the Security Council is also active in situations in which the government of a particular country was no longer able to govern its country and where the human rights of the population are massively violated by political, social and economic collapse.

The Security Council has 15 members, including five permanent members (the United States, the Russian Federation, China France, and the United Kingdom) and ten members

elected for two years by the General Assembly. These five countries- permanent members of the Security Council and the largest military powers, have the privilege, unique to the United Nations - the Right of Veto, inscribed in Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations: “1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting- The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.” [50]. This corresponds to the ability of each permanent member of the Security Council to block individual resolutions and to obstruct any security council decision, even against the majority opinion of the others. It should be noted that the right of veto is also at the very origin of the UN Charter. At the Yalta 1945 conference, only the right of veto was debated by the big three (United States, USSR, and United Kingdom): without this right these countries would probably never have signed the Charter and there would have been no United Nations. Regarding the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council, Sur (2004) considers : “The right of veto seems to be criticised, whether in the field of efficiency or representativeness (...) Not only is the Council not destroyed by the veto, but it is also saved by the veto (...) It would be possible for a majority to impose its decisions against the opposition of certain permanent members. But the price would be heavy: the members concerned would probably not bow, and the crisis would be exacerbated rather than resolved (...) There could even be a conflict between permanent members, which would likely destroy the Charter (...) The veto is in fact a safeguard for the collective security system and the Council.” [51] In my opinion, the use of the right to veto in the Security Council has a threefold function: 1) the show of force against the belligerent country (or belligerent country in coalition) or the initiator of the conflict in the region or domestic conflict and crises; 2) maintaining the compromise so that permanent members enter into the game to ensure international and domestic security; 3) the use of integrability to encourage permanent members to find solutions acceptable to all in the resolution of regional or domestic conflicts and crises. This means that from a psychological point of view the right to veto is directly addressed on all strategic directions of multilateral negotiation and promotes the cognitive and behavior aspects of problem solving. Add to this that non-permanent member countries of the Security Council wish to become one in order to obtain these right to veto.

The Security Council therefore has, under its authority, subsidiary bodies covering its entire spectrum of action: 1. Peacekeeping (peacekeeping operations and a military committee - the objective of that body is decision-making assistance throughout a process involving a military operation. 2. Peacebuilding: a more systematic and orderly analysis of peacekeeping and the set of tasks involved in peace-building. 3. The fight against terrorism: Resolution 1373 of September 2001 established a "Counter-Terrorism Committee" tasked in particular with combating the financing of international terrorism and helping States to develop legislation to enable them to have effective counter-terrorism action in this area. 4. Sanctions (political, economic, military, etc.). 5. The fight against proliferation: its enhanced action in conjunction with the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Therefore, the Security Council has primary jurisdiction to find a threat to peace or an act of aggression; it invites the parties to a dispute to resolve it by peaceful means and recommends the methods of adjustment and the

terms of settlement that it deems appropriate. In some cases, it may impose sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. Specifically, from a political and psychological point of view, when a complaint of a threat to peace is brought before it, the Security Council generally begins by inviting the parties to resolve their dispute by peaceful means during the negotiations; it can also set out the principles that stakeholders will have to adhere to. But when a dispute leads to hostilities, the priority of the UN Security Council is to put an end to hostilities as quickly as possible, and in this case it can order a ceasefire, which can prevent a escalation of the conflict; or deploying military observers or a peacekeeping operation on the ground to help reduce tensions, separate forces and restore calm to facilitate the search for a peaceful settlement. If this is not enough, the Security Council may decide to take peace-enforcement measures, including economic sanctions, an arms embargo, financial restrictions and penalties, and travel bans; the breakdown of diplomatic relations, a blockade or collective military measures. Observing how international organizations deal with what they call "crisis" situations is a way of studying what constitutes an important and growing part of international political practices. Specifically, these reconstituted rules relate to the particular issue of the Mobilization of the Security Council on a specific issue. These crises that punctuate the lives of the members of the Security Council owe part of their existence to the ways and other professional routines specific to this multilateral diplomatic space at the United Nations; some are constituent of the other, and vice versa. Breaking down the practical rules, the norms shared by these diplomats in their daily work, is therefore tantamount to understanding the springs by which a conflict is transformed into a crisis file requiring more or less urgent treatment. The examination of these conditions of the Council's mobilization then begins with a first presentation of the formal and informal rules around which the Council's mobilization work is organised (i.e. the creation of a dossier of armed conflict before the members of the Council). These rules and standards are grouped here according to successive phases of the Council's work on a given file.

Many theoretical enterprises in the discipline of international relations aim to define the most relevant units of analysis (states, "civilizations," "individuals" on the model of *homo œconomicus*, firms and other transnational actors, or - more rarely - social classes) and to model the international system from the generalization of relatively simple individual behavioral models, directly inspired by social theory or economic theory. It is up to the delegation presiding over the Council for one month to set the agenda during the month of its presidency. Much of this agenda is in fact necessary for the President, since it falls under issues that are already open and are subject to regular review on a pre-determined timetable, particularly for the renewal of the mandates of UN peace operations as they come to an end. Indeed, a delegation wishing to include this on the agenda will be able to address the refractory directly to ask them to change their position, thus placing themselves in a position of debtor vis-à-vis the latter, who are sure to recall it when a subject is of great interest to them. The strong institutionalisation of relations between delegations of permanent member states, due to a constant presence in the Council, explains the frequency of such transactions. However, other traditional activities of diplomacy may involve good agreement, incentives or retaliation, including on other issues, which undermines the importance of measuring the degree of fungibility of resources used in various areas of international policy and in multilateral diplomatic negotiations in particular. A relatively common compromise solution is to begin a first discussion on the controversial subject at the Council table when the "various points" are discussed at the end of the meeting. Whether such a position of influence is tacitly recognized

or not, the delegation or delegations that have asked for the mobilization of their partners on a subject most often have the initiative to draft the texts to be discussed. Negotiations continue, of course, outside the places explicitly dedicated to him, especially in the corridors. Another common practice is to bring together delegations (whether or not they sit on the Security Council) in the permanent missions of the Member States who share a common interest in working together in parallel with these discussions in the Council. The President of the Council is waiting to receive the approval of delegations to move on to this phase, which consists of a public display of each person's positions. One or more delegations may wish to stop discussing the text and move quickly to the formal vote despite an unfavourable configuration of the text that appeared in voting intentions. When they are not strictly declaratory, the decisions of the Security Council are required of the UN Secretariat responsible for executing them, which explains the regular word given to Secretariat officials, both at the Council table in consultation sessions and in public sessions, as well as in the corridors and permanent missions at the time of writing. The Secretariat links the operational dimensions and with the various partners (troop contributors, donors, legal services, human resources management, UN operational agencies, subcontractors, etc.). At this stage, the members of the Council are only intervening as such in the monitoring of the Secretariat's actions, essentially in the following ways : 1) the review, on pre-established dates, of the Secretary-General's progress reports detailing the types of intervention and developments in the situation and in order to determine whether or not to renew it; 2) the deployed involvement of members in informal groups set up to monitor specific files (groups of friends of the Secretary-General, monitoring committees of sanction regimes decided by the Council against political-military officials, etc.; 3) the duration of the UN commitment to the functioning of the Security Council decision. Consequently, it can take two types of measures : 1) coercive measures without the use of armed force: an embargo, a blockade, and restrictions on trade against one or more recalcitrant States, etc.; 2) coercive measures resulting in the use of armed force, an armed conflict under the authority of the United Nations.

However, the Security Council does not have its own instruments of action; it must rely on the Member States to enforce coercive measures on their own, and it remains dependent on their good will. The most visible aspect is that the Council does not have its own armed forces, and that it can at most authorize States acting on its behalf to use violence or even act on their own behalf in its decisions. The lack of resources of the United Nations has also been identified as a flaw in the system. Without its own army, it is reduced to begging troops from member states of good will when it comes to establishing a peacekeeping force in a non-strategic region. Engagement and menace are therefore the two major movements in this multilateral diplomatic negotiation. A commitment is therefore a movement to convince the country in question that you the Security Council is maintaining its position well, making it difficult for the adversary to change it. The menace, on the other hand, is the prediction, for the use of the adversary that he will be exposed to certain losses if he does not comply with the decisions of the Security Council. In this multilateral diplomatic negotiation, governments-members of the Council can commit to a position to mobilize their military, political or economic resources. The concept of menace - more complicated than that of engagement and military deterrence is indeed based on menace. In conclusion, the emergence of a "crisis" at the Council table cannot result from the mere "irruption" of large-scale violence in a particular part of the world. It arises from the more or less formally codified intervention of diplomatic officers on the Security Council and their work in institutional shaping. From my psychological point of view, it seems to me that during these multilateral negotiations three types of orientation strategy are most often used by

Security Council diplomats: 1) a progressive commitment: to adopt the tactic of advancing peacekeeping commitments gradually and serenely; 2) a diminishing commitment: to adopt very strong measures and demanding coercions from the outset and to reduce them as conflicts and hostilities; 3) a mixed and differential commitment: to adopt specific measures (promises, pressures, menaces, warnings, mediation, etc.) depending on the context and the concrete situation of the conflict or crisis.

The examination of the few formal and informal rules around which diplomatic work is organized in the Security Council is not sufficient, however, to understand the forms and degrees of mobilization of the Security Council in the face of urgent situations within its areas of attribution. Groups that are likely to meet the following two conditions: 1) they must form important groups for this permanent representative, in the economy of its identities and positions; 2) these groups must maintain, with regard to the said permanent representative sitting on the Council, collective expectations which may be affected by the decision whether or not to mobilise the Council on armed conflicts in general, or on a particular situation of armed conflict. Consequently, the decision to mobilise the UN Security Council in the face of armed conflict directly involves a first group, which brings together the permanent representatives of the fifteen member states of the Council at the time the issue is raised within it, and with them their respective delegations stationed in the permanent missions of those member states. It is up to this group to discuss and adopt, according to the rules described above, the texts that will be worth the Council's decision, with more or less institutional consequences for the United Nations as a whole, and more or less political effects on the regional actors of that armed conflict. This institutional position, each member of this group of permanent representatives owes it first to its hierarchy, to the political authorities of its State. From a psychological point of view, in order to avoid any kind of acute and armed conflict, the aim must be to prepare the negotiations on the aegis of the United Nations or other international mediators. At that time, in his *Readiness theory* Pruitt (2015) writes: "Three new additions to readiness theory are discussed: 1) the distinction between positive and negative interdependence, 2) the distinction between the strength of motivation to end a conflict and the urgency of achieving that goal - urgency affects the time at which negotiation will begin, 3) the hypothesis that a detailed framework is likely to evolve during prenegotiation rather than negotiation when the potential costs of forsaking a unilateral approach are high. In readiness theory, all concepts are variable, including readiness, motivation, optimism, and perceived risk." [52] Regarding the negotiation on national security risks, Kremenyuk (2009) remarks: "The identification of the risk is an unavoidable part of the negotiation and naturally extends into risk assessment and risk evaluation (...) One possible area of risk management negotiation is risk reduction, i.e. taking steps to reduce the scale or likelihood of risk. (...) Another possible objective of risk management negotiations is risk avoidance or risk prevention." [53] In this context, it is precisely a mapping of the perceived risks that Security Council diplomats perceive to their resources and to the decision-making positions they occupy or covet during the negotiations.

On the other hand, membership in regional groups is particularly relevant for non-permanent members of the Security Council. They are elected to their regional group in the General Assembly: 1). African States, 2. Asian States, 3. Eastern European States, 4. Latin America and the Caribbean States, 5. Western Europe States and others States, after being selected by the Security Council from among the candidates of their group, and before a formal vote in the Assembly. As Novoseloff (2010) notes: "Today, the success of a peacekeeping operation

requires ownership by each of its actors (decision-making and operational) as well as by the local population. This requires a better dialogue, "inclusive and transparent"), between all these actors on the means and conditions of implementation, for a better effectiveness of these operations whose success meets certain fundamental principles: the support of a united Security Council, the involvement of troop-providing countries, the consent of the host state, the containment of the crisis zone , accompanying a political process.” [54] It can be added that the actions of the Security Council are particularly indispensable despite the divergences of positions between the different States. Coleman and Williams (2021) explain: “ Peace operations are a very resilient international institution for managing armed conflict. Their resilience stems from what the constructivists of the theory of international relations call collective intentionality and the malleable constituent rules that define and structure such missions. Despite a series of current constraints, challenges and crises, it is unlikely that peace operations will disappear unless a critical mass of states systematically withdraw their material support and explicitly denigrate the concept of peace operations itself.” [55]. In conclusion, the moral awareness of the danger of mortal aggression obliges diplomats sitting on the Security Council to bring their strategies, positions and actions into line during the ongoing multilateral negotiations to resolve major regional or local conflicts and crises and, above all, to prevent the outbreak of war on a global scale.

Conclusion

In diplomatic negotiation, the protagonists are therefore constantly guided by the search for the interest of his country and would be willing to use all the strategies or levers at his disposal to act in this direction, because diplomacy identifies with the function of representation that is his and his actions, his words are primarily dictated by the fact that he embodies, in a way, the continuity and political position of his country. This is often the main or only reason why heads of state and heads of government participate in international negotiations. Another peculiarity in negotiation is the lability of the rules with which the parties regulate the course of their international interactions. Therefore, from a psychological point of view, the diplomatic strategy is a two-way strategy: it expects a reaction from that, to which it is oriented, and it always tries to justify itself, thereby admitting the authority of established international values or rules. But at the same time, the opposing parties each follow certain standards, which vary according to the situation and the type of opponent. However, the standards are met for two main reasons, and the parties want reciprocity, and they want to facilitate the search for an acceptable agreement. The success or failure of a negotiation can also be informed from the strategies put in place by the protagonists. This approach describes the outcome of the negotiation as being directly related to the offers and demands made by the parties in order to reach mutual concessions. The strategic approach cannot, however, predict the conduct of the protagonists or the outcome of their interactions. The negotiation itself is based on the psychology of cognitions and perceptions that make its unfolding and outcome unpredictable. The fact that the parties involved are trying to act rationally and that, in retrospect, the outcome of their negotiation also appears to be rational does not mean that it can be calculated in advance. It should also be noted that in international diplomacy, such effects are more present and that governments negotiate less to make the terms of the agreement favourable to them than to take advantage of it to disseminate their ideological propaganda, collect intelligence and influence adversaries. These predispositions therefore shape the perception of negotiators,

influence their actions and their selection of the information they will pass on to their opponents, as well as their expectations about the outcome of the negotiation. To assess whether or not certain options are advantageous, each negotiator must have in mind a balance point that allows him to order the pluses and minuses. These thresholds are psychologically subjective and can impact the bilateral or multilateral negotiation process. On the other hand, the main types of international diplomacy must be distinguished during multilateral negotiations: coercive diplomacy is a limited and gradual threat or use of armed force in order to persuade another to end an ongoing action, to return to the status quo ante, or to compel it to stop action and preventive diplomacy is intended to prevent disputes between adversaries and transformed open conflict. The transition from prevention to coercion is not uncommon since foreign interventions mandated by the United Nations no longer believe psychologically in the possibilities of conciliation and decide to use force in the event of a threat to peace at the regional or local level. In fact, the UN Security Council has primary jurisdiction to determine the existence of a threat to peace or an act of aggression, invites the parties to a dispute to resolve it by peaceful means, and recommends the methods of adjustment or terms of settlement that it deems appropriate. In some cases, it may impose sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. However, preventive diplomacy is one of the great ideas of the United Nations that will continue to be practiced as long as the world organization exists; because it is based on the simple conviction that everything that can be done to prevent crises or conflicts must be considered. In conclusion, the moral awareness of the danger of mortal aggression obliges diplomats, sitting on the Security Council, to bring their strategies, positions and actions into psychological conformity during the ongoing multilateral negotiations to resolve major regional or local conflicts and crises and, above all, to prevent the outbreak of war on a global measure.

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