

# Imperial College London

MENG INDIVIDUAL PROJECT

IMPERIAL COLLEGE LONDON

DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTING

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## Detecting Hidden Purpose in NLP Models

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# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1	Natural Language Processing . . . . .	3
1.1.1	Membership Inference Attacks . . . . .	3
1.1.2	Hidden Dual Purpose . . . . .	3
1.2	Hidden Purpose . . . . .	3
1.3	Detection . . . . .	4
1.3.1	Heuristic Search of Controversial Topics . . . . .	4
1.3.2	Model Architecture Analysis . . . . .	4
<b>2</b>	<b>Background</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Project Plan</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Ethical Issues</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>8</b>

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Natural Language Processing

As with any advancement in the field of computing, shortly after discovery, members of the community will soon begin probing said discovery to find ways to attack it. The same can be seen in the field of Natural Language Processing. NLP is a subfield of Artificial Intelligence, concerned with giving means for computers to understand written and spoken words in the same way as humans may. There are now two new ways of using NLP models for harmful purposes. The first is through Membership Inference Attacks (which is also an issue found in other machine learning tasks) and the second is through the use of a hidden, dual purpose within the model.

#### 1.1.1 Membership Inference Attacks

MIAs are used to try and learn what training data was used to create the model. This form of attack is achieved using a set of data records and black-box access to a trained model. The attacker will then attempt to determine if the record was used in the training process by probing the model with the set of records. Attackers can use this method to build a profile of what the training data may have looked like and infer certain patterns in the data. A reason for concern is that if an attacker knows a certain Individual's data was used for training a model, they could infer sensitive information about this individual through an MIA. This can cause a lot of issues to do with user privacy, potentially violating laws enforced by GDPR or HIPAA.

#### 1.1.2 Hidden Dual Purpose

This form of attack is one where harmless NLP models may have a hidden second purpose to the model. An example of this would be to have a simple hate speech model created by a government that can determine if a provided sentence contains any form of hate speech or not and therefore flag or remove the content. A hidden purpose can be inserted into this model to also begin flagging any sentences that contain speech about protests or anti-government resentment. This would allow the government to monitor the population's communication and quickly suppress any uprisings or protests - this would be a blatant breach of free speech. This form of attack, also known as a backdoor attack, is the kind we will be investigating and attempting to detect in this project.

### 1.2 Hidden Purpose

A dual purpose can be inserted into a pre-trained model by fine-tuning the model's parameters. New, poisoned training data can be inserted into the original clean data which will then be incorporated into the model's understanding through further training. This extra data can be of many forms. Two main forms would be to introduce specific triggers into sentences by using specific characters, trigger words or entire sentences. This has been researched extensively in [1].

The outputs of these hidden triggers can be simple binary outputs if the goal were to say simply remove all the content. Or the outputs could consist of a combination of outputs. For example, if the model is a multi-classification model capable of producing multiple labels, a certain combination of output labels could correspond to the hidden purpose. This distinction can be used

to separate data flagged for the intended purpose, and data flagged for the hidden purpose which could be used for further malicious intent.

## **1.3 Detection**

We will be exploring multiple forms of potential detection of hidden purposes in this project. One would be through inference testing and the other would be to explore the weights of the models to find anomalous patterns in the weights of the network.

### **1.3.1 Heuristic Search of Controversial Topics**

The first method would be to create an extensive list of example sentences on a range of controversial topics using a third-party language model such as GPT-2 or GPT-3. Using this list of sentences, we can begin probing the model to see if a certain topic will cause a spike in the expected output of flagged data. Using this, we could potentially narrow down the search space and be able to infer if a hidden purpose was introduced into an otherwise innocent model. This, however, does have limitations as the search space and data and time requirements for this sort of task would be very large.

### **1.3.2 Model Architecture Analysis**

The second method would be to investigate the model itself. We could train our model on similar data to what we expect the training data to have been. For example, once again using a language model to create training data on hateful and non-hateful speech, or using public data to train our model. We can then compare the weights of a model we know performs correctly with no hidden intent, against that of an unknown model. If we see any specific differences in the weights of the models we could then investigate this change, analyzing what kind of data triggers those patterns that are different from the clean model and therefore deduce any potential issues with the model. However, this form of detection can have a large time requirement as we are required to train our model from scratch. Moreover, if we come up with incorrect assumptions on the training data, we could end up creating a model that has a vastly different weight distribution to the target model. Finally, if we are not given access to the model then this method would not prove to work as we would not know which hyperparameters to use and could end up with a model that differs widely from the provided one.

## Chapter 2

# Background

## Chapter 3

# Project Plan

## Chapter 4

# Ethical Issues

Chapter 5

Conclusion



# Bibliography

- [1] Xiaoyi Chen, Ahmed Salem, Dingfan Chen, Michael Backes, Shiqing Ma, Qingni Shen, Zhonghai Wu, and Yang Zhang. Badnl: Backdoor attacks against nlp models with semantic-preserving improvements. *arXiv*, 2020. doi: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.01043>.