
Access Controls Will Solve the Dual-Use Dilemma

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Abstract

AI safety systems face a dual-use dilemma. The same request can be either harmless or harmful depending on who made it and why. Thus, if the system makes decisions based solely on the request's content, it will refuse some legitimate queries and let harmful ones pass. To address this, we propose a conceptual access control framework, based on verified user credentials (such as institutional affiliation) and classifiers that assign model outputs to risk categories (such as advanced virology). The system permits responses only when the user's verified credentials match the category's requirements. For implementation of the model output classifiers, we introduce a theoretical approach utilizing small, gated expert modules integrated into the generator model, trained with gradient routing, that enable efficient risk detection without the capability gap problems of external monitors. While open questions remain about the verification mechanisms, risk categories, and the technical implementation, our framework makes the first step toward enabling granular governance of AI capabilities: verified users gain access to specialized knowledge without arbitrary restrictions, while adversaries are blocked from it. This contextual approach reconciles model utility with robust safety, addressing the dual-use dilemma.

1. Introduction

User requests — and with them, model outputs — exist on a spectrum from clearly benign to clearly harmful, with most falling in the grey zone in the middle (example in Figure 1). In the grey zone, the same output could be considered harmful or harmless, depending not on its content, but on its *real-world context*: who requested it and for what purpose.

Safety systems that rely solely on content analysis imme-

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


Figure 1. The user is asking a question from the grey zone: a question that could be either harmless or harmful, depending on its real-world context. The schema shows how the system we propose would handle it. (1) The model is trained to be helpful and begins to answer the question. (2) During the forward pass, the model activates its virology expert module because it is relevant to the question. (3) The activation of the expert is observed by an external mechanism that immediately (4) checks in the company's database if the user has the required authorization to access virology knowledge. (5) Since they don't, the model is stopped. If they did, the model would be allowed to give an answer.

diately face the *dual-use dilemma*. Since the same request can be either harmless or harmful depending on the context, wherever they draw the refusal line, they will restrict model utility for legitimate users while letting slip harmful requests from adversaries. Some safety systems try to address this by considering real-world context alongside content. However, they typically infer the context from the content itself, making it easy for adversaries to fabricate.

In this paper, we argue that informative, hard-to-fabricate real-world context could be obtained using user-level verifications such as institutional affiliation, or know-your-customer checks. We then address the dual-use dilemma with two contributions:

1. We show how this type of context could be used jointly with content analysis in a safety system based on access

controls (Lampson, 1974). First, generated content would be classified into risk categories. Then, a check would be performed to see whether the user has the verifications required to access the detected categories.

2. We propose a novel technical approach to risk category classification that is based on gradient routing (Cloud et al., 2024). Our proposal avoids having the capability gap between a model and its monitors that can make output monitoring methods non-robust (Jin et al., 2024).

Our framework is a first step toward solving the challenge of “detection and authorization of dual-use capability at inference time” that was highlighted by a recent survey of problems in technical AI governance (Reuel et al., 2025) and also raised by the U.S. AI Safety Institute (2024). As such, it has important governance implications, potentially enabling a more nuanced regulatory approach where access to powerful AI capabilities is stratified rather than binary, with policies that differentiate between user types and user contexts rather than focusing solely on model capabilities. The choice of appropriate verification mechanisms and risk categories remains for future work and should ideally happen jointly with stakeholders from academia, AI governance, and industry. Nevertheless, our approach offers a promising direction for addressing the dual-use dilemma.

2. Current Safety Methods Don’t Solve the Dual-Use Dilemma

We evaluate three AI safety approaches to see how sensitive they are to contextual information, and whether their sources of real-world context are trustworthy — that is, hard to manipulate by an adversary.

First, to illustrate the need for context, consider decomposition attacks (Glukhov et al., 2023; 2024): transforming a clearly harmful query, such as “How to modify a virus to avoid immune detection?”, into a series of mundane technical questions, like the “What features of viral surface proteins are recognized by human antibodies?” from Figure 1. Here, the attacker exploits the dual-use dilemma, and the fact that model providers cannot refuse grey zone requests to preserve model utility.

2.1. Unlearning: Non-Contextual Removal of Concepts

Unlearning methods aim to remove specific knowledge, concepts, or capabilities from a model after training (Liu et al., 2024). Their goal is to eliminate the model’s ability to generate harmful content while preserving other capabilities.

Unlearning faces significant technical challenges even for preventing behaviours that are clearly harmful. As noted by Cooper et al. (2024) and Barez et al. (2025), capabilities

are hard to define, hard to remove without side effects, and it is hard to trace them back to specific data points. Many unlearning approaches mask rather than truly remove the targeted knowledge (Deeb & Roger, 2025). Moreover, even nascent robust unlearning methods (Cloud et al., 2024; Lee et al., 2025) are not contextual, and thus don’t address the dual-use dilemma without additional assumptions.

2.2. Safety Training: The Model Reacts to Context

Safety training methods modify the model’s training process to align its outputs with human preferences. This category includes safety pre-training (Maini et al., 2025), RLHF (Christiano et al., 2023), and safety finetuning.

Unlike unlearning, these methods are contextual. They don’t remove capabilities entirely but train the model to selectively deploy them based on, among other things, the perceived legitimacy and harmlessness of the request. However, these qualities are entirely inferred from content supplied by the user, such as the request content, the chat history, or the model’s memories about past conversations. It should be no surprise, then, that models are susceptible to attacks that fabricate in-chat context (Zeng et al., 2024), or attacks that diminish models’ sensitivity to in-chat context, e.g. through multi-round escalation (Russovich et al., 2025). Without access to trustworthy real-world context of the request, the model cannot make truly informed decisions about grey zone requests, and thus cannot robustly address the dual-use dilemma.

2.3. Post-Processing: External Systems React to Context

Post-processing methods are systems that classify user inputs and model outputs for the purposes of steering the underlying model, and monitoring and filtering its outputs. Sometimes, these methods are used for usage monitoring, as is the case with Anthropic’s Clio (Tamkin et al., 2024; Handa et al., 2025), other times, they are used for safety, as with Llama Guard (Inan et al., 2023) and Constitutional Classifiers (Sharma et al., 2025). However, similarly to safety training, the “real-world” context these methods work with is currently inferred mostly from user-supplied content and is thus untrustworthy and vulnerable to attacks, as evidenced by the many jailbreaks that successfully target current production systems (Zhang et al., 2025). Nevertheless, these methods could be modified to incorporate external contextual information, potentially serving as a foundation for more trustworthy, contextual safety mechanisms. We discuss this option in Section 4.2.

3. Access Controls are a Feasible Solution

In the previous section, we established that current safety systems do not address the dual-use dilemma because they

either do not consider the real-world context of the request, or they obtain the context directly from unverified, user-supplied content, making them vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this section, we present an alternative safety framework based on access controls that directly addresses the dual-use dilemma, and discuss some of its practical considerations.

3.1. Overview of the Access Control Framework

To address the problems of current safety methods, we first need a trustworthy source of real-world context about the request, or at least, about the user who made it. Drawing inspiration from other industries, we believe we can obtain this context through user-level verification mechanisms. These verifications could range from basic identity confirmation, to institutional affiliation, to thorough know-your-customer checks, each granting different access permissions (for more details, see Section 3.2).

Having obtained trustworthy real-world context, we can now address the dual-use dilemma. We propose building an access control system: (1) define multiple risk categories such as engineering pathogens or dangerous chemicals; (2) whenever the model is generating content, check whether it belongs to one of the risk categories, for example with the help of output classifiers (see Section 4); (3) if the user does not have the verification required for generating content in that category, take appropriate action, such as refusing the request.

This system is defensive. Potentially harmful grey-zone requests are refused by default — they are answered only if the user has the appropriate verifications.

Irrespective of the exact implementation, on a high level, we anticipate the system would be set up to operate as follows:

1. Clearly harmless, everyday queries would require no verification, maintaining frictionless access for common use cases.
2. Grey-zone requests would require verification that scales with potential harm. The verification requirements would be publicly available, enabling users to obtain necessary credentials ahead of time. Verification for light-grey queries would be light-weight and only used for enhanced logging, while darker-grey requests would demand progressively more stringent procedures. High-risk requests that have legitimate uses but are nevertheless currently being refused for safety reasons could still be served under the new system, if the user undergoes comprehensive verification.
3. Finally, on the clearly harmful side, the system would still refuse the request outright.

A system set up in this way creates a dual benefit compared to the status quo: enhanced safety through controlled access to grey-zone capabilities that deny the possibility of decomposition attacks, and expanded utility by unlocking previously restricted functionality for verified users.

3.2. Practical Considerations for Implementation

While we cannot provide a comprehensive plan for the implementation, we outline some practical considerations below, to demonstrate the feasibility of the approach.

Verification Developers will leverage existing verification infrastructure, as they do not have the expertise to build their own. They will have to consult domain experts to find systems that are internationally standardized, globally available, and respect privacy.

Even though verification levels will differ for different fields, we expect them to follow a general template: no verification for the lowest tier, ID-based or institutional verifications for low-risk tiers, and comprehensive verifications based on existing certification infrastructure for high-risk tiers.

For ID-based and institutional verification, established systems like Stripe Identity ([Stripe, Inc., 2024](#)) or ORCID ([ORCID, Inc., 2024](#)) are global, standardized, low friction, and cost under \$2 per user. These will help developers keep an audit trail of who has access to which potentially dangerous capabilities. The cost is negligible for the model provider, as most users will stay unverified (see Section 3.3).

For high-risk tiers, developers can leverage domain-specific certifications that indicate a user’s ability to handle dangerous information responsibly. The model provider would need to work with domain experts and national authorities to find the right certifications for their use case. For example, while restricting access to information relevant to bioweapon construction, they could leverage biosafety level (BSL) certifications in the US ([Centers for Disease Control and Prevention & National Institutes of Health, 2020](#)), or their equivalents in other countries ([European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2000](#)), while for chemical weapons, they could leverage the Schedules from the Chemical Weapons Convention ([Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 1993](#)).

This approach faces two key limitations. First, developing countries may lack advanced certification infrastructure, potentially preventing access to knowledge. This is a challenge that requires international cooperation. Second, existing certifications may be overly broad for our needs. For example, biosafety certifications verify physical equipment for handling pathogens, which is overly strict for our simpler use case of restricting access to knowledge. We concede that the existing certification systems are just an imperfect proxy,

but we believe they would be iteratively refined as the technology matures. We also note that current legislation like the EU AI Act [cite] favours broad capability restrictions for high-risk domains, which means that our system, however imperfect, might enable access for at least some users where there would be none under the status quo.

Risk categories must balance granularity with technical feasibility, reflecting usage patterns, potential harm, classification reliability, and the friction of their assigned verification level. We expect different fields of knowledge to have 1–4 risk categories, with their exact number and definition depending on the field. In many fields, there are already standardized risk categories for physical goods (chemicals, organisms, equipment) that experts could likely map to risk categories for information (producing harmful chemicals, editing harmful organisms, operating dangerous equipment). Initially, content could fall into two risk categories. Standard content (requiring no verification) includes general programming and everyday queries. High-risk content (requiring institutional verification) includes: advanced bioengineering, chemical synthesis, and advanced cybersecurity (e.g., beyond the most basic textbooks). These categories represent specialized knowledge with clear misuse potential yet legitimate research applications.

System responses can vary based on risk category and classification confidence. The initial implementation might use a three-phase response system: (1) for outputs belonging to a risk category with high-confidence, immediate refusal with a specific explanation of the verification required; (2) for borderline classifications, continued generation with enhanced logging and post-processing review; (3) for verified users, seamless access with background logging for audit purposes.

3.3. Analysis of Feasibility

User friction analysis.

- Access controls introduce friction from two sources: intentional verification requirements for grey-zone requests and accidental false positives from imperfect classification.
- By design, all grey-zone requests require verification even with perfect classifiers. Additionally, classification errors may incorrectly flag clearly harmless requests (e.g., high-school biology as advanced virology).
- To understand the combined impact, consider that only 0.5% of requests involve biology topics according to Anthropic usage data.
- Even if ALL biology requests required verification—an extreme upper bound—this would affect fewer users

than current system friction. Existing safety systems refuse 1–7% of benign requests as false positives, with Claude achieving the best rate of 0.4%. Requiring verification for all biology (0.5%) would approximately double Claude’s friction rate.

- Additionally, verification friction differs qualitatively from current false positives—users can resolve issues through one-time credential verification rather than facing permanent refusal.
- Companies can calibrate friction through multiple mechanisms: adjusting grey-zone boundaries, tuning classifier thresholds, and implementing graduated responses (requesting clarification, additional context, or secondary review) rather than immediate verification requirements.
- Companies can determine optimal settings empirically through: (1) internal red-team decomposition attacks on concerning capabilities, (2) gradual rollout with logging to measure user impact, and (3) iterative adjustment based on safety-friction tradeoffs.

Developer incentives for adoption.

- Access controls enable competitive advantages by allowing companies to serve “dark-grey” requests that competitors refuse for safety reasons, while adding surgical restrictions to “light-grey” requests vulnerable to decomposition attacks.
- Without access controls, continued decomposition attack success will likely trigger broad government regulations restricting model capabilities entirely. Surgical access controls allow compliance with safety requirements while preserving advanced capabilities for verified users, creating market differentiation.
- Even without perfect industry coordination, first movers gain competitive advantages in serving previously restricted capabilities.

Privacy concerns

4. Implementing Risk Classification

A core requirement of the verification-based access control system described in Section 3 is being able to reliably classify model outputs into risk categories. This classification needs to address key challenges: accuracy with minimal false positives, resistance to adversarial attacks, and efficiency. We examine two approaches to implementing this classification — one currently available and one theoretical — and discuss their trade-offs.

4.1. Post-Processing

As discussed in Section 2, current systems already rely on post-processing classifiers that analyse outputs before delivery to users. These could be adapted for content classification into risk categories in an access control system. For example, a classifier could be trained to identify moderately advanced virology topics and, if detected, could trigger verification of user permissions before delivering the output.

The key advantage of post-processing systems is modularity, as they can be developed and updated independently of the generation models they oversee. However, they face a trade-off between usability (latency) and safety (Kumar et al., 2025): prioritizing low latency can create a capability gap between generators and monitors that sophisticated language models can exploit (Jin et al., 2024). Despite this limitation, recent post-processing methods show acceptable efficiency and resilience toward jailbreaks (Sharma et al., 2025) and could provide a practical initial implementation path for output-based access control.

4.2. Gradient Routing

To address the capability gap problem in post-processing methods, we detail how gradient routing (Cloud et al., 2024) could be adapted to classify model outputs into risk categories. Our adaptation represents a theoretical direction for integrating risk category detection directly into model architecture. This approach can be combined with post-processing methods and offers different trade-offs.

We propose augmenting models with small expert modules controlled by learned gates, as shown in Figure 1. During model training, assuming we have examples from the relevant risk categories (e.g., advanced virology), the expert module would be made to receive gradients exclusively from these examples. Simultaneously, the module’s gate would be trained to activate the module on these examples using an auxiliary loss function. We hypothesize this would lead to the module obtaining specialist knowledge from the risk domain, and to the model learning to activate the module whenever this knowledge is needed.

Figure 1 illustrates this in the context of the wider access control system: when a user requests information about viral surface proteins, the model correctly recognizes the domain and activates the virology gate, engaging the expert but also triggering the verification system. If the user lacks appropriate credentials, the system takes the appropriate response — here, halting the generation.

This approach eliminates the efficiency-capability trade-off inherent in post-processing methods: the risk category classifier is embedded within the larger model, so there is no capability gap, and because the gated module is small and integrated into the model’s forward pass, it is computationally

efficient with minimal impact on latency.

Crucially, during standard training, the model is naturally incentivized to identify risk category information in inputs and surface this in its representation space, as this is directly linked to enabling the right specialized module at the right time. This approach differs fundamentally from post hoc methods like probing or sparse autoencoders (Cunningham et al., 2023), which cannot guarantee the model actually operates with the concepts they attempt to identify.

Additionally, it resolves the adversarial dynamic (model vs. monitors, helpful vs. harmless) common in AI safety by aligning training incentives with safety objectives.

Several technical challenges remain. While gradient routing has shown promise in creating specialized modules in smaller models, its effectiveness in larger language models, particularly with the gated-expert architecture, requires empirical validation. Other key challenges include preventing false positives and false negatives, though regularization techniques and adjusted detection thresholds, respectively, could mitigate these issues.

Our approach also requires identifying risk categories during initial training, prompting research into adaptation of gradient routing for fine-tuning scenarios. Despite these challenges, the approach offers promising theoretical properties that warrant experimental investigation.

5. Conclusion

We argued that safety systems that do not utilize contextual information face a lose-lose *dual-use dilemma*: they will restrict model utility for some legitimate users while still allowing some adversaries to use the model for ill. To address this problem, we introduced a new access control framework that limits access to outputs from certain risk categories only to users with relevant verifications (which serve as proxies for trustworthy real-world context). We also proposed a novel technical solution for classifying outputs into risk categories based on gradient routing that has the potential to resolve the efficiency-robustness trade-off of post-processing methods.

Beyond addressing specific technical challenges, our framework represents a promising governance shift from working with model-level abstractions and binary capability restrictions toward more granular user-level access controls. This offers a practical pathway for regulating increasingly powerful AI systems through stratified access rather than blanket capability limitations.

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A. Risk Tiers and Verification Levels in Bioweapon Construction

We provide a more detailed example of the access control system in the context of biology to illustrate a possible initial implementation of the system. However, we stress that this is a hypothetical example, and that an actual system would be more granular and require a lot of input from experts in the field (which we are, decidedly, not).

A.1. Tier 0: No risk

Verification No verification required. This tier contains information that is already freely available in undergraduate textbooks and poses no additional risk when accessed through AI systems.

- **Standard techniques in molecular biology** including PCR amplification, DNA cloning, bacterial transformation, and gel electrophoresis. These are taught in undergraduate courses and have limited applications to building bioweapons.
- **Basic laboratory safety procedures.** These are fundamental to all biological work and widely available.

A.2. Tier 1: Low risk

Basic ID-based verification through existing providers. This is mostly to keep an audit trail matching people to requested knowledge. This approximately corresponds to the standard BSL-1 and BSL-2.

Verification implementation Services like Stripe Identity provide global identity verification through government-issued ID documents, biometric verification, and address confirmation. These services already operate in most countries and cost under \$2 per verification. The integration requires standard API implementation and creates minimal operational overhead. For academic users, verification could instead utilize existing systems like ORCID (global researcher identification) or institutional email verification through services like SwiftVerify that confirm academic affiliations.

- **BSL-1 and BSL-2 organism cultivation and procedures.** While BSL-2 organisms can cause disease, they're standard in medical laboratories and educational settings.
- **Basic CRISPR-Cas9 techniques.** These are fundamental to modern biology education and research, but could be used for dangerous modifications.
- **Large-scale fermentation and bioprocessing.** This is essential to biotechnology but could theoretically support harmful production.

A.3. Tier 2: High risk

Maximum security for knowledge with significant weapons potential and limited legitimate applications. This approximately corresponds to the standard BSL-3 and BSL-4.

Verification implementation Model developers would tap into existing BSL-3/BSL-4 laboratory certification databases maintained by national authorities across major countries. In the United States, this involves accessing CDC select agent program registrations and NIH BSL-3/4 facility certification databases. In the European Union, individual member states maintain containment level (CL-3/CL-4) facility registrations that map directly to BSL levels. Canada maintains Physical Containment (PC-3/PC-4) facility databases, Australia has BSL-3/4 certification records, and Japan, China, and other major countries maintain similar systems with compatible standards. Additionally, access to high-risk knowledge might be only per-project, and each project might require approval from an expert committee.

- **BSL-3 organism cultivation.** These are biological weapons agents with limited legitimate applications.
- **BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratory procedures.** These require specialized facilities and training with security implications.
- **Specific information about toxin genes** including botulinum, ricin, and diphtheria toxin genes, the way to obtain them, work with them, and insert them into organisms. These are extremely limited in legitimate applications.
- **Complete viral genome synthesis techniques.** These can recreate dangerous viruses with minimal legitimate applications.
- **Advanced CRISPR applications** including multiplex editing and epigenome editing. These have greater potential for creating dangerous modifications and are typically used only in advanced research settings.
- **Cell membrane and surface protein modification techniques.** These are critical enablers for immune evasion.
- **Aerosol generation techniques for biological agents.** These are specifically needed for biological weapons delivery despite some pharmaceutical applications.