

MuddyWater eN-Able spear-phishing with new TTPs

deepinstinct.com/blog/muddywater-en-able-spear-phishing-with-new-ttps

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Executive summary:

- Deep Instinct's Threat Research team has identified a new campaign from the "MuddyWater" group
- The campaign has been observed attacking two Israeli targets
- The campaign exhibits updated TTPs to previously reported MuddyWater activity




Figure 1: Campaign overview

Introduction

Previous research showed that MuddyWater has sent spear-phishing emails, starting back in 2020, with direct links, as well as PDF, RTF, and HTML attachments containing links to archives hosted on various file-sharing platforms.

Those archives contained installers for various legitimate remote administration tools.

Before launching the new campaign during the Israel-Hamas war, MuddyWater reused previously known remote administration tools, utilizing a new file-sharing service called “Storyblok.”

On October 30th Deep Instinct identified two archives hosted on “Storyblok” containing a new multi-stage infection vector. It contains hidden files, an LNK file that initiates the infection, and an executable file designed to unhide a decoy document while executing Advanced Monitoring Agent, a remote administration tool.

This is the first public report about MuddyWater utilizing this remote administration tool.

The Multi-stage Social Engineering Campaign

While Deep Instinct could not verify the spreading mechanism of the new campaign, it most likely starts with a spear-phishing email, similar to previous campaigns.

The content of the email lures the victim into downloading an archive hosted at “a.storyblok[.]com”

In this analysis, we examine the “defense-video.zip” file.

When the archive is extracted, several folders must be navigated until a LNK shortcut, which looks like another folder named “Attachments,” is found:




Figure 2: LNK Shortcut

However, there are additional hidden folders and files extracted from the archive:

Name	Date modified	Type
Document	10/31/2023 11:24 ...	File folder
Windows.Diagnostic.Document	10/31/2023 11:24 ...	File folder
Attachments	10/30/2023 1:27 AM	Shortcut

Figure 3: Hidden folders

When the victim opens the LNK file, the infection chain starts.

By examining the LNK file, we can see that it executes an executable from one of the hidden directories:

```
simon@DESKTOP-86BIDE8184A7E560CEA461B0E05D4136D0068B35C12C0889C4036D177E331A83 (1)/Attachments/Attachments/2023$ exiftool Attachments.lnk
ExifTool Version Number : 12.42
File Name   : Attachments.lnk
Directory  :
File Size   : 1352 bytes
File Modification Date/Time : 2023:10:30 01:27:40+02:00
File Access Date/Time  : 0000:00:00 00:00:00
File Inode Change Date/Time : 2023:10:31 11:25:41+02:00
File Permissions : -RW-RW-R--
File Type    : LNK
File Type Extension : lnk
MIME Type   : application/octet-stream
Flags       : IDList, RelativePath, CommandArgs, IconFile, Unicode
File Attributes: (none)
Target File Size  : 0
Icon Index  : 4
Run Window  : Show Minimized No Activate
Hot Key     : Control-Alt-R
Target File DOS Name : conhost.exe
Relative Path : ..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system32\conhost.exe
Command Line Arguments : --headless "Windows.Diagnostic.Document\Diagnostic.exe"
```

Figure 4: LNK command line arguments

The file “Diagnostic.exe” has been used in both archives Deep Instinct observed. The purpose of this file is to execute another executable called “Windows.Diagnostic.Document.EXE,” which is located in the hidden directory named “.end” under a “Windows.Diagnostic.Document” hidden directory.

The file named “Windows.Diagnostic.Document.EXE” is a signed, legitimate installer for “Advanced Monitoring Agent.”

In addition to executing the remote administration tool, “Diagnostic.exe” also opens a new Windows Explorer window of the hidden “Document” folder. This is done to fool the victim that opened the LNK file into thinking that it was indeed a folder.

The decoy document is an official memo from the Israeli Civil Service Commission, which can be publicly downloaded from their [website](#).

The memo describes what to do in case a government worker expresses opinions against the Israeli state on social networks:



מדינת ישראל
叙事者 שירות המדינה
าง המשמעת



כ"ו בתשרי תשפ"ד
11 באוקטובר 2023

סימוכין:
0491-0013-2023-031170

לכבוד
מכ"לים במשרדי הממשלה וביחידות הסמך
מכ"לים בתאגידים הstattutoriyim
מנהל בית החולים הממשלתיים

שלום רב,

הנדון: טיפול ממעטי בהתבטאות כנגד מדינת ישראל בעת מלחמה

- 1) ביום אל נמצאת מדינת ישראל במלחמה מול ארגון הטורור חמאס לאחר שטרוריסטים פעילי החמאס חדרו לישראל ויביצעו מעשי טרור אכזריים ביישובי הדרום.
- 2) על רקע מצב מלחמה זה אנו נתקלים במקירים בודדים של התבטאות פסולות של עובדי מדינה ברשות החברתיות אשר הביעו תמייה בפעולות הטורור הנפשעות הללו וכנגד מדינת ישראל.
- 3) כידוע, על עובדי מדינה חולות מגבלות שונות, לרבות בכל הנוגע לאופן ההתבטאות. הגבלות אלוחולות גם על ההתבטאות במסגרת הפרטית וברשות החברתיות.
- 4) ההתבטאות מסווג זה של עובדי מדינה ושל עובדי הגוף הכספיים לחוק שירות המדינה (משמעות, תשכ"ג – 1963 מהוות לכאורה עבירה ממשמעת חמורה, במיוחד במצב מלחמה בו אנו מצויים כיום, והן מחייבות טיפול ממעטי תקיף ומהיר).
- 5) לפיכך, ככל מקרה בו נכmons נתקלים בהתבטאות מסווג זה, בין במקום העבודה ובין מוחצתה לו, יש **לפנות אליו באופן מיידי לקבלת הנחיות לרבות לקידום השעה דחופה, חקירה, העמדה לדין ובחינת פיטורים**.

Figure 5: Decoy document

Conclusion

MuddyWater continues to attack Israeli targets in various ongoing campaigns.

In this campaign, MuddyWater employs updated TTPs. These include a new public hosting service, employing a LNK file to initiate the infection, and utilizing intermediate malware that mimics the opening of a directory while executing a new remote administration tool.

After the victim has been infected, the MuddyWater operator will connect to the infected host using the legitimate remote administration tool and will start doing reconnaissance on the target.

After the reconnaissance phase, the operator will likely execute PowerShell code which will cause the infected host to beacon to a custom C2 server.

MuddyWater has used [PhonyC2](#) in the past. However, Deep Instinct recently observed MuddyWater using a new C2 framework named MuddyC2Go – a detailed blog will be published soon, stay tuned.

IOCs:

File

MD5	Description
37c3f5b3c814e2c014abc1210e8e69a2	Archive containing Atera Agent
16923d827a440161217fb66a04e8b40a	Atera Agent Installer
7568062ad4b22963f3930205d1a14df7	Archive containing Atera Agent
39eea24572c14910b67242a16e24b768	Archive containing Atera Agent
2e09e53135376258a03b7d793706b70f	Atera Agent Installer
1f0b9aed4b2c8d958a9b396852a62c9d	Archive containing SimpleHelp
065f0871b6025b8e61f35a188bca1d5c	SimpleHelp Installer
146cc3a1a68be349e70b79f9115c496b	defense-video.zip
dd247ccd7cc3a13e1c72bb01cf3a816d	Attachments.lnk
8d2199fa11c6a8d95c1c2b4add70373a	Diagnostic.exe
04afff1465a223a806774104b652a4f0	Advanced Monitoring Agent Installer

MD5	Description
6167f03c8b2734c20eb02d406d3ba651	Decoy Document (defense-video.zip)
e8f3ecc0456fcbbb029b1c27dc1faad0	attachments.zip
952cc4e278051e349e870aa80bab755	Decoy Document (attachments.zip)
Network	
IP or URL	Description
ws.onehub[.]com/files/7f9dxtt6	URL to Archive of Atera Agent
a.storyblok[.]com/f/253959/x/b92ea48421/form.zip	URL to Archive of Atera Agent
a.storyblok[.]com/f/255988/x/5e0186f61d/questionnaire.zip	URL to Archive of Atera Agent
a.storyblok[.]com/f/259791/x/94f59e378f/questionnaire.zip	URL to Archive of SimpleHelp
146.70.149[.]61	MuddyWater's SimpleHelp server
146.70.124[.]102	<u>Suspected MuddyWater's SimpleHelp server</u>
37.120.237[.]204	Suspected MuddyWater's SimpleHelp server
37.120.237[.]248	Suspected MuddyWater's SimpleHelp server
a.storyblok[.]com/f/259837/x/21e6a04837/defense-video.zip	URL to Archive of Advanced Monitoring Agent

IP or URL	Description
a.storyblok[.]com/f/259791/x/91e2f5fa2f/attachments.zip	URL to Archive of Advanced Monitoring Agent

Additional IOCs regarding MuddyWater can be found in our GitHub page:
<https://github.com/deepinstinct/Israel-Cyber-Warfare-Threat-Actors>