

Intrusion Detection Systems

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How old is hacking?

- In 1972, the US Air Force was worried about computer security problems.
 - <https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/detection/history-evolution-intrusion-detection-344>
 - A variety of private IDS but..
 - In 1998, Marty Roesch released the first version of Snort.
 - In 1999, Snort 1.5 with logging and packet analysis
 - In 2000, Michael Davis ported it to Windows
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Chokepoint

- One flaw of IDS is that it requires all traffic to go through a sensor
 - This creates a chokepoint
 - Prior to Snort 3.0 this meant a single thread (like python)
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Evolution of Network Processing

- Since 1998 networks have gone from 100 Mps to 1 Gig ...
 - Now to 40 Gig and moving 100 Gig
 - Sensor CPU are not able to keep up with exponential growth
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Parallel or distributed computing

- Need to distribute over
 - sensors
 - more cpus or GPU's
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Data is not information

- one single port scan can generate:
 - an alarm for each port
 - 65,000+
 - This is not useful
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Architecture alternatives

- host based
 - Each machine on the net screens its own traffic
 - detection power grows with network
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Management problems

- patching, maintenance
 - automatic denials
 - high volume of alerts
 - large user interaction
 - scalable security == user education
 - need to scale security team (personell)
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Snort Architecture

- relies on LibPcap
 - available on Windows, Mac and Linux
 - not efficient enough for high volume networks
 - packets are delivered to pre-processors
 - every packet goes through each one to check for obfuscated attack
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Configuration impacts performance

- The more checks the worse the performance
 - Snort uses a "first match" to exit and improve
 - malicious traffic is routed to an output plugin
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Suricata

- 1st release in 2009
 - Funded by Navy and Homeland Security
 - Non-profit "Open Information Security Foundation"
 - Native multi-threading (not in Snort)
 - Alert and event filtering limits (not in Snort)
 - subnet IP reputation
 - CUDA to accelerate pattern recognition
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Bro

- scientific environments
 - Project of Berkley and Lawrence Livermore
 - Based on Bash scripts
 - Vern Paxson, 1995
 - Event driven not signatures
 - Can blacklist an IP or even shut down a host based on event
 - Bro's scripting language is called Bro
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Snort performance

- Pre 3.0 single process
 - Sits on top of libpcap which is also single process
 - No built in load balancing
 - Changing to AFPackent
 - Hard coded small buffer size
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How to scale Snort

- LibPcap 1.0
 - PFRing high throughput kernel module providing load balancing
 - Threaded New API (TNAPI) and a compatible NIC
 - Can get to 10 Gigs per second
 - Custom hardware from 2K USD to 25K USD
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Suricata

- native multithreading
 - normalizes traffic only once/Snort on a per instance basis
 - sent to worker thread for payload inspection
 - Snort greater volume with the same accuracy (Elbin and Rowe, 2013)
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Suricata captures

- High performance
 - AF_Packet or PF_Ring
 - Standard
 - PCAP or NFlog
 - IPS
 - netfilter ipfw
 - cards
 - Endace, Napatech and Tiler
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Suricata new features

- IP reputation
 - multi-threading
 - IPv6
 - GeoIP Lookup
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Performance gains are contested

They've produced a clone of Snort that performs worse at taxpayer's expense. ~ Martin Roesch

Bro

- Script decisions to drop, sample, throttle or redirect packets
 - Mac, FreeBSD and Linux only
 - Steep learning curve
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Bro architecture

- supports libpcap and PF_Ring ZC
 - worker architecture
 - no native load balancers but there are commercial add ons (cPacket)
 - one core for every 80 Mbps of traffic
 - manager receives notifications and writes alerts
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Bro vs Snort

- Bro does not just drop traffic
 - send emails, page staff, terminate a connection
 - Snort2Bro can convert Snort and Suricata rules to Bro
 - Can act based on commercial services
 - hash registries, Team Cymru's Malware Hash Registry
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Overflow

- When processing limits are reached
 - packets are dropped
 - false negatives
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Best practice

Defense in depth is the coordinated use of multiple security countermeasures to protect the integrity of the information assets in an enterprise ~ Margret Rouse

- Layer security platforms
 - Suricata and Bro for >10 Gps networks
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Bro in depth

References

<https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/intrusion/open-source-ids-high-performance-shootout-35772>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZwrPBEilF9g>

http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/36465/Rowe_Finding_Realistic.sequence=1
