Local Security Governance in Vulnerable Residential Areas

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Abstract The population structure in vulnerable residential areas is often characterised by ethnic heterogeneity, a large number of welfare recipients, a high unemployment rate, an above-average number of single parents and an inadequate level of education. Such deprived neighbourhoods suffer from several social problems and often from a high crime rate with robberies, assaults, break-ins, vandalism, etc. The increase of parallel societies with subcultures and non-statutory power groups (mafia-like gangs, rocker groups, etc.) limits the effectiveness of the police and the municipality's public order offices, which are often viewed with suspicion. These factors influence the criminogenic structure on the one hand and the requirements for safety and security activities on the other. Police and public services face the challenge of activating citizens, involving them in crime prevention strategies, motivating them to support prosecution by reporting crimes and becoming witnesses and testifying before police and in court. This chapter analyses the sociological background of deprivation and vulnerability, applies criminological theories in policing strategies and takes into account the need for an inter-agency approach to promoting and ensuring security in such areas.

Keywords Vulnerability · Residential areas · Security governance · Inter-agency policing

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1 Vulnerability of Persons and Residential Areas

Victimology is a sub-discipline of criminology and considers predispositions to becoming a victim (cf. Hope 2011), which are—among other factors—based on the grade of vulnerability of a person (or a group). But vulnerability cannot (only) be more or less scientifically measured, analysed and with this objectified, it also has a subjective dimension as an element of the self-assessment of people with effect on the grade of fear of crime. For example, women and elderly people often see themselves as vulnerable and have a significantly higher feeling of insecurity although they are statistically less likely to be victimised than young men (e.g. Boers 1991). The consideration of vulnerability of persons and groups in the development and implementation of policing strategies differs between countries. Especially in the Anglo-Saxon world it has a higher significance and is discussed above all with regards to *community policing* in the sense of community oriented or citizen-oriented security work (Bartkowiak-Théron and Asquith 2012).

Making reference to Killeas (1990), Green (2011) looks at vulnerability in terms of physical, social and situational components seen and interpreted by the individual within the context of biographical, cultural and environmental living conditions and taking into account both internal and external influences. He further writes (p. 92):

> "*Vulnerability is often used to express the level of risk posed to certain groups or individuals. The more vulnerable a person is the more at risk they are of victimisation. It can also be used to refer to the level of harm we are likely to suffer when we are victimised. The greater the impact and consequences of victimisation the more vulnerable a person is. Hence vulnerability can be measured on two axes, risk and harm* ".

The extent of vulnerability can thus be determined by risk situations on the one hand and the degree of harm on the other, which is largely determined individually and cannot be generally objectified. That is to say, the degree of harm depends on the coping ability and the self-protection competence, such as the possibility to escape in the event of an attack, the ability to ward off danger but also the chances of recovering physically, psychologically, materially and/or socially from harm. [1]

A rather weak coping ability and increased vulnerability can be assumed in physically, mentally, emotionally and/or socially weak persons. The vulnerability of women, children and the elderly is a classic example here. Added to this is the vulnerability of, for example, people with physical and/or mental disabilities. As a rule, vulnerability is viewed individually and is associated with poorly perceived physical defences, existing handicaps and low self-confidence. Here, the vulnerability hypothesis focuses more on subjectively perceived coping skills rather than the actual ability to defend oneself in a dangerous situation (Bals 2004; Bornewasser and Köhn 2012).

[1] Examples: The loss of 100 Euros through a robbery is harder for a recipient of social assistance than for a senior civil servant. A young person usually recovers more easily from a broken bone after a physical attack than a senior citizen. Anyone who is supported and cared for in a dense social network of family and friends can usually cope better with the psychological consequences of a burglary than a single person.

Chakraborti and Garland (2012) refer to vulnerability also in the context of hate crime. This phenomenon, which has been discussed for some time in the Anglo-Saxon world, has only recently been examined in more detail in Germany as hate crime or as crime with reference to group-related misanthropy and includes phenomena such as xenophobia, anti-Semitism and right-wing radicalism (Schneider 2003; cf. also Bannenberg et al. 2006).[2] However, sexual minorities, homeless people and religious minorities, for example, are also affected by group-related misanthropy and are victims of hate crime.

Vulnerability must therefore by no means be analytically limited to individual coping ability but must also take into account the risks with their various influencing factors (e.g. the motives of the attackers) as well as the external protective factors, such as social integration, good police work and/or access to social services. Vulnerabilities must also be decoupled from the individual's perception and abstracted in order to capture the *risks and harms.*

An important factor in the consideration of vulnerability is resource endowment with its effects on the personal risk assessment and the coping ability of people. Wetzels et al. (1995, p. 219) have taken up this aspect with regards to fear of crime, and have grouped resources into three categories:

- *Psychological resources*, personal influencing factors (attitudes, motives, convictions, personality dispositions, norms and values, options for action).
- *Social resources* (age, gender, income, education, lifestyle, living environment).
- *Psychosocial resources*, social support.

These already highlight important elements, which in turn bring individual resource endowment to the fore. The use of Bourdieu's (1992) types of capital approach is more fruitful for the consideration of vulnerability, as it takes up the dimension of social inequality even more clearly and thus helps to analyse effects on (large) social groups. Without being able to take up and explain Bourdieu's field concept more intensively at this point (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996), it should be postulated that 'security' can also be seen as a field in which a specific logic not only determines the perception of social phenomena but in which specific structures and functions emerge, which in turn assign positions to the people moving in the field, e.g. with regards to power and influence, freedoms and constraints, etc. Material and symbolic goods are produced and consumed in these fields. This production and consumption of goods is determined by the rules of the game that affect the conditions for action.

In turn, the conditions for action are shaped by people's capital resources. Although Bourdieu (1992) makes use of the terminology from the field of economics here, he develops the concept of capital further, since in different fields different forms of capital are of more or less importance:

[2]It was not until the summer of 2015 that hate crime was included in § 46 StGB (German Penal Code), although not as a concept but in its motives it was included in German criminal law, and courts are called upon to assess it in their sentencing: "*the motives and the aims of the perpetrator, in particular also racist, xenophobic or other inhuman [and] the attitude that speaks from the act*".

> "*With his approach, Bourdieu extends the dominant concept of economy from capital only reified to different types of capital. For example, honour, artistic recognition, knowledge, scientific reputation, truth, etc., and the people competing and fighting with one another for these types of capital, whereby even in this perspective the economic functional logics of the optimization of the use (money, creativity, relationships, understanding) and accumulation of capital are preserved*" (Schöne 2011, p. 58).

Bourdieu (1992, p. 50ff.) distinguishes four main types of capital, which may have different meanings in different fields.

- Firstly, there is (the traditional) *economic capital*, which is expressed in income and wealth as well as the associated possibilities for shaping one's life.
- Secondly, he refers to *cultural capital*, which, for example, presents itself as an *objective cultural capital* in the form of cultural goods (works of art, paintings, books, etc.) or which exists as an *incorporated cultural capital* that is developed in the form of cultural abilities, skills and forms of knowledge on the basis of education and finally as *institutionalised cultural capital*, which is reflected, for example, in educational titles.
- "*Social capital is the sum of the actual and virtual resources that an individual or a group has due to the fact that they have a — more or less institutionalized — permanent network of relationships, of mutual knowledge and recognition of each other; it is thus the sum of all capital and all power that can be mobilized through such a network*" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996, p. 151). It is therefore a matter of social relationships, friendships, relatives, professional and private networks that can, if necessary, be activated as, for example, support, advice or accompaniment.
- *Symbolic capital*, for example, refers to recognition and appreciation, which are connected with the field-specific categories of perception in a special logic. If economic capital is decisive in the field of economics, institutionalised cultural capital (academic degrees and titles, positions) is more important in the academic field.

For Bourdieu (1992, p. 50), the analysis of capital or the various forms of capital essentially serves to use the unequal capital endowment of people to describe social inequalities. The capital endowment determines the possibilities and restrictions of action. And against the background of the core thesis in any capital concept, that capital can multiply or be expended in the sense of costs and can thus shrink, the consideration of capital resources makes it possible to take a look at people's life chances. With regards to vulnerability, the thesis is formulated here that a lack of economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital increases vulnerability, while a good endowment with capital can fundamentally reduce vulnerability.

However, unequal resources and capital endowments should not only be considered individually. Particularly in metropolitan areas, segregation, which accelerated and became more dramatic in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, significantly increases the vulnerability of neighbourhoods. While strong gentrification often takes place in the centres of metropolises and neighbouring districts and other

neighbourhoods are upgraded (cf. Holm 2011), a simultaneous marked squeezing-out of low-capital population groups can be observed. Sometimes exploding rents in the 'trendy' neighbourhoods are forcing the economically and socially weaker to move to poorer districts. Here a low-capital population then accumulates and social hotspots, ghettos, deprived districts or districts with a special need for renewal emerge, as it is sometimes called more dramatically or euphemistically.

While urban sociology in the US had already taken up the "*effect of the spatial concentration of socially disadvantaged population groups in the neighbourhoods*" in the 1980s (Farwick 2012, p. 389 with reference to Wilson 1987), this topic did not appear on the scientific agenda in Germany until the end of the 1990s. The effects of social segregation are examined primarily with regards to life situations that are characterised, for example, by poverty, educational deficits, unemployment and part-time employment. Farwick (2012, p. 391) refers to the frequent resource deficits in these districts and mentions, for example, limited individual self-help potential, weak community networks with little support, limited information channels and *weak ties* to social networks, limited infrastructures (education, public transport, etc.) and/or low purchasing power.

The negative effects of deprived living quarters on individual disadvantage are confirmed through empirical studies. With regards to the security aspect of crime, Oberwittler (2004) and Wurtzbacher (2008), for example, were able to draw attention to the connections between segregation, residential quarters and deviance and delinquency in Germany. Analyses has mostly focused on the relationships between residential neighbourhoods and delinquency, less on residential neighbourhoods and vulnerability.[3]

All in all, the processes of social segregation, in particular socially forced segregation, have led to a concentration of people with little capital endowment (in the Bourdieu sense) in urban districts, which leads to the formation of vulnerable neighbourhoods through the individual vulnerability of the disadvantaged in accumulation. Their inhabitants would be or are exposed to particular *risks and harms* according to the definition of vulnerability already cited here from Green (2011, p. 92).

2 Local Safety and Security Governance

Residential districts and neighbourhoods with different levels of social and criminal burdens have different needs and content requirements for security work. This concerns the concrete operational level on the one hand but also the political decisions and the control of policing. Against this background, local security work will

[3]Müller (2012) discusses this vulnerability in urban sociology under the heading of 'social exclusion'. She notes an increasing insecurity and defencelessness as a consequence of processes of exclusion, such as those that are spatially reflected in social and ethnic segregation and are accompanied by various disintegration processes (Heitmeyer 2004). The starting point for social exclusion is again the lack of resources. Müller's arguments, however, relate less to factors of security than to *social* security.

be examined from the perspective of the governance approach and the question asked as to whether the specific forms of control of local safety and security governance can mean an opportunity to put vulnerability on the agenda of the local security discourse or to take it into account.

Governance generally means a steering approach that aims at collective security provision and in doing so attempts to link different actors and their perceptions with each other or to take them into account. Without being able to go into fundamental discussions on the classification of the concept of governance (*narrow/wide*), forms of governance (*governance with/within/without government*) or normative dimensions in the sense of *good governance* (cf. Möltgen-Sicking and Winter 2019), local safety and security governance (cf. Schulze 2013) is understood as follows:

- *Governance* is used as an analytical instrument to examine structures, processes and outputs of political, administrative and social action by actors.
- *Security* focuses here on issues of internal security and thus distinguishes itself from issues of external security (war/peace, security alliances such as NATO, etc.).
- *Internal security* is understood in the two dimensions of objective security, i.e. the existence of concrete threats from, for example, crime, terrorism, extremism and various elements of misdemeanours, as well as subjective security as the perception of security and people's fear of crime.
- In terms of management, *security governance* is understood as "*the collective guarantee of security by a large number of state and non-state actors who, in a non-hierarchical relationship to one another, use various means, instruments and methods to achieve a common goal on the basis of common norms, values and/or interests*" (Ehrhart 2010, p. 25).
- The entire 'value chain' is taken into account to ensure security. The chain begins with a process known as *prophylaxis*, which refers to approaches aimed at preventing the emergence of causes of crime and is followed by *prevention*, which aims to hinder the occurrence of danger and *resilience* as the (defence) ability of those threatened in their security. In case of immediate danger, security is needed to protect people, and intervention is aimed at stopping the danger. Next is *coping* as the competence of the individual to deal physically and psychologically with experienced threats and offences as well as *restoration*, which, after the disruption of security, is the return to normality and/or dealing with the aftermath of victimisation, which includes not only the penal system but also victim support (cf. Frevel 2015, p. 116).
- In security governance, the term 'local' means that reference is made to regional security problems and how they are dealt with in a mostly communal environment. Other forms of security governance, such as the Common Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ) at the national level or the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union (CSDP) at the European level, are not considered here.

Until the beginning of the 1990s, local security was essentially characterised by competent authorities generally reactively dealing with problems that arose in their respective formally assigned areas of responsibility. Traffic accidents were the

responsibility of the police, while parking offences fell within the remit of the local administrative authority. Crime and violence were fought by the police, pollution of the public space was a matter for the city. At the same time, however, cross-authority steering modes were also used in the preparation of major events or in the context of disaster control, both with topic-related consultations and permanently installed planning committees.

Since the early 1990s a variety of committees evolved, for example, crime prevention councils, public order partnerships, community partnerships, security conferences, security partnerships, working groups and round tables or simply prevention councils and much more. They are all more or less institutionalised bodies, in which different aspects of local safety and security are discussed and steered. Upcoming models of plural policing (Jones and Newburn 2006) and nodal policing (Van Sluis et al. 2011) brought new ways of governance into security policy.

The basic patterns of organisational design are almost greater even than the variety of names for the forms of cooperation. Clear standards have so far not emerged for the organisation or the form of measures or the basic orientation towards a common concept of prevention (Frevel 2012). Orientation towards local structures and local problems brings a variety of individual solutions for specific needs.

3 Policing Vulnerable Areas

The various forms of local safety and security governance are designed to ensure that safety work is both *target group* oriented and takes into account the conditions specific to the area. Here they can build on approaches developed in the 1970s and 1980s, broaden their understanding of security production and bundle it into community-based concepts.

The relationships and links between territoriality and crime were already discussed extensively by Newman (1973) with the *Defensible Space Approach*, the significance of social control for crime prevention by Cohen and Felson (1979) within the framework of the *Routine Activity Approach* and the risks of not dealing with rule violations by Wilson and Kelling (1982) with the *Broken Windows* theorem. These already quite old insights are apparently also valid for the modern city and its processes of change: Progressive social and ethnic segregation is leading to the formation of neighbourhoods with a population structure low in capital. The concentration of people with vulnerability due to capital deficits sometimes creates vulnerable neighbourhoods in which the crime-rate is high, risks are heightened and the effects of crime, i.e. harm, are extended. *Harm* affects both individuals, whose coping skills are lower due to capital deficits, and the entire neighbourhood because the poorer security or increased risk situation leads to losses of social control, to people withdrawing from the public sphere and to reduced neighbourhood ties.

If the above chain of reasoning is correct, then vulnerable neighbourhoods will be subject to extended security requirements. However, security work that concentrates essentially on police activity with its widespread principle of response to events and

operations with a focus on averting danger, intervention and prosecution, does not take vulnerability into account as an orientation for its design. It gives priority to the actions of perpetrators and the current situation; the situation of the (potential) victims and their vulnerability are of secondary importance at both the individual and the neighbourhood level. This is also due to the fact that the understanding of security and security work (not only by the police) is rather narrow and is limited to the danger and its management.

However, especially with regards to potential victims, vulnerable persons and groups or vulnerable neighbourhoods, the concept of security work should be expanded and both upstream and downstream aspects of the dangerous situation should be taken up in order to identify the factors relevant to capital deficits, to compensate for them if necessary and to strengthen the potential for protection and coping skills. At the outset are the concepts of *prophylaxis* in the sense of primary *prevention* and (secondary or situational) (criminal) prevention. The strengthening of *resilience* as resistance as well as *coping ability* as defence and processing competence are also included. Downstream would be the *restoration*, i.e. the restoration of security after damage has occurred. This shows that traditional policing strategies with the focus on measures of risk prevention, protection, intervention and law enforcement will fall short and are restricted in their sustainability (cf. Frevel 2015).

Security work in vulnerable neighbourhoods should instead be broadly understood as regarding the different elements of the value chain of security and should consider capital (in Bourdieu's sense) of the inhabitants of the neighbourhood, especially social capital, as resources for 'more security'. The previously mentioned 'classics' of urban sociologically-oriented crime research already emphasised the importance of the neighbourhood and its social cohesion for social control and its effects on deviant behaviour. In the mid-1990s, the discussion about social capital gained in importance, especially in the US but also in European countries (cf. Franzen and Freitag 2007; on security in residential districts: Friedrichs and Oberwittler 2007, p. 452). The *Collective Efficacy* approach of Sampson (2012), Sampson et al. (1997) gave a decisive impetus to this debate:

> "*Our basic premise is that social and organizational characteristics of neighborhoods explain variations in crime rates that are not solely attributable to the aggregated demographic characteristics of individuals. We propose that the differential ability of neighborhoods to realize the common values of residents and maintain effective social controls is a major source of neighborhood variation in violence*" (Sampson et al. 1997, p. 918).

Social control here is not reduced to a reaction to deviant behaviour with formalised rules and conformity requirements by the police and judiciary. Rather, it refers to the ability of a group, in this case the inhabitants of a neighbourhood, to communicate about values and behaviours and also represent them: "*One central goal is the desire of community residents to live in safe and orderly environments that are free of predatory crime*" (Sampson et al. 1997, p. 918).

The neighbourhood concept of Sampson et al. actually has nothing to do with a normatively overloaded neighbourhood concept with close social relationships and friendships, the constant willingness to help out with a little coffee or sugar, to 'just'

look after the children, etc. This idyll is not the focus of attention but rather the aspect of *trust*, understood as (basic) trust in the sense of common expectations, is brought to the fore. Recognising the theories of social disorganisation (e.g. Kubrin and Weitzer 2003; for the German discussion cf. e.g. Heitmeyer 2004), social control is seen as a challenge to the community and to functioning accepted institutions and is not assigned to individuals:

> "*This theoretical framework recognizes the transformed landscape of contemporary urban life and assumes that while community efficacy may depend on some level of working trust and social interaction, it does not require that neighbors or local police officers be one's friend. Institutional mechanisms may be sufficient*" (Sampson 2012, p. 152).

The 'effectiveness of the collective' is based on mutual trust, on shared interests and basic values as well as their individual or collective defence, e.g. by admonishing disrupters, truants, etc.

Neighbourhoods and districts that develop social coercion and skills in the sense of collective efficacy can also demonstrably boast lower crime rates, especially in the crime areas of physical assault and violence, damage to property as well as alcohol and drug consumption (with other subsequent offences) (for case descriptions, methodological analysis, concepts and evaluations see e.g. Armstrong et al. 2015; Rukus and Warner 2012; Sampson et al. 1997). Security in these neighbourhoods is therefore not based on repression against disturbers and offenders by law enforcement and criminal prosecution authorities but on the social capital and resilience of the residents and the resulting preventive effect, which can be attributed to both primary and secondary prevention, situational and zone-related prevention, and which is based overall on community orientation.

The challenge now lies in developing and using social capital in a neighbourhood. In neighbourhoods in particular, which can be classified as vulnerable because there is a low-capital resident population living in (often forced) segregation, security work should therefore not be geared towards 'more police' but rather towards strengthening social capital. It requires an *empowerment* of the residents as a whole and not only of the individuals (Perkins 2010, p. 207):

> "*Empowerment has been defined as an intentional ongoing process centered in the local community, involving mutual respect, critical reflection, caring, and group participation, through which people lacking an equal share of valued resources gain greater access to and control over those resources; or a process by which people gain control over their lives, democratic participation in the life of their community, and a critical understanding of their environment*" (highlighting in the original text).

Local Safety and Security Governance can offer various opportunities for this context as a control approach. The combination of different actors is able to take up the perspective of residents with varying levels of capital by first addressing the inclusion and *voice* function of capital-weak groupings. Victim protection associations, for example, can represent this perspective as members of crime prevention bodies, and complement 'classic' municipal security work. Furthermore, with the involvement of civil society actors, at best not only the complexity of the perspective grows but also the thematic breadth of local security work, since vulnerability is both on the

agenda and can be taken into account in the design of measures. Nevertheless, the classic decision-making processes may also have an impact in this context: Public actors from the regulatory and municipal spheres are generally more powerful and influential than civil society organisations, which may result in a certain asymmetry in decision-making at the expense of the latter.

4 Conclusion and Recommendations

The various theoretical approaches—from Newman's *Defensible Space* Theory to Sampson's *Collective Efficacy* approach—show that social references in residential quarters are particularly significant. Social integration, with its effects on trust and the strengthening of informal social control as well as a housing industry that is oriented towards residents and the community and a needs-oriented provision of services by public and welfare organisations, all form the basis for greater security in the neighbourhood.

Particularly in vulnerable neighbourhoods, which suffer from neglect, violence and crime, social capital must be strengthened (and other capital and resources must also be built up) in order to reduce vulnerability and thus indirectly promote security. Security work that essentially concentrates on response and focuses on police interpretations can only have a limited impact. What is needed in vulnerable neighbourhoods is a broad concept of security and a more comprehensive approach that works with a mix of neighbourhood management, including employment assistance, education and leisure, counselling, care, integration, social space design, housing management and many more.

Institutionally, many actors are required for such community work, i.e. various municipal offices, welfare associations, leisure associations, housing industry and neighbourhood groups, etc. This is where the governance perspective of steering theory comes into play, which has the potential to bring many actors together across the board. What is important here, however, is not that the actors only act in their area of responsibility and remain attached to the logic of thought demanded here but that they work cooperatively with their specific competences and areas of specialisation and take into account other actors' conditions of action (Frevel and Kober 2012, p. 354). Cooperative neighbourhood and security work is called for here, for which there are certainly useful basic patterns with crime prevention councils and regulatory partnerships but which often take less account of the needs and requirements of those affected (i.e. in particular vulnerable persons, groups and neighbourhoods) and which plan more from the perspective of the institutions with their competences, resources and goals. Security work that takes more account of (potential) victims and strives to *empower* residents can result in more security than can be achieved by consistent police intervention. It will not be possible to do without the work of the police but it is true at present that it is phenomenon-oriented and thus more limited in scope than *community policing*, which emphasises the *community* and widens the definition of *policing* as security work.

To develop a target group and social-, spatial-oriented, sustainable and empowering safety and security governance, it is important to:

- Raise the awareness of the vulnerability of persons, groups and neighbourhoods.
- Make differentiated situational analyses and risk assessments in the various residential areas.
- Bring together representatives of statutory (police, municipality), non-statutory (welfare organisations), economic (enterprises, shops, housing agencies) stakeholders and civil society (especially residents) in (more or less institutionalised) community partnerships.
- Ensure an ongoing communication, coordination and collaboration amongst all partners.
- Identify factors to increase safety and security along the value chain.
- Develop programmes and projects, structures and processes to improve security and to make sure that these are evaluated.
- Keep the affordance of (input-, throughput- and output-) legitimacy and accountability in mind—in other words to keep in mind that these newly established governance arrangements have to be compatible with democratic requirements.

If security work is conceived from the question 'Whose security?' it becomes clear that it is precisely vulnerable neighbourhoods that need comprehensive security work, which is not reduced to intervention but rather includes prevention, resilience and restoration in its conception. Then community work can be instrumental in achieving *collective efficacy*.

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