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naGuard End-Point Ransomware Protection

Project definition

Project Goals

- i. Write an application, running standalone on the potential victim's machine, that will hook to core OS functions in order to detect ransomware activity
- ii. You will need to globally hook specific system process to identify anomalies related to specific types of ransomware.
- iii. Once hooks have been set, a detection mechanism should be implemented. See: <https://www.cise.ufl.edu/~traynor/papers/scaife-icdcs16.pdf> as an example of detecting ransomware activity
- iv. In case the application has detected a ransomware infection on the victim's machine, it will respond by using the built-in Windows mechanisms, e.g. Shadow-Copy to recover one or more corrupted files.

Assumptions

1

Windows 10

2

Malware run in user mode (admin available)


3

Malware main interest is in user important data files: doc, docx, xls, xlsx, ppt, pptx, pdf, txt.


4

Malware probably will not be sign OR at least not by MS.


Introduction to Windows I/O System



Architecture



naGuard I/O monitor



Handle callbacks implemented: IRP_MJ_CREATE, IRP_MJ_WRITE, IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION.

```
typedef struct filter_message_t {
    int      opcode; // Operation {read, write, rename, delete}
    HANDLE   process_id;
    float    preop_entropy; // Entropy of a file at the time when the operation was
initiated
    float    postop_entropy; // Entropy of a file at the time when the operation was
completed
    WCHAR    preop_filename[4096]; // File name at the time a rename operation was
initiated
    WCHAR    postop_filename[4096]; // File name at the time a rename operation was
completed
} NAGUARD_FMESSAGE, *PNAGUARD_FMESSAGE;
```

Kernel – User protocol

Kernel

DB

Record all operations
received from kernel divided
into Several criteria.

Polling
DB

Behavior Score engine

Create scoring table through DB
records.

- Higher score for interesting file extensions.
- Higher score for honey pot files

Suspicious process

Termination engine

Terminate malicious process


- Check process signature before termination
- Terminate parent process also if unsigned

naGuard Analyzer

Multithreaded scoring
table which grant higher
scoring to malicious
behavior processes.

naGuard Analyzer DB

unordered_map
<HANDLE,
ThreadInfo>



Criteria:

I/O operations: Read,
write(new file), rewrite,
rename.

short (3 sec) aggregation
and long (process life) time
aggregation

Absolute and relative
entropy.

ThreadInfo:

- M_score - current malicious score.
- honeyPotsCounter – counter of honey pots touched by process in the last X seconds (X=3).
- Write_end_entropy – sum of absolute entropy in rewrite operations.
- Write_delta_entropy – sum of delta entropy in rewrite operations.
- New_write_entropy – sum of entropy in new write operations.
- notExtInListWrite – number of all write operations (include all extensions) in the last X seconds (X=3) if absolute entropy higher then 3.5.
- honey_pots_touched – number of honey pots files touched (all OPS)
- m_total_ops[OPS_NUM] – number of all operations (interesting extensions only) in the last X seconds (X=3).
- m_ops[OPS_NUM] – number of all operations (interesting extensions only) in the process life.

Malware behavior analysis

Ransomware can behave in one of 3 ways:

- Read file -> encrypt -> write content to file in same path with different extensions -> delete original file.
- Read file -> encrypt -> write content to same file-> rename original file.
- Read file -> encrypt -> write content to same.

Score engine

The algorithm based on malware behavior analysis which was presented earlier.

Increase score for suspicious behavior and decrease score for innocent behavior through time

Higher score for “interesting” file extensions and higher for honey pots.

The algorithm was tuned experimentally.

If total score of process is higher than 100 and the process is not signed it would be terminated.

Tests and Results

Detection accuracy - Detect 5 known real ransomware

- WannaCry
- Jigsaw
- Satana
- Vipassana
- Cerber

False positive checks

- Windows update – no FP.
- Applications installation – no FP.
- 7z (zip and unzip) – no FP.

Various checks for System stability

Overhead [performance hit].



Future Work

- Analyzer based on machine learning.
- Check for bin file signer.
- Check for ADS.
- Protect boot sector.
- Recover encrypted files.
- Smarter honey pots (randomly generated)

Conclution

- The project include 3 distinct parts of research
 - Windows internals.
 - kernel development and debugging.
 - Ransomware research & behavior analysis.
- Despite the complexity we decided to carry out the project because we believed this is the right way to implement such mission.
- Bonus points implemented
 - **Kernel based (driver) solution.**
 - Honey pots.
 - Sign check