

# Richard Faltings

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## Education

Ph.D., Economics, The University of Texas at Austin	2025 (expected)
M.A., Quantitative Economics and Finance, University of St. Gallen	2018
B.A., Economics, University of St. Gallen	2016

## Research Interests

Market Design, Transportation, Digital Platforms, Reinforcement Learning

## References

### Eugenio Miravete

*Rex G. Baker Jr.*  
*Professor of Political Economy*  
The University of Texas at Austin  
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### Daniel Akerberg

*Addison Baker Duncan Centennial*  
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### Nicholas Buchholz

*Assistant Professor of Economics*  
Princeton University  
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### Victoria Marone

*Assistant Professor of Economics*  
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## Job Market Paper

### [Non-Binding Agreements in Matching Markets: Evidence from Trucking](#)

**Abstract:** Many matching markets feature non-binding agreements, often giving one party in a transaction the option to renege against a standardized penalty. In some cases, the penalty is non-pecuniary, and is enforced through relational incentives. This paper examines the social welfare implications of such relational penalties in the trucking industry, using novel data from an online freight auction platform. First, I document widespread renegeing on the platform and develop a theoretical model of the carrier search process with stochastic offers from outside the platform. I show the importance of considering both the direct effect of the penalty on renegeing behavior, as well as the equilibrium pass-through of lost welfare to the final transaction price. Using structural estimates of the model, I simulate counterfactual cancellation schedules with both increasing and uniform penalties. I find that the current near-zero penalties are nearly optimal for social welfare. I also consider a switch to pecuniary penalties. The socially optimal pecuniary penalty increases overall welfare by 1.6%, driven by an increase in platform profits of 8.4%. The profit-maximizing penalty raises platform profits by 61.4% but reduces overall welfare by 5.4%, indicating that while pecuniary penalties create gains from trade, they also allow the platform to extract more rents from carriers, reducing overall efficiency.

## Working Papers

### [Squeezing more Juice out of Lime: A Novel High-dimensional Pricing Algorithm.](#)

*Under Review*

**Abstract:** Sophisticated pricing algorithms used by digital transportation platforms have renewed interest in price control policies, but little evidence exists on their redistributive effects. This paper studies a uniform price mandate in the market for shared electric vehicle platforms in Washington, D.C., which prohibits origin- and destination-based pricing. To compute price equilibria encompassing hundreds of prices for specific origin-destination pairs, I develop a new simulation-based pricing algorithm, adapted from the reinforcement learning literature. I apply the algorithm to a demand system estimated using geolocation data from all firms in the market. In the counterfactual exercise, I find that the redistributive effects of the price controls are mild, and mainly serve riders in the periphery of the city. Furthermore, I find that relaxing the price controls increases rides taken by consumers by 41%, firm profits by 34%, and increases consumer welfare by more than double the profit increase (80% of firm profits).

## Work in Progress

### **From Favorites to Fresh Faces: Viewer Loyalty and New Creators in Livestreaming**

*Supported by the Twitch Research Fellowship*

(with Alexander Tang)

**Abstract:** As the gig economy grows, an increasing number of individuals are relying on content creation for their livelihood. The design of platform recommendation algorithms plays a critical role in the discovery and success of new creators. This study presents novel evidence from a natural experiment on the Twitch livestreaming platform to quantify this entry barrier. We analyze eight weeks of high-frequency viewership panel data for all World of Warcraft streams, focusing on the period surrounding the launch of a new game expansion that substantially increased both viewership and the number of streamers. Our findings highlight the significant role of viewer favorites, with the median viewer dedicating 60% of their time to a single streamer pre-launch and 48% post-launch. We also observe considerable stickiness in these preferences; fresh viewers in the post-launch period are twice as likely to watch fresh streamers compared to those active pre-launch. These patterns have important implications for the entry of new streamers and inform the design of recommendation algorithms. Future work aims to develop a theoretical model to understand the impact of these dynamics on the equilibrium distribution of viewership across streamers.

### **Equilibria in Decentralized Freight Networks**

(with Nicholas Buchholz and John Lazarev)

## Publications

### [Rot-Jaune-Verde. Language and Favoritism: Evidence from Swiss Soccer.](#)

*Kyklos*, 76( 3), 380–406.

(with Alex Krumer and Michael Lechner)

## Conference Presentations

18 <sup>th</sup> Swiss Economists Abroad Conference (Zurich)	2023
16 <sup>th</sup> Swiss Economists Abroad Conference (Virtual)	2022
MaCCI Summer School on Platform Economics	2022
15 <sup>th</sup> Swiss Economists Abroad Conference (Virtual)	2020

## Honors and Fellowships

Summer Research Fellowship, The University of Texas at Austin	2022, 2023, 2024
Graduate Continuing Fellowship, The University of Texas at Austin	2021 – 2022
Twitch Research Fellowship	2021
Outstanding Second-Year Paper Award, The University of Texas at Austin	2020
Graduate Fellowship, The University of Texas at Austin	2018 – 2021

## Research Experience

University of Texas at Austin, Research Assistant to Eugenio Miravete	2022 – 2023
University of Texas at Austin, Research Assistant to Vasiliki Skreta	2021
University of Texas at Austin, Research Assistant to Jorge Balat	2021
University of St. Gallen, Research Assistant to Stefan Buehler	2017 – 2018
University of St. Gallen, Research Assistant to Michael Lechner	Spring 2017

## Teaching Experience

Introductory Game Theory ( $\times 4$ ), evaluation: 4.48/5.00	2019, 2020, 2024
Economics of Auctions, evaluation: 3.95/5.00	2023
Introduction to Economics (summer)	2023
Political Economy (summer)	2020
Behavioral Economics	2019
Introduction to Econometrics	2018

## Other Experience and Service

PhD Student Seminar Coordinator, The University of Texas at Austin	2020-2023
Intern, Chief Economist Team, DG for Competition, European Commission	2018

## Skills

Software: Julia, Python, R, Stata, Matlab,  $\text{\LaTeX}$   
Languages: English (native), French (native), German (fluent)

Last updated: June, 2024