Aqar Chain Smart Contract Audit Final Report







July 12, 2021



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Introduction

1. About Agar Chain

Aqarchain is a blockchain (tezos) powered real estate investing platform whose aim is to create a decentralized ecosystem where investment in real estate is as easy as investing in shares on the stock market.

Aqarchain is the flagship product of the Smart Chain Information Technology Consultancy Ltd. The purpose of this product is to provide the following financial services: "Operating a Crowdfunding Platform."

- The Aqarchain Platform will facilitate selling of Properties between various Sellers and Investors.
- The Platform will cater to Retail Clients as well as Professional Clients and potentially Market Counterparties.
- The Platform will offer an additional level of smart contracts security by tokenizing the shares in the Properties.
- The Platform is developed on the Tezos Blockchain.

Visit https://agarchain.io/ to know more about.

2. About ImmuneBytes

ImmuneBytes is a security start-up to provide professional services in the blockchain space. The team has hands-on experience in conducting smart contract audits, penetration testing, and security consulting. ImmuneBytes's security auditors have worked on various A-league projects and have a great understanding of DeFi projects like AAVE, Compound, 0x Protocol, Uniswap, dydx.

The team has been able to secure 15+ blockchain projects by providing security services on different frameworks. ImmuneBytes team helps start-up with a detailed analysis of the system ensuring security and managing the overall project.

Visit http://immunebytes.com/ to know more about the services.

Documentation Details

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Audit Process & Methodology

ImmuneBytes team has performed thorough testing of the project starting with analyzing the code design patterns in which we reviewed the smart contract architecture to ensure it is structured and safe use of third-party smart contracts and libraries.

Our team then performed a formal line-by-line inspection of the Smart Contract in order to find any potential issues like Signature Replay Attacks, Unchecked External Calls, External Contract Referencing, Variable Shadowing, Race conditions, Transaction-ordering dependence, timestamp dependence, DoS attacks, and others.

In the Unit testing phase, we run unit tests written by the developer in order to verify the functions work as intended. In Automated Testing, we tested the Smart Contract with our in-house developed tools to identify vulnerabilities and security flaws.

The code was audited by a team of independent auditors which includes -

- 1. Testing the functionality of the Smart Contract to determine proper logic has been followed throughout.
- 2. Analyzing the complexity of the code by thorough, manual review of the code, line-by-line.
- 3. Deploying the code on testnet using multiple clients to run live tests.
- 4. Analyzing failure preparations to check how the Smart Contract performs in case of bugs and vulnerabilities.
- 5. Checking whether all the libraries used in the code are on the latest version.
- 6. Analyzing the security of the on-chain data.

Audit Details

- Project Name: Agar Chain
- Languages: Solidity(Smart contract)
- Github commit hash for audit: f23bf2375ad6c45ba8509ead0ade36720ae625d9
- Github commit hash for audit: 7eb6067ca621a28240b6985867fd3c3893fd07ff
- Platforms and Tools: Remix IDE, Truffle, Truffle Team, Ganache, Solhint, VScode, Contract Library, Slither, SmartCheck



Audit Goals

The focus of the audit was to verify that the smart contract system is secure, resilient, and working according to its specifications. The audit activities can be grouped into the following three categories:

- 1. Security: Identifying security-related issues within each contract and within the system of contracts.
- 2. Sound Architecture: Evaluation of the architecture of this system through the lens of established smart contract best practices and general software best practices.
- 3. Code Correctness and Quality: A full review of the contract source code. The primary areas of focus include:
 - a. Correctness
 - b. Readability
 - c. Sections of code with high complexity
 - d. Quantity and quality of test coverage

Security Level References

Every issue in this report was assigned a severity level from the following:

High severity issues will bring problems and should be fixed.

Medium severity issues could potentially bring problems and should eventually be fixed.

Low severity issues are minor details and warnings that can remain unfixed but would be better fixed at some point in the future.

Issues	<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>	Low
Open	-	1	3
Closed	3	1	3

This audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contract. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process, therefore running a bug bounty program as a complement to this audit is strongly recommended.



High severity issues

1. Invalid require statement doesn't restrict user's action adequately. Line no - 443,465,481, 501, 520, 540,555 Explanation:

The **require** statement at the above-mentioned lines involves an assignment operator(=) instead of an Equality Validation Operator(==).

This leads to a completely unwanted scenario where the boolean values like **publicrun**, **seedrun** etc aren't being validated for TRUE or FALSE but simply being assigned a TRUE boolean value, every time the **require statement** is executed.

In other words, users can execute these functions even if the Seed round or Private Round boolean value is FALSE.

Recommendation:

The above-mentioned require statements should use the equality operator to impose an adequate require statement validation.

For instance,

```
require(seedrun == true, "seed round is not started or over");
or,
  require(seedrun, "seed round is not started or over");
```

Amended (July 12th 2021): Issue was fixed by the **Aqar Chain** team and is no longer present in commit <u>7eb6067ca621a28240b6985867fd3c3893fd07ff</u>.



2. publicbnb function stores Invalid Data on chain.

Line no - 546

Explanation:

As per the current design of the **publicbnb** function, it stores a wrong uint value to the publicamount state variable.

```
if(publicamount.add(msg.value.mul(getBnbRate()).mul(publicp
usermappublic[msg.sender]=publicUserInfo({firstname:_firs
amountmaptouserpublic[_id]=amountmaptouserpublic[_id].add
publicamount=privateamount].add(msg.value.mul(getBnbRate())
i++;
usersarr.push(msg.sender);
}
```

The total amount of tokens being sold at the **Public Sale Round** is being stored in terms of the **Private Sale round**.

In other words, the **publicamount** state variable is being wrongly updated as it stores the value of tokens sold by adding it to the **privateamount** state variable instead of the **publicamount** state variable.

This will lead to a completely unwanted scenario where the data stored on chain about the total tokens Sold in the public round will be different from the actual tokens sold in the public round.

Recommendation:

The Line no 546 in the **publicbnb** function should be modified as follows:

```
publicamount=privateamount.add(msg.value.mul(getBnbRate()).mul(publicprice)
.div(1e18).div(10));
```

Amended (July 12th 2021): Issue was fixed by the **Aqar Chain** team and is no longer present in commit <u>7eb6067ca621a28240b6985867fd3c3893fd07ff</u>.



3. Invalid Require statement could make "publicBnb" function completely inaccessible.

Line no - 541

Explanation:

The **publicbnb** function includes a require statement in the above-mentioned line which checks whether or not the State Variable **privateamount** is less than Public Sale supply.

This is an inaccurate validation as the **require** statement checks the Public Sale Supply limit with the **privateamount** state variable instead of **publicamount** state variable.

Moreover, since the **Private Sale** supply(**12,000,000**) is comparatively larger than the **Public Sale supply(1,000,000)**, the **privateamount** state variable might be greater than the Public Sale supply limit at any instance. At that point, the **require** statement at line 541 shall never qualify.

This will lead to an unexpected scenario where the **publicbnb** function will be completely inaccessible and will never get executed.

Recommendation:

The require statement of **publicbnb** function at the above mentioned line should be updated as follows:

```
require(publicamount<=1000000 ether,"Public token sale completed");
```

Amended (July 12th 2021): Issue was fixed by the **Aqar Chain** team and is no longer present in commit <u>7eb6067ca621a28240b6985867fd3c3893fd07ff</u>.



Medium severity issues

1. State Variable "claimamount" has no significant usage in the Protocol.

```
Line no - 396,557,562
```

Explanation:

The State variable claim amount has no significant usage in the Contract, as per the current design of the protocol.

```
394
395
//claim amount variable
uint256 claimamount=0;
397
```

The variable is used to store the total claimable amount of a user which is then transferred to the user. However, once transferred, the claimable state variable is assigned a Zero Value again.

```
554
         function claim() external {
555
             require(claimbool = true, "claiming amount
556
557
             claimamount = usermappublic[msg.sender].am
558
             token.transfer(msg.sender,claimamount);
559
             usermappublic[msg.sender].amount=0;
560
             usermapprivate[msg.sender].amount=0;
561
             usermapseed[msg.sender].amount=0;
562
             claimamount=0;
563
         }
564
```

In simpler terms, the **claimamount** state variable shall always hold a **Zero** Value and never symbolize any imperative state change in the protocol.

Using claimamount as a State Variable unneessarily uses extra Spaces and affects the Gas Usage in the contract.

Is the USE of claimamount as a State Variable intended?

Recommendation:

If the above-mentioned scenario is not intended, it is recommended to modify the **claimamount** variable as a local variable instead of a state variable.

Amended (July 12th 2021): Issue was fixed by the **Aqar Chain** team and is no longer present in commit <u>7eb6067ca621a28240b6985867fd3c3893fd07ff</u>.



2. Violation of Check Effects Interaction pattern Explanation:

The **AqarChain** contract includes a few functions that update some of the very imperative state variables of the contract after the external calls are made.

An external call within a function technically shifts the control flow of the contract to another contract for a particular period of time. Therefore, as per the Solidity Guidelines, any modification of the state variables in the base contract must be performed before executing the external call.

The following functions in the contract update the state variables after making an external call at the lines mentioned below:

- seedusdt() at Line 446
- privateusdt() at Line 486
- publicusdt() at Line 525
- claim() at Line 558

```
function claim() external {
    require(claimbool = true, "claiming amount should be true");
    claimamount = usermappublic[msg.sender].amount.add(usermapse token.transfer(msg.sender, claimamount);
    usermappublic[msg.sender].amount=0;
    usermapprivate[msg.sender].amount=0;
    usermapseed[msg.sender].amount=0;
    claimamount=0;
    claimamount=0;
```

Recommendation:

<u>Check Effects Interaction Pattern</u> must be followed while implementing external calls in a function.



Low severity issues

1. Redundant State Variable Update Line no: 393,396,409,410,411,412

Explanation

The AquarChain Smart contract involves redundant updating of some of the State variables in the contract.

```
bool public seedrun = false;
bool public privaterun = false;
bool public publicrun = false;
bool public claimbool = false;
bool public claimbool = false;
```

A boolean variable is by-default initialized to FALSE whereas a uint256 is initialized to ZERO. Hence, such state variables do not need to be initialized explicitly.

Recommendation:

Redundant initialization of state variables should be avoided.

2. Require statements can be used instead of IF and REVERT Statements Line no - 454, 475, 492, 512, 531,551

Explanation:

The function at the above-mentioned lines uses IF-REVERT statements to ensure that users do not buy tokens more than the allowed token supply for each round.

However, this is a strict validation as the users should not be able to execute the function if this IF statement fails. Therefore, it is considered a better practise in Solidity Smart Contracts, to use **require statements for such validations**.

Is this Function Design Intended?

Recommendation:

The IF-REVERT statements can be modified as follows, unless the current function design is Intended.



```
}
```

The above-mentioned IF ELSE and Revert statement can be re-written as:

Amended (July 12th 2021): Issue was fixed by the **Aqar Chain** team and is no longer present in commit <u>7eb6067ca621a28240b6985867fd3c3893fd07ff</u>.

3. Functions promise a return Value of uint256 but do not return anything. Line no: 569, 572, 575, 578

Explanation

The functions at the above-mentioned lines indicate a uint256 return value at their function signature.

```
function toggleclaim() external onlyOwner returns (uint256) {
             claimbool = !claimbool;
570
571
         function toggleseed() external onlyOwner returns (uint256) {
572
573
             seedrun = !seedrun;
574
          function toggleprivate() external onlyOwner returns (uint256) {
575
576
             privaterun = !privaterun;
577
           function togglepublic() external onlyOwner returns (uint256) {
578
             publicrun = !publicrun;
579
580
```

However, none of those functions actually return any uint256 value. If no uint value is not explicitly returned, the function will simply return a default return value for uint256, i.e., ZERO.

Recommendation:

If the above-mentioned functions are not supposed to return any uint256 value, the function signatures should be modified accordingly.

Amended (July 12th 2021): Issue was fixed by the Aqar Chain team and is no longer present in commit 7eb6067ca621a28240b6985867fd3c3893fd07ff.



4. External Visibility should be preferred

Explanation

Those functions that are never called throughout the contract should be marked as **external** visibility instead of **public** visibility.

This will effectively result in Gas Optimization as well.

Therefore, the following function must be marked as **external** within the contract:

getBnbBalance()

Recommendation:

If the PUBLIC visibility of the above-mentioned functions is not intended, then the EXTERNAL Visibility keyword should be preferred.

5. Constant declaration should be preferred

Line no - 399 to 401

Explanation

State variables that are not supposed to change throughout the contract should be declared as **constant**.

Recommendation:

The following state variables could be declared as **constant**, unless the current contract design is intended.

- privateprice
- publicprice
- Seedprice

6. Too many Digits used

Line no - 440-456, 458-477, 478-494, 495-514, 516-533, 534-553

Explanation

The above-mentioned lines have a large number of digits that makes it difficult to review and reduces the readability of the code.

The following functions in the contract have this issue:

- seedusdt()
- seedbnb()
- privateusdt
- privatebnb
- publicusdt
- publicbnb



Recommendation:

Ether Suffix could be used to symbolize the 10^18 zeros. For instance, the require statement at Line number 441,

Can be written as:

```
require(_amount>=100 ether ,"Enter amount greater than 100 usd");
```

Amended (July 12th 2021): Issue was fixed by the **Aqar Chain** team and is no longer present in commit <u>7eb6067ca621a28240b6985867fd3c3893fd07ff</u>.

Recommendations

1. Contract includes Hardcoded address

Line no: 418, 425, 429, 430

Explanation

Keeping in mind the immutable nature of smart contracts, it is not considered a better practise to hardcode any address in the contract before deployment.

Recommendation:

Instead of including hardcoded addresses in the contract, initialize those addresses within the constructors at the time of deployment.

2. Code Style Issues

Explanation

Code readability of a Smart Contract is largely influenced by the Coding Style issues and in some specific scenarios may lead to bugs in the future.

During the automated testing, it was found that the **AqarChain** contract had quite a few code style issues.



```
Struct agarchain.seedUserInfo (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#352-360) is not in CapWords
Struct agarchain.privateUserInfo (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#361-369) is not in CapWords
Struct agarchain.publicUserInfo (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#370-378) is not in CapWords
Parameter agarchain.seetOset(string, string, string, uint256)._first (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#440) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.seedUsdt(string, string, string, uint256)._last (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#440) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.seedUsdt(string, string, string, uint256)._last (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#440) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.seedUsdt(string, string, string, uint256)._country (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#440) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.seedUsdt(string, string, string, uint256)._id (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#440) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.seedUsdt(string, string, string, uint256)._amount (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#458) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.seedUsdt(string, string, string, string)._first (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#458) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.seedUsdt(string, string, string, string)._last (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#458) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.seedUsdt(string, string, string, string)._last (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#458) is not in mixedCase
```

Recommendation:

Therefore, it is recommended to fix the issues like naming convention, indentation, and code layout issues in a smart contract.

3. Commented codes must be wiped-out before deployment

Line no: 236-276 Explanation

The AqarChain contract includes quite a few commented codes regarding a **INonStandardERC20 interface** at the above-mentioned line.

This badly affects the readability of the code.

Recommendation:

Therefore, it is recommended to fix the issues like naming convention, indentation, and code layout issues in a smart contract.



Automated Audit Result

```
agarchain.seedusdt(string,string,string,string,uint256) (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#440-456) ignores return value by usdt.transferFrom(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#448) ignores return value by usdt.transferFrom(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#478-494) ignores return value by usdt.transferFrom(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#406)
adarchain.publicusdt(string,string,string,uint256) (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#516-533) ignores return value by usdt.transferFrom(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#525)
adarchain.claim() (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#554-563) ignores return value by token.transfer(msg.sender,claimamount) (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#558)
```

Parameter agarchain.publicbnb(string,string,string).jd (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#534) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.privatemap(string,string,string,address,uint256,string)._first (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#565) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.privatemap(string,string,address,uint256,string)._last (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#565) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.privatemap(string,string,string,address,uint256,string)._country (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#565) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.privatemap(string,string,string,address,uint256,string)._amount (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#565) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.privatemap(string,string,string,address,uint256,string)._amount (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#565) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.privatemap(string,string,string,address,uint256,string)._amount (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#565) is not in mixedCase
Parameter agarchain.privatemap(string,string,string,address,uint256,string)._agarid (contracts/Updated_AQR.sol#565) is not in mixedCase



Concluding Remarks

While conducting the audit of the Aqar Chain smart contract, it was observed that the contracts contain High, Medium, and Low severity issues, along with several areas of recommendations.

Our auditors suggest that High, Medium, Low severity issues should be resolved by the developers. Resolving the areas of recommendations are up to the team's discretion. The recommendations given will improve the operations of the smart contract.

Disclaimer

ImmuneBytes's audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contract. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process, therefore running a bug bounty program as a complement to this audit is strongly recommended.

Our team does not endorse the Aqar Chain platform or its product nor this audit is investment advice.

Notes:

- Please make sure contracts deployed on the mainnet are the ones audited.
- Check for the code refactor by the team on critical issues.

ImmuneBytes Pvt Ltd.