


Automate Alert Triage and Response Tasks with Intezer EDR Connect



Written by Avigayil Mechtinger - 12 April 2022




Integrate with SentinelOne, CrowdStrike, and More

One of the biggest pain points of cyber security teams is alert fatigue — trying to keep up with a tedious, never-ending stream of alerts to triage. In today’s reality, security teams spend a large amount of their valuable time on confirming alerts instead of investigating real incidents.

To tackle the alert fatigue most security teams experience and help improve MTTR (mean time to respond), we have developed Intezer EDR Connect. Intezer EDR Connect provides you with a lightweight and simple way to automate EDR alert triage. We use [Intezer](#) to enrich file-based alerts in your EDR and accelerate the investigation and prioritization processes.

In this post we will briefly overview the “journey” of an alert and explain how Intezer EDR Connect accelerates this journey.



The Journey of an Alert

From confirmation through prioritization and response.

Confirmation

In this step we will confirm that the alert is indeed a true-positive.

EDRs and other detection engines are designed to provide signals about suspicious behavior or anomalies in the context of the entity they are monitoring (endpoints, emails, etc.). These signals raise a high volume of alerts, and depending on your tuning and tooling, can contain a large percentage of low priority alerts or false positives.

As an example, the behavior of creating [persistence](#) can be seen in both malicious and legitimate software.

Recent study by [Orange cyber defense](#) shows that malware detection signals have doubled from 2020 to 2021. With organizations expanding their EDR deployments, the number of detection signals increases as well.

Overcoming false positives by turning off noisy signals or excluding directories that trigger noisy alerts is bad practice. Remember the SolarWinds cyberattack? SolarWinds advised [excluding directories](#) from anti-malware scanning to avoid false positives. Same directories that contained the malicious DLLs that were part of the attack.

Prioritization

For confirmed file-based incidents, knowing that the file is malicious is not enough. Malware attribution and classification is crucial for properly responding and prioritizing incident response.

As an example, let's say we have an alert of a backdoor and an alert of a coin miner. We will first respond to the backdoor alert, because it has a higher potential for damaging the organization. It can potentially deliver ransomware or steal classified information of customers or of the organization, whereas the CoinMiner can damage performance, which also has destructive potential, but probably less than a backdoor.

Incident Response

Creating detection and hunting rules are an essential part of cybersecurity teams' responsibilities. One of the first steps after confirming an incident and initiating the incident response process, is hunting for the existence of the threat in other endpoints inside the organization. Hunting for file hashes or basic network artifacts is not enough. They are short lived and can be easily manipulated. This applies also for creating detection rules and providing IoCs to summarize the incident, all of which are part of the incident response lifecycle.

Enriching alerts with detection opportunities helps security teams create quality and effective rules to better accomplish tasks within the [incident response lifecycle](#).

Use Intezer EDR Connect to Accelerate your Alert Journey

Intezer EDR connect integrates between your EDR and Intezer platform.

How Does it Work?

As shown in the diagram above, the connector fetches new file-based alerts from your EDR and sends them to analysis in Intezer. Then, the connector pushes the analysis result to the EDR as an incident note.

Intezer analyzes files using both static and dynamic techniques. It detonates the file in a sandbox, extracts memory modules, and compares the extracted code against an extensive code genome database. Intezer's unique code reuse detection technology allows you to determine the file verdict and its [classification and origin](#). This capability enables you to confirm and prioritize alerts within seconds.

Malicious

Main Family: Emotet

737285f50b5f9c5d3f7e1196080abd96....

SHA2567e840af1a1cac73a67f9b3e22563161feb6d16a529189e776f6661ba84d4c34c

VIRUSTOTALReport (7 / 67 Detections)

pe dll i386 WinUpack

Malicious.

This file contains code from malicious software, therefore it's very likely that it's malicious.

Genetic Analysis

TTPs

IOCs

Behavior

Detect & Hunt

BETA

Original File

737285f50b5f9c5d3f7e1196080abd96.dll684 KB

MaliciousEmotet (265 Genes)

Dynamic Execution

Powered by Cape

Show all

Memory

▼ rundll32.exe | 616

737285f50b5f9c5d3f7e.dll675.5 KB

MaliciousEmotet (265 Genes)

rundll32.exe143.23 KB

MaliciousEmotet (29 Genes)

▼ rundll32.exe | 2788

737285f50b5f9c5d3f7e675.5 KB

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Static Extraction

Extract

Genetic Summary

Related Samples

Code (495)

Strings (1,803)

Capabilities (1)

737285f50b5f9c5d3f7e1196080abd96.dllEmotet

pe dll i386 WinUpack

▼ Emotet

Malware

Related Samples265 Code genes594 Strings

61.05%

Corel Corporation

Library

Related Samples125 Code genes0 Strings

20.2%

WinUpack

Packer

Related Samples82 Code genes3 Strings

13.34%

Microsoft Visual C/C++ Libraries

Library

Related Samples21 Code genes8 Strings

3.64%

File Metadata

Size684 KB

SHA2567e840af1a1cac73a67f9b3e22563161feb6d16a529189e776f6661ba84d4c34c

MD5737285f50b5f9c5d3f7e1196080abd96

Companyjwhu1024@gmail.com

ProductSimpleTerminal (1.0.0.1)

Malicious

Main Family: Emotet

737285f50b5f9c5d3f7e1196080abd96....

SHA2567e840af1a1cac73a67f9b3e22563161feb6d16a529189e776f6661ba84d4c34c

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Companyjwhu1024@gmail.com

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Emotet example in Intezer analyze

To help you with the incident response process, investigation and quality rules creation within the entire incident response lifecycle, we have added the Detect & Hunt feature. Detect & Hunt combines our unique classification abilities with sandboxing, to present high-quality detection content. By matching the malware behavior against a huge database of malware and benign software behavior, we filter out non-relevant artifacts and present those that are unique to the studied sample or that have been previously seen in other malware samples. This allows analysts to quickly create effective rules, with high accuracy and low false-positive rate.

Malicious Main Family: Formbook

SHA256 3707f95c0f2e3b38bbded16d9aa084b5b36b50d93a50ac4377c831280058a509

Malicious file behaviour was observed during the dynamic execution

Genetic Analysis TTPs IOCs Behavior Detect & Hunt BETA Extended Dynamic Execution

Activity-based (43) File-based (21)

Search...

Filters

Artifact Effectiveness

Artifact Type Filter

Family Filter

Activity-based Detection Opps

Artifact Type	Artifact	Source	Seen In	Related Samples
Process Tree	explorer.exe ↳ chkdsk.exe ↳ cmd.exe	Process Tree	Formbook	Related Samples
Process Tree	explorer.exe ↳ chkdsk.exe	Process Tree	Formbook	Related Samples
Process Tree	chkdsk.exe ↳ cmd.exe	Process Tree	Formbook	Related Samples
Process Tree	svchost.exe ↳ EQNEDT32.EXE	Process Tree	Malicious Library	Related Samples
Process Tree	AcroRd32.exe ↳ WINWORD.EXE ↳ spiwow64.exe	Process Tree	Unique	Related Samples
Process Tree	outlk.exe ↳ outlk.exe	Process Tree	Unique	Related Samples
Process Tree	AcroRd32.exe ↳ WINWORD.EXE	Process Tree	Unique	Related Samples
Process Tree	services.exe ↳ svchost.exe ↳ EQNEDT32.EXE	Process Tree	Unique	Related Samples

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Process Tree	outlk.exe ↳ outlk.exe	Process Tree	Unique	Related Samples
Process Tree	AcroRd32.exe ↳ WINWORD.EXE	Process Tree	Unique	Related Samples
Process Tree	services.exe ↳ svchost.exe ↳ EQNEDT32.EXE	Process Tree	Unique	Related Samples

To read more about Detect & Hunt, browse to [Scale Incident Response with Detection Engineering: Intezer Detect & Hunt](#).

Examples of Intezer-Enriched Alerts in EDRs

Example of an enriched incident in [SentinelOne](#), with the analysis automatically added by Intezer EDR Connect noted on the right:

Threat Status: MITIGATED | AI Confidence Level: MALICIOUS | Analyst Verdict: Undefined | Incident Status: Unresolved

Mitigation Actions taken: QUARANTINED 1/1

First seen Oct 29, 2021 00:40:18
Last seen Feb 03, 2022 13:21:39

3 times on 2 endpoints
1 Account / 1 Site / 2 Groups

Find this hash on Deep Visibility
Hunt Now

THREAT INDICATORS NOTES (1)

Add new

yelen@intezer.com • Feb 20, 2022 10:57:53

Intezer Analyze File Scan

Malicious - Zeus (1109 shared code genes)

Size: 3.1MB
File type: pe
IOCs: 2 IOCs

Full report: <https://analyze.intezer.com/analyses/ec3344e5-7449-4813-b525-859afb74921a>

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Example of an enriched incident in [CrowdStrike](#):

explorer.exe

2

8

2

2

0

ACTION TAKEN

File quarantined

SEVERITY

High

OBJECTIVE

Falcon Detection Method

TACTIC & TECHNIQUE

Machine Learning via Cloud-based ML

TECHNIQUE ID

CST0008

SPECIFIC TO THIS DETECTION

A file written to the file-system meets the File Analysis ML algorithm's high-confidence threshold for malware.

TRIGGERING INDICATOR

Associated IOC (SHA256 on file write)
70690df30efa9d014efe9d9d64203dee1540a18d2b45d490cb0db005c9c7cf82

GLOBAL PREVALENCE

Low

LOCAL PREVALENCE

Unique

Connect to host

Execution Details

No Machine Learning Exclusions

0

Comments & Log Entries

1

TIME	USER	ACTION
Apr. 5, 2022 13:10:21	intezer integration	Intezer Analysis: <div>Malicious - Formbook > https://analyze.intezer.com/analyses/fbbf8e0d-f29d-4570-847e-9c2fd3a7fa4c</div>

explorer.exe

2

8

2

2

0

ACTION TAKEN

File quarantined

SEVERITY

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Upcoming EDR support

This connector supports [SentinelOne](#) and [CrowdStrike](#), support for additional EDRs such as Microsoft Defender, Carbon Black, and more is coming soon. [Contact us](#) to learn more about upcoming EDR integrations.

Start Enriching your Alerts with Intezer

Intezer can host EDR Connect for enterprise users. For more information, please visit [Intezer EDR Connect Docs](#) or reach out to our team for a demo and to talk about upgrading your account.

[Get a Demo](#)



Avigayil Mechtinger

Avigayil is a product manager at Intezer, leading Intezer Analyze product lifecycle. Prior to this role, Avigayil was part of Intezer's research team and specialized in malware analysis and threat hunting. During her time at Intezer, she has uncovered and documented different malware targeting both Linux and Windows platforms.

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