

# Finding and Evaluating Parameters for FV using the average-case approach

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
## Notations

$\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle x^n + 1 \rangle$   $\mathcal{K} = \mathbb{Q}[x]/\langle x^n + 1 \rangle$  where  $n = 2^\kappa$ .  
 $m \in \mathcal{R}_t$  message  $\mathbf{c} = (c_0, c_1) \in \mathcal{R}_q$  ciphertext  
 $s \in \chi_s$  secret key, where  $\chi_s = \{-1, 0, 1\}$   
Let  $a \in \mathcal{R}$  random, and  $V_a$  the variance of the coefficients of  $a$ .  
The bounds for the error estimation are:  
Our  $\max \leq 6\sqrt{2V_a}$ , Our mean  $\approx \sqrt{V_a}$ , can  $\|a\|^{can} \leq 6\sqrt{nV_a}$

## What a complex life!


① Every operation increases the error.

② Any error must be bounded.



③ Security & Parameters problem:

# operations  $\uparrow$   $q \uparrow$   $\lambda \downarrow$   
# operations  $\uparrow$   $q \uparrow$   $\lambda = n \uparrow$



## Our method: average-case approach analysis

The *invariant noise* associated with a ciphertext  $\mathbf{c} = (c_0, c_1)$  is the minimal  $\nu \in \mathcal{K}$  such that

$$\frac{t}{q}[c_0 + c_1 s]_q = m + \nu + kt \quad \text{for some } k \in \mathcal{R}.$$

Any coefficient of  $\nu$  can be well-approximated with a Gaussian centered in 0.



💡 **Idea:** study the variance of each coefficient.

😞 **Problem:** coefficients are not independent.

😊 **Solution:** estimate the behaviour of (powers of)  $s$  statistically.

$$\text{HomAdd}(\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{c}') \rightarrow \nu_{\text{add}} = \nu + \nu' \Rightarrow V_{\text{add}} = V + V'$$


$$\text{HomMul}(\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{c}') \rightarrow \nu_{\text{mul}} \approx \nu \frac{t}{q}(c'_0 + c'_1 s) + \nu' \frac{t}{q}(c_0 + c_1 s)$$

$$\Rightarrow V_{\text{mul}} \leq \frac{t^2 n^2 V_s}{12} (V + V') f(\ell + 1)$$

where

$$f(x) \approx -\frac{1}{e^{ax-b}} + c,$$

where  $a, b, c$  depend on  $n$  and  $\chi_s$ .



## Parameter Generator


### Notations

$M$  = # multiplications  
 $\eta$  = # summands  
 $\tau$  = # rotations

### Generator Inputs (Selection)

Input	Options
sec or $n$	any integer $\geq 40$ or $\geq 4$ , resp.
$M, \eta$	any integer $\geq 1$
$\tau$	any integer $\geq 0$
Model	1, 2, 3, 4
Library	None, 'OpenFHE', 'PALISADE', 'SEAL'
KeySwitch	'BV', 'GHS', 'Hybrid'

### Generator Circuit (Model 3)



## Comparison

Let  $\nu$  be the invariant noise associated with  $\mathbf{c}$ . The *noise budget* captures the correctness in FV. Indeed, it is the number of bits left for correct decryption. Since  $\|\nu\| < 1/2$ , then the noise budget for  $\mathbf{c}$  is defined as  $-\log_2(2 \cdot \|\nu\|)$ .

$n$	$\log_2(q)$	Encryption						Addition					
		can	our	exp	our	exp		can	our	exp	our	exp	
$2^{12}$	74	54.9	60.4	61.1	63.5	63.9		53.9	59.9	60.7	63.0	63.4	
$2^{13}$	149	128.9	134.9	135.7	138.0	138.4		127.9	134.4	135.1	137.5	137.86	
$2^{14}$	298	276.9	283.4	284.0	286.5	286.9		275.9	282.9	283.6	286.0	286.4	
$2^{15}$	597	574.9	581.9	582.5	585.0	585.4		573.9	581.4	582.0	584.5	584.9	

$n$	$\log_2(q)$	Multiplication						Circuit ( $M = 3, \eta = 8, \tau = 0, \alpha = 1$ )					
		can	our	exp	our	exp		can	our	exp	our	exp	
$2^{12}$	74	39.9	47.9	48.8	51.0	51.6		0.7	17.7	19.1	20.7	21.4	
$2^{13}$	149	112.9	121.4	122.3	124.5	125.1		71.7	89.7	90.3	92.2	92.8	
$2^{14}$	298	259.9	268.9	269.8	272.0	272.6		216.7	235.2	235.9	237.7	238.4	
$2^{15}$	597	556.9	566.4	567.3	569.5	570.1		511.7	530.2	531.5	533.2	533.9	

## References

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/600>

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