

Hybrid Attacks and the Lattice Estimator

Martin Albrecht*

Ben Curtis†

Michael Walter†

*Royal Holloway, University of London

†Zama

{ben.curtis, michael.walter}@zama.ai martin.albrecht@royalholloway.ac.uk


Overview

- Lattice Estimator
 - Better Estimates
 - Examples
- Hybrid Attacks

How do we pick secure parameters?

-EVERY FHE DEVELOPER, EVER

LWE problem




$$\mathbf{A}_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$\mathbf{S}_j \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_S$$

$$\mathbf{e}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_e$$

LWE problem



Search-LWE: given (A, b), find s

Decision-LWE: given (A, b), determine whether:


b = $As + e \mod q$, or

2 **b**
$$\leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^m)$$

LWE Estimator vs Lattice Estimator

Lattice Estimator is v2.0 of the LWE Estimator

What does the lattice estimator do, anyway?



Security estimate λ

```
dual : rop: \approx 2^175.0, mem: \approx 2^95.6, m: \approx 2^11.9 ...

dual_hybrid : rop: \approx 2^123.5, mem: \approx 2^92.5, m: \approx 2^11.1 ...

dual_mitm_hybrid : rop: \approx 2^113.7, mem: \approx 2^84.6, m: \approx 2^11.0 ...

primal_bdd : rop: \approx 2^168.3, red: \approx 2^168.1, ...

primal_usvp : rop: \approx 2^169.0, red: \approx 2^169.0, ...

primal_hybrid : rop: \approx 2^114.7, red: \approx 2^113.9, ...
```

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```

Security estimate $\lambda \approx 113.7$

A (subset) of important output values

rop
Ring operations

(Total cost of the attack)

m

Number of samples

(LWE samples required)

red

Cost of lattice reduction

(BKZ)

What's New?

Modularity Input Changes **Better Estimates**

What's New?

Better Estimates


More supported attacks


BKZ simulator

Modularity


Input Changes

Better Estimates (1)








Better Estimates (1)



Lattice Estimator 3 ? ? **.** 5 ? ?








Hybrid (Dual) Attack

[CHHS19]: A Hybrid of Dual and Meet-inthe-Middle Attack on Sparse and Ternary Secret LWE. Jung Hee Cheon, Minki Hhan, Seungwan Hong, and Yongha Son


[BLLWZ21]: Hybrid Dual Attack on LWE with Arbitrary Secrets. Lei Bi, Xianhui Lu, Junjie Luo, Kunpeng Wang, and Zhenfei Zhang





$$L = \{ \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m \mid \mathbf{x} \mathbf{A_2} \equiv \mathbf{0} \bmod q \}$$


$$\mathbf{v} \leftarrow \mathbf{B} \mathbf{K} \mathbf{Z}_\beta(L)$$

$$\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{b} \rangle \approx \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{A_2} \mathbf{s_2} + \mathbf{e} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{v} \mathbf{A_2}, \mathbf{s_2} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{e} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{e} \rangle \bmod q$$











Getting Short Vectors: BKZ



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
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$$\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{b} \rangle \approx \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{A_2} \mathbf{s_2} + \mathbf{e} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{v} \mathbf{A_2}, \mathbf{s_2} \rangle + \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{e} \rangle = \langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{e} \rangle \bmod q$$

Better Estimates (2): BKZ Simulator

- LWE Estimator Assumed GSA (only)
- Lattice Estimator includes BKZ Simulation



[CN11]: BKZ 2.0: Better Lattice Security Estimates. Yuanmi Chen and Phong Q. Nguyen

What's New?

Modularity

New code structure for ease-of-use

Input Changes

No More estimator.py

```
+-- LWE Estimator
  +-- estimator.py
+-- Lattice Estimator
 +-- docs
  +-- estimator
    +-- conf.py
    +-- cost.py
     +-- errors.py
```

What's New?

Better Estimates

Modularity

Input Changes

Input LWE parameters are more intuitive

Simpler Parameter Representation (1)

```
n = 512
m = 1024
q = 8192
alpha_0 = alphaf(sqrt(10/4.0), q, sigma_is_stddev=True) # error
alpha_1 = alphaf(sqrt(21/4.0), q, sigma_is_stddev=True) # secret
_ = estimate_lwe(n, alpha_0, q, secret_distribution=alpha_1, reduction_cost_model=BKZ.sieve, m=m)
```

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```

```
params = LWEParameters(n=512, q=3329, Xs=D(\sigma=1.22), Xe=D(\sigma=1.22), m=512, tag='Kyber 512') LWE.estimate(params)
```

Simpler Parameter Representation (2)

```
secret_distribution = (0,1)
secret_distribution = "normal"
secret_distribution = alpha
secret_distribution = ((-1,1), 64)
```

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secret_distribution = alpha
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```

How do we pick secure parameters?

-FHE DEVELOPERS

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https://github.com/malb/lattice-estimator

Contributions welcome!

- Benjamin Curtis
- Cedric Lefebvre
- Fernando Virdia
- Florian Göpfert
- James Owen
- Léo Ducas
- Markus Schmidt
- Martin Albrecht
- Michael Walter
- Rachel Player
- Sam Scott

Summary

More Features

Hybrid-dual

Hybrid-decoding

BKZ simulator

Modularity

New code structure for ease-of-use

Input Changes

Input LWE parameters are much more intuitive

Questions?

