

Breaking the power-of-two barrier: noise estimation for BGV in NTT-friendly rings

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Why non-power-of-two polynomial?

Let $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle \Phi_m(x) \rangle$, where $\Phi_m(x)$ is the cyclotomic polynomial of degree $n = \phi(m)$.

Usually $m = 2^i$ ($n = m/2$ and $\Phi_m(x) = x^n + 1$) \implies gaps in security estimates.

To fill the gaps, we explore the case $m = 2^i 3^j$:

Now $n = m/3$ and $\Phi_m(x) = x^n - x^{n/2} + 1 \implies$ the structure of \mathcal{R} changes.

1 Every operation increases the error.

2 Security & Parameters problem:


operations \uparrow $q \uparrow$ $\lambda \downarrow$
 # operations \uparrow $q \uparrow$ $\lambda = n \uparrow$

3 Decrease the polynomial degree n



Decrease the length of ciphertexts.

	M	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
$n = 2^{14}$	$\log q$	379	461	542	624	707	789	870
	λ	147	119	101	88	78	71	65
$n = 2^{13} \cdot 3$	$\log q$	352	425	499	572	645	719	793
	λ	259	208	173	149	131	117	105
$n = 2^{15}$	$\log q$	392	476	560	645	730	815	899
	λ	310	248	206	176	153	136	123
$n = 2^{14} \cdot 3$	$\log q$	364	439	513	588	671	748	824
	λ	562	449	372	317	271	239	214



NTT-friendly rings

Let Ψ be the CRT isomorphism

$$\mathcal{R}_q \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_q^l \times \mathcal{R}_q^r$$

$$\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} f_i x^i \rightarrow \left(\sum_{i=0}^{n/2-1} f_i^l x^i, \sum_{i=0}^{n/2-1} f_i^r x^i \right)$$

$m = 2^i$: with radix-2 butterfly NTT algorithm, the computation of polynomial products in \mathcal{R}_q requires $O(n \log n)$ operations.

$$\Phi_m(x) = x^n + 1 = (x^{n/2} + \zeta_2)(x^{n/2} - \zeta_2)$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} f_i^l \\ f_i^r \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -\zeta_2 \\ 1 & \zeta_2 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} f_i \\ f_{i+n/2} \end{pmatrix}$$




Figure 1: Cooley-Tukey radix-2 butterfly

$m = 2^i 3^j$: similar solution, with one extra addition (red arrow in the diagram) for each butterfly iteration in the first level.

$$\Phi_m(x) = x^n - x^{n/2} + 1 = (x^{n/2} - \zeta_6)(x^{n/2} - \zeta_6^5)$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} f_i^l \\ f_i^r \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \zeta_6 \\ 1 & 1 - \zeta_6 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} f_i \\ f_{i+n/2} \end{pmatrix}$$




Figure 2: Alternative first-layer butterfly

The other layers are similar to the radix-2, so again $O(n \log n)$. **Extra additions are not costly.**

Coefficient variance in random products

Ciphertexts are random polynomials $a(x) \in \mathcal{R}_q = \mathcal{R}/q\mathcal{R}$ having centered coefficients with variance V_a .

$V_a \implies$ norm estimation \implies error estimation.

Noise estimation through homomorphic operations: we use the canonical norm with the estimate $\|a\|^{can} \leq 6\sqrt{nV_a}$ to keep track of the noise growth.

Issue: Bound V_c when $c(x) = a(x)b(x) \in \mathcal{R}$, $a(x), b(x)$ random.

- For $m = 2^i$, $V_c \leq nV_aV_b$ (diagonal covariance matrix).
- For $m = 2^i 3^j$ the covariance matrix is obtained using the NTT algorithm:

$$\text{CovM}(\mathbf{c}) = \begin{pmatrix} \text{Diag}(\alpha_0, \dots, \alpha_{n/2-1}) & \text{Diag}(\beta_0, \dots, \beta_{n/2-1}) \\ \text{Diag}(\beta_0, \dots, \beta_{n/2-1}) & \text{Diag}(\alpha_{n/2}, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}) \end{pmatrix}$$

where

$$\alpha_k = \begin{cases} \left(\frac{3}{2}n - (k+1)\right) V_a V_b & \text{if } 0 \leq k < n/2 \\ \frac{3}{2}n V_a V_b & \text{if } n/2 \leq k < n \end{cases}$$


$$\beta_k = (k+1-n) V_a V_b \quad 0 \leq k < n/2.$$

and so $V_c \leq \frac{3}{2}n V_a V_b$ in our estimates.

Considering BGV...

BGV example with

$\eta = 9$ $\tau = 8$ $\alpha_i \neq 1$ $t = 64$ $\lambda_{\text{target}} \geq 128$



Notations

M = # multiplications
 η = # summands
 τ = # rotations
 α = constant multiplication

References

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/783>

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