

# Authentication Protocols

Kerberos, X.509, PKI


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# Authentication Applications

*We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are acquainted with their designs.*

**—*The Art of War*, Sun Tzu**

# Authentication



- Most technical security safeguards have authentication as a precondition
- How to authenticate:

Something you know	Password, Secrets
Something you have	Smart Card, Token
Something you are	Biometrie
Somewhere you are	Location

# The authentication process



- Authentication
  - Ask the user for credentials
- Verification
  - Verify this credentials againsts something previously known
- Authorization
  - Mark the user as authenticated
  - Commonly here also the AC rights are assigned

# Authentication Applications

- will consider authentication functions
- developed to support application-level authentication & digital signatures

# Kerberos

- trusted key server system from MIT
- provides centralised private-key third-party authentication in a distributed network
  - allows users access to services distributed through network
  - without needing to trust all workstations
  - rather all trust a central authentication server
- two versions in use: 4 & 5

# Kerberos Requirements

- its first report identified requirements as:
  - secure
  - reliable
  - transparent
  - scalable
- implemented using an authentication protocol based on Needham-Schroeder

# Kerberos v4 Overview


- a basic third-party authentication scheme
- have an Authentication Server (AS)
  - users initially negotiate with AS to identify self
  - AS provides a non-corruptible authentication credential (ticket granting ticket TGT)
- have a Ticket Granting server (TGS)
  - users subsequently request access to other services from TGS on basis of users TGT



# Kerberos v4 Dialogue

1. obtain ticket granting ticket from AS
  - once per session
2. obtain service granting ticket from TGT
  - for each distinct service required
3. client/server exchange to obtain service
  - on every service request


# Kerberos 4 Overview



# Kerberos Realms

- a Kerberos environment consists of:
  - a Kerberos server
  - a number of clients, all registered with server
  - application servers, sharing keys with server
- this is termed a realm
  - typically a single administrative domain
- if have multiple realms, their Kerberos servers must share keys and trust

# Kerberos Realms



# Kerberos Version 5

- developed in mid 1990's
- specified as Internet standard RFC 1510
- provides improvements over v4
  - addresses environmental shortcomings
    - encryption alg, network protocol, byte order, ticket lifetime, authentication forwarding, interrealm auth
  - and technical deficiencies
    - double encryption, non-std mode of use, session keys, password attacks



# X.509 Authentication Service

- part of CCITT X.500 directory service standards
  - distributed servers maintaining user info database
- defines framework for authentication services
  - directory may store public-key certificates
  - with public key of user signed by certification authority
- also defines authentication protocols
- uses public-key crypto & digital signatures
  - algorithms not standardised, but RSA recommended
- X.509 certificates are widely used

# X.509 Certificates

- issued by a Certification Authority (CA), containing:
  - version (1, 2, or 3)
  - serial number (unique within CA) identifying certificate
  - signature algorithm identifier
  - issuer X.500 name (CA)
  - period of validity (from - to dates)
  - subject X.500 name (name of owner)
  - subject public-key info (algorithm, parameters, key)
  - issuer unique identifier (v2+)
  - subject unique identifier (v2+)
  - extension fields (v3)
  - signature (of hash of all fields in certificate)
- notation  $CA\langle\langle A \rangle\rangle$  denotes certificate for A signed by CA

# X.509 Certificates



(b) Certificate Revocation List




# Obtaining a Certificate

- any user with access to CA can get any certificate from it
- only the CA can modify a certificate
- because cannot be forged, certificates can be placed in a public directory

# CA Hierarchy

- if both users share a common CA then they are assumed to know its public key
- otherwise CA's must form a hierarchy
- use certificates linking members of hierarchy to validate other CA's
  - each CA has certificates for clients (forward) and parent (backward)
- each client trusts parents certificates
- enable verification of any certificate from one CA by users of all other CAs in hierarchy

# CA Hierarchy Use



# Certificate Revocation

- certificates have a period of validity
- may need to revoke before expiry, eg:
  1. user's private key is compromised
  2. user is no longer certified by this CA
  3. CA's certificate is compromised
- CA's maintain list of revoked certificates
  - the Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
- users should check certificates with CA's CRL

# Authentication Procedures

- X.509 includes three alternative authentication procedures:
- One-Way Authentication
- Two-Way Authentication
- Three-Way Authentication
- all use public-key signatures

# One-Way Authentication

- 1 message ( A->B) used to establish
  - the identity of A and that message is from A
  - message was intended for B
  - integrity & originality of message
- message must include timestamp, nonce, B's identity and is signed by A
- may include additional info for B
  - eg session key

# Two-Way Authentication

- 2 messages (A→B, B→A) which also establishes in addition:
  - the identity of B and that reply is from B
  - that reply is intended for A
  - integrity & originality of reply
- reply includes original nonce from A, also timestamp and nonce from B
- may include additional info for A

# Three-Way Authentication

- 3 messages (A→B, B→A, A→B) which enables above authentication without synchronized clocks
- has reply from A back to B containing signed copy of nonce from B
- means that timestamps need not be checked or relied upon




# X.509 Version 3

- has been recognised that additional information is needed in a certificate
  - email/URL, policy details, usage constraints
- rather than explicitly naming new fields defined a general extension method
- extensions consist of:
  - extension identifier
  - criticality indicator
  - extension value

# Certificate Extensions

- key and policy information
  - convey info about subject & issuer keys, plus indicators of certificate policy
- certificate subject and issuer attributes
  - support alternative names, in alternative formats for certificate subject and/or issuer
- certificate path constraints
  - allow constraints on use of certificates by other CA's

# Public Key Infrastructure



# Summary

- have considered:
  - Kerberos trusted key server system
  - X.509 authentication and certificates