# Adapting to Heat Extremes with Unequal Access to Cooling: Evidence from India

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Preliminary Version. Please do not cite.

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Introduction

ullet Global warming  $\Rightarrow$  more frequent and intense hot extremes

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- Large evidence about the welfare costs of extreme heat Literature



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- Evidence of the protective effects of air conditioners
  - (Barreca et al. 2016, JPE)

- Global warming ⇒ more frequent and intense hot extremes
- Large evidence about the welfare costs of extreme heat Literature
- Agents shield themselves ⇒ air-conditioning
- Evidence of the protective effects of air conditioners
  - ← e.g., 80% reduction in heat-related mortality in US Graph
     (Barreca et al. 2016, JPE)
- Problem: access to air conditioning is unequally distributed

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(Davis et al. 2021, GEC; Pavanello et al. 2021, NC; Romitti et al. 2022, PNAS Nexus)
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- ⇔ especially in developing economies
- $\hookrightarrow$  air conditioners are too **expensive**  $\Rightarrow$  high operational and capital costs

Are there any alternative cooling appliances affordable for poorer households?

Air conditioner



Evaporative cooler



Air conditioner



Evaporative cooler



- Policymakers promote evaporative coolers as a sustainable and cheap option
- ullet Evaporative coolers  $\Rightarrow$  low upfront and operational costs

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- They can reduce indoor temperature

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 $\hookrightarrow$  Trade-off (?)  $\Rightarrow$  cost and accessibility — health protection effectiveness

#### This Project

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  - Household (> 200k) panel data from India
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- Test whether the choice of the technology determines the level of protection from extreme heat
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- Examine the differential technological responses to heat extremes of households
  - Household (> 200k) panel data from India
  - Information on technology and electricity consumption
- Test whether the choice of the technology determines the level of protection from extreme heat
  - District-level annual mortality data
- 3. Determine the consequences of **technological inequality** in heat adaptation
  - Number of prevented deaths
  - Implications for policy

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  - → At the same rate air conditioners would have prevented 46% of heat-related deaths

1. Air-conditioning adoption, temperature and income

(Davis and Gertler 2015, PNAS; Davis et al. 2021, GEC; Pavanello 2021, NC; Randazzo et al. 2023, JEEM)

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4. Mediator effect of cooling

(Barreca et al 2016, JPE; Park et al. 2020, AEJ; Somanathan et al. 2021, JPE; Hua et al. 2022, JPopE)

→ Main contribution: add the technological dimension

#### India

#### • Extreme heat:

- ullet Between March and May 2022: temperature reached 51°C
- In a  $+2^{\circ}$ C scenario: 2-20 times more likely and 0.5-1.5°C hotter relative to 2022 (Zachariah et al. 2022)

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#### • Consequences of extreme heat:

- <u>Historical</u>: about 4-6 deaths per 100k people per year
- <u>Future</u>: 10-60 deaths per 100k people per year by 2100 (Carleton et al. 2022, QJE)

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#### Cooling adaptation:

- Rising incomes and temperatures ⇒ boost in cooling demand (IEA, 2018)
- Demand for cooler raising even in remote areas
- Air-conditioning spread is still low (9%, in 2019)
   (Davis et al. 2021; Pavanello et al. 2021, NC)
- One of the first countries to develop a Cooling Action Plan (2019)

**Theoretical Framework** 

#### Set-up

A representative household maximises its utility function:

$$\max_{q_S,q_N,k,x} u = D\left[T,a,q_S,k\right] \cdot z\left[q_N,x\right] \quad \text{s.t. } y \ge p\left[q_S + q_N\right] + rk + x$$

- $\hookrightarrow$  Assumption: (1)  $\partial u/\partial D < 0$  (2)  $\partial u/\partial z > 0$ 
  - $\bullet$  T = ambient temperature
  - $q_S$  = electricity for cooling
  - k = space conditioning capital (total capacity)
  - p = electricity price, r = discounted capital cost
  - $y = \text{income}, q_N = \text{electricity for other uses}, x = \text{numeraire good}$
  - a = loss of effectiveness

#### **Damage Function**

The damage function is defined as follows:

ullet Higher-than-optimal indoor temperatures  $T^*$  incur a linear utility penalty D with marginal disutility coefficient  $\delta$ 

$$D = 1 - \delta \left( \frac{1}{A[q_S, k]} T - T^* \right)$$

where we assume that  $\mathit{A}^{(-1)}\mathit{T} \geq \mathit{T}^*$ 

• For simplicity, let A being a Leontieff function

$$A = a^{(-1)} \min \left[ q_S, k \right]$$

## Solution

#### Solve the model:

• Closed-form solution for electricity consumption and cooling capital

$$q_S^*, \overline{k}, q_S^* = k^* \propto \sqrt{T} \sqrt{Y}$$

- $\hookrightarrow$  diminishing returns to adaptation
- Income inequality ⇒ how much a household can adapt
- Current assumption: no technological differences

## **Technology**

- ullet Assume that there exists two type of technologies  $heta\Rightarrow$  conditional utility
- The two technologies only differ in loss of effectiveness a and cost r
- The optimal disutility due to temperature becomes:

$$D_{ heta}^* \propto \sqrt{r_{ heta}}, \sqrt{a_{ heta}}$$

- Coolers are cheaper than air conditioners ( $r_C < r_{AC}$ )
- If coolers are less effective at bringing thermal comfort  $(a_{AC} < a_C)$

# Moving to Empirical Analysis

Our empirical analysis:

- 1. Identify how Indian households are adapting and through which technology

- 2. Estimate the marginal disutility  $\partial D/\partial T$

- 3. Determine differences at reducing thermal discomfort  $a_{\theta}$

**Cooling Adaptation** 

#### Data

- Household panel data: Consumer Pyramid Dx survey (2014-2019):
  - Four-month air-conditioning and coolers ownership
  - Monthly electricity expenditure
  - Households' socio-economic and demographic characteristics

- Actualised electricity prices: 2011 National Socio-Economic Survey
  - Aggregated at the district-urban/rural level

- Population-weighted climate data from ERA5 (0.25° × 0.25° cells):
  - Daily average temperature
  - Daily total precipitation

# The Choice of the Heat Adaptation Technology

- Our data feature allows to look at both ownership and adoption of cooling appliances
- The investment decision is a slow adjustment process ⇒ long lifetimes of cooling appliances
- Households invest based on expectations about climatic conditions ⇒ average weather over long periods
   (Cohen et al. 2017)
- Adoption in short period of time ⇒ driven only by economic development but conditional on climatic conditions Trend State
- How we model unobserved heterogeneity determines the dimension of study

## **Empirical Framework**

Estimating the impact of temperature and income on the ownership and adoption of the cooling appliances:

$$C_{ciw} = \gamma_0 + \beta_1 \overline{CDD}_{d(i)w} + \beta_2 I_{iw} + \gamma_2 g(P_{d(i)w}) + \lambda X_{iw} + \mu_k + \delta_w + \theta_{s(i)} y + \theta_{s(i)}^2 y^2 + \zeta_{iw}$$

- $C_{ciw}$ : dummy if household i in wave w has a cooling appliance c
- $\overline{CDD}_{d(i)w}$ : 10-year moving average of quarterly CDD in the previous decade
- Iiw: natural logarithm of quarterly income of household i
- Controls: second-degree polynomial of precipitation and household characteristics
- $\mu_k$ : unobserved heterogeneity (state or household FE)
- Additional fixed-effects: wave FE, quadratic state-year trend
- All regressions are weighted using survey weights that also correct for attrition

# **Ownership**

Evaporative coolers are climate sensitive, air conditioners respond only to income

	Both Appliances	Air Conditioner	Evaporative Cooler	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
CDD (100s)	0.0146***	0.0000542	0.0145***	
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	
Log(Income)	0.0861***	0.0607***	0.0597***	
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)	
Precipitations Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Household Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
State FE, Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Quadratic State $\times$ Year Trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	
$R^2$	0.51	0.21	0.51	
Observations	2442730	2442730	2442730	

**Notes**: (1)-(3) clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All regressions are conducted using survey weights.

## Additional Drivers

#### Air conditioners:

- Living in an urban area (介介)
- Hours of power availability during the day and ownership of generators (↑)
- Education level  $(\uparrow\uparrow)$ , female head  $(\downarrow\downarrow)$ , house materials  $(\uparrow\uparrow)$ , head age  $(\downarrow\downarrow)$

#### Coolers:

- Hours of power availability during the day and ownership of generators (↑↑)
- Education level  $(\uparrow)$ , female head  $(\downarrow)$ , house materials  $(\uparrow)$ , head age  $(\uparrow)$

## Adoption

Adoption is a matter of economic development

	Both Appliances	Air-conditioning	Evaporative Cooler	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
CDD (100s)	-0.000666	0.000216	-0.000764*	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Log(Income)	0.0410***	0.0135***	0.0344***	
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	
Precipitations Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Household Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Household FE, Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Quadratic Trend $\times$ State	Yes	Yes	Yes	
$R^2$	0.05	0.02	0.06	
Observations	2432366	2432366	2432366	

**Notes**: (1)-(6) clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All regressions are conducted using survey weights..

## Robustness

Our results remain robust to alternative specifications:

- Alternative time and time-invarying fixed-effects
- Clustering standard errors at state level
- Changing CDD thresholds
- Specifying temperature up to degree 3 polynomials
- GLDAS rather than ERA5 climate data

## **Electricity Consumption**

- Consumption electricity in response to temperature is a short-term decision
- Technology modulates household response
- Using the monthly information we observe the causal effect of short-term response to temperature
- Heterogeneity in the response should be confirmatory of the distribution of the technologies


# **Empirical Framework**

Estimating the impact of temperature on electricity quantity:

$$Q_{imy} = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \theta_j T_{d(i)my}^j + \beta_2 f(P_{d(i)my}) + \beta_3 I_{imy} + \mu_i + \delta_{my} + \epsilon_{imy}$$

- $Q_{imv}$ : natural logarithm of electricity quantity of household i in month m and year y
- $T_{d(i)my}$ : 3°C bins of daily average temperature in district d (17-20 as reference category)
- Controls: second-degree polynomial of total precipitation and natural logarithm of monthly income
- ullet Fixed-effects: household FE  $(\mu_i)$  and month-year FE  $(\delta_{\it my})$
- All regressions are weighted using survey weights that also correct for attrition

# Temperature-electricity



An additional day  $\geq$  35  $^{\circ}\text{C}$  (wrt 17 - 20) increases electricity consumption by 0.46%

## Heterogeneity

We test the heterogeneity of the response across different sub-samples

	Rural			Urban			
	Poor Middle Rich		Poor	Middle	Rich		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
≥ 35	0.00345***	0.00271***	0.00422***	0.00566***	0.00748***	0.00779***	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Month-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
$\mathbb{R}^2$	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.09	
Observations	791899	1293061	236447	854902	2698269	1297719	
Avg. kWh	69.35	103.86	171.59	83.37	117.99	195.08	
$\Delta(kWh)$	+0.24	+0.28	+0.72	+0.47	+0.88	+1.51	

**Notes**: (1) to (6) clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All regressions are conducted using survey weights.



## Robustness

Our results remain robust to alternative specifications:

- Alternative time and time-invarying fixed-effects
- Electricity quantity in levels
- Clustering standard errors at state level
- Specifying temperature as 5-degree bins, up to degree 3 polynomials, as Cooling Degree Days (CDD)
- CRU rather than ERA5 climate data

**Health and Extreme Heat** 

## Data

- District-level annual mortality data: Civil Registration System (2009-2019)
  - Digitalise the reports
  - All-age and all-causes
  - Distinction between total, urban and rural deaths

- District-level data on heat adaptation: Consumer Pyramid Dx survey (2014-2019)
  - District and state-level penetration rates of air conditioners and evaporative coolers

- Population-weighted climate data from ERA5 (0.25° × 0.25° cells):
  - Daily average temperature
  - Daily total precipitation
  - Daily specific humidity

# **Empirical Framework**

Estimating the impact of temperature on mortality:

$$M_{dt} = \alpha_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{8} \theta_i T_{dt} + \sum_{r} \delta_r \{ P_{dt} \in tercile \, r \} + \mu_d + \rho_t + \lambda_{r(d)} t + \lambda_{r(d)}^2 t^2 + \epsilon_{dt}$$

- $M_{dt}$ : natural logarithm of mortality rate in district d and year y
- $T_{d(i)my}$ : 5°C bins of daily average temperature in district d (15-20 as reference category)
- Fixed-effects: district FE  $(\mu_d)$ , year FE  $(\rho_t)$
- ullet Trend: climatic region imes quadratic trend  $(\lambda_{s(d)}t + \lambda_{s(d)}^2t^2)$
- Square root of district population used as weight for the regression (Barreca et al. 2016, JPE; Burgess et al. 2017)
- Additional regressions: (1) bins of humidity, (2) interaction warmest × most humid bin


# The Role of Cooling

#### Estimate an augmented regression model:

$$\begin{split} M_{dt} &= \alpha_0 + \sum_{j=1}^8 \theta_j T_{dt} + \sum_{j=1}^8 \sum_{l=1}^2 \gamma_j T_{dt} \times \frac{C_{dtl}}{t} + \sum_{l=1}^2 \phi_l C_{dtl} + \\ &+ \sum_r \delta_r \{ P_{dt} \in \textit{tercile } r \} + \mu_d + \rho_t + \lambda_{r(d)} t + \lambda_{r(d)}^2 t^2 + \epsilon_{dt} \end{split}$$

- C<sub>dtl</sub>: penetration rate in district d of technology I
- Additional regressions: interactions with (1) bins of humidity, (2) warmest × most humid bin
- Drawback: no quasi-experimental design
  - $\hookrightarrow$  the two shares do not have to correlate with other drivers of mortality

# **Temperature-mortality**



An additional day  $\geq$  35  $^{\circ}$ C (wrt 15 - 20) increases mortality rates by 1%

# **Controlling for Humidity**

	FE	FE	FE	FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
T (≥ 35)	0.00943***		0.00996***	0.000320
	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.003)
H(0-3)		0.000660	-0.000505	-0.000102
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
H (≥ 18)		-0.000102	0.000756	0.000110
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
T ( $\geq$ 35) $ imes$ H ( $\geq$ 18)				0.000123***
				(0.000)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quadratic Trend $\times$ Region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$R^2$	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.04
Observations	3908	3908	3908	3908

**Notes**: (1)-(4) clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\*\* p < 0.01. All regressions are weighted by the square root of district population.

# Heterogeneity I

Heat-related deaths mostly occur in rural areas

	R	ural	Urban		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
T (≥ 35)	0.00909**	-0.00191	0.00549*	0.00229	
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	
T ( $\geq$ 35) $ imes$ H ( $\geq$ 18)		0.000153**		0.0000533	
		(0.000)		(0.000)	
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Quadratic Trend $\times$ Region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
$R^2$	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02	
Observations	2520	2520	1549	1549	

**Notes**: (1)-(4) clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All regressions are weighted by the square root of district rural and urban population.

## Heterogeneity II

Heat-related deaths mostly occur in district with a higher share of poor individuals

	Below	Median	Above Median		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
T (≥ 35)	0.00430*	0.00410	0.0173***	0.00147	
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	
T ( $\geq$ 35) $ imes$ H ( $\geq$ 18)		0.0000199		0.000168**	
		(0.000)		(0.000)	
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Quadratic Trend $\times$ Region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
$R^2$	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.07	
Observations	1369	1369	1384	1384	

**Notes**: (1)-(4) clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All regressions are weighted by the square root of district population.


# **Evaporative Cooler vs Air conditioner**

### Evaporative coolers are more than two times less effective than air conditioners

	Temperature		Humidity			Temperature X Humidity			
	Air conditioner	Cooler	Both	Air conditioner	Cooler	Both	Air conditioner	Cooler	Both
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
AC × T (> 35)	-0.0302***		-0.0268***						
/ (=/	(0.009)		(0.009)						
Cooler × T (> 35)	(0.003)	-0.0132**	-0.0123**						
/ · ( <u> </u>		(0.005)	(0.005)						
AC × H (> 18)		(0.000)	(*****)	-0.000661		-0.000685			
/ (=/				(0.002)		(0.002)			
Cooler × H (> 18)				(0.002)	0.000506	0.000538			
( <u> </u>					(0.001)	(0.001)			
AC × T (> 35) × H (> 18)					()	()	-0.000436***		-0.000368***
(= 17, 11 (= 17							(0.000)		(0.000)
Cooler × T (> 35) × H (> 18)							()	-0.000131**	-0.000113**
(= 1, 11 (= 1,								(0.000)	(0.000)
								()	(* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quadratic Trend X Region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$R^2$	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06
Observations	2753	2753	2753	2753	2753	2753	2753	2753	2753

Notes: (1)-(9) clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All regressions are weighted by the square root of district population.

# Discussion



Let's make an example:

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• Delhi:

 $\hookrightarrow$  income = 42183 rupees, CDD = 465 degree-days

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#### • Delhi:

- $\hookrightarrow$  income = 42183 rupees, CDD = 465 degree-days
- $\hookrightarrow\,$  increase by 30% p.p. in air-conditioning penetration rate (25% to 55%)

#### Let's make an example:

#### • Delhi:

- $\hookrightarrow$  income = 42183 rupees, CDD = 465 degree-days
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- What would have happened if air conditioners were as spread as evaporative cooler?
  - air-conditioning alone ⇒ 46%
  - $\hookrightarrow$  gross welfare gains  $\Rightarrow$  14 billion \$  $\Rightarrow$  0.46% of the annual GDP

# Implications for Policy

- Subsidise air conditioners may be a very expensive policy
  - $\hookrightarrow$  the annualised cost is around 3083 rupees (37 \$)
  - $\hookrightarrow$  100% subsidy for having same rate of coolers  $\Rightarrow$  252 billion rupees (3 billion \$)
- Evaporative coolers seems a stop-gap solution
  - better an evaporative cooler than no cooling
- Air conditioners are likely the solution in the long-term
  - ⇔ extreme heat will become more intense and frequent

  - → need for investment in innovation United States

# Conclusion

### Conclusion

- There exists a trade-off between accessibility to cooling and health protection
- Technology layer in the heat adaptation inequality for low- and middle-income households
- Only rich urban households adopt and use the most effective technology
- Trade-off also for policy makers
- Future research agenda:
  - $\hookrightarrow$  **projections**  $\Rightarrow$  how will the situation evolve in the next 30 years?
  - $\hookrightarrow$  is there a trade-off between adaptation and mitigation?
  - $\hookrightarrow$  is the technological gap specific of India?

Thank you for your attention! Any questions?

### Welfare Costs of Extreme Heat

### Examples of evidence about the welfare costs of extreme heat:

Mortality and morbidity
(Deschenes and Greenstone 2011, AEJ; Barreca et al. 2016, JPE; Burgess et al. 2017; Heutel et al. 2021, RESTAT; Carleton et al. 2022, OJE)

Learning
 (Park et al. 2020, AEJ; Zivin et al. 2020, JEEM; Park 2022, JHR)

 Mental health and mood (Noelke et al. 2016, ER; Baylis 2020, JPubE; Hua et al. 2022, JPopE)

Labour productivity
 (Dasgupta et al. 2021, Lancet; Somanathan et al. 2021, JPE)


 Aggressive behaviour and crime (Ranson et al. 2015, JEEM; Baysan et al. 2019; JEBO; Blakeslee et al. 2021; JEBO)



# Mediating Effects of Air-conditioning

### Mortality

(Barreca et al. 2016, JPE)




Further evidence: learning achievements, labour productivity and mental health

(Park et al. 2020, AEJ; Somanathan et al. 2021, JPE; Hua et al. 2022, JPopE)




# Trends in Ownership Rates by Income and Climate





### Trends in Ownership Rates by States











# **Zooming In**

### United States (1900-2004)



### Delhi (2014-2019)







## Electricity - Heterogeneity II

### Heterogeneity based on technology

	Air Conditioner	Evaporative Cooler
	(1)	(2)
≥ 35	0.00726***	0.00429***
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Precipitations Controls	Yes	Yes
Household FE	Yes	Yes
Month-Year FE	Yes	Yes
$R^2$	0.04	0.01
Observations	724127	3648335

**Notes**: (1) and (2) clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All regressions are conducted using survey weights.

## **Electricity - Heterogeneity III**

#### Focusing on high-income families

	Air Conditioner	Evaporative Cooler
	(1)	(2)
≥ 35	0.00939***	0.00677***
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Precipitations Controls	Yes	Yes
Household FE	Yes	Yes
Month-Year FE	Yes	Yes
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.05	0.02
Observations	490613	995301

**Notes**: (1) and (2) clustered standard errors at district level in parentheses. \* p < 0.10, \*\*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. All regressions are conducted using survey weights.

### **Innovation in the United States**

Rapson (2014, JEEM)

