

# Malware Analysis Report

Clop Ransomware

December 6 | BY Fahad Ali | v1.0



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
### **Executive Summary**

SHA256	3320f11728458d01eef62e10e48897ec1c2277c1fe1aa2d471a16b4dcc
HASH	fc1207
пазп	

Clop Ransomware belonging to a popular Crypto mix ransomware family is a dangerous file encrypting virus which actively avoids the security unprotected system and encrypts the saved files by planting the .Clop extension.It exploits AES cipher to encrypt pictures, videos, music, databases papers, and attach .CLOP or .CIOP file extension, which prevents victims from accessing personal data. For example, "sample.jpg" is renamed to "sample.jpg.Clop". Recently, Clop ransomware has been associated with cybercriminals who have been using Accellion File Transfer Appliance (FTA) vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-27101, CVE-2021-27102, CVE-2021-27103, and CVE-2021-27104. The exploitation of these flaws led to the compromise of high-profile organizations starting in February. Also, there has been evidence of an affiliate utilizing a webshell dobbed DEWMODE that was being used to steal data from Accellion FTA devices.



## Programme Flow:





## TTPS:

urce	Initial	Execution	Persistence	Privilege	Detense	Credential	Discovery	Lateral	Collection	Command	Exfiltration	Impact
pment	Access	Cloud		Escalation	Evasion	Access	,	Movement		and Control		
	Content	Administration	Account	Abuse Elevation	Abuse Elevation	Adversary in the Middle	Account	Exploitation of	Adversary-in-the-Middle	Application	Automated	Account
	Injection	Command	Manipulation	Control Mechanism	Control Mechanism		Discovery	Remote Services		Layer Protocol	Exfitration	Access Removal
	Drive-by	Command and Scripting	Boot or Logon Autostart	Account	Build Image	Brute Force	Application	Internal	Archive	Communication Through	Data Transfer	Data
	Compromise	Interpreter	Execution	Manipulation	on Host	BIOLET GOL	Window Discovery	Spearphishing	Collected Data	Removable Media	Size Limits	Destruction
	Exploit	Container	Boot or Logon Initialization	Boot or	Debugger	Credentials from	Browser	Lateral Tool	Audio	Content	Extitration Over Alternative	Data Encrypted
	Public-Facing Application	Administration Command	Scripts	Logon Autostart Execution	Evesion	Password Stores	Information Discovery	Transfer	Capture	Injection	Protocol	for Impact
	External	Deploy	Browser	Boot or Lagon	Deobluscate/Decode	Exploitation for	Cloud	Remote Service	Automated	Data	Exfitration	Dota
	Remote Services	Container	Extensions	Initialization Scripts	Files or Information	Credential Access	Infrastructure Discovery	Session Hilacking	Collection	Encoding	Over C2 Channel	Manipulation
	Hardwore	Exploitation for	Compromise Client	Create or Modify	Deploy	Forge Web	Cloud Service	Remote	Cloboard	Deta	Extitration	
	Additions	Client Execution	Software Binary	System Process	Container	Credentials	Dashboard	Services	Data	Obfuscation	Over Other Network Medium	Defacement
	Hostoria			-				Software			Exfitration Over	
	Phishing	Inter-Process	Create	Domain Policy	Domain Policy	Input	Cloud Service Discovery	Deployment Tools	Data from	Dynamic	Physical Medium	Disk Wipe
		Communication	Account	Modification	Modification	Capture	_		Cloud Storage Data from	Resolution		
	Supply Chain	Native API	Create or Modify	Escape	Execution	Authentication	Cloud Storage	Taint Shared	Configuration	Encrypted	Exfitration	Endpoint Denial
	Compromise		System Process	to Host	Guardrails	Process	Object Discovery	Content Lise Alternate	Repository	Channel	Over Web Service	of Service
	Trusted	Scheduled	Event Triggered	Event Triggered	Exploitation for	Multi-Factor Authentication	Container and Resource	Use Alternate Authentication	from Information	Falback	Scheduled	Financial
	Relationship	TaskUob	Execution	Execution	Defense Evasion	Interception	Discovery	Material	Repositories	Channels	Transfer	Theft
	Velid	Serverless	External	Exploitation for Privilege	File and Directory Permissions	Multi-Factor Authentication	Debugger		Data from	Ingress Tool	Transfer Data	Firmware
	Accounts	Execution	Remote Services	Escalation	Modification	Request Generation	Evasion		Local System	Transfer	to Cloud Account	Corruption
		Shared	Hjack	Hjack	Hide	Network	Device Driver	]	Data from Network	Multi-Stage		Inhibit System
		Modules	Execution Flow	Execution Flow	Artifacts	Sniffing	Discovery		Shared Drive	Channels		Recovery
		Software	Implant	Process	Hijack	OS Credential	File	1	Data from	Non-Application	1	Network Denial
		Deployment Tools	Internal Image	Injection	Execution Flow	Dumping	and Directory		Removable Media	Layer Protocol		of Service
		System	Modify	Scheduled	Impair	Steal Application	Log			Non-Standard	-	Resource
		1 1	Authentication	TaskUob	Defenses	Access Token	Enumeration		Data Staged	Port		1
		Services	Process		Deterses	Steal or Forge		-			-	Hijacking
		User	Application	Valid	Impersonation	Authentication	Network Service Discovery		Email	Protocol		Service
		Execution	Startup	Accounts		Certificates			Collection	Turneling		Stop
			Power		Indicator	Steal or Forge	Network Share		Input	Proxy		System
			Settings		Removal	Kerberos Tickets	Discovery		Capture			Shutdown/Reboot
			Pre-OS Boot		Masquerading	Steal Web	Network		Screen	Remote Access		
						Session Cookie	Sniffing		Capture	Software		
			Scheduled		Modify	Unsecured	Password Policy		Video	Traffic		
			Task/Job		Process	Credentials	Discovery		Capture	Signaling		
			Server Software		Modify Cloud Compute		Peripheral			Web Service		
			Component		Infrastructure		Device Discovery			Web service		
			Traffic	1	Modify	1	Permission	1			-	
			Signaling		System Image		Groups Discovery					
			Volid	1	Network Boundary	1	Process	1				
			Accounts		Bridging		Discovery					
				,	Obfuscated Files	1	Remote System	1				
					or Information		Discovery					
						1		1				
					Plist File		Software					
					Modification	-	Discovery					
					Pre-OS Boot		Information Discovery					
					Provess		System Location					
										_		



### LIST OF TOOLS USED

## 1. Basic static analysis

- Strings and Floss
- PE-View
- PE-Studio
- Capa

## 2. Basic Dynamic Analysis

- Wireshark
- Process Hacker
- Procmon

## 3. Advanced Static Analysis

- Cutter
- Ida Pro

## 4. Advanced Dynamic Analysis


• X32dbg



## Basic Static Analysis

#### PE-View and PE-Studio:

#### **PE-Studio**






### Capa:

CAPABILITY	NAMESPACE
decode data using Base64 via WinAPI encode data using XOR (2 matches) encrypt or decrypt via WinCrypt encrypt data using RC4 PRGA contain a resource (.rsrc) section extract resource via kernel32 functions accept command line arguments query environment variable get common file path delete file enumerate files recursively (2 matches) set file attributes move file read file write file (7 matches) get disk information check mutex and exit enumerate network shares allocate thread local storage (2 matches) get thread local storage value set thread local storage value (2 matches) enumerate processes terminate process (5 matches) terminate process via fastfail (4 matches)	data-manipulation/encoding/base64 data-manipulation/encoding/xor data-manipulation/encryption data-manipulation/encryption/rc4 executable/pe/section/rsrc executable/resource host-interaction/cli host-interaction/file-system host-interaction/file-system/delete host-interaction/file-system/files/list host-interaction/file-system/move host-interaction/file-system/move host-interaction/file-system/read host-interaction/file-system/write host-interaction/file-system/write host-interaction/file-system/write host-interaction/file-system/write host-interaction/process host-interaction/process host-interaction/process host-interaction/process host-interaction/process/list host-interaction/process/list host-interaction/process/terminate host-interaction/process/terminate
create thread (6 matches)  link function at runtime  parse PE header (3 matches)	host-interaction/thread/create linking/runtime-linking load-code/pe



#### VIRTUAL TOTAL RESULT

The scanned results display the number of antivirus engines that detect the sample as malicious and the total number of engines that analyzed it.





### **Strings and Floss Output**

Interesting	Strings
IIIICICSIIIE	Julies

BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----

MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCpEnzYAtPzcmKnw41bLkkkDDmZ

1YB4weOpyx0IY8gVI0gvveTMKhmhYNzjc5uQfXH3fbGmbbdELle/u7YsdXkuNHRQ

ThnFfs+q7SIw1nibfYa4c9KA4ftfr69dZTt4T/RzRzsISVNU1Q6me59k9bBq xgiy DRjJhl79BT65Ggn+uQIDAQAB -----END PUBLIC KEY-----

Clop

//...//

1234567890

Clopfdwsjkjr23LKhuifdhwui73826ygGKUJFHGdwsieflkdsj324765tZPKQ WLjwNVBFHewiuhryui32JKG

CryptReleaseContext

CryptGenKey

CryptExportKey

CryptEncrypt

CryptAcquireContextW

CryptDestroyKey

ADVAPI32.dll

### Antidebugger technique:

Is Debugger Present

Program Files (x86)

PROGRAM FILES (X86)

**Program Files** 

PROGRAM FILES

\\?\%s

\\?\%s

\ \* \*

Desktop

DESKTOP

\\*.\*

-\*.\*

zoolz.exe

mysqld-nt.exe

syntime.exe

agntsv.exe

**Clop Ransomware** 



mysqld-opt.exe tbirdonfig.exe dbeng50.exe oautoupds.exe thebat.exe dbsnmp.exe oomm.exe thebat64.exe ensv.exe ossd.exe thunderbird.exe exel.exe onenote.exe visio.exe firefoxonfig.exe orale.exe winword.exe infopath.exe outlook.exe wordpad.exe isqlplussv.exe powerpnt.exe xfssvon.exe

xfssvon.exe msaess.exe sqboreservie.exe tmlisten.exe msftesql.exe sqlagent.exe PNTMon.exe mspub.exe sqlbrowser.exe NTAoSMgr.exe

sqlservr.exe Ntrtsan.exe

mydesktopservie.exe

mydesktopgos.exe

sqlwriter.exe mbamtray.exe mysqld.exe steam.exe CLOP#666

A%s\ClopReadMe.txt

SIXSIX

ClopReadMe.txt




## Basic Dynamic Analysis

#### **Network Indicators**

No host indicators found on execution of the malware sample.


#### HOST INDICATORS


INDICATOR: After successfully encrypting files and compromising the system, clop drops following files in the desktop ,RecyleBin, Program Data waindows folder and many other also it encrypt the python files present in the python27 folder. All the files are replaced by .clop extension.






### **Procmon Process tree:**













### **INDICATOR:**

Files dropped in recyclebin.






## INDICATOR: Files dropped in c drive ,user and allusers folder









## Advanced Static Analysis

### **IdaPro Details:**

#### **Main Function:**

```
Pseudocode-A
    1 int __stdcall WinMain(HINSTANCE hInstance, HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, LPSTR lpCmdLine, int nShowCmd)
    2 {
        int v4; // esi
       signed int i; // esi
       HANDLE v6; // esi
       int j; // ebx
       UINT v8; // eax
       WCHAR pszPath[260]; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-214h] BYREF
       WCHAR RootPathName; // [esp+214h] [ebp-Ch] BYREF
       DWORD v12; // [esp+218h] [ebp-8h]
    10
   11
   12
       CreateFileA("popup.txt", 0, 7u, 0, 3u, 0, 0);
   13
       v12 = GetLastError();
   14
       while ( (unsigned int)GetCurrentProcess() <= 1 || (unsigned int)GetCurrentThread() <= 1 || v12 !=
   15
   16
          Sleep(0x32u);
   17
   18
         ++v4;
    19
    20
        Sleep(0x1388u);
        sub_40D7C0();
   21
       for ( i = 0; i < 666000; ++i )
   22
    23
         EraseTape(0, i, 0);
   24
        GlobalDeleteAtom(0);
if ( DefineDosDeviceA(i, "1234567890", "//...//") )
   25
   26
           FindAtomA("27");
   27
    28
   29
            GetCurrentThread();
    30
        GetACP();
   31
   32
       Sleep(0x1388u);
   33
        sub_40D8D0(L"zoolz.exe");
        sub_40D8D0(L"mysqld-nt.exe");
       sub_40D8D0(L"syntime.exe");
      0000C8C5 WinMain@16:24 (40D4C5) (Synchronized with IDA View-A, Hex View-1)
```



```
Pseudocode-A
                                                                                                           1 BOOL __thiscall sub_40D8D0(LPCWSTR lpString2)
   2 {
       HANDLE v2; // ebx
      void (__stdcall *v3)(LPWSTR, LPCWSTR); // esi
int v4; // eax
   5
      int v5; // eax
       HANDLE v6; // eax
       void *v7; // esi
   8
       const WCHAR *v9; // [esp-4h] [ebp-650h]
      PROCESSENTRY32W pe; // [esp+ch] [ebp-640h] BYREF WCHAR String[260]; // [esp+238h] [ebp-414h] BYREF WCHAR String1[260]; // [esp+440h] [ebp-20Ch] BYREF
  10
  12
  13
14
       v2 = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(2u, 0);
15
       v9 = lpString2;
16
       v3 = (void (__stdcall *)(LPWSTR, LPCWSTR))lstrcpyW;
       lstrcpyW(String1, v9);
17
18
       v4 = lstrlenW(String1);
       CharUpperBuffW(String1, v4);
19
20
      if ( v2 != (HANDLE)-1 )
  21
22
         pe.dwSize = 556;
23
         if ( Process32FirstW(v2, &pe) )
  24
  25
  26
27
              v3(String, pe.szExeFile);
28
              v5 = lstrlenW(String);
              CharUpperBuffW(String, v5);
29
9 30
              if ( !lstrcmpW(String, String1) )
  31
9 32
                v6 = OpenProcess(1u, 0, pe.th32ProcessID);
                v7 = v6;
33
34
                if ( v6 )
  35
36
                  TerminateProcess(v6, 0xFFFFFFFF);
37
                  CloseHandle(v7);
  38
  39
                else
  40
                {
41
                  CloseHandle(0);
```

- The function takes a wide-string (LPCWSTR) parameter lpString2.
- It creates a snapshot of the system processes using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot.
- It copies and converts the input string to uppercase.
- It iterates through the processes in the snapshot using Process32FirstW and Process32NextW.
- For each process, it compares the uppercase executable name with the uppercase input string.
- If a match is found, it attempts to terminate the process using OpenProcess, TerminateProcess, and CloseHandle.
- The function returns CloseHandle(v2), where v2 is the handle to the process snapshot.



```
Pseudocode-A
              ACP();
         Sleep(0x1388u);
    32
         sub_40D8D0(L"zoolz.exe");
sub_40D8D0(L"mysqld-nt.exe");
    33
    34
         sub_40D8D0(L"syntime.exe");
    35
         sub_40D8D0(L"agntsv.exe");
sub_40D8D0(L"mysqld-opt.exe");
    36
    37
         sub_40D8D0(L"tbirdonfig.exe");
    38
    39
         sub_40D8D0(L"dbeng50.exe");
         sub_40D8D0(L"oautoupds.exe");
    40
         sub 40D8D0(L"thebat.exe");
    41
         sub_40D8D0(L"dbsnmp.exe");
    42
         sub_40D8D0(L"oomm.exe");
    43
    44
         sub_40D8D0(L"thebat64.exe");
         sub_40D8D0(L"ensv.exe");
    45
         sub_40D8D0(L"ossd.exe");
sub_40D8D0(L"thunderbird.exe");
    46
    47
         sub 40D8D0(L"exel.exe");
         sub_40D8D0(L"onenote.exe");
    49
    50
         sub_40D8D0(L"visio.exe");
         sub 40D8D0(L"firefoxonfig.exe");
    51
         sub_40D8D0(L"orale.exe");
    52
         sub_40D8D0(L"winword.exe");
sub_40D8D0(L"infopath.exe");
    53
    54
    55
         sub_40D8D0(L"outlook.exe");
         sub_40D8D0(L"wordpad.exe");
sub_40D8D0(L"isqlplussv.exe");
    56
    57
         sub_40D8D0(L"powerpnt.exe");
    58
         sub_40D8D0(L"xfssvon.exe");
    59
         sub_40D8D0(L"msaess.exe");
sub_40D8D0(L"sqboreservie.exe");
    60
    61
          sub_40D8D0(L"tmlisten.exe");
    62
         sub_40D8D0(L"msftesql.exe");
sub_40D8D0(L"sqlagent.exe");
    63
    64
         sub_40D8D0(L"PNTMon.exe");
       00000000 M : 01 (400000) (0 1 : 1 : 1 TD3 TT: 3 TT TT:
sub 40D8D0(L"mysqld.exe");
sub_40D8D0(L"steam.exe");
 v6 = CreateMutexW(0, 0, L"CLOP#666");
if ( WaitForSingleObject(v6, 0) )
 SetErrorMode(1u);
 CreateThread(0, 0, sub_40D9F0, 0, 0, 0);
            n. `-
            stdcall sub 40D9F0(LPVOID lpThreadParameter)
  1
  2 {
3
       sub_40B380(
         "----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY---- MIGFMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCpEnzYAtPzcmKnw41bLkkkDDmZ 1YB4weOp
"KhmhYNzjc5uQfXH3fbGmbbdELle/u7YsdXkuNHRQ ThnFfs+q7SIw1nibfYa4c9KA4ftfr69dZTt4T/RzRzsISVNU1Q6me59k9bE
  4
  5
         "65Ggn+uQIDAQAB -----END PUBLIC KEY----");
7
      Sleep(0x1388u);
8
      return 0;
9 }
```



```
А
                          :
                                              M
                                                                        P
                                                                                                   Structures
                                  Enums
                                                            Imports
                                                                                       Exports
×
                                 ∄
                                                           ×
                                                                 €
                                                                                            Pseudocode-A
                                       Stack of sub_40B380
                                                                        Stack of StartAddress
      PCERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO pvStructInfo; // [esp+10h]
      DWORD Size; // [esp+14h] [ebp-1018h] BYREF
      HCRYPTPROV phProv; // [esp+18h] [ebp-1014h] BYREF
      DWORD pcbBinary; // [esp+1ch] [ebp-1010h] BYREF
HCRYPTKEY phKey; // [esp+20h] [ebp-100Ch] BYREF
DWORD pdwDataLen; // [esp+24h] [ebp-1008h] BYREF
BYTE pbBinary[2048]; // [esp+28h] [ebp-1004h] BYREF
 10
 12
 13
 14
      CHAR pszString[2048]; // [esp+828h] [ebp-804h] BYREF
 15
16
      Src = a2;
      SetErrorMode(1u);
17
      v4 = lstrlenA(lpString);
18
19
      memmove_0(pszString, lpString, v4);
20
      pcbBinary = 2048;
21
      phProv = 0;
22
      phKey = 0;
23
      if ( !CryptStringToBinaryA(pszString, 0, 0, pbBinary, &pcbBinary, 0, 0) )
24
        return 0;
25
      if ( !CryptDecodeObjectEx(1u, (LPCSTR)8, pbBinary, pcbBinary, 0x8000u, 0, &pvStructInfo, &pcbStructInfo) )
26
        return 0;
27
      if ( !CryptAcquireContextW(&phProv, 0, 0, 1u, 0xF0000000) )
28
29
      if ( !CryptImportPublicKeyInfoEx(phProv, 1u, pvStructInfo, 0, 0, 0, &phKey) )
30
         return 0;
31
      Size = 117;
32
      pdwDataLen = 117;
33
      if ( !CryptEncrypt(phKey, 0, 1, 0, 0, &pdwDataLen, 0x75u) )
34
        return 0;
35
      v6 = GlobalAlloc(0x40u, pdwDataLen);
      memset(v6, 0, pdwDataLen);
36
37
      memmove_0(v6, Src, Size);
      if ( !CryptEncrypt(phKey, 0, 1, 0, (BYTE *)v6, \&Size, pdwDataLen) )
38
39
        return 0;
40
      *a1 = pdwDataLen;
41
      return v6;
42
     0000C440 sub_40D040:7 (40D040) (Synchronized with IDA View-A, Hex View-1)
```



```
∄
                                                             3
         Pseudocode-A
                                     Stack of sub_40B380
                                                                   Stack of StartAddress
   1 int __fastcall sub_40D200(void **a1, DWORD *a2)
   2 {
      BYTE *v4; // esi
      HCRYPTPROV phProv; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-8h] BYREF
   4
      HCRYPTKEY phKey; // [esp+10h] [ebp-4h] BYREF
      SetErrorMode(1u);
8
      phProv = 0;
9
      phKey = 0;
10
      if ( !CryptAcquireContextW(&phProv, 0, L"Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider", 0x18u, 0)
        && !CryptAcquireContextW(&phProv, 0, L"Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider", 0x18u, 8u) )
  11
  12
13
        return 0;
  14
15
      if (!CryptGenKey(phProv, 1u, 0x4000u, &phKey))
16
        return 0;
17
      if ( !CryptExportKey(phKey, 0, 6u, 0, 0, a2) )
return 0;

19 v4 = (BYTE *)*a1;

20 memset(*a1, 0, *a2);
21
      if ( !CryptExportKey(phKey, 0, 6u, 0, v4, a2) )
22
        return 0;
23
      if ( phKey )
24
        CryptDestroyKey(phKey);
25
      if ( phProv )
26
        CryptReleaseContext(phProv, 0);
27
      return 1;
28 }
     0000C692 sub_40D200:20 (40D292) (Synchronized with IDA View-A, Hex View-1)
                                                                                                              □ ₽
```



### Advanced Dynamic Analysis



#### Mutex Creation

#### Thread Creation:

```
004AD6F4 FF15 60E14A00 | Call dword ptr ds:[<&SetErrorMode>]
004AD6FA 8B35 4CE04A00 | mov esi,dword ptr ds:[<&CreateThread>]
004AD700 GA 00 | push 0
```



