



Faireum Smart Contracts Security Analysis

This report is public.

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Abstract

In this report, we consider the security of the <u>Faireum</u> project. Our task is to find and describe security issues in the smart contracts of the platform.

Disclaimer

The audit does not give any warranties on the security of the code. One audit cannot be considered enough. We always recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contracts. Besides, security audit is not an investment advice.

Summary

In this report, we considered the security of <u>Faireum</u> smart contracts. We performed our audit according to the <u>procedure</u> described below.

The audit showed no critical issues. However, one medium severity and a number of low severity issues were found. They do not endanger project security. Nevertheless, we highly recommend addressing them.

General recommendations

The contracts code is of good quality. The contracts code does not contain issues that endanger project security. However, we recommend covering <u>Code with tests</u>, fixing <u>Documentation mismatch</u>, and removing <u>Redundant code</u>.

In addition, if the developers decide to improve the code, we recommend following best practices for <u>Pragmas version</u>. However, these issues are minor and do not influence code operation.

Checklist

Smart Contracts Security

The audit showed no vulnerabilities.



Here by vulnerabilities we mean security issues that can be exploited by an external attacker. This does not include low severity issues, documentation mismatches, overpowered contract owner, and some other kinds of bugs.

Compliance with the documentation



The audit showed discrepancies between the code and the provided documentation.

ERC20 compliance

We checked <u>ERC20 compliance</u> during the audit. The audit showed that **FaireumToken** contract was fully ERC20 compliant.

ERC20 MUST



The audit showed no ERC20 "MUST" requirements violations.

ERC20 SHOULD



The audit showed no ERC20 "SHOULD" requirements violations.

Tests



There are no tests provided with the code.

The text below is for technical use; it details the statements made in Summary and General recommendations.

Procedure

In our audit, we consider the following crucial features of the smart contract code:

- 1. Whether the code is secure.
- 2. Whether the code corresponds to the documentation (including whitepaper).
- 3. Whether the code meets best practices in efficient use of gas, code readability, etc.

We perform our audit according to the following procedure:

- automated analysis
 - we scan project's smart contracts with our own Solidity static code analyzer <u>SmartCheck</u>
 - we scan project's smart contracts with several publicly available automated Solidity analysis tools such as Remix, and Solhint
 - we manually verify (reject or confirm) all the issues found by tools
- manual audit
 - o we manually analyze smart contracts for security vulnerabilities
 - we check smart contracts logic and compare it with the one described in the whitepaper
 - o we check ERC20 compliance
 - we run tests and check code coverage
- report
 - o we reflect all the gathered information in the report

Checked vulnerabilities

We have scanned Faireum smart contracts for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities. Here are some of the commonly known vulnerabilities that we considered (the full list includes them but is not limited to them):

- Reentrancy
- <u>Timestamp Dependence</u>
- Gas Limit and Loops
- DoS with (Unexpected) Throw
- DoS with (Unexpected) revert
- DoS with Block Gas Limit
- Transaction-Ordering Dependence
- Use of tx.origin
- Exception disorder
- Gasless send
- Balance equality
- Byte array
- Transfer forwards all gas
- ERC20 API violation
- Malicious libraries
- Compiler version not fixed
- Redundant fallback function
- Send instead of transfer
- Style guide violation
- Unchecked external call
- Unchecked math
- Unsafe type inference
- Implicit visibility level
- Address hardcoded
- Using delete for arrays
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Locked money
- Private modifier
- Revert/require functions
- Using var
- Visibility
- Using blockhash
- Using SHA3
- Using suicide
- Using throw
- Using inline assembly

Project overview

Project description

In our analysis we consider Faireum whitepaper ("Faireum_whitepaper2.0_En.pdf", sha1sum: 630f7cd253fa9e61f56e0b51e777857bb943b6da) and smart contracts code ("FaireumToken.sol", sha1sum: 637e2aa0797f95d5853cf4f3c692a36853977c03).

For the audit, we were provided with the FaireumToken.sol file.

• The file successfully compiles with solc command.

The total LOC of audited Solidity sources is 273.

Automated analysis

We used several publicly available automated Solidity analysis tools. Here are the combined results of SmartCheck, Solhint, and Remix. All the issues found by tools were manually checked (rejected or confirmed).

True positives are constructions that were discovered by the tools as vulnerabilities and can actually be exploited by attackers or lead to incorrect contracts operation.

False positives are constructions that were discovered by the tools as vulnerabilities but do not consist a security threat.

Cases when these issues lead to actual bugs or vulnerabilities are described in the next section.

Tool	Rule	False positives	True positives
Remix	Gas requirement of function high: infinite	24	
	Should be constant but is not	2	
	Use of "now"	3	
	Use of "this" for local functions	1	
Total Remix		29	
SmartCheck	Erc20 Approve		2
	Pragmas Version		1
	Private Modifier Don't Hide Data	4	
	Safemath	2	
Total SmartCheck		6	3

Solhint	Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic	3	
	Compiler version must be fixed		1
	Event and function names must be different	3	
Total Solhint		6	1
Total Overall		42	4

Manual analysis

The contracts were completely manually analyzed, their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the documentation. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified. All confirmed issues are described below.

Critical issues

Critical issues seriously endanger smart contracts security. We highly recommend fixing them.

The audit showed no critical issues.

Medium severity issues

Medium issues can influence smart contracts operation in current implementation. We highly recommend addressing them.

No tests and deployment script

The provided code does not contain tests. Testing is crucial for code security and audit does not replace tests in any way.

We highly recommend both covering the code with tests and making sure that the test coverage is sufficient.

There is also no deployment script. However, the contracts deployment does not seem trivial. Bugs and vulnerabilities often appear in deployment scripts and severely endanger system's security.

We highly recommend developing and testing deployment scripts very carefully.

Low severity issues

Low severity issues can influence smart contracts operation in future versions of code. We recommend taking them into account.

Documentation mismatch

There is a discrepancy between the smart contracts code and the whitepaper: According to the documentation ("Faireum_whitepaper2.0_En.pdf", page 35):

```
Team/Developer/Advisor: Locked for a minimum of 12 months and followed by 1 to 2 years vesting schedule to the long-term benefit of the team/developer/advisor.
```

However, half of the tokens locked for 6 months and another half for a year in the code.

```
function lockTeamTokens(address _beneficiary, uint256
    tokensAmount) public onlyAdmin {
        uint256 _half = _tokensAmount.div(2);
        _lockTokens(address(teamAdvisorsTokensVault), false,
        beneficiary, _half);
        _lockTokens(address(teamAdvisorsTokensVault), true,
        beneficiary, _half);
}
```

We recommend either changing contracts' functionality so that it matches the whitepaper or modifying the whitepaper in order to avoid any discrepancies.

Redundant code

SafeERC20 library at **FaireumToken.sol**, lines 357-369 is redundant, as it is not used in the project.

We highly recommend removing redundant code in order to improve code readability and transparency and decrease cost of deployment and execution.

Pragma version

Solidity source files indicate the versions of the compiler they can be compiled with. Example:

```
pragma solidity ^{0.4.24}; // bad: compiles w 0.4.24 and above pragma solidity 0.4.24; // good: compiles w 0.4.24 only
```

We recommend following the latter example, as future compiler versions may handle certain language constructions in a way the developer did not foresee. Besides, we recommend using compiler version 0.4.25. Moreover, new version of compiler (0.5.2 at the moment) is available and contains several important changes. In order to update your contracts to compiler version 0.5.2 the developers should follow solidity documentation.



Notes

ERC20 approve issue

There is <u>ERC20 approve issue</u>: changing the approved amount from a nonzero value to another nonzero value allows a double spending with a front-running attack.

We recommend instructing users to follow one of two ways:

- not to use approve() function directly and to use increaseApproval()/decreaseApproval() functions instead
- to change the approved amount to 0, wait for the transaction to be mined, and then to change the approved amount to the desired value.

This analysis was performed by **SmartDec**.

Boris Nikashin, Project Manger Alexander Drygin, Analyst Pavel Kondratenkov, Analyst Kirill Gorshkov, Analyst

Sergey Pavlin, Chief Operating Officer

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Appendix

Solhint output

FaireumTo	ken.sol	
1:17	warning	Compiler version must be
fixed	_	C
ompiler-f:	ixed	
7:1	error	Definition must be surrounded with two blank line
indent		two-lines-top-level-
separator		,
71:1	error	Definition must be surrounded with two blank line
indent		two-lines-top-level-
separator		
	error	Definition must be surrounded with two blank line
indent.	01101	two-lines-top-level-
separator		two lines top level
150:1	error	Definition must be surrounded with two blank line
indent	CIIOI	two-lines-top-level-
separator		two lines top level
157:5	error	Function order is incorrect, external function
		external constant function func-order
159:5		
	error	Function order is incorrect, external function
161:5		external constant function func-order
	error	Function order is incorrect, external function
_		external constant function func-order
different	warning	Event and function names must be
		no-
simple-eve		
173:2	error	Line length must be no more than 120 but current
length is		max-line-length
179:1	error	
indent		two-lines-top-level-
separator		
219:5	warning	Event and function names must be
different		no-
simple-eve	ent-func-	
357:1	error	Definition must be surrounded with two blank line
indent		two-lines-top-level-
separator		
376:1	error	Definition must be surrounded with two blank line
indent		two-lines-top-level-
separator		
405:1	error	Definition must be surrounded with two blank line

indent separator		two	-lines-top-level-	
-	Constant name m	nust be in ca	apitalized	
SNAKE CASE			const-na	ame-
- snakecase				
409:28 error	Constant name m	nust be in ca	apitalized	
SNAKE CASE			const-na	ame-
_ snakecase				
410:27 error	Constant name m	nust be in ca	apitalized	
SNAKE_CASE			const-na	ame-
snakecase				
437:49 warning	Avoid to make t	cime-based de	ecisions in your	
business logic			not-rely-on-ti	Lme
_	Avoid to make t	time-based de	ecisions in your	
business logic			not-rely-on-ti	
441:16 error	Statement inder	ntation is in	ncorrect. Required	
space after if			statement-indent	
_	Avoid to make t	cime-based de	ecisions in your	ı
business logic			not-rely-on-ti	
	Statement inder	itation is i	ncorrect. Required	
space after if 497:5 error	Function order	ia ingorrog	statement-indent	
497:5 error not go after intern			t, public functior nc-order	I Call
			nc order t, public functior	n can
not go after intern			nc-order	i Caii
-			t, public function	can
not go after intern			nc-order	ı oan
			t, public function	n can
not go after intern			nc-order	
519:5 error	Function order	is incorrect	t, public function	n can
not go after intern	al function	fu	nc-order	
524:5 error	Function order	is incorrec	t, public function	n can
not go after intern	al function	fu	nc-order	
528:5 error	Function order	is incorrect	t, public function	n can
not go after intern	al function	fu	nc-order	
532:5 warning	Event and funct	cion names m	ust be	
different			no-	
simple-event-func-n				
			t, public function	n can
not go after intern			nc-order	
			t, public function	n can
not go after intern			nc-order	_
	visibility modi	liler must be	e first in list of	
modifiers order			visibility-modif	ler-
	Function order	is incorrect	t outomal functi	on
can not go after in			t, external functi func-order	LOII
can not go after in	cernar runction	I .	runc-order	

```
543:9 error Statement indentation is incorrect. Required space after if statement-indent
```

X 36 problems (29 errors, 7 warnings)

Solium output

```
FaireumToken.sol

437:48 warning Avoid using 'now' (alias to 'block.timestamp'). security/no-block-members

438:12 warning Avoid using 'now' (alias to 'block.timestamp'). security/no-block-members

449:25 warning Avoid using 'now' (alias to 'block.timestamp'). security/no-block-members

**X 3 warnings found.
```