

Information Security

DR. Muhammad Umar Aftab

Integrity and Authentication


Security Goals

- Consider the following security risks that could face two communicating entities in an unprotected environment:



- Eve could view the secret message by eavesdropping on the communication.**
Loss of privacy/confidentiality


Security Goals



***Eve* could alter/corrupt the message, or the message could change while in transit. If Bob does not detect this, then we have Loss of Integrity**

Security Goals

(3) Or it could send a message to Bob pretending to be Alice



If Bob cannot verify the source entity of the information then we lack authentication

Security Goals




Alice might **repudiate** having sent m to Bob

Hence, some possible goals for communication:


- Privacy/confidentiality - information not disclosed to unauthorized entities
- Integrity - information not altered deliberately or accidentally
- Authentication - validation of identity of source of information
- Non-repudiation – Sender should not be able to deny sending a message

Cryptographic Goals



HASHING

A **hash function** H accepts a variable-length block of data M as input and produces a fixed-size hash value $h = H(M)$.



Hash Function

- a Hash Function produces a fingerprint of some file/message/data

$$h = H(M)$$

- condenses a variable-length message M
 - to a fixed-sized fingerprint
- assumed to be public

Requirements for Hash Functions

1. can be applied to any sized message M
2. produces fixed-length output h
3. is easy to compute $h=H(M)$ for any message M
4. given h is infeasible to find x s.t. $H(x)=h$
 - *one-way property*
5. given x is infeasible to find y s.t. $H(y)=H(x)$
 - *collision resistance*
6. is infeasible to find any x, y s.t. $H(y)=H(x)$
 - *collision resistance*

Table 11.1 Requirements for a Cryptographic Hash Function H

Requirement	Description
Variable input size	H can be applied to a block of data of any size.
Fixed output size	H produces a fixed-length output.
Efficiency	$H(x)$ is relatively easy to compute for any given x , making both hardware and software implementations practical.
Preimage resistant (one-way property)	For any given hash value h , it is computationally infeasible to find y such that $H(y) = h$.
Second preimage resistant (weak collision resistant)	For any given block x , it is computationally infeasible to find $y \neq x$ with $H(y) = H(x)$.
Collision resistant (strong collision resistant)	It is computationally infeasible to find any pair (x, y) such that $H(x) = H(y)$.
Pseudorandomness	Output of H meets standard tests for pseudorandomness.

Hash Function

- In the context of message authentication, a hash function takes a variable sized input message and produces a fixed-sized output
- The output is usually referred to as the **hash code** or the **hash value** or the **message digest**
- We can think of the hash code (or the message digest) as a fixed sized fingerprint of a variable-sized message

Avalanche Effect

A message digest depends on all the bits in the input message, **any alteration** of the input message **during transmission** would cause its message digest to not match with its original message digest. This can be used to check for forgeries, unauthorized alterations, etc. Example:


Message: "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog"
SHA1 hashcode:

2fd4e1c67a2d28fced849ee1bb76e7391b93eb12

Altered Message

Message: "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dogs"
SHA1 hashcode:

8de49570b9d941fb26045fa1f5595005eb5f3cf2



Hash Functions Properties

- An ideal hash function has three main properties:
 - It is easy to calculate the hash value for any given data.
 - It should be extremely difficult to reverse engineer the hash value.
 - It is extremely unlikely that two different input values, no matter how similar, will generate the same hash value.

Attacks on Hash Functions

Brute-Force Attacks

- Does not depend on the specific algorithm, only depends on bit length.
- In the case of a hash function, attack depends only on the bit length of the hash value.
- Method is to pick values at random and try each one until a collision occurs.

Cryptanalysis

- An attack based on weaknesses in a particular cryptographic algorithm.
- Seek to exploit some property of the algorithm to perform some attack other than an exhaustive search.

Classes of Hash Functions

- Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA-2 and SHA-3)
- RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest (RIPEMD)
- Message Digest Algorithm 5 (MD5)
- BLAKE2

Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)

- SHA was originally designed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and published as a federal information processing standard (FIPS 180) in 1993.
- Was revised in 1995 as SHA-1.
- Based on the hash function MD4 and its design closely models MD4.
- Produces 160-bit hash values.
- In 2002 NIST produced a revised version of the standard that defined three new versions of SHA with hash value lengths of 256, 384, and 512.
 - Collectively known as SHA-2

Comparison of SHA Parameters

	SHA-1	SHA-224	SHA-256	SHA-384	SHA-512
Message Digest Size	160	224	256	384	512
Message Size	$< 2^{64}$	$< 2^{64}$	$< 2^{64}$	$< 2^{128}$	$< 2^{128}$
Block Size	512	512	512	1024	1024
Word Size	32	32	32	64	64
Number of Steps	80	64	64	80	80

Note: All sizes are measured in bits.

SHA-512 Logic


Step 1. Append padding bits

Step 2. Append length

Step 3. Initialize hash buffer

Step 4. Process message in 1024-bit blocks

Step 5. Output



$+$ = word-by-word addition mod 2^{64}

SHA-512 Logic

(Figure can be found on page 337 in textbook)

The padded message consists blocks M_1, M_2, \dots, M_N . Each message block M_i consists of 16 64-bit words $M_{i,0}, M_{i,1}, \dots, M_{i,15}$. All addition is performed modulo 2^{64} .

$H_{0,0} = 6A09E667F3BCC908$	$H_{0,4} = 510E527FADE682D1$
$H_{0,1} = BB67AE8584CAA73B$	$H_{0,5} = 9B05688C2B3E6C1F$
$H_{0,2} = 3C6EF372FE94F82B$	$H_{0,6} = 1F83D9ABFB41BD6B$
$H_{0,3} = A54FF53A5F1D36F1$	$H_{0,7} = 5BE0CDI9137E2179$

for $i = 1$ to N

1. Prepare the message schedule W :

for $t = 0$ to 15

$W_t = M_{i,t}$

for $t = 16$ to 79

$W_t = \sigma_1^{512}(W_{t-2}) + W_{t-7} + \sigma_0^{512}(W_{t-15}) + W_{t-16}$

2. Initialize the working variables

$a = H_{i-1,0}$ $e = H_{i-1,4}$

$b = H_{i-1,1}$ $f = H_{i-1,5}$

$c = H_{i-1,2}$ $g = H_{i-1,6}$

$d = H_{i-1,3}$ $h = H_{i-1,7}$

3. Perform the main hash computation

for $t = 0$ to 79

$T_1 = h + \text{Ch}(e, f, g) + \left(\sum_{i=0}^{512} e\right) + W_t + K_t$

$T_2 = \left(\sum_{i=0}^{512} a\right) + \text{Maj}(a, b, c)$

$h = g$

$g = f$

$f = e$

$e = d + T_1$

$d = c$

$c = b$

$b = a$

$a = T_1 + T_2$

4. Compute the intermediate hash value

$H_{i,0} = a + H_{i-1,0}$ $H_{i,4} = e + H_{i-1,4}$

$H_{i,1} = b + H_{i-1,1}$ $H_{i,5} = f + H_{i-1,5}$

$H_{i,2} = c + H_{i-1,2}$ $H_{i,6} = g + H_{i-1,6}$

$H_{i,3} = d + H_{i-1,3}$ $H_{i,7} = h + H_{i-1,7}$

return $\{H_{N,0} \parallel H_{N,1} \parallel H_{N,2} \parallel H_{N,3} \parallel H_{N,4} \parallel H_{N,5} \parallel H_{N,6} \parallel H_{N,7}\}$

Figure 11.13 SHA-512 Logic




Figure 11.10 SHA-512 Processing of a Single 1024-Bit Block




Figure 11.12 Creation of 80-word Input Sequence for SHA-512 Processing of Single Block

$$W_t = \sigma_1^{512}(W_{t-2}) + W_{t-7} + \sigma_0^{512}(W_{t-15}) + W_{t-16}$$

where

$$\sigma_0^{512}(x) = \text{ROTR}^1(x) \oplus \text{ROTR}^8(x) \oplus \text{SHR}^7(x)$$

$$\sigma_1^{512}(x) = \text{ROTR}^{19}(x) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{61}(x) \oplus \text{SHR}^6(x)$$

$\text{ROTR}^n(x)$ = circular right shift (rotation) of the 64-bit argument x by n bits

$\text{SHR}^n(x)$ = left shift of the 64-bit argument x by n bits with padding by zeros on the right

$+$ = addition modulo 2^{64}




Figure 11.11 Elementary SHA-512 Operation (single round)

$$T_1 = h + \text{Ch}(e, f, g) + \left(\sum_1^{512} e \right) + W_t + K_t$$

$$T_2 = \left(\sum_0^{512} a \right) + \text{Maj}(a, b, c)$$

$$h = g$$

$$g = f$$

$$f = e$$

$$e = d + T_1$$

$$d = c$$

$$c = b$$

$$b = a$$

$$a = T_1 + T_2$$

where

t = step number; $0 \leq t \leq 79$

$\text{Ch}(e, f, g) = (e \text{ AND } f) \oplus (\text{NOT } e \text{ AND } g)$
the conditional function: If e then f else g

$\text{Maj}(a, b, c) = (a \text{ AND } b) \oplus (a \text{ AND } c) \oplus (b \text{ AND } c)$
the function is true only if the majority (two or three) of the arguments are true

$$\left(\sum_0^{512} a \right) = \text{ROTR}^{28}(a) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{34}(a) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{39}(a)$$

$$\left(\sum_1^{512} e \right) = \text{ROTR}^{14}(e) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{18}(e) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{41}(e)$$

$\text{ROTR}^n(x)$ = circular right shift (rotation) of the 64-bit argument x by n bits


MD5

- designed by *Ronald Rivest* (the “*R*” in RSA)
- latest in a series of MD2, MD4
- produces a **128-bit hash value**
- until recently was the most widely used hash algorithm
 - in recent times have both brute-force & cryptanalytic concerns
- specified as Internet standard RFC1321

MD5 OVERVIEW

1. pad message so its length is $448 \bmod 512$
2. append a 64-bit length value to message
3. initialise 4-word (128-bit) MD buffer (A,B,C,D)
4. process message in 16-word (512-bit) blocks:
 - using 4 rounds of 16 bit operations on message block & buffer
 - add output to buffer input to form new buffer value
5. output hash value is the final buffer value


MD5 OVERVIEW



MD5 COMPRESSION FUNCTION

- each round has 16 steps of the form:
$$a = b + ((a + g(b, c, d) + X[k] + T[i]) \lll s)$$
- a,b,c,d refer to the **4 words** of the buffer, but used in varying permutations
 - note this updates 1 word only of the buffer
 - after 16 steps each word is updated 4 times
- where $g(b,c,d)$ is a different nonlinear function in each round (F,G,H,I)
- $T[i]$ is a constant value

MD5 COMPRESSION FUNCTION



STRENGTH OF MD5

- MD5 hash is dependent on all message bits
- Rivest claims security is good as can be
- known attacks are:
 - Berson 92 attacked any 1 round using differential cryptanalysis (but can't extend)
 - Boer & Bosselaers 93 found a pseudo collision (again unable to extend)
 - Dobbertin 96 created collisions on MD compression function (but initial constants prevent exploit)
- conclusion is that MD5 looks vulnerable