COMP250: Artificial Intelligence

3: Planning

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Game theory

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- Important applications in economics, ecology and social sciences as well as AI

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- If **both betray each other**, both get an F

Payoff matrix

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	A silent	A betray
B silent	A: 50 B: 50	A: 70 B: -100
B betray	A: -100 B: 70	A: 0 B: 0

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Socrative `FALCOMPED`: what would you do?

Alice's thought process

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... and Bob's thought process is the same!

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- If all players are **rational** (in the sense of wanting to maximising payoff), they should converge upon a Nash equilibrium

Does every game have a Nash equilibrium?

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	A rock	A paper	A scissors
B rock	A: 0 B: 0	A: +1 B: -1	A: -1 B: +1
B paper	A: -1 B: +1	A: 0 B: 0	A: +1 B: -1
B scissors	A: +1 B: -1	A: -1 B: +1	A: 0 B: 0

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- E.g. if you always choose paper, I choose scissors
- If we try to reason naïvely, we get stuck in a loop
  - If I choose paper, you'll choose scissors, so I should choose rock, but then you'll choose paper, so I'll choose scissors, so you'll choose rock, so I choose paper...

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- The optimum strategy is to be **unpredictable**

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- If we try to reason naïvely, we get stuck in a loop
  - If I choose paper, you'll choose scissors, so I should choose rock, but then you'll choose paper, so I'll choose scissors, so you'll choose rock, so I choose paper...
- The optimum strategy is to be **unpredictable**
- Choose rock with probability $\frac{1}{3}$, paper with probability $\frac{1}{3}$, scissors with probability $\frac{1}{3}$

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- In contrast to a **pure** or **deterministic strategy**, which always chooses the same action
- If we allow mixed strategies, **every game has at least one Nash equilibrium**

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- Socrative `FALCOMPED`: make your guesses!

The rational guess

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- So no rational player would guess greater than 29.629
- ... and so on ad infinitum
- So the only **rational** guess is 0, as every rational player should guess 0 and $\frac{2}{3}$ of 0 is 0

Rationality

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- However it's important to remember that **humans aren't always rational**

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Planning

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- The agent can perform **actions** to change the state
- The agent wants to change the state so as to achieve a **goal**
- Problem: find a sequence of actions that leads to the goal

STRIPS planning

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    - Postconditions (specifying what predicates are made true or false by this action)

STRIPS example



STRIPS example



Initial state:

```
At(A),
BoxAt(C),
BananasAt(B')
```

STRIPS example



Initial state:

```
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BoxAt(C),
BananasAt(B′)
```

Goal:

```
HasBananas
```

STRIPS example — Actions




```
Move(x, y)
  Pre:  At(x)
  Post: !At(x), At(y)

ClimbUp(x)
  Pre:  At(x), BoxAt(x)
  Post: !At(x), At(x′)

ClimbDown(x′)
  Pre:  At(x′), BoxAt(x)
  Post: !At(x′), At(x)

PushBox(x, y)
  Pre:  At(x), BoxAt(x)
  Post: !At(x), At(y),
        !BoxAt(x), BoxAt(y)

TakeBananas(x)
  Pre:  At(x), BananasAt(x)
  Post: !BananasAt(x), HasBananas
```

STRIPS example — Solution



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

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

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

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

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- We can also find the **next state** resulting from each action based on their **postconditions**
- We can construct a **tree** of states and actions
- We can then **search** this tree to find a goal state

Tree traversal

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procedure DepthFirstSearch
    let S be a stack
    push root node onto S
    while S is not empty do
        pop n from S
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Tree traversal

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procedure BREADTHFIRSTSEARCH

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    let Q be a queue
    enqueue root node into Q

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

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Assignment check-in

AI component

- Assignment brief on LearningSpace
- For **next week**: prepare your **proposal**

Research journal

Final check-in